Confidential. A/I Jin nr ■AJiTsA. CCOFNT OP THE BRITISH WARS WITH PERSIA FROM THE / OCCUPATION OF KHARAJ IN 1838, TOGETHER WITH A PRECIS OF CONTEMPORANEOUS EVENTS AND ABSTRACTS OF IMPORTANT CORRESPONDENCE CONNECTED WITH THE WAR OF 1856-57. PREPARED IN THE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH OF THE QUARTER MASTER GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT IN INDIA BY* Major (Brevet Lieut.-Colonel) Mark S. BELL, v.c., r.e. DEPUTY QUARTER MASTER GENERAL. \ ^ {r88 5 ). SIMLA: PRINTED BY THE SUPERINTENDENT, GOVERNMENT CENTRAL PRESS. 1889. — .....I—.— ' - Bs SIHIA .* rriNTED ST THE RUPEE IS TUS BENT, 0OVEEJTMETT CENTRAL PEERS.. CONTENTS. . CHAPTEB I. page, Delations with Persia fbom the time of Fatah Auf Shah to the fTAB OF 1856-57, AND CONTEMPORANEOUS HISTOEY OF HERAT AFFAIRS , 1 CHAPTEB II. Precis of the operations connected with the Persian' war of 1856-57 12 CHAPTEB III. Detailed account of the Persian war of 1850-57 , . , is APPENDICES TO CHAPTER II L Appendix A. Despatches ; details of actions and extracts from reports concerning the movements and numbers of the enemy 61 „ B. — Extracts from correspondence relating to the object and the plan of the campaign and its conduct . . . . , log „ C. — Intelligence collected relating to Bnshire and Aluhammarah and the adjacent coast districts . . * . . , 125 >» P* — Extracts relating to the neutralization of the coast Shaikhs and the enlistment of the coast tribes in our service . . , 148 >» E. — Extracts relating to the acquisition of intelligence and the forma- tion of an Intelligence Department ..... 154 j» E. — Extracts relating to the composition and despatch of the force . 101 jj G* — Extracts relating to the Laud Transport Corps and transport generally . . . . 200 » H* — Extracts relating to the transport of horses by sea and horse transport fittings. . . 210 99 1* — Extracts relating to the camp followers and establishments . , 217 „ J. — Extracts relating to the Engineer Park, temporary and permanent barracks and hospitals ........ 222 „ E . — Extracts relating to the hospitals and carriage of the sick . , 2S7 « E, — Extracts relating to the supply of necessaries and provisions to the force 256 „ If. “-Extracts relating to the supply of ordnance stores and the ordnance captured . 275 ■ a 3ST* — Extracts relating to the return or the troops. to India . . 285' *? % Military Beport on Son: -West Persia, pnbEsicd by the Intelligence Bsanen of the. Quarter Master Gener&ds Departm^ik ia India. h f - 7 7 Aisr accotxn't OF THE BRITISH WARS WITH PERSIA. CHAPTER I. RELATIONS WITH PERSIA PROM THE TIME OF FATAH ALI SHAH TO THE WAR OF 1S5G-57* AND CONTEMPORANEOUS HISTORY OF HERAT AFFAIRS; * Hunt’s Persian Campaign. i Hunt’s Persian War. Persia* may be regarded as one barrier of our East Indian dominions (see South- West Persia) ; and the rulers of Russia, aware of this fact, have availed themselves of every opportunity for creating a difficulty between the two states. Her settled policy has been to seek by all possible means to induce the Persian monarch to pursue an unbecoming and offensive course in his dealings with England; and whether the treatment of the British representatives in Persia or the occupation of Herat was the point in debate, Russian diplomatists have invariably sought to aggravate the case and render an accommodation impossible. During the reignf of Fatah All Shah, the community of interests be- tween Great Britain and Persia united them, not more by formal engagements than by a sense of common danger, in an intimate alliance for tlieiiAiutual defence. But Shall Muhammad, after mounting the throne (in October 1834) had removed all experienced and wise councillors from around him, and had placed the affairs of his empire entirely in the hands of persons who shared in the love of conquest by which he was himself actuated. To enable him to prosecute these schemes, it was necessary that he should so cultivate intimate relations with Russia as to relieve him from all apprehension that, while he was engaged on distant expeditions, Russia Would profit by his absence to disturb or dismember his kingdom; and he was taught to believe that, if he could insure the support of Russia, England would not venture to oppose him. In furtherance of concerted plans with Russia, an envoy was sent by the Slidh to Kandahar and Kabul, charged with presents and com- munications not only from his Persian Majesty, but also from the Russian Minister of the Persian Court. At a very early stage after Muhammad Shah’s accession to the throne of FvWitionn-nlnst Herat P ? rsia ’ a PP ears to have conceived that his rights rWd of sovereignty should extend not only to Herat and Kandahar but to Ghazni, although warned by Sir Henry Ellis, oui Special Envoy, that such pretensions could not be recognized, by the British Government. As a prelude, therefore, to his extensive designs upon Afghanistan, an expedition against Herat was planned. ° i : : : AAa IMiSilSlSSSl Herat was then an independent province governed by Prince Kamran, who by his non-fulfilment of treaties had given a certain amount of pretext for the aggressive action of the Persian monarch; but he offered to make repar- ation, and the English Minister tried to mediate and bring matters to aii issue by peaceable negotiation. It was, however, soon evident from the exor- bitant demands of Muhammad Shah that he was not to be induced to abandon his projects of Eastern conquest, and that all that had been gained was the postponement of the expedition. In a despatch to Lord Palmerston, dated 30th December 1835, Mr. Ellis, who had been sent on a mission of condolence and congratulation to the young Shah, stated the case in these words: u Herat and some neighbouring dis- tricts are under the immediate authority of Kamran Mirza, whose father, Muhammad Shah, was for a short time King of Kabul. Kamran Mirza, with- out distinctly acknowledging the- sovereignty of Persia, has been in the habit of paying annually a sum of money to the Shah of Persia whenever the Gov- ernor of Khdrasan, the province or Persia adjacent to Herat, was in a condi- tion to threaten an attack upon Kamran Mirza’s principality. The successes of Abbas Mirza in his Khurasan campaigns led to the contracting of certain engagements on the part of Kamran Mirza, the principal of which were the razing of the fort of Ghorian, the return of certain families to their domicile in Persia, and the payment of a sum of 10,000 tomans to the Shah. The Herat prince has failed in his performance of all, and the Shdh has conse- quently a right to obtain redress by force of arms. Under such circum- stances, even if the British Government was not restrained by the ninth article* of the existing treaty from interfering between the Persians and Afghans, it would be difficult to oppose an attack on Herat, or to define the exact limit to which hostilities were to be carried against Kamran Mirza ; bub an attempt to annex Kandahar and Ghazni to the Persian dominions upon pretensions derived from the time of Nadir Shah has no such justification, and could not be looked upon with indifference by the British Government." During the negotiations which ensued, the spring of 1836 and 1837 passed by ; but in November of the latter year, the Persian iege o era . army invaded Herat, accompanied by the Shah in per- son and by the Russian Envoy, Count Simonich, and on the 22nd of that month the siege of Herat began. The Parliamentary Papersf in which these transactions are related contain some very important disclosures with reference to the Russian deceptive policy, rea j character of Russian diplomacy, and show that the same pernicious system of deception propounded by the Czar Nicholas to Sir G. H. Seymour at St. Petersburg is carried out in every branch of the diplomatic service of that State. The policy advocated by Count Simonich was so much at variance with the professed principles and the declared system of the Russian Government, that Lord Palmerston in 1837 wrote to the Earl of Durham, at that time Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to bring the matter to the attention of the Russian Government. This was , done, and Count Nesselrode replied that our Minister must have been mis- informed, as Count Simonich had been distinctly ordered to dissuade the Shah from prosecuting the war at any time and in any circumstances. But it was * Treaty of 25th November 1814, Article IX : If war should be declared between the Afghans and Persians, the English Government shall not interfere with either party, unless their mediation to effect a peace shall be solicited by both parties. t Hunt’s Persian Campaign. s a well-known fact that Count Simonich not only urged the advance of the Persians against Herat, but actually offered his services to the Shah in a military capacity. So much for the truthfulness of Bussian, diplomacy. The siege lasted ten months, and the defence is among the more memor- _ _ . , ,, able ones of history. The determination with which defence?^* C ° n UC S 6 ^he P^ aee ou t is ascribed to the presence with the Afghan forces of an English officer, Lieutenant Eld red Pottinger, of the Bombay Artillery. Colonel Stoddart was in the Persian camp, and Mr. McNeill arrived in the spring of 1838. The Bussian Minister, Count Simonieh, was also present, and assumed a personal super- intendence of the military operations; and a Bussian detachment, called c< deserters,^ Under General Sanson, took part in the siege. Mr. McNeill wrote on the 23rd February 1838: “The defence which Value Of Herat to India. ^ ™ ade . , is very creditable to its inhabit- ants, and, considering the amount of the means ■which the Shah succeeded in collecting before it (nearly 40, Of 0 men and 80 guns), the want of artillery in the town, the facility with which His Majesty has obtained supplies, the. depressing effect upon the Heratis of the fall of Ghorian (it fell after a siege of 10 days), the failure of all their allies to afford them efficient succour, and the unusual mildness of the season so favourable to the operations of a siege, I confess the value of Herat has been greatly enhanced in my estimation ; and, although I have always regarded it as a most important position with reference to the security and tranquillity of India, I was not prepared to look upon it as so strong arid defensible a place, or as one so capable of being made a barrier to the advance of any hostile power; and I feel that, if Herat should fall into the hands of any such power, it would be an evil even greater than I had hitherto believed it would be.” These considerations induced Mr. McNeill to advise the English Government to interfere for the preservation of the independence of this important fortress. Mr. McNeill was active in his remonstrances with the Shah, but without Rupture between Eng- avad ’ and on the | 7th June he left the camp under eir- land and Persia. cum stances winch, amounted to a diplomatic rupture between Persia and Great Britain. In the meantime the siege was vigorously pressed, and in an assault on the 24th June the place was nearly lost by the Afghans, and would have been it is said, had it not been for the personal gallantry of Lieutenant Pottino-er ’ The garrison, however, was nearly worn out, their sufferings from famine were extreme, and the siege operations began to assume the character of a blockade .' 1 The energetic prosecution of the siege of Herat by the Persian Government had produced an estrangement aggravated by several indignities offered to British subjects. In the meantime the events in progress at Herat had aroused the atten- British expedition to the Government, and in the spring of Persian Gulf, 1838. lboS Lord Auckland despatched a small expedition XT AT -11 • Li n to . tdle Persian Gulf to be ready for any service Mr McNeill might call upon it to undertake. This force (of under 500 men) was landed on the islander KM raj m the Persian Gulf near Bnshite, and exag- gerated accounts of its dimensions reached Herat, arid produced some alarm in the Persian camp. It happened also that Mr. McNeill, at the same time that he heard of the arrival of the British expedition in the Persian GuL received instructions from the Foreign Office (in anticipation of the ref sil f the Persian monarch to desist from the siege of Herat), which induced him 4 ■ L .6 seize the opportunity of making an effort to regain the ascendancy of English counsels at the Persian Court. In accordance with these instructions, he despatched Colonel btoddart to the Colonel Stoddards mis- Shah’s camp with a decided message to the effect sion. that, if the siege of Herat were not raised, the British would proceed to hostilities; and Colonel Stoddart reached the Persian head- quarters before Herat with this information on the 11th August. Without going into details of what then took place, and of the vain ■ . . , . ' intrigues of Russia carried on through M. Goutte, an Rn«si*n mtngws. 0 f the mission (having for their object to induce Prince Kamran to make some sign of vassalage to the Shah, such as coming out to visit him in order to give a semblance of success to the ” Persian Expedition), it will be sufficient to say that Siege of II crdt raised. C() | one i stoddart’s mission was successful, and that the Shah began his retreat to Tihran on the 9th September. It, should be observed here that simultaneously with these events other intrigues were being carried on in Afghanistan by a Russian agent, Captain Yicoviteh, at Kandahar and Kabul, whose instructions were to exaggerate the power of Persia and the support being accorded to her by Russia, with the object: of inducing’ the rulers of those places, Dost Muhammad and kohandil khan, to throw in their interest with Persia anti Russia rather than with England. . When the Persian army retreated from Herat on 9th September 183b., it was evident that the Russian plans had sustained a temporary check; and according, when the English Ambassador at St, Petersburg remonstrated on the subject of the intrigues just mentioned, the Russian Government disavowed Count Simonieh was superseded in 1839 by Count Meden, and Captain Vieovitch, being ignored altogether, committed suicide. When the siege of Herat was raised, the state of the population from famine was serious, and every effort was made by Colonel Stoddart and Lieutenant Pottinger to save the people from starving ^and a sum or money was paid by Lord Auckland for the support of Prince Kamran and his duels, and for the restoration of the defences of Herat. .At. the ■ same time -an. English mission was despatched to Herat, and tie , TT independence of the district was to be guaranteed by ToiIEa mission to Herat. ^ on condition 0 f the abolition of the slave trade. The head of this mission was Major Todd, of the Bengal Artillery, and its members were Lieutenant R. Shakespear, Captain Sanders, Lieutenant Abbott, Lieutenant- C olo a el Stoddart, Lieutenants Connolly and Kortb, and burgeon L °^rhis mission bad great difficulties to contend with, owing to the avarice and treachery of Prince Kanaran's Minister, Yar Muhammad, who had also pre- viously been a source of great trouble to Eldred Pottinger. US IV UOtJU. il au ^ « . A -t -A • 1 > n This man continued to intrigue both with Persia and Afghanistan all the i nis mail uuuuuucu uu,i«v*jguy - — o , ri time that he was in the receipt of a subsidy from the Anglo-Indian Hovern- ment* and eventually Major Todd withdrew his mission in September IBM), Rottino-cr having left in August 1839. He had been appointed Rditieal Agentat Herat from the 9th September in the previous year, the date or the raising of the siege. , , i Ills exertions* at Kandahar were crowned with such success that the loi- 1,, w ; no - draft of a treaty between its chief and the Persian monarch was drawn ll P under the sealed guarantee of the Russian Ambassador at Tihran : # Hunt’s Persian Campaign. , t ' n X, as Minister Plenipotentiary of the Russian Government at the Court of Persia, guarantee the fulfilment of the following conditions of treaty between His Majesty Muhammad Shah and the Sirdar of Kandahar: 1. The principality of Herat to be bestowed on the rulers of Kandahar. 2. The Kandahar territories and tribes to be 'preserved. to it. ■ 3. All Afghan tribes to remain free of Persia, and to be administered by. the rulers of Kandahar. K Prince K am ran and his Wazir, Yar Muhammad, to be excluded from all participation in the councils of Persia. 5. The Shah to aid the Kandahar Sirdars against the Amir of Kabul or the , English. 6. A son of Kohandil Khan to be given as a hostage to the Shah. 7. A Kandahar! contingent of 12,000 men to garrison Herat and to assist the Shah on occasion of ' service. 8. On the arrival of the treaty duly ratified at Kandahar, Muhammad Umar Khan to repair to the royal presence. 9. After the presentation of this prince, the necessary money for the outfit of the horse and artillery to he made over by the Persian Government to the Sirdars of Kandahar ; Sirdar Mihrdil Ivhan to be then sent with 1,000 horse to the royal camp ; ■ * * * y no other demand to be made upon the Kan d aha ns by the Persian Government than that of military service.” “ Should Muhammad Shah, i.e., the Sheik of Persia, fail to fulfil any of these several conditions-, or depart in any way from the stipulations, /, as Minister Plenipotentiary of the Russian Government becoming myself responsible, will, oblige him in whatever way may be necessary to act fully up to the terms and conditions of the treaty,” In communicating this remarkable document to the chief authorities, Mr. McNeill stated with great force : “The question of Herat seems, therefore, to be the question of all Afghan- istan; and if the place should fall without any attempt having been made to save it, I feel convinced that the moral influence of that event would have a most prejudicial effect on our national reputation in all these countries ; for it is no secret to any one that the British Government have been desirous to prevent its fall, and that Russia, on the contrary, has been solicitous to see it in the hands of Persia. All Central Asia will regard it as a question between the greater powers, whose views are so publicly spoken of, that I did not converse with a villager between Isfahan and this place who did not ask me whether the Russians did not favour, and the English oppose, the Shah’s enterprise against Herat/’ In the same despatch Mr. McNeill pointed out to Lord Auckland the beneficial effect the advance of a British force in that Importance of Herat, direction would have, not only upon the Shah of Persia, but upon all the rulers of Central Asia. Mr. McNeill declared Herat to be the key of Afghanistan. “ The country,” he stated, “between the frontiers of Persia and India is far more productive than I had imagined it to be; and there is no impediment, either from the physical features of the country, or frmn the deficiency of supplies, to the march of a large army from the frontiers of Georgia to Kandahar, or, as I believe, to the Indus. Count Simonich drove his carriage from Tihran to Herat, and could drive it to Kandahar; and the Shali’s army has now for nearly seven months subsisted almost exclusively on the supplies of the country immediately around Herat and Ghorian, leaving the still more productive 6 districts of Sabzwar and Farah untouched. In short, I can state from persona! observation that there is absolutely no impediment to the march of an army to Herat; and that from the information I have received, the country between that city and Kandahar presents no difficulties, but affords remark- able facilities for the passage of armies. There is, therefore, no security for India in the nature of the country through which an enemy would have to pass to invade it from this side. On the contrary, the whole line is peculiarly favourable for such an enterprise, and I am the more anxious to state this opinion clearly, because it is at variance with my previous belief, and with statements which I may have previously hazarded, relying on more imperfect information, binder such circumstances, it seems to me that it would be a most hazardous policy to allow Persia to act as the pioneer of Russia, and, under protection of the article of the treaty, to break down the main defence of Afghanistan, and thereby make the country untenable to us, at a moment when the concert between Persia and Russia in these operations is avowed. I shall therefore urge Lord Auckland, by every argument I can call to mind, to take a decided course, and to save Herat, &e,, fee.” Mr. Kaye, in his “ History of the War in Afghanistan/ 5 thus describes Herat : “ Situated at that point of the great range of mountains hounding the whole of our (Indian) northern frontier, even to Assam, which alone presents facilities to the transport of a train of heavy artillery, Herat has, with no exaggeration, been described as the gate of India. Within the limits of the Herat territory, all the great roads leading on India converge. At other points, between Herat and Kabul, a body of troops unencumbered with o-uns or having only a light field artillery, might make good its passage, if not actively opposed, across the stupendous mountain ranges of the Hindu Kush - but it is only by the Herat route that a really formidable, well-equipped army could make its way upon the Indian frontier from the regions on the north- west. Both the nature and the resources of the country are such as to favour the success of the invader. All the materials necessary for the organi- zation of a large army and the formation of its depots are to be found in the neighbourhood of Herat. Its mines supply lead, iron, and sulphur ; the surface in almost every direction is laden with saltpetre : the willow and’ the poplar trees, which furnish the best charcoal, flourish in all parts ; whilst from the population might, at any time, be drawn hardy and docile soldiers to recruit the ranks or the invading aimy. Upon the possession of such a country would depend, in no small measure, the success of operations under- taken for the invasion or the defence of Hindustan.” This same year, 1812, the differences between England and Persia, which had reached their climax when Mr. McNeill left the Adjustment of the differ- shah's camp at Herat on the 7th June 1838 were Persia through Russian me- am] caoly adjusted ; and in the month of March the diation, small British contingent was withdrawn from the island of Kharaj, in the Persian Gulf. This result was brought about by the mediation of Russia, at whose dictation Persia made the reparation claimed from her for the affront which had led to the rup- ture. She also guaranteed a commercial treaty. 1 In 1844 Prince Kamran was murdered by his Wazfr, Yar Muhammad who seized upon the supreme power at Herat for himself, and retained it till hisdeathin 1851. Yar Muhammad banished all the Sadozai Princes, Kamran's relations, from Herat, and secured his possession of power by payings assiduous 1 court to the Persian Government ; and after his death his son and successor, . Sayyid Muhammad Khan, acknowledged himself a 1844 to 1851. eM 10111 subject of Persia, and that he held his appointment as Governor of Herat from the Shah. He was a weak Prince, and was driven to this course by his desire for Persian support against the Herat chieftains, whose opposition he began to encounter soon after his accession. The Persian Court had never lost sight of the subject of Herat, and the present was deemed a good opportunity to take possession of the city. Accordingly a Persian force was organized under Murad Mirza, Governor of Khurasan, but not nominally for the occupation of Herat. The pretext for armed action was to repel the advance of a Barakzai Chief of Kandahar on Parah ; hut in the operations which ensued, the citadel of Herat was occupied by a strong Persian force. Upon Renewed Persian espedi- this, the British Minister, Colonel Sheil, remonstrated SuS of British remon- with sueh effec ^ that on the 25th January 1853 strances. an engagement was contracted by the Persian Govern- ment not to interfere in Herat affairs. The next event concerning British relations with Persia was a misunder- standing* which seems to have arisen from the appoint- meat by- Mr. Taylour Thompson of a Persian SW the Shah, tar J tile Mission* who was disapproved of by the Shah. The dispute which arose about this matter was in progress when Mr. Murray assumed charge of the Legation in April 1855* and seems to have lasted until December of that year* when the attitude of the Persian Government towards the British Lega- -d * * ^ neces Stated the breaking off of diplomatic rela- reiatfotT ° * P tio ? s on the P art o£ Great Britain* and Mr. Murray retired to Baghdad. It would seem that the Shah was much annoyed by the convention of Changes at Herat in 185 3; . he showed this plaiul/ by his attitude during 3.855 toe Oiimean war. s In 1855 a change of some importance had taken place in the government of Herat. In September of that year the chief power was seized by Muhammad Yusuf, a Sadozai Prince, grandson of a former ruler of Herat, and one of the numerous Sadozai nobles whom Yar Muhammad had expelled when he murdered Prince Kamran. Yusuf now, who was a relation of Prince Kamran, inaugurated his success Accession of Muhammad “ nrf e« n ff Yar Muhammad’s son, Sayyid Muham- Yusuf. mad* and some others* on the plea that they were accomplices in KamraiYs murder. The Persian Government is said to have approved of Muhammad Yusuf* s Decline of British influ. a f essioa to in Herat, as they saw in it a means €nce at Tihr&n. ” renewin g their own designs on that place* and were _ . less apprehensive than formerly of British interference, as this country was engaged in the Crimean war. The successes of the Russians at Kars in November 1855 are also believed to have encouraged Persia in the aggressive measures to which she now resorted. In the autumn of 1855, Muhammad Yusuf applied to Persia for aid against Muhammad Yusuf applies Afghanistan, deelaring that Dost Muhammad (who Af-hInl af0raidagainsUhe ° n the death o£ bis b ™thei Kohandil Khan, ruler of , . .' , . , , Kandahar, had marched there, and annexed it to his dominions) intended to invade Herat. iiiim Accordingly, in the spring of 1856, Prince Murad Mirza was ordered to advance with a Persian army and occupy the city. The accession of Muhammad Yusuf was regarded by Dost Muhammad, who had concluded a treaty with us on the 80th March Treaty of Peshawar, 1855, as almost tantamount to a Persian annexation of Herat. It was the aggressive attitude of the Tihran Court which induced Dost Muhammad to enter into this alliance with us. Counter-alliance between The proceedings of Persia with reference to Herat England and A giafais an. p] ace j n gpj^ 0 £ ^he remonstrances of the British Minister, Mr. Murray, to which the Wazfr, bent on flattering the ShalFs vanity, turned a deaf ear; and it is added that from this time the members of our Legation and everybody under British protection were subjected to perpetual annoyances and insults, for which no redress could he obtained. It is probable" that the misunderstanding respecting a Persian Secretary, already referred to, was merely one item among the details of this .persecu- tion. ^ Early in 1856 the Persian troops advanced on Herat; but when Prince A . - \ 't a Murad Mirza reached Turbat, he was informed that Prince * Jidr&d his advanced guard bad been refused admission to the v&nces on Herat. city, and that the Heratis were bent on resisting his Capture of Ghorian. approach. Prince Murad, then acting under stringent orders from Tihran, attacked the Herat forces near Ghorian, inflicting on them a signal defeat,, and taking their General and several hundred men prisoners. He then laid siege to Ghorian, which after twenty days succumbed, and, leaving a garrison there, he advanced to Herat. , The resistance of the Heratis to the Persian claims is said to have been . 1V , » . due to Muhammad Yusufs Wazfr, Psa Khan, an by his Wazfr, I'm Khan, energetic chieftain belonging to an Afghan tribe, in and the Persians refused the earlier days of the siege, these two men worked admittance to the fortress. amicably together; but soon the Prince became jealous of the rising power of the Wazfr, and the latter, anticipating the intention of the f o r me r°t o wa rds himself, made a prisoner of his master, and sent him into the Persian camp. Thence Prince Murad sent him to Tihran, where he was treated as a rebel by the Shah. This was at the end of April 1856, and the siege lasted till the 26th Octo- , her, when the place succumbed to famine, and the Per- Siege ami fell of Herat. ^ toob posgession 0 f Herat. Murad Mirza had a besieging force of 80,000 men, and the operations were conducted by a Frenchman named Biihler. Their loss during the siege was 1,800 men; that of the Heratis, 1,500. Psa Khan was murdered after the surrender. The Persian monarch demanded that for the future money should be coined in his name ; the kh if halt, or prayer for the sovereign, be read in the mosques on Friday, and a certain amount of tribute paid yearly. Our Ambassador had before this quitted Tihran owing to an insult offered to him by the Prime Minister; but this was a temporary and personal difference, which would probably have been smoothed over had not the Persian Court been well aware that their proceedings regarding Herat must bring on a rupture at any rate {Blackwood’s Magazine). 9 In the meantime the English Government had not been idle. Negotia- tions were first opened at Constantinople between Lord Stratford de EedcliSe and Farukh Khan, an envoy from Persia on his way to Paris; but these had no result. Accordingly the English Government sent orders by the mail of the 20th September to the Governor- General of India to make warlike preparations, and on the 1st November the Viceroy declared war against Persia. On the 6th of the same month, the occupation of Herat by Persia was publicly notified at Tib ran. On the 4th December the island of Kharaj was re-occupied without opposition by a British force, and on the 7th the troops Occupation of KMraj. Were landed at Ilalila Bay, near Bushire, On the 9th Capture of Rasln'r. they captured the fort of Eashir near tile sea and bom- barded the town, capturing a quantity of guns and small arms and stores of ammunition. The town surrendered on the 10th. These successes were achieved b} r an advanced detachment of the army under General Stalker. The head -quarters of the expedition, under General Sir James Outram, Concentration of the main sailed from Bombay on the 16th January 1857, and force under General Sir arrived at Bushire on the 27th. The force was divided dames Outram at Bushire. into two divisions, under Generals Stalker and Havelock, and the whole of it was concentrated at Bushire by the end of the month. ■ # , On the 3rd February General Outram moved forward against a Persian force occupying an entrenched camp at the village of Boras jab, 48 miles from Bushire, and 12 from the foot of the mountains which separate the sandy coast from thft table-land of Persia. On the 5th, after a trivial skirmish, this position was occupied, and a „ 'i quantity of ordnance stores and camp equipage fell Battle of KUuslmb. ^ ^ bauds Qn the ?th General Outnun moved back to Bushire, followed by the Persian army, 7,000 strong, to which he gave battle on the 8th near the village o£ Khusbab. In this engagement the Persians were utterly routed, and they fled in disorder, leaving behind them 700 dead and two guns. The safety of Bushire being now secured, General Outram left on the Expedition to Mulmmma- 18th of Ivlareh with 4,800 men and 12 guns by sea, rah. accompanied hy four armed steamers and two war sloops for Muhammarah, at the confluence of the Ivarun river with the Shatt- ul-Arab, where a Persian army of 13,000 men and 30 guns was encamped under Prince Khalai Mirza The mouth of the Ivarun had also been strongly fortified. # This position was attacked by Sir James Outram on the 26 th March, and B-ittle nt the confluence captured with but few casualties. The Persian losses of the Shatt-ul-Arab and were severe, and in their headlong flight they aban- the Karfin. doned 16 guns, besides quantities of tents, baggage, and miscellaneous stores. On the 29 tli the fugitive force was followed by a naval expedition under Commander Rennie, of the Indian Navy, which sailed up the Karun as far as the town of Ahwaz, about 100 miles from the mouth of the river, and midway between Muhammarah and Shustar. The ships reached Ahwaz on the 1st April, and about 300 men landed to attack the Persian army, which was posted on the right bank. England declares war against Persia. 10 The Persian force, which could not have numbered less than 10,000 men, was so demoralised by the experience it had already had of British troops that it fled in confusion. The Persians left great stores of grain behind them, and suffered much in consequence from destitution during their retreat on Shustar. On the 4th April, the English expedition returned to Muliammarah, where, Conclusion of peace. °" the foll °'ying da}', General Outram received news or peace having beei> concluded at Pans on the 4th of the preceding month as the result of negotiations between Lord Cowley and Farukb Khan (the Persian Ambassador already mentioned as having before the war been engaged in futile negotiations with Lord Stratford de Redeliffeat Constantinople). The details of this last war are given in Chapter III. The ratification of this treaty, by which the independence of Herat was Herat recognized hide- recognized, and in which Persia engaged to abstain pendent. from all interference in the internal affairs of Afghan- istan, was completed at Baghdad on the2jid May 1857, Mr. Murray being the representative of Great Britain. The treaty of 1855 (Treaty of Peshawar) with Dost Muhammad and Persia pledges herself another ( Cf Articles of Agreement 33 ) in 1857 with not to interfere in Afghan- the same potentate had their origin in our relations lst n \ # with Persia. By the latter the Amir of Kabul was subsidized as our ally in the Persian war, but the contest was at an end before he was called upon to give aid. As these treaties have little practical bearing on actual events, no more need be said about them. The \ Illth clause of the Treaty of Paris contained a stipulation that all prisoners taken in the recent war in Afghanistan were to be surrendered by the Persian Government; but on the 17th April, after the signature of the treaty, but before its ratification, the Shah caused Prince Muhammad Yusuf to he given to the relations of Sayyicl Muhammad, whom he had put to death on assuming the government of Herat. _ They now avenged their relations death by murdering Muhammad Yusuf within the precincts of the palace at Tihran, hacking him to pieces. As regards Herat itself, i f s defences had been dismantled during the war Persians renew their in- by order of Murad Mirza, the Persian Governor of fence at Herat. Khurasan; and after the war the new ruler, Sultan Jan, son-in-law and nephew of Dost Muhammad of Kabul, who had quarrell- ed with his uncle (and nephew also of Kohandil Khan, late ruler of Kanda- har), was persuaded to receive as his YYazxr a creature of the Shah, so as to keep alive the influep.ee of the Court of Tihran at Herat, which was now eva- cuated by Murad Mirza and the Persian troops ; and for the next five years, though the Treaty of Paris was not violated, Herat was administered almost as a dependency of the Persian Crown. M hen the conclusion of peace was known, the British force at Muham- marnh was broken up. The orders fpr this were issued on the 9th May, and on the i 5th the troops embarked to return to India. A detachment, however, under General Bonner, remained on the island of Kharaj till February 1858, as th ) Persians delayed the evacuation of Lash and Juain on the Sistan frontier. ■; Amicable relations between Persia and Great Britain were now resumed, PH the 18th July 1857 Mr. Murray returned to Tihran, when certain Ceremonies and apologies prescribed by the Treaty of Paris were duly gone’ through. During the absence of Mr. Murray from Tihran before the war, up to November 185(1, Great Britain had been represented at the Persian Court by Mr. (Consul) Stevens. '• After the restoration of peace, an English Envoy was sent to Her£t to Despatch of an English ascertain that the provisions of (he treaty had been tuition to Herat, faithfully fulfilled. This officer, Colonel Taylor, accom- panied by Captain Claud Clerk, started for Herat in August 1857* and left •Herat on the completion of his mission in March 1858;' :: /. It may be as well here to embody in a few words what remains to be said of Herat before dismissing the subject for the remainder of the chapter. At the period to which the narrative has now come, the Indian. Mutiny was in progress, giving an opportunity to the Shah of renewing his designs on that city ; but so much impressed was he by the lessofj administered to him by Sir James Outram, that he could not he induced to venture again on a The Tekeh Turkmans f u pture with the English Government. Afterwards, defeat the Governor of in July i860, the Persian Governor of Khurasan, Khurasan. Harfizah Mirza, successor of Murad Mirza, sustained a crushing defeat at the hands of the Tekeh Turkmans, losing the greater part of his army, and several of his guns, so that Nasr-’ud-Din was not in a posi- tion to undertake any aggfessive movement on a large scale. The new ruler of Herat, Sultan Jan, also known as Ahmad Khan, was Sutt&n Jan of Herat anxious to succeed to the dignity of Chief of the invades tin 1 territory of Dost Barakzais, and with this object he prepared to invade Muhammad. the territory of Dost Muhammad. Having gained possession of Farah by treachery, he was met by Dost Mu- hammad, who marched against him in 1882, and in the month of May drove him back into Herat, and laid siege to the town. The shah of Persia was desirous of aiding Ahmad, and a force hovered Attitude Of the Shah abnut the frontier J but the British M.nister at 'tihran insisted on the provisions of the Treaty of Paris being respected. ° His overtures also for English aid against Dost Muhammad, made both Suitin' Jan’s overtures through bis Ambassador in London and thro noli our for English aid. Minister at Tihran, were discouraged. ** In the spring of the following year Ahmad died, and was succeeded by his Si.-sre and capture of eldest son, whose reign was, however, short, as the Herat by Dost Muhammad, siege terminated in the surrender of Herat to Dost Muhammad at the end of May 18 >3. Almost immediately afterwards Dost Muhammad died also, and it is con- uis deatli . sidered that the nearly simultaneous death of these two hostile leaders occurred at an opportune moment, and averted a renewal of complications in connection with Herat. In 1885 the Government of Herat was conferred on Dost Muhammad's Government of Henlfc grandson, Sirdar Muhammad Yakub Khan, a lad of conferred on Yakub Khan, sixteen, son of Slier All Khan, the late Aimrof Kabul whom- the latter again made Governor of Herat, when he had made good his accession; and he retained that post until his quarrel with his father about the year 1872, when he was deposed and imprisoned. CHAPTER II. gi! PRECIS OP THE OPERATIONS CONNECTED WITH THE PERSIAN WAR OP 1856-57. Extract from a Paper on Persia, compiled by Captain (now Colonel) E. F. Chapman, R.A. In 1854. Mr. Thomson, in charge of British Affairs at Tib ran, appointed Mirza Hashim to be first Persian Secretary of the Mission — an appointment so obnoxious to the Shah that the Persian Government declined to receive the 'Mirza, and, on his destination being changed to Shiraz, notified to Mr. Murray, who was now the British Minister, that should the Mirza set out for his post, he would be seized and forcibly detained. This notice was given on the 6th of November lb55, and immediately afterwards the Mirza's wife was seized by order of the Persian Minister. On the 17th Mr. Murray offi- cially intimated that, unless the lady was released, the flag of the mission would be hauled down, and friendly relations would cease; and as his menace produced no effect, the flag was struck on the 20th of November, and on the 5th of December the mission withdrew from Tihran. The Persian Govern- ment then published a justification of its conduct, which set forth that Mr. Murray was carrying on an intrigue with the wife of Mirza Hashim; and in an autograph note to his Prime Minister, the Shall indulged in the most intemperate language against Mr. Murray, charging him with insolence, and speaking of him as “stupid, ignorant, and insane." In the same month of December Prince Sultan Murad Mirza put himself at the head of 9,000 men intended to act against Herat. It must be admitted that there was some colour for this expedition, as a tribute had been guaranteed to the Shah from the city; and further, Prince Muhammad Yusuf, the son of Kamran, who, after putting Sayyid Muhammad to death, had recovered his heritage, had applied to Persia for aid, alleging that he was threatened with an attack by Dost Muhammad of Kabul. On the 27th of February 1856, the Persian Government, doubtless encouraged by the Russian successes at Kars in November of the preceding year, published their reason for this offensive movement. After futile negotiations between the Persian Envoy at Con- stantinople and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, instructions were sent out by the mail of the 20th September 1856 by Lord Clarendon to the Governor- General of India to prepare a force at Bombay for the occupation of Kharaj. In the meantime the Persian army under Sultan Murad had defeated the Herat forces near Ghorian, taking their General, Ahmad Khan, and several hundred men prisoners ; and, having captured and garrisoned Ghorian after a twenty days* siege, were closely besieging Herat itself. On the 29th of April 1856, Prince Muhammad Yusuf was sent as a prisoner into the Persian camp by his Wazir, Fsa Khan. On the 26th of October 1S56 Herat was surrendered to the Persians, and its occupation was publicly notified at Tihran on the 6th of November. On the first of the same month the Governor-General of India issued a proclamation declaring war against Persia. On the 11th several ships sailed with troops from Bombay to the 13 Persian Gulf; and on the 13th, Sir EL Leeke, commanding the naval forces, embarked for the same destination. On the 26th the whole fleet, consisting of thirty-four sail, assembled at Kishm ; on the 3rd of December the island of Kharaj was re-occupied; and on the 7th, the army, consisting of two brigades, the first under Brigadier Stopford, c.b., and the second under Colonel Homier, disembarked at Halila Bay, 12 miles south-east of Abu-shahar (Bush ire), the 20tli Bombay Native Infantry and the 4th Bombay Rifles being the first regiments on shore. On the 9th the troops advanced to dislodge the enemy from their position near the fort of Rashahar (Raslffr). A body of Arabs made a most determined resistance at an earth- work, and the action was not gained without loss. Brigadier Stopford, Colonel Malet of the 3rd Cavalry, and Lieutenants Utterson and Warren of the 20th Bombay Native Infantry were killed, and Captain Wood of that regiment was wounded, and thirty-five inferior officers and men were killed or wounded. On the 10th, after a sharp cannonade of three hours, Abu-shahar surrendered, and the British flag was hoisted on its walls at 5 p.m. of that day. Fifty- eight guns were taken, and several Persian officers of high rank were made prisoners. In the meantime, a reserve force, consisting of the 14th Light Dragoons, the 1st Sind Horse, the 4th Troop of Royal Horse Artillery, the 1st Company of the 2nd Battalion of Foot Artillery, the 78th Highlanders, the 23rd and 26th Regiments Bombay Native Infantry, and a light batta- lion of ten companies drawn from regiments not serving with the force, had been assembled at Bombay under General Outram, to whom the command of the wh de army was given. The General and his staff sailed from Bombay on the morning of the 1 6th January 1857, and the army was now formed into two divisions, of which General Stalker commanded the first, and Briga- dier Havelock the second. The reserve reached Abu-shahar in the end of January, and on the 3rd of February General Outram, with the 2nd European Light Infantry, the 64th, and 78th Highlanders, the 3rd Bombay Cavalry, the Punah Horse, the 4th Bombay Rifles, the 20th Native Infantry, the 2nd Biluch Battalion, and some guns, marched to dislodge the enemy from an intrenched camp at Borasjan, 48 miles from Abu-shahar, On the 5th this position was occupied after a slight outpost affair, in which Cornet S pens of the Cavalry and a few troopers were wound* d. A vast quantity of stores and ammunition were taken in the camp. On the night of the 7th, General Outram commenced his return, after having first exploded 3 C, 000 pounds of the enemy's powder, to ignite which the rifles with shell bullets invented by General Jacob were used. During the darkness of the night, thp enemy made a sharp attack on the English column while on the march, in winch Captain Muckier and Lieutenant Green tree of the 6 l*th were wounded, and a few men killed and wounded. General Outram met with a severe accident, his horse falling with him, and rolling over him. At daylight on the morning of the 8th the enemy were seen drawn up in order of battle, with their right resting on the village of Kliushab, numbering 6,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, with about 15 guns, under Shuja-ul-Mulk, reputed the best officer in the Persian army. After a short but sharp action this force was completely routed, and fled, leaving 700 men dead on the field, and two guns in the hands of the English. A regiment of Persian infantry was in this battle ridden over and cut to pieces by the 3rd Bombay Cavalry, whose commanding officer, Cap- tain Forbes, was severely wounded. The English loss altogether was one officer and eighteen men killed, and four officers and sixty men wounded. General Outram regained his quarters at Abu-shahar by midnight on the 9th. On the Wm mmmm. . /', % 1 ■ : 1&2 v <K ti :. - , irJs , * .■ jfjtf mm SHtll March the General, having 1 organized a force for the capture of Mnhaitf- marab,afcown at the confluence of the Kardn with the Shafct-ul-Arab, where the Persians had thrown up strong batteries, and had stationed an army of 15 , 000 ' ""men, attacked the place, and captured it, with the loss of ten men killed, and one officer and thirty men wounded. The loss of the enemy was very severe. On the 29th March, General Outrun despatched a light force to pursue the enemy to Ahwsz, a town about 1 00 miles distant up the Karim. This force proceeded in the Comet, Plane t f and Am/riaii steamers under Commander Rennie. On the 1st of April, the expedition came within sight of the Persian army near Afcwaz, but on the right hank of' the river, the town being on the left Although the Persians amounted to at least 10,000 men, and the English troops did not exceed 300, such was the terror General Outranks victories had inspired, that the instant the English advanced on Ahwaz the Persians deserted the place, and not long after, a shell falling near the General’s tent, the whole army likewise took to flight. Then was seen the astonishing spectacle of five heavy masses of infantry, well supplied with artillery, and 2,000 horse, among which were the picked men of the Bakhtiari tribes, reputed the best cavalry in Persia — a complete army, in short — retiring before a handful of Englishmen less numerous than the wing cf a single* regiment. ° The vast stores of the Persians were destroyed or thrown open to Hie' plundering Arabs, and the retreating enemy suffered dreadful distress ere they reached Shustar, 100 miles distant, where was their nearest depot. # The Persian army was thoroughly disorganized, and in a few dnvs Outran* might easily have conquered the whole province of Arab 1st an. The treaty of peace, which suddenly put a stop to these successful operations, had been negotiated between Lord Cawley and Farukh Khan at Paris, and was signed' on 4th March 1S57. By this treaty the Shah engaged to* withdraw the troops from Herat, to relinquish all claims to sovereignty over it, and never to demand any' marks of obedience, such as the coinage, or khutbah , from the chiefs. He further agreed to abstain from all interference with the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and to recognize the independence of Herat. All prisoners taken at Herat were to be set at liberty without ransom. The British mis- sion was to he received at Tihran with apologies. The slave trade was to be" suppressed in the Persian Gulf. Finally, apologies Were to be made to Mr. Murray for the insolent conduct of the Shah and his Minister. The. ratifica- tions of the treaty were exchanged at Baghdad between’ Mr. Murray and a Persian of fleer on 2nd May 1S57. During the war the Persian Governor of Khurasan, Prince Murad Mfrza bad dismantled the defences of Herat; and Sultan Ahmad Khan, or Sultdn Jan, a nephew of Kobmdil Khan, the late ruler of Kandahar, and son of” Sirdar Muhammad Azim Khan (brother of Dost Muhammad), was sent by the Persians to assume the government of the city and territory of Herat (27th July Jl 857). He was bribed to receive a creature of Persia named Sayyid Abbul Hasan Shah as liis YV azir, and to make other concessions On April 17th, after the signature of the treaty, and in open violation of one of the articles, the Shah caused an atrocious murder to be perpetrated on the unfortunate Prince Muhammad Yusuf, late ruler of Herat. He was <riven up to the relations of Sayyid Muhammad within the precincts of the palace at Tihran, and literally hacked to pieces, having received seventeen tfotfnds before' Jus sufferings were over,- '.. __ III! ■■8 p ■La Mr - , Ma 7 returned to Tihran on 18th July 1857, and the stipulated -ceremonies and apologies from the Sadr-i-Azam having been duly gone through friendly relations were resumed between Persia and England/ Murad Mfrzi ■£?., . the Pw-s'an troops evacuated Herat ; the English forces at Busbire and Kharaj, under General Jacob, were ordered to return to Bombay; and Colonel laylor, accompanied by Captain Claud Clerk, was sent on an embassy to Sultan Ahmad khan, the new ruler of Herat, in August 1857, to ascertain that the provisions of the treaty had been faithfully fulfilled. He was received with all Heilt w'lBtMwh : 'lgss ^ th ® DeW ruier in Member. Colonel Taylor left Thus ended the Persian war, and so severe was the lesson taught during General Outran, a brief campaign that not even the disasters of the Indian revolt could induce the blian to venture once more on a rupture with the .nglisli Government. It is possible that a movemmfc might have ao-ain taken place ui i the direction of Herat; but in May 1858 the Shahzadah com- manding in that quarter suffered a severe defeat from the Turkman hordes the greater part of his army being destroyed, and several of his ’ CHAPTER III. * DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE PERSIAN WAR OF 1856*57. From the preceding chapter, it will be apparent that the cause of all the differences which have occurred between England and Persia — two powers whose Interests are so identical — may be comprised in the one word, Herat, “ This principality " — the writer of the Persian War of 1856-57 in Black- wood's Magazine for September 1861 writes , — u it does not aspire to the dignity of a kingdom-lies in the very centre of Asia, and its fortunes might be* supposed little entwined with those of the mistress of the seas. There are indeed several links in the chain. Herat is situated between Russia and India. It does not adjoin Russia, for Persia comes between them.^ It does not adjoin India, for Afghanistan comes between. Still Persia might act on Herat, Herat on Afghanistan, and Russia, Herit the cause of the mysterious power which ever and anon haunts ersian war. reveries of our Indian statesmen, might act through all three on India. This is the pith of the train of reasoning which has induced us to speod many millions of treasure, and many valuable lives, in Afghan and Persian wars. Herat, in one of those dangerous epigram- matic phrases, has been called the key of India. It is no more the key of India than the gateway of a nobleman's deer-park is the key of his castle. An army advancing from the westward toward India must certainly occupy it. But if Herat refused to throw open her gates, the capture of a central Asian city ought not to present many difficulties to a general who aspires to measure swords with the British in their own dominions. Herat occupied, the invader, so far from having found the key to success, has all his diffi- culties before him. £ Deserts/ said Napoleon, i are the most formidable frontiers for a state, mountains the next, and rivers the least of all/ But India has a river, desert, and a range of mountains on her north-west frontier; and five hundred miles of badly-watered, thinly-populated Afghan territory lies between this triple barrier and Herat. There may be many a purling brook and many an oasis among its hills and sandy plains; but the country is generally barren, and our own army, during the Afghan war, was con- stantly in great want of supplies, and we never concentrated a tenth of the force which would be assembled for an invasion of India. England, however, objects to Herat becoming a Persian province, lest Persia should give Russia a free passage through its territories. We may, however, be sure that the very last people, the English not excepted, whom the Persians would desire to see in Herat, if it was her own, would be the Russians ; but if Herat is independent, the natural bribe which Russia would offer Persia for a free passage through Persia proper would be to put her in possession of this coveted dependency. If Russia ever attempt that tremendous march from the Caspian to the Indus, she may bribe and overawe the Persians, Turk- mans, Heratis, and Afghans, or pit them against one another at first ; but she will find that Nicol Jarvis's description of the Highlanders might well 17 be applied to the Central Asian tribes : f They may quarrel among themselves and gie ilk ilher ill names, or may be a eladi wi' a claymore ; but they are v snre to join in the long run against a" civilised folk that wear breaks on their hinder ends, and hae purses in their pouches/ If Eastern /diplomat is ts«— those at least who desire their country's good, and not to find work for them- selves — would sometimes reflect on this inevitable conclusion to their well- woven schemes and elaborate treaties, what trouble and difficulties they would avoid ! Two inodes of operation were open to the British Government to compel the Persians to evacuate Herat after it fell to them in October 1S5(5. One was to march an army across Afghanistan, and expel the Persians from Herat, The difficult v and expense attending such an expedition (which was, however, serious! v proposed) would have been enormous. It would have irritated the Afghans, and probably brought on another Afghan war. In fact, it would have been braving all those difficulties of climate and country which we have just alluded to as being the real safeguard of our Indian fro.. tier. The other plan was to send an expedition by sea to the head of the Persian Gulf, and srize Bush ire, the maritime capital (such as it is) of Persia; from thence operations might be directed against the interior; and a march from Bushire to Tihran, the capital of Persia, would not be more difficult than a march from our Indian frontier to Herat. That part of the northern shores of the Indian Ocean which lies west of the Indies, as well as the shores of the Sea of Oman and Straits of Ormuz, are of a most desolate character. Sandy plains alternate with low rocky ranges, entirely destitute of verdure, save when a few date trees cluster round brackish wells. Bain seldom falls, as if the clouds declined to waste their fertilising treasures on such a thankless soil. Two thousand years ago Alexander the Great returned from his Indian expedition across this miserable country. His generals in vain remonstrated with him on the difficulties he would Vneoun ter ; they only stimulated his desire to achieve what was reck- oned impossible by ordinary mortals. He placed part of the army on board a fleet under the orders of his favourite Nearehus, and despatched them from the Indus, with orders to sail for the Euphrates, and to collect all the inform- ation which could be obtained regarding the coast. Part of the journal of this voyage has been preserved, and is extremely interesting. At some of the villages on the coast the inhabitants lived on nothing but fish. Fresh or salt fish served them for animal food, and cakes made of flour ground from dried fish was their substitute for bread. The jaw bones of whales were considered a valuable building material, and their cattle fed from mangers, filled with fish instead of hay or corn. The sailors were greatly terrified by the whales which sported around them. We are told that * on one occasion the whales appeared so formidable, that the mariners suffered the oars to fall from their hands. However, the Admiral encouraged them, and ordered them whenever they saw any of these monstrous fish approach, to direct the beaks of their ships exactly towards them, as if they were to engage an enemy ii a sea-fight; as also to row stoutly, and to make as great a noise as they could as well with their voices as their oars. The mariners thus instructed reeov cm! from their fright, and upon a given signal plied their oars man fully and when they came near the fish, not only shouted as loud as possible* bu sounded their trumpets, and beat the sea vehemently with their oars, v/her? upon the whales, who were now just under the beaks of their ships, terrific with the strangeness of the sound, sunk down to -thehottom of the deep, lb 18 . ■ ill ■ sailors rejoiced exceedingly at the unexpected deliverance, and with one voice applauded the wisdom and courage of the Admiral/ Near elms brought his fleet to the head of the Persian Gulf with less damage and difficulty than Alexander accomplished his land journey; many of the annv perished miser- ably in the desert, or by the hands of the barbarous tribes whose country they traversed. It was bv the same tract which Nearehus followed that the British expedition sailed for the Persian Gulf.* The main rendezvous for a force intended to invade Persia from India in this maimer would (1856) be Bombay, where there is an ample harbour, and abundance of all kinds of military stores. From Bombay to the Straits of Ormuz, at the entrance of the Persian Gulf, is 1,'M 0 miles, ami from Ormuz to Bush ire, 600 miles. The sea is generally calm, except during the south-west mm soon, which blows from the beginning of June till September. liven this rarely rises to a gale, and it is only the timid crews of the native craft who are afraid to navigate those seas at all times of the year. H The immediate arrangements for organizing the expedition Were neces- sarily intrusted to Lord Elphinsfcone, Governor of Bombay, a nobleman whose capacity for administration had been developed by ten years* experi- ence at the head of an Indian Government. Final instructions for the despatch of the expedition reached Bombay on the 9th November. The expedition got under weigh on the 12th and 13th November, embarking from four points, i.e. } Bombay, Karachi, and two smaller ports. Most of the soldiers were on board. sailing transports, but they were taken in tow by vessels belonging to the Indian Navy, or hired steamers. The force comprised Her Majesty 61th Regiment, the 2nd Bombay Europeans, 4th and 20th Native Infantry; two squadrons 3rd Native Cavalry, and one squadron Punah Horse; 3rd Troop Horse Artillery; 3rd and 5th Light Field Batteries; two" companies Bombay Sappers and Miners, with a staff of Engineer officers and an Engineer Park. The entire number of lighting men was 5, 670, of which 2,270 were Europeans, with 3,750 followers, 1,150 horses, and 430 bullocks. There were eight Indian Navy steamers, seven steam and thirty sailing transports of the largest size under Rear-Admiral Sir 11. Leeke, Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Navy. Major-General Stalker, of the Bombay Army, commanded the expedition. “ On the 21st, head-quarters reached the Straits of Ormuz, and waited four days at anchor to reassemble the transports, and make a fresh departure for Bus hi re/* Whilst the transports were anchored off Kishm, much inconvenience was felt from the want of boats. Plans for effecting a landing in the neighbour- hood of Bushire were discussed. ^ The plans put forward were to land at Halfla Rendezvous of Kishm. or favour of the former plan were — ( i ) the water there was known to be good ; (2) the landing was said to be easy; (3) it might be expected that the Persians would not leave their works to oppose a force in the open. The difficulties of the coast about Kashi r were considered by Commodore Ethersey to be considerable. Finally, it was resolved to rendezvous the fleet 20 miles below the town of Bushire, and to reconnoitre the coast. At Kishm it was discovered that doolies and dooly-bearers had been left behind, and the opportunity was seized during the halt of making up stretchers. * See ficnith- West JPersia, 19 From Kishm several of the transports were ordered to sail to the Bushire rendezvous* This gave rise to no little confusion, and the end of it was that all the engineer officers, half of one of the artillery batteries, and two of the cavalry transports were lost sight of for days ; in fact, one half battery of artillery and one of the cavalry ships did not arrive until after Bushire had fallen, and the engineers only came in time for the landing* During the passage strong north-west breezes were experienced, which retarded the steamers tugging the transports. The transports anchored in Kishm roads without system ; infantry and cavalry ships, store ships, coal ships, &c., &e., were huddled together indiscriminately; so that a Brigadier or regimental commanding officer found the greatest difficulty in commu- nicating with his command. This induced General Stalker to officially request the Commodore to so arrange at the next rendezvous that the fleet might be anchored in divisions — one of cavalry; a second of artillery ; a third, the 1st Infantry Brigade; a fourth, the 2nd Infantry Brigade, Rendezvous off Buskire. a naval offi «; r in charge of each division. ' The plan was never adopted, for both in the Bushire roads, and again in Ilalila Bay, there was the want of arrangement that had bean so apparent at Kishm. — •( IFmi/.) The flag-ship, the Js^n/e, with head -quarters, brought up the rear, leaving Kishm on the 28th November, Arrived off Bushire on the *30 th November ; the fleet rendezvoused in full view of the town, in Bushire roads, instead of 20 miles down the coast. { Pur description of B ns hire, see South-West Persia.) The coast below Bushire was reconnoitred for several miles ; in places it was guarded ; generally it was found that a reef of e<mfc reconnaissances to roe fc s at 2 Of) yards from the shore ran along tl e whole place, 1st to 4th December! wa }b with snaall openings here and there. '1 he coast oif Bashir was reconnoitred with like unsatisfactory results, the seam of rocks being* found still running parallel to the shore. There being a fine low sandy beach immediately south of the Bushire batteries, about half a mile in length, where troops could land easily, but tinder considerable fire and without much protection from our own ships, which could not lie nearer in than 1,200 yards, the Commodore proposed that the force should land here, the ships first dost roving the batteries. The objections to this plan were that the landing to be openly forced under the lire of the batteries and town walls must result in a certain loss; that without boats it was impos- sible to land more than a portion of the force in one day ; that the flanks of the landing party would he exposed, and the force between two bodies of the enemy ; whereas in favour of landing at Ilalila, it might be expected that no opposition would be enci untered. Ilalila Bay lies a few miles down the coast from Bushire. A reconnaissance of Ilalila Bay was next carried out, and it proved to be well suited for the purpose. The hay lias a fine, sloping, hard, HaUIa Bay, sandy beach, the landing place between the two ends of the reef about 800 yards in length. At high water the tide comes up to within about o0 yards of a hard sandy ridge, which, if defended, would form excellent cover for matehlockmen. Beyond having to wade through water for 4-0 yards, the landing presented no difficulties* The small steamers approached the shore to within 200 y ards. The water is good and plentiful from small wells .close to the beach. As the declaration of war was made at Calcutta on the 1st November,* it had not reached Bushire before the arrival of General Stalker. The Persian Vide Calcutta Gazette, 1st November 1856. 20 Governor of Bushire, whose sway extends all along the coast, is stvled Darya Beg, or Lord of the Seas. He expressed a natural surprise at the appearance of a hostile fleet in Bushire roadstead. The Indian Government, although it gave the Persians very slender warn- ing of when it was going to begin, made all its own preparations with a praiseworthy deliberation. Besides the collecting of troops and warlike stores at Bombay, Captain Wray, Assistant Quarter Master General, and a Com- missariat officer, had been despatched to the Persian Gulf in October to spy out the laud. Amongst other places Captain Wray visited Bushire, provided with compasses, measuring chains, and all the necessary implements for taking a survey. This cool attempt to map out the fortifications of a town for whose capture a siege train had been already embarked was more than the Resident’s sense of propriety could permit. The appearance of these military strangers, moreover, created considerable excitement both among the authorities and population of Bushire. Captain Jones was not sorry when he had them safely re-embarked after a few hours’ sojourn ashore, lie himself remained at his official residence until the expeditionary force arrived, removing his office on board one of the men-of-war on the 5th December, just live weeks subsequent, to t lie declaration of war, and three days previous to the bombardment of Bushire. But no insult was offered to him, and the Governor politely escorted him to the yAur {see Append ice*). Very much useful and valuable information and intelligence were received through the medium of Captain Jones and the staff of his office. On the oth December, Major Ilill, Chief Engineer, and the Engineer officers joined ih* force. It was now finally arranged that the fleet should drop down to Ilah'iu, Bay on the 6th, and the force he landed on the morning of the 7th. A committee of officers, composed of Commodore Ethersey, Major Orders for timlina. Colonel Younghushand, and Captain Wruv, assembled to draw up orders for and to arrange the plan of landing. The following gives the chief points of the order published : I.— The force is to land in Halfla Bay, about 2 miles east of the village; the landing to commence at daybreak ou the 7tli, and in the following order” boats, '90’ men") 6 , 2nd Brigade in men- of-war boats. 1st Brigade in rnnn- '■ of- war boats. f Punjab,, ' | ' Victoria . Chmdn ' , I Jssaye' {^Fcrozc ( Ajdaha I ■{ Peremee | Semiram is l 60 „ > 2nd European Lisrhfc 2 „ 25 „ J Infantry. S ;; ioo ;; 4 \ SO , from Potthiger J 5 ( 70' „ yilov Majesty's 64th 2 ( 50 „ j Regiment, from Precursor J 30 boats, 600 men. The Assyria stonier with 150 Sappers and Miners, Thfe 'Flat with 300 men, 2nd Brigade. The larhj Falk (a ad with 200 men, 1st Brigade. The Sir Jumetjee Jeejeebhoy with 250 men, 1st Brigade. The Bombay with 300 .men, 2nd Brigade. Toe above thirty boats and the flats will be towed as near shore as possible by the three first named steamers, and they will be east off and pulled in shore when the steamers can take them no further. Having landed the men, the boats will immediately return to the small steamers, and land as many more men as possible. £i The four gunboats to cover the landing will be also taken in tow by the above steamers. On nearing the shore, the gun -boats will take up positions, two on each flank of the landing-place ; the other boats not to pull in until the ' gun-boats are prepared for action. In the meanwhile, four gunboats and one spun son boat, each from the Punjab ami Assay e, the two paddle box boats of the Ajdaha, and the two large boats belonging to the Raja of CoeJtin and Mel bourne will he employed in landing a battery of artillery. These boats will be towed by the Bombay. After landing their cargo, the boats to be pulled back to the Bombay, and the whole towed back by her for the horse artillery. The boats belonging to artillery ships to be sent at daylight to head-quarters : £nd Brigade, and cavalry ships’ boats to be sent to head-quarters 1st Brigade, to. assist in landing' infantry.; After the first line of boats has left the ships, these boats will he filled with infantry, also the boats of the Precursor, Result, ami Maria Gray* Tiie small steamers when cleared will put back to assist in towing up boats. The Remit is appointed hospital ship, and the -Melbourne store ship. The Assyria will go in the morning to the: Arthur the ■ Great' and Thames City for the Sappers, having left the Hat alongside the Feroze . She will after- wards return to the Feroze for the flat, and take her in tow, together with boats ol Assay e, Feroze, and C/m&m. The Bombay will go to the Feroze for orders about infantry ; then hack to the Melbourne to take the artillery boats in tow, together with the boats of the Assays. The Lady Falkland will go to the head-quarters 1st Brigade in the PiMinger for orders. She will then take in tow the boats of the Ajdaha, Berenice , and one of the Sc mini mis. The Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhng will also go to the head-quarters 1st Brigade, and afterwards tow in one boat of the Semiramis and six boats of the Victoria, and three of the Punjab . By 8 P.H., 6th, every officer, military and naval, who had any leading part to play, had their orders in detail for the morning. The Fleet Captains under- stood the whole thing directly. Each man took down his order in a few minutes in the Flag Captain’s office, and well they carried them out. Every- thing prospered, and by 7 next morning the first boats were full and ready to shove off ; everything went well, and all was well done, owing to the exertions of all concerned and good management. At about 7-30 a.m., on the 7th, the boats shoved off, pulling in line, the gun- . boats in advance clearing a date grove of the enemy mg operations. \>y tlieir fire. The first party to land numbered 600 infantry and a few guns; in two hours nine guns, with four horses each, and their wagons, had been landed, whereupon an advance was made to the date groves, £ miles inland. At 1 p.m. the force advanced to the neighbourhood of the Half la village, where is a camping ground, with wells of good water, and bivouacked there. During the night the head-quarters of the 3rd Cavalry reached the camp. The night was fine, but cold. During the 8th landing operations were continued throughout the day, and by evening had sufficiently advanced to allow of plans being formed for the operations of the 9th. These were to the effect that Captain Jones, Political Officer, should call upon the Governor of Bus hire to surrender the town. To . effect its surrender, It was arranged that gunboats should, force the creek to PUn nf the north-east of the town, so as to cut off the retreat ; I? 1 that the land forces should assault the town from the south and south-east, the fleet opening the bombardment when they, the troops, had arrived at a distance of 2 miles from the town walls. These arrangements were not carried out ; no attempt was made to force the creek, and the hoiwbaid- ment commenced when the land forces were 6 miles from the town walls, and the garrison escaped. At 8 A.M.j on the 9th, the advance guard, composed of 2 companies of the Want Of information. f nd Eu ™If “ Light Infantry under Captain II. Wil- loughby ; 2 troops, 3rd Light Cavalry, under Captain Forbes; 2 guns, 3rd Troop Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant Gibhard, accom- panied by Captain Wray, Assistant Quarter Master General, and Lieutenant Johnson, interpreter, marched in the direction of Bushire. Up to this time the troops were unaware that the fort of Rasim* was held in force, and had only heard rumours of its existence. At 9-30 a m. the village of Imamzada was reached. The villagers professed friendship, but on the left was seen the old Butch fort of Rasim* strongly occupied. This fort, or rather earthen redoubt, . An P , t w is rectangular in plan, with sides approximately 200 yards and dull yards in length; its parapet of some height, proof against field artillery; its interior well defiladed ; its ditch deep f« r a field redoubt, from 50' to 100' wide at the ground level, with slopes that were onee steep and inaccessible, but which from neglect were passable at several points. It was garrisoned by from 400 to 500 Tangastauis and other tribesmen living in the vicinity of Bushire under the Taugastani Chief, Bnukar Khan. The ground inside the fort was much broken, and that in its front is a succession of hard ridges. Soil, sand and rock. The rear face of the fort rests on the cliffs, here high, perpendicular, and inaccessible. The advanced guard took up a position on broken ground about 400 yards from the fort; the infantry extended, with their left resting on the outskirts of the village of Rashir. Cavalry were posted on the right so as to cut off all retreat to Bushire, and the guns unlimbered ; and in this position the advent of the main body was awaited. The enemy becoming bold by the delay, occupied in force the ruins outside the fort. To drive them back into the fort, the artillery opened upon them with ease whereupon a close tire of musketry from the fort was commenced with siieh good effect that our forces retired 200 yards, followed by the Tangastauis "who skirmished in an admirable manner. The arrival of the main body at this time caused the Persians to retreat into the fort. Both brigades deployed and opened fire, the 4 th Rifles ( Bombay) occupying the village oE Basln'r, and touching the coast ; the 2nd Brigade storming the left breach, the Biluchis being on the extreme left. Both the field artillery and the men-of-war now opened fire upon the fort. The fort was at once assaulted, and its defenders either killed or driven out. The General formed his force so as to encircle the redoubt as much as possible and prevent escape; while two columns, one of the 2nd Bombay Europeans, and the other of the 64 th Regiment and 25 th Native Infantry, were to give the assault —the former at the north-east angle, the latter on the east or landward side. ’ The cavalry were placed on the right close to the sea. Had the fort been in repair and properly defended, its capture would have been most difficult to a force, except by escalade. The Tangastauis had con- tented themselves with digging rifle pits on the top of the parapet These they defended resolutely, fighting to the last. Giving quarter was not under- stood ? and .many were shot in flight.- , Brigadier- General Stopford was killed leading the assault at the head of the 1st Brigade (tUthand 20th), and Lieutenants Warren and Utfcerson, 20th Native Infantry, were shot within the fort, and Captain Wood, 20th Native Infantry, wounded. The cavalry cut up the fugitives escaping along the beach, and here Colonel Malet was treacherously killed by a man to whom he had given quarter. The man-of-war shelled the fort from about a mile off shore, but it is ques- tionable whether their fire was of any effect. Most of the killed fell by the musket or bayonet,. Amongst the slain were the s m and nephew of Baukar Ivhan. About half of the tribe was killed ; and, when later on he was called upon to take the field, he replied that they had better first send husbands for all the wives in his clan, The fate of these men did not offer much encouragement to the sur- rounding population to take up arms against the British. They were regarded with much justice as having been recklessly sacrificed by the Governor of Bush ire, who threw these undisciplined levies, with a few rounds of ammunition for their matchlocks and a few bags of dates for food, into an isolated post, where they were''. easily cut off, and which there was really very little use of occupying at all. Some of the neighbours went so far as to say that the Governor, being a pure Persian, looked upon the slaughter of two or three hundred Tangastanis, who were half Persians, half Arabs, as no great loss to the Persian empire. ‘ After the occupation of Bushire, Baukar Khan, the chief of the] Tangas- finis, secretly favoured the British, and gave much valuable intelligence as to the movements of the enemy. A store of dates was found in the fort. Leaving the 1311 deli regiment to hold the fort, the force quitted it and bivouacked outside, facing Bushire, the right resting on the village of Imam- zada, the left towards the fort. The village was held by three companies of the 61th. During the night the Commissariat landed provisions and ammunition from the Melbourne , and the sick and wounded were removed to the Result, hospital ship. These vessels had accompanied the force on its march, keeping parallel with it, and were now anchored off Bashir. The best water is obtained from wells about a mile from the fort on the Bushire road. ( For despatch in full, see a Calcutta Gazette 33 of 7th January 1857.) At 8 a.m,, on the 10th, the column resumed its march towards Bushire; the ... „ r . advance party, 50 ii yards in front, consisting of the Punah Horse, 2 guns Horse Artillery, and T companies of the 6Tth Regiment. The main body advanced in mass of columns, right in front, a detachment oE the 3rd Cavalry forming the rear-guard. Before the columns started, the bombardment of Bushire by the fleet com- menced, contrary to the pre-arranged programme. No enemy was seen until the tower recently built at about 1 mile from the town to protect the wells was reached. The General now deployed the 1st Brigade, the 2nd following in contiguous columns, with artillery on either flank. Without waiting for the near approach of the troops, the Persians aban- doned the tower and beach batteries outside the walls. The tower was of masonry, of recent construction, a solid foundation enclosed at the top by a masonry parapet pierced for guns. A steep ramp lead up to the gateway, on ■ each side of which was a small guard-room. Halting for a few minutes at the tower, 4- companies of the 2nd European Light Infantry, No. 3 Li<>Lt Field Battery, and the Sappers were sent off to the left to occupy the deserted heaeh batteries, and to establish a lodgment there prior to breadline the tow.i walls. & The men-of-war now ceased to fire, and the troops advanced to within 5(10 yards of the walls, the 1st Brigade in line, with No, 5 Light Field Battery t > the right ; the 2nd Brigade in. second line, in contiguous columns, finally joined the first line. The horse artillery and eava'ry halted on the right front, near the creek to intercept the enemy's flight, who, in the absence of any gunboats in the creek, were crosslng in boats. Without further operations the town capitulated, the garrison, about 2 000 regular troops, marching out and delivering up their arms. The uext’day they were dismissed. Their muskets were all stamped with the Tower-mark and had been presented by the English to the Persian Government in former days, when we wished to strengthen Persia as a barrier against Russia. Russian intrigue and Persian acquiescence in it were compelling us in fact to pud down what it had been the policy of previous generations to build up at no small cost of trouble and expense. ‘ The force returned to their previous bivouac at the wells. The party of Sappers threw up a battery in the deserted beach batteries. Had the town held out, it would have been occupied by the 0-pr. battery, and the town walls battered at a range of from 200 to 300 yards. The ships’ fire had done little damage to the town walls and batteries, and very few of its defenders wen; killed. The work on the height outside the town was a formidable and hi<> h mound of stilt' earth with raised batteries on it ; the embrasures were stremHh- ened by date stumps firmly driven into the ground; the front and cheeks were further strengthened by sugar baskets filled with sand, gabions, &e. There was a masked battery inside the town near the Residency, also very st-ron* and similarly 'const rue ted.. . , J ' b *' The town itself was defended by a wall of no military importance w ith round towers, at about musket range intervals, for flank defence and has n„ ditch._ Situated on a sandy spot, the sea washes two faces, and a swampy creek the third ; at times, at high tide, the sandy plain, to- the south is covered to * depth of a few inches. " The large guns had been collected together and ranged, all loaded to the muzzle, just inside the town gate, ready for < ur storming, party. There was u similar row near the Govern r’s house. Those in the towers were full Vf shot : one contained three 12-pr. shot and one 6-pr.shot, with a cartridge about half a yard long. Borne of the cannons were good and serviceable (ofFm-lish and Tihran manufacture) ; but they were uncared for, and their carriaoes in very bad order. J he magazine dose to the Sadder Bazar caused the inhabit ants to fear a bombardment, for the effects of a shell landing in it would have been fatal to the town ; for it was lying in the utmost confusion— loose powder cases of musket halls, shot and shell, grape and canister. 1 ' * „ , Tlu r sfm f'L f at « ° f the ^wn was very bad. Many of the inhabitants had fled. In a lew. days they returned, and the place began then to be well sud- plied with provisions. 1 On llth December the head-quarters were established at the Kelat tower where the Darya Beg and Commnnder-in-Chief were kept prisoners until they could be removed to the A stage for passage to Bombay. 3 the beach aUt k° atS ^ St ° reS Was 8 ' reat) and mu ch confusion resulted at W u - IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD Of* B U S H ! R E. Approximate Seale 1 Inch. — I Mil Marshv plain otsriooded in many places at high water spring tides extending from 4 to 5 miles • towards the country and hounded by ' a sandy desert without water for a further distance of 5 miles. ....... .... . Tabu UtncL yri£h. rn+och? brok<in/ qrovuixT/ .A, "'m&mfa'o, w ^ f~~ ^y YULotjgt. of Itruxm %oufjxh. o o o iSUSHtRE^'" O A N‘«IX‘s» GUI Dvctc/i, Tort Line ot coast very irregular and indented with Bays. There are several email villages 12 or 13 miles scattered over the table land of Bushire, KB. 097 I&88. J.AA. Y ilZauf c of Ji~a.b6l.cL- ; About ilia 14th matters began to improve ; 15th, the <*amp shifted. Posts of Events cavalry were established 2 miles to the front. Reports '"' 0; l ' were to the effect that the enemy were moving down upon Bushire. They were supposed to be at Farrashband, above the Haft Mill a pass, and on this side of Fimzabad. The camp was entrenched (see page 28). On the 20th an armed reconnaissance was pushed to Tihsiya, about lb miles from Bushire. The party was composed of 2 troops 3rd Cavalry, the Punah Horse, and 2 guns Horse Artillery, accompanied by Lieutenant Ballard, Intel- ligence Officer, Captain Wray, Assistant Quarter Master General, and Major Hill, r.e*, Commanding Royal Engineer, &c., &c. Starting at 6 a.m., Chahgadak, 14 miles distant over the barren Sat, was reached at 10 30 a.m., and Tihsiya at 1*30 p.m. Returning at 2-30 p.m,, camp was reached before dark after a march of 36 miles. The objects of the expedition were to bring to view our troops and guns, and to warn the villagers to bring in supplies and informa- tion on pain of tire and sword. The road to Chahgadak lies across the great, hard, mud flat, the Marshxla ; beyond, the level is covered with camel-thorn, A good deal of the land is cultivated, but the villagers had deserted their holdings. Its mud fort with corner bastions, not constructed for guns, is not of importance. From it Abram, another mud fort near the fort of the Tang-i- B a wash pass, the head -quarters of Baukar Khan, Chief of the Tangastanis, was visible. On December 25th the enemy were reported to have reached Kalima, above the Haft Miila pass. The north-eastern shore of the Persian Gulf is very flat for about 30 miles from the sea, when a range of hills rises very the Per81im abruptly from the plain. Through these some difficult passes lead to the central plateau, which composes the greatest portion of the Persian dominions. Wheeled vehicles are never used for the purpose of carrying merchandise across these hills. The steep narrow paths on the direct routes are sometimes barely practicable for a laden mule ; but there am more circuitous routes by which artillery can be taken, as the Persians themsehes brought a considerable train from Shiraz to the low country during this war. The country both above and below the passes is barren, not always from the want of natural fertility, but from the absence of population ; for there are large districts which in former days were thickly inhabited, but now are almost perfect deserts. There has been a process of decay going on in these regions (including the valley of the Euphrates and Tigris, of which the Persian Gulf is a continuation), not altogether to be accounted for by the evils of misgovernment ; for we have no proof that the government has deteriorated, or at any rate deteriorated in the proportion in which the population has died out. Nineveh and Babylon have long been buried beneath the earth, save when some descendant of savage tribes, whom Nebuchadnezzar and Cyrus never heard of, has scraped away the dust from above their palaces. Persepolis, situated between Bushire and Shiraz, has never so entirely lost her ancient glory as to have required a foreign hand to bring her faded relies to the light of day ; but total silence reigns amid the ruins of the city from which Alexander the Great took 25,000 muleloads of plunder. Shustar, a small town at the confluence of the Karun and Dizful, stands on the site of Slmsan, the palace whence King Ahasuerus wrote orders to the rulers of a hundred and twenty-seven provinces, to every province according to the writing thereof, and laid a tribute upon the land and upon the isles of the sea. Within the present century the population of the town of Bassorahj situated about 40 miles below the junction of the Tigris and M i^iti Euphrates, has dwindled from 100,000 to 30,000 inhabitants. A small village called Korna, situated at the junction of these two rivers, occupies the site of the Garden of Eden ; but the spot is now much more like the Eden of Martin Chuzzlewit than the Eden of the Bible. On the spot where there flourished every tree that is pleasant to the eye and good for food, a few tall dates and yellow reeds alone remain ; while of all the beasts which Adam named, pigs and mosquitoes alone seem to linger in the cradle of their race. The staple article of food along the upper shores of the gulf and banks of the lower Tigris is dates. These are consumed in great quantities, both by man and beast. Horses, dogs, and camels all enjoy this nutritious food ; and the little foxes, as they wander of a morning among the date groves, instead of attempt- ing to reach the clusters hanging high above their heads, or in their disap- pointment pronouncing them sour, wait patiently till a breeze of wind rustles among the fan-like branches, and shakes the ripened fruit. The dates for general use are not preserved separately like those which usually find their way to this country, but are thrust into bags made of mats, and soon adhere to one another, forming a sticky paste. ■ With the exception of a regiment of native infantry, the British force was not quartered in Bushire itself, but in an intrenched camp which they constructed about 1 \ miles from the walls. This was a more healthy locality, and more convenient for obtaining a good supply of water, as all the water used in the town has to be brought a distance of 2 miles. The water-carriers are usually women, who thus become capable of undergoing great bodily fatigue. This accomplishment was much prized by our Bikieh soldiers, who are accustom- ed to leave all the hard work at home to be done by their better halves. Several matrimonial alliances were entered into by them, as they considered that any one who had the good fortune to obtain the hand of a Bushire beauty became possessed both of a wife to solace his cares and a donkey to carry his burdens. The liberated garrison of Bushire took the road to Shiraz, which is situated above the passes, about 1 50 miles from Bushire. Being ^Occupation of Bushire, unarme( ^ they kept well together, for the Persian soldier is not on very good terms with his countrymen. The blame does not entirely rest with the poor soldier, for he must live ; and his superiors do not always give him a sufficiency of the staff of life, so he occasion- ally helps himself* to what should be provided in a regular way. The soldiers are also sometimes called in to assist in collecting taxes, which are not more willingly paid in Persia than elsewhere, especially if the governor of a district, in addition to the King's taxes, wishes to levy a small rate for his own private expenses. The liberated prisoners, therefore, did not altogether expect to be received by their countrymen as gallant, but unfortunate, defenders of their country. They had only got out of the fire into the frying-pan, and the un- armed party from Bushire kept together to Shiraz, where they were again reorganized and furnished with arms sent from Tihrau. We have already stated that the Persian Government, although they heard 0 . .. of the capture of Bushire before receiving the absolute . P-r-hon, deelarat 4 of warj had still been » ofc altogethe £ ignorant that some such ^operation was contemplated by the British. They had been informed by the officials on the coast of the constant passing to and fro of our steamers, and straws of that kind gave an indication of the wind which was likely to blow. About five regiments (or 4,000 men) had been collected at Shiraz under an officer called the Shuja-ul-Mulk, and the 27 'jj/m feudal chiefs, especially the Ilkhaai, or chief of the “ Ik/' or wandering tribes, had been summoned to his standard. These a Ils " form a nomad population in the midst of the regular settled inhabitants. The term u 11 3 denotes a nomad tribe; “lliyafcs," a man belonging to an “II" The Uiyats pass the summer in the high ranges of hills, where there is plenty of rood for their cattle. As winter and its snows approach, they sow some patches of grain, and then descend to the low country, where they remain until the spring is well advanced, and the pastures and corn are springing up luxu- riantly from ground well moistened by the melting snow. The Government had also collected some supplies of flour and ammunition at the villages of Borasjan and Chahkuta in the low country — the former 45, the latter 80 miles from Bush ire* The amount of ammunition would not be considered as indicating a very provident spirit on the part of any other Government than that of Persia, for there were not above one thousand rounds of cannon shot, and some fifteen or twenty tons of gunpowder ; but as all this had to be brought on the back of mules by difficult roads for 300 miles, it was of considerable value. General Stalker resolved to send out a party to destroy the stores at Chahkuta, which were lodged in a small fort. The magazine at Borasjan was in a larger fort, which a few men might hold for two or three days against any force not provided with Want of transport. siege artillery; and as there was no transport with .the British force, it was impossible to undertake anything where a large supply of ammunition and a few days' provision would require to be carried for some distance {Blackwood'). The enemyk intention was stated to he to march on Bushire via Borasjan, Chahkuta, and Chahgadak. The General proposed to march on Borasjan and destroy the depots, but desisted from doing so, not being sure of the sincerity of professed good intentions of the informant, Baukar Khan, Chief of the Tangastanis. , To destroy the Chahkuta dep6t, on the 1st January Expedition to C atkuta. ^57 a p ar ty 0 f the strength below were detailed : 3rd Cavalry under Captain. Forbes ; the Punah Horse under Colonel Tapp; 3 guns. Horse Artillery, Captain Blake, with Lieutenant Ballard, Intelligence Officer, Captain IV ray, Assistant Quarter Master General, and Captains Hancock and Good fellow. Leaving .camp at 3 A.ivr., Chahgadak was reached at 7-30 a.m., and Chahkuta at 10-3:2 a.m, The country between the two latter places is an open plain covered with camel-thorn. There is a deep muddy nala & miles from Chahkuta, difficult during this, the rainy season, but dry in the summer. Stores of ammunition, barley, wheat, and flour were found ; 30,000 lbs. of powder were blown up. The attempt to destroy the grain was but partially successful Leaving at 5 p.m. ? camp was reached at 11 P.M., the party having marched a distance of 44 miles. The following account of this expedition is taken from Blackwood *$ Magazine; u The inhabibants of Chahkuta and most villages near Bushire aie Arabs by descent and language, and have little sympathy with their Persian sovereign or fellow- subject. The chief, or * Shaikh/ Hussain by name, would no doubt have made us very welcome to the stores (supposing he had no chance of being able to appropriate them himself) ; but there was a Persian commissary in charge, before whom he considered it necessary to make some show of attempting to save the property committed to his care. Accordingly, when Colonel Tapp, after the usual complimentary inquiries, proceeded to M WHBHB m business, tbe Shaikh listened with well-feigned astonishment to his questions regarding the whereabouts of the ammunition* * What could have put such an idea into the head of General Stalker as to suppose that there . was any magazine in the wretched little fort of Cbahkuta ? The Colonel rnierht look round and see/ &e., &c. When at last he was told we would look round and hum the whole fort if we did not find a magazine, the Shaikh gave the commis- sary a look, which implied, c l have done all I could, and you see it is no use/ and slowly moved towards the magazine. Lieutenant (icodfellow of the Engineers made arrangements for destroying it; hut to avoid injuring the fort, or rather the Shaikh’s apartments, which were in it, and the village generally, a quantity of the ammunition boxes were carried out to the open plain, the villagers being called on to assist in tran sport mg th em , which they did willing- ly emmgh, when the object was explained to them. They still more willingly availed themselves of permission to carry away as much grain and flour as they could before it was burned, or attempted to be burned ; for grain is not easily destroyed when collected in large quantities. The explosion which took place on the ignition of several tons of gunpowder was very fine. The troops return- ed to Bushire before 9 o'clock that evening. The guide who accompanied them, a man of 12 or 14- stone weight, rode all the distance, upwards of TO miles, on a small donkey ; yet such is the endurance of these little beasts, that it seemed quite fresh to the last. They are the usual baggage animals attached to Persian regiments, and answer the purpose well, as one man can look after fifteen or twenty of them on a march. Between the 1st and 15th January, Slufl to the north-north-east of Bushire was visited, and the creek behind Shaikh Sa'ad explored. Shiff is a good landing place at high water (see Military Report on South-West Persia). There is no water there or along the line Shiff- Boras jan. On January 20th the enemy were reported to have descended the pass to Nanizak and Borasjan in numbers estimated at 8,000 to 10,000 men, with 11 to 15 guns, with the intention of advancing on Bushire. The liberated garrison of Bushire, allowed to go where they pleased, had taken the road to Shiraz, where they were reorganized and reequipped. These men formed part of this ‘'force. The Bushire camp was well entrenched with ten 12-pr,and four large siege guns in position. The entrenchment consisted of a simple ditch about 3' deep and 6 / in width, with a parapet composed of the excavated earth. The camp itself, situated rather more than a mile to the south of the town, stretched across the isthmus, and faced Bushire. A cavalry picket, about 2 miles towards the hills, was the duly outpost necessary to its security. On 20th January Sir James Outram, with his staff, arrived in the Sew ir ami * , and assumed chief command. On the 50th and 31st the 78th Highlanders and 28th Native Infantry arrived. Supplies of all descriptions were plentiful and good in camp, and the inhab- itants, both of the town and neighbourhood, were evidently pleased at the British occupation. The kind treatment and ready money payments received from the British troops contrasted most favourably with .the exactions levied by the previous Persian garrison. On the arrival of Sir James Outram, KiC.B., of the Bombay Army, in Bombay (22nd December), armed with full diplomatic powers (General Stalker had no diplomatic powers, and had been instructed to refer to Calcutta in case of necessity), the following troops were placed at his disposal by the Government as reinforcements, and to form the 2nd Division of the army in Persia, viz. — 14th King's Light Dragoons* I 78th Highlanders. 1,000 Sind Horse (Jacob’s). j 23rd Native Light Infantry. 28th Native Infantry, and a light battalion composed of ten light companies of different native regiments not employed with the field force. Major-General Stalker, e.B., remained in command of the 1st Division at Bus hi re, with Brigadiers Wilson, 64th, and Honner, 4*tli Bombay Rifles, under his orders as Infantry brigadiers; Brigadier Tapp in command of Cavalry, and Brigadier Trevelyan of Artillery. The 1st Division consisted of Her Majesty's 61th Regiment, 2nd Bombay European Regiment, 4th and 20th Regiments of Native Infantry, the 2nd Bilueh Battalion, the head-quarters and 2 squadrons 3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry, and 2 troops Punah Irregular Horse, a troop of Horse Artil- lery, 2 companies of European Field Artillery and Reserve Artillery, with the head-quarters and 2 companies of Bond say Sappers and Miners. Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B., Deputy Adjutant-General, Her Majesty's Forces in India, was appointed to command the 2nd Division, with Brigadier Hamilton, 7hth Highlanders, and Brigadier Hale, Bombay Army, for its two brigades, composed as follows : 1st Brigade — 78th Highlanders. 26th Native Infantry. 2nd Brigade — 23rd Native Light Infantry. The Light Battalion. Brigadier of Cavalry — Colonel Steuart, I4th Light Dragoons : 14th King’s Light Dragoons. 3rd Regiment Sind Horse. Brigadier of Artillery — Brigadier Hill : One troop of horse artillery. Two field batteries. Brigadier-General Jacob, C.B., Sind Horse, commanded the cavalry of both divisions; all under the command of Lieutenant-General (temporary rank) Sir James Out-ram, k.c.b. f ' The transports having on board the 78th Highlanders and 26; h Native In- fantry in tow of steamers, also carrying troops, leaving Bombay on the* afternoon of the 19th January, were off Bassadore, at the entrance to the Gulf, on the Bath, and anchored off Bushire on the evening of the 30th. The troops landed -on the 31st with no baggage except their bedding. 1 Proponed, plan of operations (Ip Sir James Outram). The force already despatched to Persia was as follows : 1st Brigade of Infantry . One European regiment One Native regiment. 2nd Brigade of Infantry . One European regiment Two Native regiments. 30 Brigade of Artillery* On© troop of Hors© Artillery. One company of Foot Artillery. One battalion of Reserve Artillery. Engineer Department , including two companies of Sappers. Brigade of Cavalry* Two squadrons of Regular Cavalry. . y * . ' One sqnjdim .of Irri^niar :€ayal.ry.;: . 2nd Brigade of Infantry, the Brigade of Cavalry, and all the Artillery, the Horse Troop and portion of sappers, to occupy Bushire, affording detachments for Kharaj and other Commissariat depots. The 1st Brigade of Infantry, troop of Horse Artillery, and portion of Sappers to be re-embarked, and proceed with the war steamers to occupy Muhammarah the Karun river, where no opposition can be offered which would not be put rn by the fire from the shipping. The troops at Bushire to be reinforced by two regiments of Native Inian- from India. . Those at Muhammarah to be reinforced by one regiment of Sind Horse, two squadrons of Dragoons, and one regiment of Native Infantry, two com- panies of Foot Artillery, with detail of mountain guns in addition, to be shipped from India direct. - , . . , . , Pending the arrival of these reinforcements, competent officers to be detached cavalry escort to survey the roads from Bushire towards Shiraz, and others to ascend the Karun river in steamers guarded by infantry to survey the country towards Shustar, while carriage, cattle, supplies, &c., were to be pre- pared for the coming reinforcements. When all were assembled at their respective camps at Bushire and Muhammarah, the European regiment, one regiment of Native Infantry, and the two squadrons of the 3rd Regiment of ~valry, with some mountain artillery, to advance from Bushire to Khisht, * miles on the Shiraz road— a position well calculated for an army during the hot months, being a flat plateau elevated 2,000 feet above the sea, with water and wood in abundance. With reference ro the expedition to Khislit, Sir James Outram wrote to Gen- eral Stalker : “1 hope you will think the move on Khisht advisable. Being so it ought to he more healthy than Bushire for the Europeans, and the t there would be regarded at Tiliran as the advanced guard of the army they will hear is coming from India. In the meanwhile pray contrive to make it be believed that our sole object for the present is the seizure of Shiraz, and that you are only waiting the reinforcements from India to advance. « X hope that you wilt be able to effect a survey as far as Khisht, &c., &e. From Muhammarah the 1st Brigade and all the cavalry, horse artillery, and mountain guns to march up the Karun river to Shustar, supplied on the inarch by the Commissariat in the steamers. The additional native regiment and proportion of foot artillery to occupy Mu- hammarah, and to furnish guards to the several fuel stations to be established on the river as the army ascends it. The positions of Shustar and Khisht to be occupied during the hot season while preparations are made for the additional forces to be supplied before October next, when operations in the interior would commence. SI In this interval Colonel Jacob would be occupied at Shustarin the organiz- ation of Turkish Arabian levies, formed on the nucleus of the regiment of Sind Horse, to aid him in which duty, well qualified officers would be placed under him. During the hot season, moreover, strong cavalry patrols would escort the Quarter Master General's Department in surveying the roads in advance. The advantage of holding both the advanced positions of Shu star and Khishfc* besides affording healthy and easily supplied sites for the European troop® during the hot season, was that it would cause the Persian Government to apprehend invasion from both points, and compel defensive preparations on both routes, between which, communication is so difficult, as to preclude the possibility of their armies uniting on either line in time to oppose the advance of the English army, choosing, as they could do, whichever line of advance they should find most feasible, and rapidly withdrawing the troops from either quarter, and assembling the whole army on the other base of operations, ready to advance before the enemy could be capable of effecting a corresponding Junction of its army on the threatened line of advance; this rapid change of formation being easily effected by the aid of the steamers, and previously pro- vided means of carriage. The effect of menacing invasion from two different quarters, threatening Isfahan on the one side and Shiraz on the other, the active preparations for which, during the hot season, would doubtless be greatly exaggerated at Tihran, would possibly be to terrify the Shah into submission, whilst at the same time the army would be most advantageously placed for carrying on the war, should such be necessary. The views of General John Jacob, c.B., with regard to the plan for operating in Persia are given in the following extracts of a letter to Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, dated Karachi, 1st March 18^7: “ My own opinion with regard to the plan of proceeding is not at all in favour of making a rush through the hills into the interior of Persia in the hope of frightening the Shah into submission. “ Russia would not fail at once to see and inform the Persian Government of our faully position, with the sea for our base, barren countries all round the isolated valley in which we are operating, immense ranges of mountains across our communications with the sea, and across the line of onr further advance. “ Under such circumstances, the wisest advice which Russia could give as our enemy and to our enemy would be — ‘ Induce them to advance into the interior as far as you can ; every step they take must render ultimate success less and less possible for them/ I would not advise any such course, but would occupy the whole maritime provinces between the mountains and' the sea, from the Euphrates to Bandar Abbas, This would give us, either in our own possession or in that of perfectly friendly allies, the whole line of land communication between the Mediterranean and India, and render us independ- ent of Egypt and of French influence there. “ I would inform the Shah that, he not having afforded us the satisfaction which we required, and which we had a right to require, we intended to keep this country permanently, and to annex it for ever to the British Empire. 1 “ Khuzistan would undoubtedly prove a most valuable possession to us, while the ancient wealth and ancient history of Ormuz seem to me to prove that Bandar Abbas is the natural outlet for the whole commerce of Persia by sea. The interior of the country must undoubtedly be more accessible from j that port than from any other. * \ / I Persian V CAMP j Yfo .§f ^ ■-. - x z f—M A&V&TzC.G o/' > Jl r^i British. troo'ps !! ^ ‘ £z / rz i ^Cr * »?%•? 7 rf cr. -*r_ PERU 2L /^sZ- ^ ^ #4^ ' #JbvA- ^ifeu. AJ oam^Sc- -ri^-^T-^rr.- W /5Wrzec£ /or/ .’ .. “ s / » X AJ W"*% 3^ / ' \ PERSIAN \^ •v^-V — - — f. — ^ —a ~ C AMP IjMlfH A MM A RAH;j- - -TT — Bj TZV >,^i| tagssil W ^«r ^ A p ■^gs*^ Ku'x far.. ygg?*~ : ~.f ~=rb XZ-~- ' — ~f~ cr> i»c.M5 ABADAN BOUGH SKETCH >x. ^5** ATTACK ON THE BATTERIES : =>v — . ^ ^ ^ Xi.r*«4>'r <7, a J<? v W&y$ c? r* ~~ ~ ' '~~ ~ -JVE ^X T „JT" ’ -> V Se.miramis ^ ~ ~. — ..“ <<S£YHAiW Victoria *®( PAlKUWO Note. — T his was compiled ehie&y from a sketch of the ground by Captain Holland, Quarter Master General’s Department. MUHAMMARAH, By the combined Naval and Military Forces under command of Lieutenant-General Sir James On. tram, k.c.b,, 26th March 1857, Scale i Inch = 400 Yards , 400 500 200 (Sd,) J. WRAY, Captain, By. Qr. Mr, GenL* P.E.FJ ** In establishing ourselves in these provinces, the mountains How presenting ■such formidable difficulties in our way would prove rather an advantage to us as forming a wall of defence to us on the north. “ We might proceed steadily to organize the whole country we had taken* •and might probably restore the district of Kliuzistan to its pristine fertility and imp >rtance ; while the whole of the war-like and manly tribes of Kurds* as well as the Arabs, would be ready to serve us against all the World for money. u In possession of this line of country* opening on the valley of the Euphrates, taking three maritime provinces, especially the valley of the Kanin as our base, with full arsenals, magazines, and supplies of all kinds ready there, instead of being immediately dependent on distant support from Bombay and Sind, we should be in a position* in Case of renevved war with Russia, to march an Anglo-Turkish army into Georgia, and there, co-operating with other forces, sent, if necessary md Trebizonde, to drive the Russians behind the Caucasus, and to keep them there* “With complete command of the Black Sea* and being paramount on the ocean generally, England then could not be in a better position for engaging in a war single-handed with Russia. “We should be independent of the French alliance in a great measure, and have the most direct route to India in our own hands, or securely open to us ; while, without first taking Constantinople, no other power could interfere with us on the battle field, or even approach tile seat of wan “ Russia must see all the consequences of our permanently settling our- selves in possession of Kliuzistan, and unless now prepared to fight with us h Voubmnce 7 and to throw her full strength on India (which she undoubtedly is not), would assuredly be inclined, on perceiving symptoms of such intentions on our part, to advise the Shah to accede to any terms whatever rather than risk placing us in such a favourable position for offensive measures against herself. All this seems worthy of consideration* and perhaps your Lordship might wish to know any thoughts on the subject/* The above remarks by General Jacob are still pregnant with advice for Us, and should not be lost sight of ; for a study of the topography of the Zagros hills to the north of the maritime provinces from Bushire to the Euphrates points to their great value to us as a base against the Caspian region and the Caucasus. — On the arrival of reinforcements mentioned on page 29 on the 3rd February* the General decided to attack the Persians in their position at Boras- jan, and to destroy their magazines. The expedition to Borasjan was under- taken under the impression that the enemy were becoming so strong that it was their intention to attempt the recapture of Bushire. The reports furnished to the Intelligence Department put the force at 8,450 regular infantry, 17 guns, and 1 mortar. Reinforcements were rapidly being received by it. Twelve regiments of regular infantry, with 35 guns, were stated to be moving to join it, and that arrangements had been made to assemble 4,000 of the Iliyafc (nomad) tribes within 24 hours. Their advanced parties of horse began to check the sup- ply of provisions to Bushire, and to cause apprehension to prevail in the town.' It became imperatively necessary to strike a blow in the threatening quarter before extending operations elsewhere. In the evening of 3rd February, the following detail marched from camp in two lines of contiguous quarter distance columns, viz, : 3rd Light Cavalry Punah Horse -ho. • 176 | Brigadier Tapp. 83 3rd Troop Horse Artillery [Blahes) * . - - - 0 — . Ho. 3 Li glit Field Battery * . . . • 6 „ > Colonel Trevelyan. Ho. 5 Light Field Battery . . - . • • 6 „ ) Sappers and Miners 118 Captain Dickinson, ist Brigade, lst( Hev Majesty’s 64th Regiment . . 780 _ ] Brigadier Wilson. Division. I 20th Hative Infantry . . » 442 ) & 1st Brigade, 2nd < Her Majesty’s 78th Higtlanders . . 739 _ | Brigadier Stisted. Division. (. 26th Native Infantry . * . 479 1 ■ 2nd Brigade, 1st ( 2nd European Light Infantry , . 693 J Division, and< 2nd Biluch Battalion . . . 460 ... £ Brigadier Honner. rear-guard. t 4th Rifles ♦ * 623 ' ) i.e., 419 cavalry, 18 gu ns, 118 sappers, 4,116 infantry : the infantry in first line, and cavalry and artillery in second line. The advance guard under Colonel Tapp, Punah Horse, was composed of one troop 3rd Light Cavalry, two guns Horse Artil- Advance on Borasjan, ]ery f 2 companies Her Majesty*s 6 1th Regiment, 2 companies 20th Native Infantry ; and the rear-guard under Major Hough (2nd Biluch Battalion) of the 2nd Biluch Battalion, and one troop of Punah Horse. A guard under Lieutenant-Colonel Shepherd was left of sufficient strength to hold the camp, i.e., 378 Europeans, 1,466 Native Infantry, 1 company Euro- pean Artillery, and 14 guns, to assist which a party of seamen from the ships of war were landed to serve as artillerymen. No tents were taken. The men took their great-coats and blankets and two days* cooked provisions, and the officers what a spare horse could carry in their saddle bags. The commissariat in addition carried three days* provisions for the force. At midnight Chahgadak was reached. At 5 a.m., on the 4th, the muddy creek was crossed with difficulty, and at 6-30 a.m. Chahkuta was reached. Here the troops halted for the day on a fine open plain, the different regiments piling arms in column in the same order as they had marched, and the men lying by them. The road traversed had been round the head of the Bushire creek, and was alternately hard and loose sand and reedy swamp ; a small fortified tower near some wells and few scattered date trees being the only objects of inter- est passed upon the march. Two good wells, west of the village, furnished au abundance of water. A severe duststorm lasted all day. At 4 p.m. the. troops started again, taking a north-east direction. At 6 p.m. a nala, dry, but with steep banks, was crossed, the road thus far being si ill over a fine open plain. At 6-30 p.m., at 5 miles from Chahkuta, a halt of half an hour was made at two wells of good water called Chah Arabi, At 7 miles the small walled village -of Ishafundi was reached, five or six Persian horsemen galloping out of it at the same time. At 9 miles a well and canal of good water were passed, and at 10 miles a halt in the order of march was made for the night on the rising ground close to the village of Khushab. At 10 p.m. a violent thunderstorm of hail and rain, lasting till 2 A. M., drenched the force in their bivouac. The force had marched 30 miles with but a few hours* rest, and was much fatigued, and the exposure to the piercing cold wind was very trying. At 7 a.m., on the 5th, the march was resumed over a fine plain. One troop Punah Horse, 2 guns 3rd Troop Royal Artillery, and 3 companies Rifles formed the advanced guard. The remainder of the force followed in mass of columns ; the cavalry and artillery, in second line, on the reverse flank. The country, a desert flat, was very muddy and heavy in places, especially near Borasjan, At 2 miles Khushab, 4 miles 20th Hative Infantry 1st Brigade, 2ndf Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders Division. C. 26th Native Infantry 2nd Brigade, Istr 2nd European Light Infantry Division, and « 2nd Biluch Battalion rear-guard. t 4th Bifles ■ o. 6 guns 6 „ 6 „ 118 780 442— 739 479 *** 693 460... 623 84 from Borasjan, was passed ; the latter place was concealed fr eion of date groves with openings between them,th between the left and centre date tained wells of good water. The of attacking the town from th< pied. Gaining the heights (14' were seen to be deserting their camp on the it, and to be moving towards the Haft Mul The Horse Artillery and Cavalry B columns moving to the south-east along the foot During the retirement, the enemy’s cavalry covering on Persian and Arab horses, were emboldened to a skirmish with our cavalry, dashing by and diseharg gallop, wounding Cornet Spens of the 3rd Cavalry and was very stony and interspersed with konar trees, un becoming worse as the hills were approached. Never] e 1 over it without hindrance. A few shots from the The troops were those of the Ilkham of the Kash stoutest of the Persian forces. The re"! Mulk had retired to Dah'ld. i A lar p quantity of stores and ammunition was captured. The camp was badly en trenched, and commanded from the direction of the town. ■ e tillage might have been readily converted into a formidable post. It was surrounded by a Aval] with tower bastions at intervals, detached square towers within overlooking all. A ditch, la' deep, surrounded it, beyond which were gardens with high thorn and cactus fences. The Ilkham s cavalry hovered around the rear- guard, and succeeded in decapi- tating two dooly-bearers. The force bivouacked in the enemy’s cam p. . ‘-cme treasure, many horses, and baggage cattle were secured. The Per- sians had thrown several guns down wells, the carriages of which were discov- *rea and burnt. An alarm on the night of the 6th caused the troops to stand to their arms. Urn enemy felt up to the outposts, but finding the troops prepared, and it beirm- t bright moonlight night, they attempted nothing. Many spies were doubtl- ess in the camp, and all movements well reported. Intercourse between the lllagers and camp was encouraged, and such strict precautions enforced that hey should not be pillaged or ill-treated, that they were civil, and if not friend- ■Qm view by a sucees- . e main road to the town being The grove on- the extreme right eon- ined this grove with the intention The groves were found unoceu- overlooking the town, the enemy gentle slope to the north-east of A pass and the hills 3 miles distant, rigade moved in pursuit of several large of the hills, but desisted, f the retreat, well mounted dvanee and open a sharp ing their muskets at full l two troopers. The ground suitable to our cavalry, and iheless the Persians gallop- rear-guard drove them off. igai irregulars, esteemed the ;ular troops and guns under the Suja-ul- 85 f bm' F At 4 a.m., on the 7th February, a party paraded to proceed to Gisibund feo^report upon it as a sanitarium, but did not start, no guide being procur- The General hearing that the enemy was moving with his artillery into Force returns. the -cavalry moving into the Haft Mula pass, and provisions beginning to fail, abandoned the idea of following them up, and issued orders for the return of the force to Bus! \ire. At 8 p.m., on the 7th, the return march commenced. Hie advanced guard, under Colonel Tapp, consisted of— Pun ah Horse, 2 H orse Artillery guns. Sappers and Miners. 2 companies Her Majesty’s 64th. Main body. Pier Majesty’s 64* h Regiment 20th Regiment Native Infantry 2 Horse Artillery guns. No. 3 Light Field Battery. 78th Highlanders 26th Regiment Native Infantry No. 5 Light Field Battery. ;."2nd European Light Infantry Biluch Battalion .1 In open column of sub-divisions right in front. :] In open column of suh-divisions right in front. open column of right in front. suh-divisions Rear-guard ( Brigadier-General Monner), 3rd Cavalry. J 2 Horse Artillery guns. * 4th Rifles. Baggage on the reverse flank. .After leaving camp, the enemy’s stock of powder (40,000 lbs.), with shells and combustibles of all kinds, were exploded, the train being fired by a Jacob’s rifle shell fired at a range of 150 yards. Great delay was occasioned by the difficult nalas that cut up the country for . 3 miles. At 11-30 p.m. the column passed Jvhushab and halted. News was here received that the rear- guard w T as attacked, and firing in its direction was heard. The General and staff galloped back. The horse of the former falling, he received considerable injury, when the conduct of further operations fell on Major-General Stalker aided by Colonel Lugard,*’ Chief of the Staff. The rear closed on the front, aided by the two batteries sent back to their assistance, and the whole moved towards the water, 3 miles past Khushab. The guide losing his way, the column halted, surrounded by the enemy, who kept up a constant fusikde. The night was intensely dark. The enemy’s horse showed great boldness, dashing close up to the line, and firing. The troops behaved with great steadiness, the regiments manoeuvring and taking up their positions in the dark as methodically as if on parade. The formation adopted was an oblong, a brigade protecting each flank, and a demi- brigade the front and rear; field battery guns at intervals, and a thick line of skirmishers connecting and covering all; the horse artillery and cavalry !. II * Writing to the Governor-General, lie expressed Ins apprehension that he had not done suffi- cient j n'st ice in his despatch to the services of Colonel Lugnrcl, who had been invaluable to him in supplying jus place during the two or three hours he was disabled at the niost exciting crisis before the break of day. 86 on tlie flank of the face fronting the original line of march ; front and flanks of the oblong facing outwards ; the baggage and followers in the centre. Thus formed, the troops lay down, waiting for daylight in perfect silence and dark* ness. . - At 4-80 a. 3L, on the 8th, the enemy's artillery opened on the force with effect. Our guns replied, but with what effect is unknown. After half an hour the enemy's guns ceased firing, and moved to another position. Our losses during the night were two officers (fifth) and about half-a-dozen men wounded, one man (64tk) killed; several camp-followers and baggage animals billed. At -daybreak the enemy were discovered to the left rear, north-east of the line of march, drawn up by wings iu line, the centre on a rising ground, with guns on both flanks and in the centre; the infantry wings, half a mile apart ; and cavalry, on their left flank chiefly, formed a third body, a mile from the infantry. Their right flank rested on the walled village of Kbushab and a date grove; their left on a hamlet, with round towers at intervals; deep nalas, thickly lined with skirmishers, protected the right front and flank. They numbered some 6,000 infantry and 2,000 hor the Ilkhani of the Kashgai commanding the cavalry, f ■ Action of Kliusbab. Shuja-ul-Mulk commanded in chief, his tribal levies, in person. Our guns took position to the front and opened fire; the cavalry, in column of troops, swept round the base of the hill, and charged the Persian cavalry and the left of their line. They were allowed to advance a little too soon, or else anticipated their orders, for they had charged before the infantry was within musket range. Without waiting for the shock, the enemy's cavalry moved off towards the Haft Mula pass. The charge and artillery fire shook the infantry consider- ably. In tbe meanwhile our infantry deployed, the 78th Highlanders and 26th Native Infantry in front line, the 6-i-th and 20th in second line, the 2nd Brigade and baggage in third line ; skirmishers covered the front, flank, and rear, aided by cavalry. The enemy's guns played upon the advancing infantry and our artillery, their round shot passing over the second line; their grape shot, however, strik- ing the second line and artillery. Without waiting for the infantry attack, the Persian line, already shaken, broke and fled to the rear, casting a, way their arms and accoutrements, "and even their clothing, followed by our artillery, the cavalry re-forming for another charge. The two field batteries and the infantry soon gave up the pursuit. The cavalry again charged, the two or three battalions of regular infantry alone preserving any semblance of order, and, accompanied by the 3rd Troop Horse Artillery, continued the pursuit for 3 miles, until fairly exhausted, returning to camp at 10 a.m. The 3rd Cavalry were seen to charge through, and back again, one of these battalions. Captain Forbes, who commanded the squadron, was severely wounded, and Captain Moore and his brother both had their horses killed. The Punah Horse were by no means behind in gallantry. The enemy's horse displayed no courage. They showed in considerable numbers in parts of the field, but courted no engagement. The Persians left seven hundred dead on the field. These brilliant results were obtained by the loss on the British side of Lieutenant Frankland, 2nd European Light Infantry, ' '•! f Brigade-Major of Cavalry, 1 officer and 18 men killed, and 4 officers and 60 men wounded. ■ , ■ The enemy abandoned two 9-pr. brass guns, and had our force been able to pursue further, two more would have been captured. The rout was now complete; many of the enemy were cut up during the flight. Nothing but the paucity of our cavalry prevented their total destruction and the capture of the remaining guns. ( For despatch hi full, see “ Calcutta Gazette” of 12 fh March 1857. ) Captain Wray, in his diary, remarks: “ The Sarbaz are magnificent men ; some of them very handsome ; all large- limbed and stout ; mostly very fair ; their uniform consists of red or blue coats, with chevrons like our non-commissioned officers, boots, &e. ; they are armed with flintlock muskets and bayonets; white belts; good pouches filled with ammunition; arms very dirty and badly kept. “The Persian infantry had not sufficient discipline to rally when broken, but sufficient to keep them together in masses for our artillery to play on with fearful effect. It was the terrible fire of our 18 guns rather than the cavalry charge which disorganized them. No troops could have stood it long. The only course open to them was to assume the offensive, or retire to some piece of ground where they could await our attack less exposed to artil- lery fire. But it was quite clear that the Persian officers, although they might understand their drill on parade, had not so far completed their educa- tion as to have an idea of manoeuvring on the battle-field ; and, once the retreat was commenced, they soon became mingled with the common herd of fugi- tives. The action was one of artillery and cavalry alone, so far as the British were concerned, the infantry merely looking on. “ Some of the wounded Persians fired on our troops after their lives had been spared, which so exasperated them that no quarter was given ; one batch of about 40, who collected on a small hillock and made signs of wishing to surrender, were cut down to a man.” — ( Blackwood ,) The force bivouacked at midday near the field of action close to the village of Chakar Kkana, a poor place, with a had water-supply. itain commenced to fall, and continued incessantly for several days, accom- panied by a cold wind. The force, carrying with it its killed and wounded, commenced its return march at 8 p.m. The country was now a swamp, ieie urn maici. ankle deep in mud. About midnight a broad stream was crossed which caused some confusion ; and at 1 A.M.,on the 9th, Ahmadi, a miserable village, without water, was passed. At 5-30 a.m. Chahgadak was neared ; but the guide losing the way, a halt was made till daylight. Chahga- dak was reached at 7 a.m. The artillery, cavalry, the Biluch and Rifle Batta- lions halted here ; the European Corps, ‘20th and 26th Native Infantry resum- ed the march at 2 p.m. in the midst of heavy rain, reaching Bushire at 9 p.m. tired out and fagged, but with spirits undiminished ; the remainder of the force reached camp on the morning of the 10th February. Not a single man fell into the enemy’s hands during this trying march. The whole division was in a deplorable condition. The boots were dragged from the feet by the mud, so that half at least of the 78th returned barefooted. Next day a new pair of boots was issued to each soldier gratis. The following complimentary order was published to the troops : Field Force Order, dated Camp near Bushire. 10th. February 1857. “ In offering to the troops composing the field force his hearty congratu- lations upon the successful issue of the operations against the enemy, and HHHj ' . especially upon the decisive victory gained over the Persian army under their Commander-in-Chief Shuja-ul-Mulkon the 8th instant at Ivhushab, the Lieu- tenant-General desires to return his sincere thanks to all under his command for their steadiness and gallantry in the field, their extraordinary exer- tions on the march, and their cheerful endurance of fatigue and privation under circumstances of peculiar hardship, rendered doubly severe by the in- clemency of the weather, to which they were exposed without shelter of any kind. The troops marched from their camp on the evening of the 3rd instant without tents or extra clothing of any kind ; each man carried his greatcoat, blanket, and two days* cooked provisions. After a march of 46 miles in forty-one hours, during which they were exposed to the worst of weather, cold winds, and deluging rains, they reached the enemy's irregular infantry, cavalry, and eighteen guns in an intrenched position on the morning of the 5th, but found it abandoned. “The enemy, on hearing of our approach, had evacuated their intrench- ment so precipitately that their tents and camp-equipage and ordnance maga- zines were abandoned ; the former were being rapidly carried off by village plunderers operating for some hours before we arrived. Every exertion was made to intercept the retreat of some bodies of the enemy's cavalry; and some little skirmishing with a few horsemen took place, but eventually they all made off. After occupying for two days the position the enemy had abandoned, and learning that they had succeeded in getting the guns which they had carried away into the difficult pass of Maak, the troops com- menced their return march on . the night of the 7th instant, carrying away the large stores of flour, rice, and grain which the Persian Govern- ment had collected for their -army, and, destroying their magazine, found to contain about 66,000 lbs. of powder, with small arm ammunition and a vast quantity of shot and shell, and thereby crippling the future operations of their army. Some of the guns are supposed to have been east into wells, and, as their wheels and carriages fell into our hands, cannot again be used. At midnight an attack was made upon the rear-guard by the enemy's horse, and parties threatened the line of march on every side. The troops were halted, and so formed as to protect the baggage and resist the horsemen in whatever direction they might attempt to charge. Before this was quite completed, four of the enemy's guns, of heavy metal, were opened upon the forces, but the darkness of the night prevented any steps being- taken to capture them. At break of day the Persian force, .amounting to between 5,000 or 6,000 infantry, 2,050 cavalry, and 5 guns, was discovered on our left rear, north-east of our line of march, “The cavalry and artillery immediately moved rapidly to the attack, sup- ported by two lines of infantry, a third protecting the baggage and rear. The firing of the artillery was most excellent, and did great execution. The cavalry also charged twice with great gallantry and success ; indeed, upon these two arms fell the brunt of the action, as the infantry moved away too rapidly to overtake them. By 10 o'clock the defeat of the Persians was complete, and two guns were captured. The gun ammunition, laden on mules, fell into our hands, and at least seven hundred men lay dead on the field ; the wounded, the number of which must have been considerable, were carried away; the remainder fled in a disorganized state, generally throwing away their arms, which strewed the field in vast numbers ; and nothing but the paucity of our cavalry prevented their total destruction, and the capture of their remaining guns. their mar i'll to Bushire, which they reached before nudnight on the 9th instant, thus performing 1 another harassing march of miles under incessant rain, besides fighting and defeating the enemy during the progress within the short period of thirty hours. The cavalry and artillery, with an infantry escort, reached camp this morning. The result is most satisfactory, and will, the Lieutenant-General trusts, have a very beneficial effect on our future opera- tions in Persia. The Lieutenant-General therefore feels that he cannot too strongly express the obligation he is under to Major-General Stalker and the officers and men of all arms for the almost incredible exertion they have under- gone, and the gallantry they have displayed on the occasion.” By command, (Sd.) E. LUGARD, Colonel, Chief of the Staff, The following account of the battle is compiled from information given by wounded Persian soldiers and the Intelligence Department j The first information regarding the advance of the English army was re- ceived by the Shuja-ul-Mulk at Borasjan on the morning of the 4th February, or the day after the force marched. Preparations were immediately made for abandoning the camp, and by 8 p.m. the whole force of infantry and guns, as V er margin, were en route for the es from Boras- Regimenfc of G nurds 2 Ravag'd slu regiments . Shiraz Regiment 4th Regiment of Tabriz Arab regiment Kaslikai regiment Regulars Cavalry of Shiraz Ditto Ilkhanf ‘ _*** & 40 regiment was upon our troops Before daybreak tbe Shuja drew up his forces, having three regiments in line of contiguous columns on his right and four others in the same formation, 500 yards distant, and slightly thrown back, on liis left. At daylight, February 8th, when the position of the two armies became apparent, he made the left wing take ground still more to its left, supported by its cavalry, apparently with the view of intercepting our return to Bushire. He then deployed it into line, with a regiment in rear in reserve, and advanced with skirmishers and guns in front towards our right. It was this body that our cavalry first encountered. The Persian cavalry, either from disaffection or pusillanimity, retired from the field at the very commencement, and made straight for the Haft Mula pass. On the Punah Horse charging and dispersing the infantry, the Kashkai regiment took the same direction, while the others retreated in rear of the right wing towards Borasjan. The standard of the latter taken. ' \ ' - The right wing remained stationary in line of contiguous columns, suffering severely from the fire of our artillery, which was chiefly concentrated on them, and to which their guns replied briskly with grape and round shot. At about i past ?. they commenced slowly retiring, the guns still firing. On the approach of the 3rd Cavalry, the regiment of guards precipitately retired ; hut the remaining two formed square, and were terribly cut up. After this there was no further organized attempt to continue the action. The officers, who are mounted in the Persian army, disgracefully abandoned their men ; while the latter were hotly pursued by our cavalry and horse artillery to within 4 miles of Borasjan, leaving the line of retreat for a distance of nearly 5 miles strewed with killed and wounded. It is reported that Sohvab Khan, nephew of the Ilkham and commanding his cavalry, was killed ; but this is mere rumour. We have no account of the officers of rank lost by the enemy, but it is probable there were many. The Shah-in Shah's account of the battle, taken from the Tib ran Gazette Extraordinary, is given below : “ According to an express sent by Shuja-ul-Mulk, it appears that the English army, consisting of 5 regi- ments and 10 guns, marched on the 3rd February 1857 to Chakkuta, 4 farsakhs from Bushire, intending to work some injury to the army under Shuja-ul-Mulk before it could join the other Moslem troops. The Shuja-ul-Mulk, with 8,000 infantry, 300 cavalry, and 12 guns, on the 4th contemplated a night attack on the enemy* When he had proceeded 4 miles from Borasjan, the rain began to fall heavily. The English advanced about 4 miles from Chakkuta, where they entered holes, and went behind irregularities in the ground. The Moslem troops having no shelter from the rain, and finding their own encamp- ment nearer than that of the enemy, went back, proposing to return to tbe battle. As the English army were under cover, they reached Borasjan the next morning. On the night of the 7th, the Shuja-ul-Mulk, at the head of 3,000 picked infantry and 8 guns, attacked the English, whose advanced guard, becoming aware of the movement, fired a signal gun. The British, being , # Note. — W e found that the Shuja actually did leave his camp with some infantry and o-uns with the intention of attacking us in our bivouac on the night of the 4th ; so this part of his account is true. Why he went back has been before stated. This^ despatch got Shuja-ul-Mulk a dress of honor from the Shah in honor of the victory The Shfija required it too, for he ran away from the field, they say, with nothing on but a piece of cloth over hig head. ° 4 The Shales account of the battle. 41 unable to remove the enormous quantity of their ammunition owing to the mud, blew it up, and retired to Bush ire. The victorious Persian army pursued the English to within St| farsakhs (10 miles) off Bushire, when reinforcements,* consisting of 2 regiments, 400 cavalry, and 10 guns, came out to their relief. On this they turned back again, and wanted to fight. Though the strength of the victorious Persian army did not exceed 3,000 men and 8 guns, still they heeded not the overpowering number of the enemy, but eagerly rushed forward to the slaughter. They fought heroically for four hours, beginning at daylight, twice breaking into the English squares, entered their lines, and strove vigorously. It is also reported that General Stalker, who first arrived in Bushire, was killed in that action ; but it requires confirmation. Among the Persian officers, Muhammad Kuli Khan, Sartip, was wounded with a grape shot, and All Khan, Sartip, of the Kamgdslu regiment, received a sword wound when he penetrated into the English ranks ; but, thank God, neither of them have come to harm. Owing to the intensity of the rain, each party was obliged to desist from further warfare, and returned to its own camp, leav- ing on both sides sundry guns sticking in the mud. An accurate account of the killed and wounded could not be obtained in consequence of the inclemency of the weather; but the killed on the side of the English must have been from 700 or 800 to 1 ,000, and on the part of the Persians from 600 or 500 to 300. The Saras hkar bash i, who has proceeded to the field of battle, will shortly write a true account of the affair, and it shall be published in the next number of the Gazette/' / /■: Preparations now began to be pushed forward for the expedition to Preparations for ulterior Muhammarah. Materials for the barracks of one operations. European regiment were provided at Bushire. tJHospi- tals were prepared at Eharaj, which place was found remarkably healthy when we held it formerly. These were to receive the sick both of the 1st and 2nd Divisions. The remainder of the month of February was one of no importance in the general conduct of the campaign, and passed in comparative idleness by all but the Transport Sexwice and Quarter Master General's Department, awaiti ng the arrival of the 2nd Division, delayed by heavy weather. The Sind Horse were still beating up the Gulf to Bushire in sailing vessels unaided by steam. By the end of February, 5 companies of the Light Battalion, No. 2 Light Field Battery, a company of Goltmdauze, the Aden troop of Sind Horse, and other details had arrived. Strong north-west winds also delayed the embarka- tion of the expedition. Brigadier-General Havelock on arrival took over the command of the 2nd Division, and Brigadier Hamilton that' of its first brigade, which had been held, in the action of the 8th, by Colonel Stisted. The supplies brought in decreased after the action of the 8th, and forage in particular became scarce. Every regiment furnished daily 300 men as a working party. This duty had a most beneficial effect on the health of the men. Five strong redoubts were built, four in front sweeping the width of the isthmus, that in rear securing the communication with the town ; all were armed with position, guns, one with two 68-pounders. The prevailing high winds caused the greatest annoyance from the drift in g sand ; these nor'- westers, commencing about 9 a.m., lasted till sundown. By the 1st March, the 3rd Troop Horse Artillery was embarked, not- withstanding the bad weather, in three days; on the 5th and 6th, the 64th / I ill » 1 j ij§ j Regiment and a detachment of the 78th Highlanders sailed for the rendez- vous off Muhammarah. A troop of the 14th Dragoons, arriving, unexpectedly, was also directed to proceed with the expedition. The horse artillery trans- . port was provided with bullock fittings only; they stood together, eight in a division, and fared well enough, as no bad weather was experienced during the 30 hours' sail. / On the 9th March, a wing of the 26th Native Infantry embarked, when again heavy weather delayed the operation. On the 6th March, three additional companies of the Light Battalion arrived off Bush? re, and shortly after the 4th Troop Horse Artillery, one troop 3rd Cavalry, and the remaining company of the Light Battalion, and all passed on to the Muhammarah rendezvous. The difficulty of embarking troops and stores in an exposed and shallow roadstead and the poverty of steam power were much felt. The Turks remonstrated against the movement on Muhammarah, as it necessitated the navigation of the Shatt-ul-Arab, the right bank of which stream is Turkish territory. They also advanced a claim to the town, and the question arose whether it should be made over to the Pasha of Baghdad when captured. The local tribes objecting to Turkish rule, the claim was kept in abeyance ; but the circumstance was considered to be of no moment. On the 14th March, General Stalker, c.b., whom it was proposed to leave in command at Bush ire, in a moment of mental derangement shot himself. He was an officer who had gained distinction in the held, and whose kind heart and gentlemanly maimers won the regard of all. Major-General Stalker was by service senior to Sir James Outram ; and with reference to this, the latter wrote : “ Should Busbire, contrary to expectation, hold out, and not yet be in our possession when I join the army, and should General Stalker then be con- ducting operations against the town, it would be the wish of His Lordship, 1 presume (as it would be my own), that he should not be deprived of the credit of taking the place ; and in that ease I would, with His Lordship's permission, defer assuming the command until after it had fallen. I know not whether General Stalker would wish to continue with the army after I have taken command ; but should he choose to do so, I might place him in command at Bushire, while I myself take the advanced division to Muliam-* marah and S has tar. Serving under rae would be the less galling*, I hope, to Stalker, inasmuch as we have been intimate friends ever since we entered the service together, on the same day, 37 years ago." As regards the separate command, lie wrote much to the same effect to General Stalker direct, adding* : ^ I can only say it will be a source of great gratification to me to be associated with you in the field, and I can assure you we should get on well together/'’ General Jacob (lately arrived) was placed in command at Bushire. The Persian forces under the Coniraander-in-Cbief (Sarashkarbashi), with 16,000 men and 30 guns, was reported to have arrived at Nanizak with authority (either to fight or to treat for terms of peace : overtures indirectly made by him were discouraged. On the 17th March, Commodore Kthersey shot himself; memoranda in his note book showed that his mind was affected. The 4th Troop Horse Artillery returned to Bushire from Muhammarah Wt© 19th March. The Persian attempts to strengthen Muhammarah were reported to have been very successful On this day the head -quarters m of the Muhammarah expeditionary force left Bnshire : the force com- prised— No. 2 Light Field Battery 6 6 guns . a 176 men. No. 3 Troop Horse Artillery, 6 guns . , * . . 106 „ lith Dragoons (troop) . . . . . . . 89 „ Sind Horse (part t>f) . 303 „ 64th Regiment . . . . ... . . , . 704 „ 78th Highlanders * . '* ; .* ■ ■* . , , 830 „ Light Battalion . . * . . . . 920 „ 26th Regiment Native Infantry * . . , , 716 „ 23rd Regiment Native Infantry , * . * . . 749 tj Madras Sappers and Miners . , . . . , 124 „ Bombay Sappers and Miners * * . # . , 109 Reserve Artillery . . > * , , *. «•> 392 horse, 1,534 European and 2,386 Native Infantry, 342 artillery, and 12 guns — total 4,886 men — with 4 armed steamers and 2 sloops of war. There remained at Btishire Brigadier-General Jacob, c.b., in command, with Brigadiers Wilson, Homier, and Tapp; 2 field batteries and the mountain train, the entire cavalry of the 1st Division, 3 companies each of Her Majesty's f>4th, the 4th Rifles, 20th Native Infantry, and the Biluch Battalion. Sir James Outram thus discussed the advantages of an advance oil Shuster over that on Shiraz : “ Should the enemy really he mustering in advance of Shiraz in force, it is next to certain their object is to oppose our advance on Shiraz ; for they would hardly have the temerity to attack our entrenched position in front of Bnshire. In that case the passes below Khisht would afford positions so naturally strong, and which they would not fail to improve by art, that we may be exposed to severe loss ere we make our footing sure at Khisht, And then it might require our whole means, thus weakened by battle, to maintain own position there ; for the neighbouring tribes are not to be depended on, being Shiahs and more subservient to the Shah's Government than are the half Arab ‘ Sunni ' tribes who intervene between Shustar and Muhammarah. Our advance from Muhammarah to Shustar, on the other band, though liable to be opposed by tile army of the Viceroy of Khuzistan, represented at from 3,000 to 8,000 men, has no great physical difficulties to contend against, — no passes to surmount; and onr army there would possess the advant- age of water carriage for its supplies, and a better provision of land carriage than can be obtained at Bushire. ° The neighbourhood of Shustar, moreover, is described as abounding in forage, fuel, and water ; and the population being f Sunnis', with stranguries of connection with the Turko-Arabian tribes in the vicinity, are generally, it is said, bitterly inimical to their Shiah rulers, and would, it may be hoped, readily be induced to favour our cause. Our vicinity to the Turkish frontier would besides facilitate the organization of the Turko-Arabian levies." He showed cause for preferring Shustar to Khisht on military, sanitary, and political considerations ; and, if the menace to Shiraz was a strong argu- ment in favour of the latter position, he recognized a show of impending danger to Isfahan in our maintenance of the former. He wrote : . ‘ Shustar, being further from Muhammarah than Khisht from Bushire, might be more difficult to support were the intervening tribes hostile, and were it not that we have the river Karun to aid us, navigable to our armed steamers. But there not merely are the people l'.keely to be with us, but 44 we shall soon have more ample means for controlling the intermediate coun- try in our Arab levies than we could have at Khisht, where we should be too fnr from the T u i k r s h frontier to obtain the services of the tribes we wish to employ. And the increasing strength of our lines would, I hope, prevent the necessity for further reinforcements until the season for active operations in October next. Should I find, therefore, that it is impracticable to maintain both Khisht and Shustar, I may probably confine our operations to the latter quarter. In which ease it may be advisable to borrow one of General Stalker's European regiments and some of his European artillery, with the double view of adding to our strength on the Karun, and securing a better climate for the Europeans ; and General Stalkers attention would be confined for the pre- sent to the defence of Bushire and holding Kharaj, for which the troops then left to him would, I think, amply suffice/ Previous to the sailing of the expedition, Captain J ones, i.w., the Resident at Bushire, the Revd. Hr. Badger, Captain M. Green, Military Secretary, Commodore Ethersey and Captain Young, i.n., proceeded to Muhammarah to secure the friendly co-operation of the Arab tribes to whom Muhammarah belonged; to obtain information regarding the strength of the Persian armv, the defensive works, the navigation of the Shatt-ul-Arab, &e., &e. Sir James Outram hoped to raise levies amongst the nomads to be found on the confines of Western Persia. Lord Clarendon's instructions had assumed that there were independent tribes amongst those with whom the General would come in contact, and, to avoid complications, had restricted him from seekino- the aid of others. But whether independent or semi-independent, the sovereTgnty of the soil on which they lived and moved was a question which could not be disre- garded. Outram's idea was that we could avail ourselves of the services of the nomads living some on Turkish, some on Persian, territory, and some mi«Tat.in<r periodically from one to the other, provided that, at the close of the war an amnesty were proclaimed to all who befriended us while the war lasted. ’ * The expedition started six weeks later than the time General Outram had expected; the delay was caused by the nou-arrival of reinforcements and the unexpected strength of the armaments prepared by the enemy in front of Bushire. The lateness of the season before which the ascent of the Karun could be commenced* and the restrictions precluding him from embodying the Arab nomad tribes, caused him to anticipate that he might have to aban dm the advance on Shustar. “ In that case, ” he wrote, “ after the seizure of Muhammarah, my operations will be probably confined to driving the enemy from below the. passes in our front, and it will depend on the strength and condition m which they retreat up the passes, whether or not 1 totlow on to Shiraz, or content myself with holding the low country and placing the Europeans on the elevated plateau above Borasjan for the hot months But under any circumstances the hot season must have commenced betore the troops here can be equipped to move against the enemy. The rendezvous below Muhammarah was reached between the 21stand 2 3rd lhe river at the anchorage was 1,200 yards broad ; both hanks were covered with date groves. Favourable accounts were received of the intentions of the Arab tribes • they brought off supplies, .sheep, &e., to the ships. ,, Af^r.Matare deliberation, it being impossible to erect counter- batteries on the I urkisk bank ot the river (neutral territory), and thp P.n nf. TITO rv-p tl-in nnnTL 45 battery and the occupation of the island of Abadan, and the left bank of the Hafar canal offering no advantages, the battery and island being commanded by the works of the main position on the right bank of the canal, General Oufcram resolved to attack the enemy's batteries with the armed steamers and sloops of war, and, as soon as the fire was nearly silenced, to pass up rapidly with the troops in small steamers towing boats, land the force 2 miles above the northern point of the Hafar canal, and immediately advance upon and attack the entrenched camp. Such an operation would be only possible against imperfectly armed batteries manned by Oriental troops. Orders were issued regarding the landing which was appointed for the 25th. It was, in consequence of some unforeseen accident, postponed till the 26th March (some of the large ships shoaled on the way). The following was the order ; Field Force Order, dated'" Feroze, ” 22nd March 1 857. The order for the attack. “ following plan of attack upon Muhammarah was decided on this day : “ 1. The whole of the war vessels and transports to move up S hat t-ul- Arab ; to anchorage some 4 miles below the junction with the Bamishir at such time as the Commodore may appoint with reference to the arrival of the ships not yet come up ; the state of the tides, &c. “ 2* Immediately after dusk, on the day of arrival at the rendezvous, a party of sappers, with mortars and artillerymen, will proceed to Dubbar island, and erect a mortar battery upon it during the night. Brigadier Hutfc will be pleased to direct all arrangements connected with the same in communication with Major Boileau, Commanding Ifngineer, and Captain Selby, i.n. <c 5. The mortars will open fire upon the enemy's works at dawn of day, and the war vessels will move into position off the south-west point of the island as soon after daybreak as possible, under instructions that will be given to the several commanders by the Commodore, opening their fire at first from 800 yards, and subsequently running in abreast of and above the enemy's batteries, as circumstances may determine. “ 4. In the meantime the troops, horses, &c., will be transhipped from the transports into small steamers and boats ready to move up to the left bank of the Shatt-ul-Arab, immediately below Jabis fort, where they will be landed. “ The following are the arrangements for the transhipment of the troops, and any further or more detailed instructions required by commanding officers can be obtained on application from the Deputy Quarter Master General ; The order for the attack. March 23rcL —' The Commodore will be so good as to give the requisite instructions to the commanders of steamers and masters of transports. u During the bombardment of the batteries, the infantry, and that portion of the artillery which will land in advance, will be transferred from the ships to the small steamers and flats as follows > the work to commence at daybreak : . “ D The Planet will be alongside the Ocean Monarch at daybreak, and will take on board as many horses and men of the battery as she can carry, including the horses of Brigadiers Hale and Hutt and three Majors of Brigade. “ The Napier will take from the Avalanche and Euxine 80 horses of the 3rd Troop Horse Artillery and all the staff officers' horses (one horse for 48 m each) and the mounted officers horses of the 7 8th Highlanders now on board those ships. “ (8) The Comet to be kept as a despatch boat. <£ (4) The Assyria will land the stall officers' horses from the F nit ay Sul fart and Fuliay Salam i mounted officers' horses, Light Battalion, from Fuliay Salami and mounted officers' horses, 26th, from Fuliay iloubafnh . “ (6) The Sindian to he alongside the Bride of the Seas at daylight, take off all the 64th Foot from that ship, and afterwards go to the Fuliay Sul fan , and take on hoard the detachment of the same regiment. The remainder of the 64th will go on in the Hugh Lindsay. “ (®) The j !U kersey flat to be alongside the Said an ha on the evening’ of the arrival at the rendezvous, and the whole of the 2 3rd Native Light Infantry, with the mounted officers' horses, uill he transferred to her at daybreak next morning. She will then he taken in tow by the Sindian . “ (7} The detachments 78th Highlanders will he transferred to the Bere* nice in the early morning from the Kingston , Pottinger, and Clifton . “ (8) The head-quarters 26th Native Infantry from the Earl of Clan to the Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy „ “ (9) The wing of the 26th Native Infantry, now on board the British Queen , will remain in that vessel, and be towed by the Berenice . “ (1H) The three companies Light Battalion from the Feroze and the one’ from the Assaye, now on board Precursor , to the Chuan . b “ (11) The three companies Light Battalion in the Fultay Salmi to the Pioneer . “ (12) The Bombay will take the troop of the Sind Horse coming from the Mirzapore . “ Dooly bearers to accompany their own regiments under instructions from the Superintending Surgeon. “ The Commodore has arranged for the horse ships to he towed up as near the batteries as may be found practicable. “The river steamers and flat, after disembarking their horses and men, will immediately return to the horse ships, and land from them as many more as they can carry. a The. Kingston has been appointed the hospital ship. “The infantry transports will not be brought up from the rendezvous until after the fall of the place, when the baggage tents, &e., will be landed, as will hereafter be directed. “ The troops are to land with three days' cooked provisions." By command, (Sd.) E. LXJGARD, Colonel, Chief of the Staff. Soon after daylight on the 24th March,- the fleet was ready to start for the second rendezvous at Huertah. The banks of the river continued to be well fringed with date groves and swampy with grassy slopes to the water's edge. The country appeared to be well peopled, and stocked with numerous herds of cattle. The fleet consisted of 14 steamers and 21 transports, besides 5 small river steamers, flats, and boats. The enemy took no means to annoy the transports, the decks of which were closely packed with troops and within easy range. At noon the Huertah battery was passed ; it was found deserted; it was well placed to rake the river, and consisted of three embrasures of date stumps, with roofing of the same material, but without platforms. At 1 p.m. the fleet anchored off Huertah within sight of Muhammarah. 47 The Arabs welcomed the fleet* and, putting off from shore, gave information concerning the enemy. Dubbar island proving*, on being reconnoitred, to be too swampy for the establishment of a mortar battery upon it, it was decided that a raft should be constructed for two 8'' and two smaller (5") mortars, which should be towed up by the Comet during the night within range of the batteries. On the 25th, the arrangements above were completed. Troops, horses, and guns were transhipped into lighter draught steamers and vessels. All ships prepared for action. The enemy continued to throw up breastworks on cither bank of the Ha far. The following order was issued by the Commodore for the attack on the batteries : Dated " Feroze/' 25th April 1857. ie The following is the order of attack upon the enemy's batteries for to- morrow morning : “ At the earliest dawn the Semiramis , with Clive in tow, leads into the channel on the western bank of the river, and, followed by the Ajdaha and Feroze in close company, anchoring in such a position that the rearmost vessel may have broadside bearing upon the batteries before opening fire, after which every endeavour will be made to silence the enemy's batteries. The Assay e remains at anchor until her commander can proceed and anchor west of the north fort, taking it on the dank. On the fire slacken- ing, the Feroze , followed by th$ Ajdaha , will proceed to cover the landing of the troops, firing on the batteries as she passes. Semiramis weighs with Clive., and drops her on the flank of the batteries inside of the Bamishir, proceeding onward to the attack of the Persian camp and advanced batteries. cc The Victoria with Falkland in tow, to follow Ajdaha , and take up a posi- tion to the south-east fort, as soon as circumstances will permit, to protect transports from fire of the enemy in the date groves. u When the rendezvous flag is hoisted on board of the ship of the Com- modore commanding, it is to be repeated by the other vessels engaged, upon which the steamers, which have already received instructions to land troops, will proceed on that duty, and land them between the first and second creek, suth of Jabi's fort. “ Subsidiary orders regarding the landing of the troops will be issued by the Commodore commanding on the spot. In operations of this nature unforeseen contingencies will arise. No cap- tain will do wrong who places his vesseHn an effective position/' (Sd.) ETHERSEY, Commodore Commanding, At daylight on the 2Gf h, the mortar battery, placed in position during the previous night, opened fire with effect from the b" mortars ; the range of the ,5£" proved to be too short. The enemy soon found its range, and there being delay in the steamers getting off, it was for the space of an hour in considerable danger, and had the enemy had any enterprise, they might have taken or destroyed it. At about 6-#0 a.m. the steamers started : the Semiramis lead the way, with the Clive in tow, the Ajdaha close behind. The Feroze followed shortly after, succeeded by the Assays. The Victoria , towing the Falkland sloop, delayed to engage the guns on the left bank amongst the date groves, evidently awaiting the transports* They then passed on after the others. The leading vessels passed the southern batteries, neared the point of Dubbar, and opened fire,* the Feroze and Assay e followed the latter, taking station near the mouth of the Bamishir and within 200 yards of the batteries* 48 silifitil The Semtramis , trying to get into the Ba mi shir, grounded. The practice of both sides was excellent. For an account of the naval operations, which were highly creditable, see despatches. The bombardment continued till 8 a.m., when the order for the transports to advance was hoisted. At 9-30 am* they advanced, a gun from the Abadan opening upon them in succession. The Berenice steamer, carrying the Highlanders, a company of sappers, and General Havelock and staff of the "2nd Division, led the column ; her decks, crowded, passed within 100 yards of the batteries. Though struck several times in hull and rigging, the decks escaped. The transports pushed on to the ground above the batteries, which had ceased firing, the magazine in the northern fort having exploded. Two field pieces of the enemy opened on the transports — one remained stationary, the other moved up parallel to the shipping, and gave an occasional shot as the ground proved favourable. Much mischief might have been thus caused owing to the crowded state of the decks. Each transport carried a light; gun or more. The Berenice lay close in shore, and the Highlanders and the Grenadiers of the 64th landing advanced as skirmishers. All the infantry, with a field battery and 50 Sind Horse, were on shore by 2 p.m,, when the rising of the tide having filled the creeks and made impassable the ground to be crossed by the horse artillery and troop of the 14th Dragoons, the General determined to advance with those who were ashore. In the meantime the fire of the batteries had ceased. After the} 7 ceased firing artillery, a firing of musketry was opened from them, as well as from, the breastworks, and maintained with great spirit for some time, when storm- ing parties were landed from the Semiramis, Clive , Victoria , and Falkland , which drove before them the last of the enemy, and took possession of their works and guns. The naval casualties amounted to 5 killed and IS wounded. The Sind Horse pushed to the front without encountering any of the enemy. The Persian camps, one immediately to the north of Muhammarah, a second a little to the east of it, and a third more to the westward, were clearly seen. The advance was made as follows : A line of contiguous quarter-distance columns; a field battery on the right; next came in succession the 78th Highlanders, 26th Native Infantry (one wing), Her Majesty's 61th Regiment, the Light Battalion, the 28 rd Bengal Light Infantry — the Whole covered by a cloud of skirmishers. Up to the® moment of our advance, these troops were drawn up in order of battle outside the boundary of the Shahzadah's camp, the right of their liiie far outflanking our left, which had actually no protection when it had once advanced into the open plain, beyond the 23rd Native Infantry being slightly thrown back. When within gun range of the camp, the Persian army seemed literally to have vanished. At the last moment all courage deserted the foe although the odds were greatly in their favour. They were reported to have been very confident at first, but to have lost heart at the size and effect of the 6 8- pounder shot, and the loss very early in the day of Sartip Aga Jhau Khan, their most able chief, whilst showing a most gallant example. In the north battery, Prince Khanlar Mirza was” in chief command. Every tent was left standing. The ground was strewed with arms, accoutrements, ammunition, grains, See, Large quantities of grain, flour, BOUGH SKETCH OF THE ATTACK ON THE BATTERIES O F MUHAMMARAH, By the combined Naval and Military Forces under command of Lieutenant-General Sir James On tram, k.c.b,, 26 tli March 1857. /Scale 1 Inch = 400 Yards * YA P n.<? 4 22 — S?.? 2< f° <? 400 =====^^ YARDS Apr it .1 o! J. A. A (Sd,) J. WRAY, Captain v J>V- Qr- Mr, Genl . P,B,FJ\ N9.9 E PERSIAN V CAMP J o/’ .. -•••.. • t'** ^ Sj& __ "' X /* M ABu & ?nce of \\ r^~"i M ri British troops \\ CD \! jf Q -r 6©^. ji ffzzirzetk Bor/r a AJ PAHA^H^ / .* / V /*• /« x / \ PERSIAN \^ CAMP MUHAMMARAH ,^|| my nnnr i ptnnnj p;^ ^ ■ * KUT FARIS ;=fepg~ :rzr:i\^ f es u zA <s *cn_r ~~ — ~~~ . ~ ~ ~ ~^ . floTtar reft — • *... ,^-A- «*iocVr GfSkj3* r U/oY-f&r*. ^vp-T~ — ■~-"- w » . 9> a </ Semiramii SEMIRAMtS ^iT^rr ABADAN —--'•X Y-* ^C LIVE | VICTOR! A paukw 2?0TK-~~T3iis was compiled cuietiy from a sketch of the ground by Captain Holland, Quarter Master General’s Department. BOUGH SKETCH OF THE ATTACK ON THE BATTERIES 0 F muhammarah. By the combined Haval and Military Forces under command of Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K,c«B., 26tli March 1857, Scale 1 Inch = 400 Yards, 400 300 200 400 ssa#. VAftDS (Sd«) J. WRAY, Captain , ity. $r. Jfr. P.KF.F. 48 The Semiramis, trying to get into the Bamishir, grounded. The practice of both sides was excellent. For an account of the naval operations, which were highly creditable, see despatches. The bombardment continued till 8 A.M., when the order for the transports to advance was hoisted. At 9-30 a.m. they advanced, a gun from the Abadan opening upon them in succession. The Berenice steamer, carrying the Highlanders, a company of sappers, and General Havelock and staff of the 2od Division, led the column ; her decks, crowded, passed within 100 yards of the batteries. Though struck several times in hull and rigging, the decks escaped. The transports pushed on to the ground above the batteries, which had ceased firing, the magazine in the northern fort having exploded. Two field pieces of the enemy opened on the transports — one remained stationary, the other moved up parallel to the shipping, and gave an occasional shot as the ground proved favourable. Much mischief might have been thus caused owing to the crowded state of the decks. Each transport carried a light gun or more. The Berenice lay close in shore, and the Highlanders and the Grenadiers of the 64th landing advanced as skirmishers. All the infantry, with a field battery and 50 Sind Horse, were on shore by 2 p.m., when the rising of the tide having filled the creeks and made impassable the ground to be crossed by the horse artillery and troop of the 14th Dragoons, the General determined to advance with those who were ashore. In the meantime the fire of the batteries had ceased. After they ceased firing artillery, a firing of musketry was opened from them, as well as from the breastworks, and maintained with great spirit for some time, when storm- ing parties were landed from the Semirams, Olive , Victoria, and Falkland , which drove before them the last of the enemy, and took possession of their works and guns. The naval casualties amounted to 5 killed and IS wounded. The Sind Horse pushed to the front without encountering any of the enemy. The Persian camps, one immediately to the north of Muhammarah, a second a little to the east of it, and a third more to the westward, were clearly seen. The advance was made as follows : A line of contiguous quarter-distance columns; a field battery on the right; next came in succession the 78th Highlanders, 26th Native Infantry (one wing), Her Majesty's 81th Regiment, the Light Battalion, the 23rd Bengal Light Infantry — the whole covered by a cloud of skirmishers. . Up to the 6 moment of our advance, these troops were drawn up in order of battle outside the boundary of the Shalizadah's camp, the right of their line far outflanking our left, which had actually no protection when it had once advanced into the open plain, beyond the 23rd Native Infantry being slightly thrown back. When within gun range of the camp, the Persian army seemed literally to have vanished. At the last moment all courage deserted the foe although the odds were greatly in their favour. They were reported to have been very confident at first, but to have lost heart at the size and effect of the 68-pounder shot, and the loss very early in the day of Sartip Aga Jhan Khan, their most able chief, whilst showing a most gallant example. In the north battery, Prince Khanlar Mirza was in chief command. Every tent was left standing. The ground was strewed with arms, accoutrements, ammunition, grains, &c« Large quantities of grain, flour, 49 chopped straw, and dates were secured, and 18 brass gun's and mortars (three 12 and 18-pounders, two 9-pounders). Before flight they exploded their reserve ammunition. The want of cavalry prevented any efficient pursuit j it was pushed to a dis- tance of 8 or 4 miles without results by a few troopers of the Sind Horse. The 14th Dragoons and Blake's Horse Artillery were still delayed on the river banks. The troops bivouacked in line of battle where they stood ; the night proved bitterly cold. During the night a false alarm induced the outlying pickets of two regi- ments to fire into each other, by which five men were wounded. The Dragoons and Horse Artillery joined the camp during the night. On the 27th the army marched back to Muhammarah, and occupied it. The flies in the date' groves by day and the fleas in the sands by night caused great inconvenience. ° Guards were posted in the town, and orders issued that private property should be strictly protected, as also every precaution taken to prevent ill-usage to the inhabitants. The loss of the enemy was estimated to be S00 killed. Many, of the wounded were during their flight mercilessly butchered by the Arabs. The few that fell into our hands, imagining that they were only being reserved for greater torture, at first resisted all kinds of treatment, even water, from the hands of their captors — an unmistakable evidence of their own brutality in warfare. Our casualties were ten men killed, one officer (Lieutenant Harris, i.h.) and thirty men wounded. On inspection the batteries were found to be much damaged, and most of the embrasures destroyed. The works were strong and regularly constructed ; parapets, 18' thick at base, 10' at top. The embrasures S' by 2' were formed of date stumps, firmly fixed in the ground, and blinded by a roofing of sods and date stems. The north battery bad embrasures for 18 guns, and stood on the right bank of the Karun at its junction with the Shatt-ul-Arab, and looked across and down the stream of that river. The south battery had eleven guns, and was on the opposite bank of the Kanin, commanding in the same direction. A small fort, between the north battery and the town, and connected with the former by a long entrenchment, with embrasures for guns, also mounted 8 or 10 guns. This entrenchment, crowded with infantry, had kept up a heavy musketry fire during the action. Several minor batteries of from two to four guns were on either bank ; and just outside the west face of the town, on the right bank, was a very carefully made and strong work for 10 guns. The following is a list of the Persian troops engaged in the defence : 2 regiments Kassaji — commanded by Muhammad Marfd KMn, Sartip . . . . . . 1 regiment Bahadan— Sartip A gd Jban Khan (killed) 1 Silakhori — Moza Khan, Sarhang A v . 4 . T\T— K „ L.- ~ it .. .... „ ' 2 regiments Feraghani — Muhammad Hussain KMn, Sartip 2 ,, Luristani , 1 regiment Jarrandi— All Nukkia Khan, Sartip Artillery . 1,400 700 700 1,400 1,400 700 600 6,900 . 11 Total Regulars . , PA KT op THE KARtJir RIVER ~ VEAK SI ^HA»rAHAH, Smle 1 AwA = vj J/e’fe. •? September 18S8 J, A,- A. Irregakv Infeiitrr, Bak’atMri , Cavalry Arabs . Bil&Ms rfrfy/rfrf'v: ; A Total Irregulars ] ,200 1,500 3,000 400 6,100 13,000 , Grand Total ' ' . ; and ;8| guns* ‘ ^ ^ (Fm General Outranks despatch, see a Cakitdta Gazette ” of 23rd April ^ 1857 J , ; ^ t ‘ , - Skips of 600 tons cm lie in the Hafar channel ; ships; of small to linage cm lie close .in shore, and at low water, both im the Hafar 'channel and in tb@" SfaatHd- Ar&b, north of M uhammar&h. A plank from ship to shore suffices for Thick date groves extend all along . the shore, intersected in every direction by wafer cuts, which render passage through them very difficult for horsemen and impossible for artillery ; for many of the cuts are very deep, and at high water very wide. The Golden Era, a thousand ton ship, was brought close in to the" hank, and slung her horses on shore. During spring tides the banks are overflowed and landing impossible. The small steamers ran close alongside the bank, | mile up the Hafir canal. By gang-boards horses were embarked on them at both high and low t tide. The sappers constructed several landing stages and floating platforms by planking over boats. The facilities for landing here may, therefore, be said to be great. By care- ful reconnaissance, points along the bank can be found, where the obstruction of creeks does not exist, and troops can at once march inland. • The best camping ground is the high open plain about 1 b miles, behind the town. For drinking, the water from the Hafar should be used. To follow up the enemy and to destroy his magazines at Aliwaz, an expedi- rr* f. tion was organized to ascend the river in the steamers arun expe i i . Comet , Bland , and Assyria under the direction of Com- mander Rennie, t.n. * The delay in the despatch of this reconnaissance, the total want of baggage animals preventing it being carried out in any other way, was due to the necessity of coaling the steamers, and putting on board seven days* provi- sions, whilst all were busily engaged disembarking tents and stores from the transports. The troops told off for the service were 150 men from the flank companies of the 6tt-h Regiment, and a like number furnished by the Light and Captain Me Andrew’s companies of the 78th Highlanders. Each steamer took 100 men. The following officers accompanied the expedition — viz,, Captain Wray, Assistant Quarter Master General; Captain Green, Military Secretary to Sir James Outram ; Captain Kemball, Political Agent in Turkish Arabia and Consul at Baghdad ; Captain Baigrec, Lord Kerr, &e. The troops were commanded by Captain Hunt of the 78th Highlanders. The steamers left Muhammarah about 10-80 a.m. on the morning of the 88th March, the Comet leading and lending a tow-rope to the Assyria . A gun- boat carrying two 81-pounder howitzers was also in tow of each steamer. At sunset the flotilla anchored for the night close to the ruined fort of Kotal-al-Abd. The Karun is here about 100 yards wide, 18' to 20' deep, with a powerful current ; its banks fringed on. both sides with dwarf poplar and willow jungle, which extends but a short distance from the bank. , : Below this point to Muhammarah, the Karun varies in width from 90 to 180 yards; banks in many places high and generally covered with tamarisk or dwarf poplar jungle. The marks of five guns and a light four-wheeled carriage were noted close to the anchorage, the Shustar road here being' within 150 yards of the bank. Getting under weigh at daylight on the SOth March, the ruined mosque of Imam Sabbali, the enemy’s second halting ground, was reached early in the afternoon. At this point the river begins to bend sharply, and the progress was slow; an anchorage for the night was effected off the Arab village of Ismaini; information was here obtained that the enemy had passed up the previous day with 7 regiments, 2,000 horse, and 4 guns ; another with its broken carriage was towed up. The Arabs were most friendly, and brought supplies of sheep, milk, &c., in abundance. With the earliest dawn of the 31st March, the flotilla was again under weigh, and the Comet , now casting off the Assyria, proceeded alone, at full speed, to overtake, if possible, the boat with the gun. At 9 a.m. the first straggler was captured ; here another of their bivouacs was passed; the Persian flight was so precipitate that but a small stock of food or fodder was carried with them ; their horses appeared to have been fed on camel-thorn, there being no sign of grain or forage anywhere. Moran was passed in the afternoon, and in the evening Kut-Omaira, where the Arabs came out in numbers, bringing sheep, milk, &c* They gave informa- tion that the enemy had reached Ahwaz on the 30th, but had not yet crossed the river; that the horses had been sent on on account of scarcity of forage; that provisions were scarce, those at Ahwaz being the only store that they had to depend upon ; and that the force was concentrating opposite Ahwaz on the right bank. At 3 a.m,, on the 1st April, the pursuit was resumed, and soon after day. light Ahwaz was sighted, and the Persian army seen drawn up behind a ridge on the right bank. There were crowds of horsemen, some guns, and infantry innumerable. Four large masses of infantry were partly screened by a low range of sand-hills which ran along their front; three guns were in position near a small mpsque in their centre, a fourth being on a slope below and to the left of it. Their line fronted down the river and at a slight angle to it, their left resting immediately upon its bank. The flotilla steamed to within 3,000 yards of the position, capturing the boat carrying the 12-pounder brass gun. A couple of horsemen, following the movements of the steamers, were dispersed by a rifle shot. Some Arabs now hailed from Ahwaz, and were brought on board ; they gave information that the garrison of the ..village did not exceed 500 infantry and 30 horse left to protect the stores which had scarcely been touched by the enemy before our approach. It was now determined to land on the left bank, and to reconnoitre Ahwaz. To cover the movement, a gunboat was to ascend the river and open fire with its two howitzers, covering "the retirement, should Ahwaz prove to be held in force. Beyond two boats and two baliams, the enemy had no means of crossing the river, and the force ran no risks on this account. At 10 a.m. the landing took place. To deceive the enemy, three separate * detachments were formed, each <e in rank entire, ” to act and look like regiments in brigade. The landing and these arrangements were made in jungle sufficiently high to conceal the men, and to prevent their numbers being ascertained. A single line of skirmishers, each man 10 or 12 paces apart, first issued from the bushes on the plain in view of the enemy ; the supports followed these at about 10 0 yards interval, also in single rank, and with files very it i I ' • •' ■ . I i | ; i : : , | j gup r h8r much loosened. At another interval of about 100 yards, tke three main detachments advanced, about 200 yards apart, each in columns of threes, and opened out to very wide intervals. The Highlanders were on the left; the 64th in the centre, and Captain McAndrew's detachment of 64th and High- landers on the right. Cowed by his recent defeat, the troops exhausted by a rapid retreat and want of food, and the heavy shells from the gun-boat bringing to mind the recent losses experienced at Muhammarah, the Shahzadah retired, leaving his supplies to their fate. The town was not defended, the garrison retiring up the river. On the approach of the troops, the village Shaikh, with his retinue, came out some 100 yards to claim protection, and to make his sub- mission. On the condition of his pointing out and assisting to destroy the Persian magazines, it was agreed that private houses should not be searched, and the town property should be respected. The Persians neither returned the fire of the gun-boat nor opened upon the town, although the range was within 500 yards. About noon a shell was pitched close to a small mosque where the Shahzadah had his head-quarters, whereupon a movement in retreat commenced, and the army of 9,000 or 10,000 men retired in perfect order before a detachment of 306. Taking the detachment as the advance guard of General Outranks force, and dreading a general action, the Persian prince preferred to run the risk of losing his men by starvation in a retreat upon Shustar, where were his next dep6ts of supplies, and to abandon his supplies and a strong military position. Their infantry, still keeping in four distinct masses, first retired, march- ing very rapidly on a course parallel to the river, taking the four guns seen in position with them. The cavalry, exceeding 2,000 in number, brought up the rear; they were well mounted and dressed in long blue frocks, with trousers of lighter colour, a white belt, and the high black lambskin cap peculiar to the Persians. A sabre and long matchlock, slung across their backs, appeared to be their only arms ; no lances were seen. Amongst them were the pick of the Bakhtiari horse, esteemed to be the Shah's best cavalry. They carried three standards with them in crimson cases, not flying. A party crossed over and exploded the ammunition abandoned. As much flour and wheat as could be stowed on the steamers was retained ; the remainder of the immense stores of grain was thrown open to the Arabs to carry away. Besides grain, 15 cases of firelocks and bayonets were taken, 56 mules, a number of pack saddles, numerous intrenching tools, and many sheep. It was proposed to follow the enemy to Wais. Had this been possible, the starving army might have surrendered. The scheme was found to be impracticable however, as the steamers could not be got past tliejiver bunds. ( For despatch in full, see u Calcutta Gazette )} of 2nd May 1857.) The climate was pleasant; the mornings and nights cool, the maximum heat being 80°. For a description of Almaz, see Military Eeport on South-West Persia , Intelligence Branch , Quarter Master General’s Department in India . To the remarks there made upon the means of turning the rapids may be added the simple expedient of blasting a passage in-shore on the left bank, of sufficient width, and of stationing there permanent gangs of Arabs to haul the traffic through. A suitably buoyed passage midstream or along the right bank would enable all boats to shoot them without danger during the spring of the year. The expedition remained at Alnvaz during the 2nd of April. On the morning of the 3rd, it left for Muhammarah, running down stream at a great speed, and reaching it at 8 p.m. g— liagli . s &, c ; During its absence all the stores and tentage required for the comfort; of the army had been landed, and a large, regularly pitched camp established on the open plain, about a mile from the river, the most elevated spot to be found in the neighbourhood. A strong moral effect was produced by the capture of Muhammarah, which the Persians imagined they had rendered impregnable by the massive batteries they bad erected, the number of guns they had placed in them, and the strength of the garrison. This was . the only blow that could be struck after the occupation of Push ire without penetrating into the interior — an operation which would have caused a heavy drain on our resources. Fortunately for both countries, both had discovered how unwise it was to continue the struggle. >, General Outrara thus wrote non-officially to the Chairman in the Court of Directors of the result of the Ahwaz expedition : “A more daring feat is not on record perhaps than that of a party of 300 infantry, backed by three small river boats, following up an army of some 8,000 men, braving it by opening fire, deliberately landing and destroying tlie enemy's magazines, and capturing one of his guns in the facts of his entire army, and actually compelling that army to fly before them, and then occupying for three whole days the posi- tion they had compelled the enemy to vacate. The effect will be to clear Khuzistan entirely of the Persians ; and the entire province, including Shu star and Dizful, is now at our command, and the Persians will never make head again in the province, for they have neither troops nor guns, nor stores nor munitions of war, wherewith to reinforce and supply their troops in this quarter. Whether, therefore, we occupy Aliwaz or Shustar, the Persians will certainly leave the province altogether in apprehension of an attack from our army. The news of the treaty of peace concluded at Paris on the 4th March, negotiated between Lord Cowley and Farukh Khan, was received and pro- mulgated. The troops were in good health and condition, acclimatized and inured to exposure in all weathers. The Comet proceeded to Baghdad to ascertain the conditions of peace. The 64th Regiment early in the month rejoined the 1st Division at Bushire. Russian influence alone could have protracted Persian resistance after the occupation of Bushire and Muhammarah, her finances being in a deplorable state, and her forces disorganized. Pending the ratification of the treaty, the Shahzadah sent in a messenger to inform Sir James Outram of the conclusion of peace, and received a reply that had he not been aware of it, he should have been at Shustar to beat his quarters up days before. Like notification was received at Bushire by General Jacob from the Sarashkarbashi, who received in answer the following replies : 7 Itiilil H Dated Bushire, 12th April 1857. After compliments, &c., &c. — a You mention the evils of war. No injury can come to the English from the continuance of the war with Persia, which His Majesty the Shah, under the influence of foolish advisers, has provoked. But when the English Government shall have been satisfied and may be pleased to give orders to that effect, there will be peace/'* And again on the 15th April : « As to the peace at which the Shuja rejoices, and on hearing of which he has apparently become brave and proposes to advance nearer to the British cam p, I have heard that His Majesty the Shah having satisfied the demands of the English Government, it has been determined to make peace ; but no terms or particulars have as yet reached me.” « We have not found the Persian soldiers very formidable in war. They have probably out of pure mercy and good-will kept pretty well out of our reach ; but be it peace or be it war, if the Persian Commander-in-Cliief or the brave and truthful Shuja-ul-Mulk presuming on our forbearance move nearer our camp, and their people bausc any annoyance to our servants and unarmed followers, whether of this country or of India, I shall order my cavalry to take the offenders, and shall cause them to be punished ; for if it be war, they are enemies ; and if it be peace, they are robbers.'" The enemy’s army in retreat on Shustar was described to be in such extre- mity from want of provisions, that they might at any moment be heard of as having dispersed, each man seeking to subsist as best be might. The silence of their guns and non-resistance to our proceedings at Ahwaz is fully accounted for by the fact of their having but seven mule-loads of ammunition with their entire army; and as they were expecting, when they moved off, that they might possibly be overtaken and brought to action, they would, in case they had expended this on us, have been almost without the means of resist-. To insure his army fighting to the last, the Shah had actually ordered the Want of cavalry. if tlibes *° f oso ** f ss f having them no retreat ; so that five hundred sabres would in this instance have secured us the Shahzadah himself, his guns, and his army days before the intelligence reached us which tied the General's hands. With the magnificent and incomparable cavalry, both regular and irregular, at her command, the greater mismanagement and pity it is that Great. Britain should ever lack a sufficiency of this arm wheu results almost incalculable might, as on this occasion, have been secured by their presence. The Planet steamer left Muhammarali with despatches for Baghdad on the 29th April. Sir James Outram thus wrote to Mr. Murray on the 23rd April : “ The previous official announcement of peace, received here on the night of the 4th April, of course tied our hands and saved the Prince's army from unconditional capitulation, which must have followed the advance of this division to Ahwaz (if not to Shustar itself) ; for the inhabitants of Shustar and Dizful would probably have risen against their oppressors at our approach (as, indeed, we received intimation they proposed doing) ; but without anv such compulsion their dread of our advance against them would, there can be no doubt, have induced proffers of surrender in their dispirited state, conscious as they are of their inability to stand against us (even had they the pluck), as they are devoid of ammunition and supplies ; and they would prefer the alternative of surrender to us to running the gauntlet of the tribes in any endeavour to retire towards Burujird. They have scarcely any musket ammuni- tion even left wherewith to defend themselves. “ Knowing that this division would meet with no opposition, I had arranged to send it up to Aliwaz under command of Havelock, there to be guided by the information Kemball would obtain regarding the state of the enemy, whether or not to push on to Shustar ; and the information we have since received makes it certain that the occupation of Shustar (and Dizful) would have been effected without opposition; consequently Havelock would certainly have advanced, and the surrender of the Persian army must have ensued. I myself 55 arranged to returned to Bushire (sending back the 64th there) to attack the Sirkesheechee Bashee*; and from the information we now have of the position lie has taken ap at Nanizak, there can be little doubt that we could have cut off his retreat by the cavalry dashing round to his rear when attacked by our artillery and infantry from the front. Of the result there can be no doubt : thirty more guns added to our stores,, and another army captured or destroyed — a very satisfactory termination for our short campaign. “ No discretionary power lias been left to me to sent back any portion of the army to India; and, perhaps, slippery as Persian diplomatists so noto- riously are, it is as well to husband all our strength in Southern Persia until the Shah has really ratified the treaty. But I should have preferred all troops, beyond those who can be maintained in Bushire, being located at Karachi (whence they could be brought back in time for further operations, should they be necessary) to keeping them here. As it is, I am compelled to leave the 2nd Division in this neighbourhood, for we cannot accommodate more troops at Bushire/ * The banks of the Karun were examined with the view to the selection of a permanent camping ground as far as Sabla, but none offered itself better than that the troops now occupied. It was determined on the 24th April to collect material and to build huts at once ; the shipping to he kept in readiness to receive the troops, and on the least appearance of sickness the men to be transferred to them, and dropped down to the mouth of the river or any other healthy spot. ■/;. • .... t It was proposed to extemporise quarters for Europeans, double roofed and well ventilated, with tatties to temper the fiery air ; to build efficient huts for the sepoys, and to roof in the transports to provide cool barracks for the sickly. , ^ The supply of forage for the baggage animals and the detention were serious considerations. General Jacob opposed the idea of cantoning troops at Muhammarah, and wrote thus to General Out-ram on the subject : u I am quite certain that if you do as you propose, you will make a most shocking mess of it, and perhaps cause the most serious loss by sickness. “ We know what the deltas of large rivers are all over the world. I care not what particular spot you select in them or near them ; a few miles here or there, or a few feet or a hundred feet of higher or lower level, make no differ- ence. The locality is deadly, and must be so during and after the inundation. u Muhammarah, or other place near the mouth of the Euphrates, is only ^valuable, and should only be occupied as the extremity of the Karun line. If we have not this line, to attempt to hold the mouth of the river is mad- ness ; we should have all the injury and inconvenience, and none of the advantage. “ The loss by sickness in one season would probably be fifty times greater than any which we could suffer in retaking the place if necessary; while, in the one case, the survivors would be broken-hearted and demoralized, and, in the other, strengthened and encouraged to further exertions/' General Jacob expressed his conviction that the climate of Bushire was better than it had been represented to be, and the island of Kharaj was the * As now rendered Sarkasliakchibashi, commander of the guard. His force had been esfci- mated in February at 27,000 men, including 31 regiments of regular infantry and a numerous body of cavalry, with 85 guns. But Sir James knew that many of the guns must be left above the passes. ISWlllillil M Ai Hi MPH -3 %est place in the Gulf for troops, there being abundant spring's of beautiful water there. 5=5 These opinions were adopted. In the end of April, the General visited Kharaj and Bushire with the object of providing healthy shelter for the force. j After securing General Jacob’s consent to remain in command on his eventual departure for India he returned to Muhammarah, and thence, on the 17th May, proceeded to Baghdad to arrange the formation of the mission to be deputed to Herat to see the evacuation of that fortress and district carried out by the Persians; and, m conjunction with Captain Kemball, to take measures for the disposal and discharge of such portions of the animals and establishments of the land transport corps as were not required at Bushire. Persia ^ 16 Ba S h dau for Bushire, and on June 17 th final] y left Early in May^ the force at Muhammarah began to disperse ; the High- landers and Blake s horse artillery, the mountain train and Madras sappfrs, being the first to leave for India. At this time the thermometer read 102- in the tents. On the break up of the force, the following Field Force Order was issued : Field Force Order, dated Camp Muhammarah, 9th Maj 1857. ‘[ C r,T mt °r tbe f ssat i° n of hostilities in Persia, the following troops will be held in readiness to embark for India • ° no P s “Third Troop of Horse Artillery to Karachi j 1st company 2nd Battalion of Artillery to Karachi ; reserve companies to Bombay ; Her Majesty’s 6kh He giment to Vingorla; Her Majesty’s 78th Highlanders to Bombay] Light Bat talion to Bombay ; Madras Sappers and Miners to Bombay. ^ “ 2. The 23rd Native Light Infantry and the 26th Native Infantry are transferred to the 1st Division, and will proceed to Bushire with the detach- meD « f m, nd I ?°I Se a f nd 1 La " d Ti-ansport Corps now at Muhammarah. P T f P °- tbS 2nd , DlVlsl0n wil1 rctam to Bombay, with the exception of the engineers ordnance, and commissariat departments, which will proceed to Bushire, and await further instructions. “4. Brigadier-General Jacob, c.B., will command the troops stationed at Bushire, wlueli will be organized as follows : 1 U 1 “ Cavalry Brigade -. :3rd Regiment Light Cavalry, Sind Horse, Punah Horse Aden roop, 14th King s Light Dragoons— Brigadier Stewart Artillery Brigade . — 4th Truop Horse Artillery 3rd LioLf Pml,] Poo 5th Light Field Battery , 8th Light Field Battery, three companies of the W 1,1 tle itL “ Infantry, 1st Brigade.— 20th Regiment Native Tnfantry, 26th Regiment Native Infantry .—Colonel Maean ; 2nd Brigade— 4th Beno-al Nntih t,,y l 4 23rd Regiment Native Light Infantry, BiMeh Battalion. -Cokmel Ilonnei T ’ o. The Lieutenant-General avails himself of this opportunity to return his wannest thanks to the whole of the troops placed under his command for service m Persia, for their very exemplary conduct since their airSn tlfil country, evinced by the fact of scarcely one instance of SeoXt ont part of any individual having been brought to his notice. This entire ab sence of crime amongst so large a body of troops assembled in camp redounck to the credit of both officers and men, and is the strongest possible proof of the 57 cxptdS; °L d 2'^ °1„ j 1 ' : t i ’™'Kh' ! 1 l J tr r s' 1 ™ 1 «■• , “«■ Lieutenant-General 1s!r laif o"r” n ' le, ' mOStl !?”* dre »»“‘u»ee” Wur.dwithsuchacomraandblTot M„? “ *? l - d “ r wh ° b “ b«M opportunity has not been afforded theVoons hvTlf Dg h ’ S r f gret tlmt mo ™ ot that prowess and gallant spirit Jhth i V tte eUemy for tlte display ranks; but as peace hfs been concluded ty g ei kn ° ws . to P™I amongst ad inent, it is a source of much satisfWKm/ f +u ^ T ^ C10US Majesty's Govern- great portion of the force is thus enabled to Ll + eutenarjt -General that a the monsoon commences; and he hones fhit 40111 0Dee to dnd ia before of the Persian Government with tireond tions'ot H 0011 "/ 11 ! 1106 ° n the P art remove the necessity which still exists for ^ 16 treat >' wil1 shortly “ 7. Whilst bidding farewell to thA lui f bpr oc <mpation of Bushire. mg them a pleasant voyage and hannv abo " t , t ° le . ave Persia, and wish- in India, the Lieutenant-General beS to assert th J families audfr; ends is to remain at Eushire **»» th»« that no exertion will be spared fa/render theii U t *° r theu ’ welfare, and as comfortable and as little injurious to tli h( Sf this country bar lacks are in course of erection, and militarv m t M P assi ^ e - Spacious are being collected for their use. 4 7 materia!s of every description to all now about to 1 ^W^ S t^i^i^' n ^^ l ^|^!' offer his sincere thanks C.b.j for the zealous and valuable ^ i iT ^^* a( ^ ler -Greneral Havelock «je ™ «““ » to Brigadiers Hutt, Hale and H™;it ! , wdl beso good as to convev personal, divisional, and brigade staffs Stf 4 ° f * ! ? General officers of his mental officers, a similar expression of’hfiY i “V® t he “edieal and depart- services they have performed ° f *" ^ f ° r the vakab ^ and efiS Y U ’ m - «. “ d likewise Maior Bove Denntv T„T Tf Infantry of the 1st Division and Watson, Chaplain, who also return!' to *iZfa»' Geam!ll > md the Reverend G. By command, (Sd.) E. LUGAED, Colonel, t> , , , Chief <ff the Staff. troops from Iletotftfreltjffish all Sb^ 8 ^ 1 * 4 ° witlldraw his to demand any marks of obedience sur W ^ sovereignty over it, and never the King-) from the chiefs He furtW e comag*e 5 or hhutbah (prayerfor — "»*. fchn-l Xis of f »»» d i.tafcr! ence of Herat. All prisoners taken at and ‘° f «*«» the independ- ransom. The British mission * a ! Heiat wer f be set at liberty without The slave trade was to be suppressed in th r p 61v . ed a * Tihran with apologies, were to be made to Mr S o the P f man Gulf - finally, apoCies ministers. U1MJ fo1 the msoleut conduct of the Shah andhis at BagM " d between Mr - mainedin command at Bushire. ^ ° 1Ce ° U tbe E ‘ aruD; General L c Jb re- ! §MI : fell .... '. - \a; .IMkj §g§ jm His best endeavours were given to completing Bushire as a dep6t of sup- plies and to stock it with coal, provisions, hay, &c., all of which had to be forwarded from India before the monsoon set in, or forwarded in country craft from the Euphrates. He also requisitioned India to supply smiths, car- penters, and tools, none being procurable in Persia. The Persian force collected during April at the foot* of the hills at Nanizak was estimated to be some 17,000 to 18,000 men, with 25 to 30 guns, and' wad known to be strongly posted. It was necessary to clear the plain of these, and to hold an advanced posi- tion dominating the plains ; to retreat after beating the enemy, or after his Sight would, General Jacob thought, do more harm than the delay necessary to ensure the arrangements to effect the above. ■ 1 he force under General Jacob was insufficient for this purpose. Leaving one regiment in camp, he could not muster for the expedition over 1,500 infan- try. It was therefore proposed not to attack the Sarashkarbashi Until .rein- forcements could be sent from the Karun. General Jacob s opinion was that the army would never be satisfactorily placed until the whole country from the Karun to Bushire was in our occu- pation, and our communications carried on through it. Early in April detachments of the 3rd Cavalry and of the 14th Dragoons arrived at Bushire and landed. Ihe want of coal at the various ports of the Gulf and at Muscat was much felt. Towards the end of the month the stock both of it and of screwed hay became plentiful at Bushire, and sufficient for three months'’ consumption. On the 23 rd April, Geneial Jacob wrote to General Outran) proposing that, as he was quite convinced the peace would be confirmed, all the European troops should be. sent back to India; that Muhammarah should be abandoned, and the following garrison kept at Bushire, vie.': Two Infantry Brigades — 1st Brigade . . ' . Regiment. 12/ th 2nd Brigade . C Light Battalion altered to 23rd Regiment, ri . , ° ' * iBiiueh „ One Artillery Brigade — 3rd Troop Horse Artillery . ,r Gibbard’s Mold Fattery . . 3 with four subalterns each. Hutche s Biekl Battery . . ( Two reserve companies of Golundauze, each with three officers. Commissary of Ordnance. Commanding Engineer. Two companies Sappers. All the artificers. One Cavalry Brigade — 3rd Light Cavalry. Punah Irregular Horse. 1st Regiment Sind Irregular Horse. • Two large steamers. The river steamers Planet , Comet , and one other to remain at Bushire. Plenty of coal. , ^ ^ ^f r< ? determined not to send the remainder of the force back to India, Be counselled the 2nd Division being moved to Kharaj, except the Sind Horse, c mar ebed to Bushire, attended by proper Persian officials. To hold Muhammarah, he recommended that two large ships of war be stationed here; so that should the crews get sickly, one at a time might go on a cruise 59' Oil the 1 5th May, Brigadier-General Havelock, with the staff of his late division and the Light Battalion, sailed for India, All had embarked by the 16th May. Previous to his departure, the town of Muhammarah was given up to Shaikh Jabber's tribe of K'ab Arabs, and the Clive sloop was left moored in the river to prevent the ‘Persians from molesting them or entering the town before tbe evacuation of Herat should be certainly ascertained. Of the original force, the 64th Regiment, 2nd European Light Infantry, 78th Highlanders, Light Battalion, 3rd Troop Horse Artillery, No. 2 Light Field Battery, and the Madras Sappers and Miners returned to India. The 20th, 23rd, 26th, Biluch Battalion, 4th Rifles, No. 3 and No. 5 Light Field Batteries, No. 4 Troop Horse Artillery, the Native Light Field Battery, 3rd Cavalry, Punah. Horse, Sind Horse, and Bombay Sappers were to remain at Bushire and Kharaj until the terms of fhe treaty had been fulfilled. ' * A party of officers (two, Captain Green and Dr. Wood) proceeded to Baghdad to accompany the Ambassador to Tihran, Jfhe Herat deputation consisted of Major R. L. Taylor, 18th Bombay Native Infantry, Lieutenant Claude Clerk, 2nd Madras Cavalry, and Lieu- tenant B. Hardy, Bombay Artillery. When in June Genera] Outram proceeded to India, he handed over the command at Bushire to General Jacob, c.&. His principal attention was required to provide effective shelter for the four months of summer. This was so well accomplished that the mortality among the troops was no greater than if they had been iu a temperate climate. The occupation of Bushire lasted till October, when it was handed over to the Persians. A single Native Infantry regiment remained on the island of Kharaj till the beginning of 1858, when it too was evacuated (4th February 1858). The writer* of u the Persian War of 1856-57" thus concludes his article in Blackwood: “ So ended the Persian war of 1856-57. Like the little child in Southey's c famous victory/ our readers may ask, * And what good came of it at last ? ' And we cannot tell, any more than the old man could, except that it certainly was not a * famous' victory. It is not much to boast of that by an expend- iture of two or three millions sterling, we equipped a force sufficient to har- ass the shores of a barbarous empire, which had not a single war-galley. W. made the Persians give up Herat; but what benefit either Her Majesty's Indian or English empire received we cannot comprehend. » What little interest we have in Persia should be friendly, "and make it an object to strengthen her; but by depriving her of Herat, we of course weakened her, and alienated her affections. Formerly English officers used to drill the Persian batta- lions; but lately a whole staff of Frenchmen have been summoned to Tihran. By making Herat independent, we have added one more to the turbulent prin- cipalities of Central Asia, and therefore made one more chance of a disturb- ance. This would matter little to the English public or Indian ryot (who, as he has to pay the war charges, is a principal party interested) were it not for the unfortunate inclination our statesmen evince to meddle in these mat- ters, which concern them not. “The British Embassy returned to Tihran in July, and a mission under Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor was despatched to Herat to see the former * His conclusions can be received only as those of a Magazine writer with a partial knowledge of the requirements of Imperial interests (If. S» B.) 60 dynasty re-established, and the Persian occupation properly terminated. This object was successfully accomplished. iS There were two circumstances so disposed of by Providence at this time as materially to sustain our empire in the East : one, was the conclusion of the war with .Persia; the other, the commencement of the war with China. The first sent the 64th and 78th Regiments, with the gallant Havelock, to Bengal, and saved ■ Lucknow 'from the fate of Cawnpore. The- war with China had summoned a large force from Great Britain, who were diverted from their .course. at Singapore, and placed under the Indian Government, by orders of Lord Elgin. Our statesmen have taken measures to prevent another' Indian mutiny. We trust that public opinion will prevent our statesmens , from commencing another Persian ward* , 1 !<. * ROUGH sketch op THE attack oh Bashir "■ Cav £P ® Dn i V eewE b'e+xs'Ji' ,A\ ; i i .7/^sUf.v/,^ I SOOycLs | CA,,„ / y/ V V/ *""l 1 ** > /w;j r , ' f y^;/ni'' / W///n n w//l UC' S ' > // £>Qtb j^j | 2"* position 33 -rok^ux/ ^ rou^odj ’i 1 2.H.A.gcjr<s lfl */®J •'•-'■ yr*U . c (Sd.) J WRAY, extern, ft M„ J\ p. j? P' 3 d Cava I ry \.jr one squadron B att e ry fjf E • L . I. Svance skirmish ^ bg de e,Kv**m^ ^ Battery V/3^C S Baiuch 2" 05 E.L.i ■I' <|f >1' i|i ijr t|s 3 at t e rjy reference. a The redoubt of Rashir. ince of the line 812 am v . l - i ‘-< September iSSS £*0. J. A A. Avvmmx a. Despatches and Extracts prom Reports concerning the movements and NUMBERS OF THE ENEMY. Nor detailed despatches , see “ Calcutta Gazettes ” cf 1st November 1856, 7th January f 12th March , 23rd April , 2nd May , and 19th June 1857 . Dated Bushire* 12th December 1856. Despatch from— M ajor-General F. Stalker, c.b., Commanding Persian Expe- ditionary Foi'ce, To — The Adjutant-General, Bombay Army. 1 have the honor to report, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the movements of the Field Force under my command since the commencement of the operations. On our arrival off Bushire, I despatched reconnoitring* parties to examine the coast between the fort and FI all la Bay. See rough sketch No. 7, and also pages 107 and 110 . The reports I received were to the effect that the only points at which a landing could he effected at neap tides were immediately to the proper left of the Bushire batteries under the fire of the walls and in Halfia Bay. There being a deficiency of boats, and being unwilling to expose the infantry to the fire of the enemy's batteries without the certainty of supports from our own artillery, I determined on landing in Halfia Bay. At midday, on the 6th instant, the fleet dropped down to the Bay, and anchored at miles from the beach. Before evening all our arrangements were made and necessary orders given for the landing, &e. At daylight, on the 7th, the landing of the troops commenced, covered by the gunboats of the fleet. As the boats neared the shore, a number of armed men, between 600 and 400 probably, appeared among the date groves near the landing place, but they were driven away by the fire from the boats. The troops landed without further opposition, and advanced immediately into the date groves, whence they were removed the same evening to better ground near the village of Halfia. On the morning of the 9th, I advanced towards Bushire, intending to occupy the village of Imamzadah with my right, and to place my left near the old fort of Bushire, so as to communicate easily with the store and hospital ships, which, by previous arrangement with Rear-Admiral Sir Henry Leeke, had been ordered to stand in and anchor as near shore as possible. The advance party found Rashir in possession of the enemy — some men of the Tangistani tribes under their chief. The advance skirmished with the enemy until the main body came up, when, after a sharp fight, the tribesmen were destroyed or driven off, and the force encamped. On the following morning I advanced on Bushire, passing the wells and redoubt outside the town without opposition. A number of men occupied the ground, and had entrenched themselves on it close to the redoubt, but, as we approached, they disappeared. As we neared the town, we saw the garrison passing in great numbers from the batteries towards the creek. At 1 j?.m. the force was in front of the town. The governor surrendered, and those of the garrison who had not made their escape across the creek laid down their arms the same evening in' front of the gateway. I am now encamped near the redoubt, a mile from the walls of the town. The permanent encampment is marked out, and we are now moving into it. The force landed without baggage. The men had their greatcoats, canteens filled with water, and three days’ cooked rations, and were for four days and nights without any shelter whatever. I am happy to say that as yet they do not appear to suffer from the exposure. The want of dooly-bearers was severely felt. We were obliged to make up canvas stretchers for the sick and wounded, and our men, assisted by tent and store lascars, had to carry them. All the sick are now in the hospital ship, and are well cared for. Memo, by— Captain J. Wbay, Assistant Quarter Master General, Persian Expeditionary Field Force. See rough sJcelch No. S- A. of the attach on Bashir. A . — The redoubt of Raslffr. B. — Village occupied by the enemy. The advance moved at the well C y and took up a position as shown. After an hour's delay, some of the enemy made their appearance in the direction of the village B , and the left gun opened to drive them back again. The enemy immediately opened & hot fire from the front face of the work, wounding several of our men. The main body, being now near at band, the line retired for several hundred yards, the enemy following up closely. At about 800 yards from the redoubt the line deployed and advanced, covered by the fire of the field batteries and horse artillery, and stormed the work, the survivors of the enemy leaving it by its rear face, the cavalry following along the sea beach. Memo, by— C aptain J. Wjiay, Assistant Quarter Master General, Persian Expeditionary Field Force. "References . (a) battery at point; (b) battery facing sea; (c) battery facing sea; (r7) battery facing sea ; {e) battery behind gate ; (/) gateway; (g) deseSled redoubt. (A) shows the position of the horse artillery and cavalry who were sent off to the right to cut off the guns when we saw them move off from the battery. (j?) The advance of the 5th Light Field Battery on right, 1st Brigade, de- ployed. 2nd Brigade, in mass of columns, afterwards deployed in contiguous columns at quarter distance. (C) Small party of cavalry. (D) Four companies 2nd European Light Infantry, sappers, and 6 guns sent to occupy the deserted battery at 6. ■ *■ . i {E) Intended position of gun-boats in the creek. f ; j See Rough sketch No. 3 of the advance on Rush ire, 10th December 1856. j; I From the Quarter Master General, Bombay Army, to tlie Commissary General, Bombay,— No. 112, dated 5th January 1857. Calls for report of the causes which prevented the despatch of the cattle ; j and dooly-bearers from Bombay in time to aid in the landing .of the troops i \ and stores at Bushire. • fci Dated Bushire, 12th December 1856. Despatch from— Major-General F. Stalker, c.b., Commanding Persian Expo- I :' ditionary Field Force, . g uj.uoua.ry jc letu cuiw, To — The Adjutant General, Bombay Army. - E.S- i I have the honor to report, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the complete success which, _ under the protection of Almighty God, has attended our arms. The British flag waves over the walls of Bushire. The place, infinitely stronger than I had any reason to 'W believe from the information I had received, surrendered on the appearance fe of our troops before it on the 10th instant. The previous day we had a smart I" affair in dislodging the enemy from a strong position they occupied in the TV ■Pm.f nf “R.oobir* TIia '-/> a.analf.iAR nn this nncHsimi. thon.o*h Tmmpri. old Dutch fort of Rashir. cally small; were principal! — ~ o x - »/ x. e casualties on this occasion, though xiumen- captain YVOOU, JJieUbfciimUUS U ilbibuu u-uu. »» jwtcuj.^ui/u xncguucuu, vvuyuucu , .y the two latter since dead (Captain Wood, though severely wounded, is doing ■ well) . The lesson the enemy received on this occasion, together with the bom- well) . The lesson the enemy received on this occasion, together with the bom- barding of the works, the imposing appearance of the troops in line and of the ... fleet was doubtless the cause of their want of spirit in surrendering the strongly t uaiuillg UJL bllC YVU11V-, unv uu^vouig cnji^r - — r r ■ — w — ; fleet was doubtless the cause of their want of spirit in surrendering the strongly f i fortified town of Bushire, in which we have found §9 guns * with large quanti- F ties of ammunition and warlike stores. The governor of the place and the com- ' j inander of the troops came out and gave up their swords. They and one of the principal officials are no w in my camp, and will be sent to Bombay. The garrison, i to the number of 1,500 or 2,000 men (a large number having previously effected their escape, and very many others having been drowned in attempting to do j so) grounded their arms in front of our line, and were next morning escorted by the cavalry some distance into the country and set free. Every assistance ; and co-operation has been rendered by the fleet; a heavy fire was opened in ! the early morning, and kept up spiritedly for some hours, till the place surren- dered. At Rashir also, the previous day, all the co-operation possible was i rendered by the fleet. And my very best thanks are due to Sir Henry Leeke, | the officers and seamen, for their unwearied exertions in landing the troops, , wl lie b, owing to the absence ol any other boats than those of the fleet, was a l work of much labour, occupying the greater part of three days and two nights. .JMmm | The force landed at Hall la Bay, about 12 or 13 miles south of Bushire, with- M U | out any serious opposition, a body of 300 or 400 ; men who appeared being ; scattered by the fire of the gun-boats. There being no caniage cattle, the ■’ i troops were landed without tents or baggage of any description, three days \ # Six others have since been discovered. [ 9 64 rations being carried in the havresacks. The hardships which the men have been called upon to undergo have been endured most cheerfully, and I cannot say too much in their praise. Being still without our baggage, I have been unable as yet to obtain the reports called for from the several officers com- manding brigades, regiments, and detachments; but I shall do myself the honor to enclose them for the information of His Excellency the Commander- ip-Chief. 1 ought to have mentioned that on approaching Bushire, the enemy were observed to occupy in some force an entrenched position, with a strong redoubt about a mile and a half from the walls, and commanding the wells from which the main supply of water for the town is derived. This position was precipitately abandoned on my line being formed. It also had sustained a bombardment from the fleet. I would beg especially to mention the unwearied exertions and valuable aid rendered to me, from the landing at Halfla Bay to the taking of Bushire by my Assistant Adjutant General, Lieutenant-Colonel Younghusband ; Cap- tain Wray, the Assistant Quarter' Master General; Major Hill, Commanding Engineer; Captain Dunsterville, Assistant Commissary General; and Dr. Mackenzie, the Superintending Surgeon. Brigadier Stopfordand Lieutenant-Colonel Maletdied leading on their men in the most gallant style. Brigadier Homier, Commanding 2nd Infantry Brigade ; Lieutenant-Colonel Shepheard, who succeeded to the command of the 1st Infantry Brigade; Lieutenant. Colonel Trevelyan, Commanding the Artillery Brigade; and Lieutenant-Colonel Tapp, Commanding the Cavalry Brigade, have earned my warmest thanks for the manner in which their arduous duties have been carried out, as also Captain Pottinger, Brigade Major of Artillery, whose exertions were conspicuous; and my best thanks are equally due to Major Sterling, Commanding Her Majesty’s CJth Iteo-i- ment; to Captain Macleod, who succeeded to the command of the 20th Regiment; to Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay, Commanding 2nd European Lio-ht Infantry; to Major Manson, Commanding 4th Rifles; to Captain Hough commanding 2nd Bilueh Battalion ; to Captain Forbes, who succeeded to the command of the 3rd Light Cavalry; to Major Blake, Commanding 4th Troop Horse Artillery ; to Captain Hatch, Commanding No. 3 Light Field Battery* to Captain Gibbard, Commanding No. 5 Light Field Battery; and to Captain Dickinson, Commanding the. Sappers and Miners. I have also derived every possible assistance from my aide-de-camp, Captain Hunter; Major Ballard, Head of the Intelligence Department; Major Bo ye the Deputy J udge Advocate General; Captain Rigby, who has acted as my Persian Interpreter; Captain Finnimore, Commissary of Ordnance; Captain Collier, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General ; Captain Shewell and Lieutenant Holland, Deputy Assistant Quarter Masters General ; Major Barr, Paymaster • and Lieutenant Willoughby, Sub-Assistant Commissary General! ’ Lord Dunkellin of the Coldstream Guards; Major Taylor of the Persian Embassy; and Mr. Johnstone of the Indian Navy also rendered most efficient service (having attached themselves to my personal staff) ; and to Mr John- stone's knowledge of the country and its inhabitants, with the unwearied zeal he has exhibited, I am much indebted. zea * In fine, nothing could have surpassed the admirable spirit exhibited by the officers and men of all ranks, and the utmost praise is due for their zeal devotion^ and gallantry* * A IF /J> * SKETCH OF THE advance of the bbitise tboofs 0 H bushibb, tinder Major G-eneral Stalker, C.B., lOtih December 18S6, Scale 2 Inches = 1 -M*&. dfrfcz. (Sd ) J. WRAY, Captain, I. B„ September 1868. Exd. J. A. A, Return of killed, wounded, and missing in the. Field Force under the command of Major-General Stalker, c.B., in the action at Kashir on the 9th December 185£>. WOTJTrBSB, UfilBQFO'. Remarks, Artillery'. 3rd Troop, Howe Artillery ; . ... Reserve . Artll- ■ lery ... ... Names of officers hilled ana wounded. Brigadier Stopford, c.B., Commanding 1st In- fantry Brigade, killed. Major ( Brevet Lieute- nant-Colonel) Male!, 3rd Light Cavalry, killed. Captain Wood, 20th ie- giment Native Infan- try, severely wounded. Lieutenant Warren, 20th .Regiment . Native In- fantry, mortally wound- ed ; since dead. Lieutenant Utterson, 20th Regiment Native Infantry, mortally wounded j einee dead. Sappers ' and .Miners . ... Her Iklajegty’s 64th Regiment 1 20th Regiment " Native Infan- 2nd j Brigade In - fantry. 2nd European Light Infan- try ■'4th Regiment Native Infan- try (Rifles) ... 2$ Bilfleh attalion Two of these since dead. | t Both these officers since dead, F. STALKER, Major-General, Commanding Persian Expeditionary Force, It was determined that the disembarkation of the troops should take place in Hahla Bay, about 1 0 miles south of the town. All was ready on the morning* of the 7th instant, and the gunboats in advance to cover the landing, when a number of the enemy were discovered in a dategrove about 200 yards to the left of the beach; the boats opened fire, and, after the exchange of a few shots, the enemy retired. Here the famous chief, the son of Baukar Khan, was killed by a shell from one of the advanced boats, and I trust gave a check to, and prevented the approach of, a large number of Persian troops, who would have ' very much harassed the army while landing. On the following day, I paid a visit to General Stalker at the camp, and on parting I promised him that I would keep close to the shore in this ship, and support the left of the array on its approach to the fort of Bashir (about 4 miles from this place), where it was supposed, from the information we had received, the enemy, in number from 1,500 to 2,000, would receive our troops, and make a powerful resistance. On my nearing the fort, this information was confirmed, and we saw it perfectly full of Persian soldiers, who were drawn up ready for the attack. At this moment 1 was about 1,700 yards from them when we commenced firing shell, many dropping within the trenches and com- mitting much slaughter, which obliged the Persian troops to fly, with the excep- tion of about 800, who made a resolute stand, and were driven out by the troops in one of the most brilliant and gallant charges I ever witnessed. Here the troops halted for the night. I then pushed on for this roadstead, and at daylight this morning, seeing the Persian army drawn up near the wells (their centre support- ed by a high fortified tower and redoubt), it was my duty to dislodge them ; and for this service I ordered the vessels named in the margin under the eora- FalMand, sloop mand of Lieutenants Tronson, Worsley, Chitfcy, and Adjaha, steam frigate. Giles, and eight heavy-armed gun boats under Lieu- Mremce. tenant S trad ling, to place their ships in position to . 10 orMy s eam 8 °° r * attack it. This was done in a most gallant way, and in the course of an hour I had the satisfaction to see the whole of the Per- sian troops in full retreat to the town, but in perfect order and with great cool- ness, supported by their artillery. A boat, with a white flag, was now seen approaching the ship, and, on one of the chiefs arriving on board, a request was and the embrasure in which a gun was mounted; as well as the lower part of the wall. The fire from their batteries at this time gradually slackened, and at this moment the flagstaff in the town was hauled down in token of submis- sion, and the place surrendered. The army was by this time close to the town, and it was a source of the greatest pleasure to me to feel that we had cleared away every obstacle that pre- sented itself on their onward march, the more so as they had lost so many gal- lant fellows the day before when storming the fort of Rashir. The ships of the fleet have suffered considerably in their hulls, masts, and rigging from the fire of the enemy's guns ; the Semiramis and Feroze have some shot through them, but nothing to prevent all being ready for sea in a day or two. I am most happy to add that no person has been touched, nor has any casualty occurred during the four hours and a half we were under fire. How this has happened is miraculous, for the grape shot which fell at every instant around and abreast the gun-boats and the round shot over and about our ships was very severe, and proved that our enemy was more formidable than they were supposed to be even by those who had known the town years before, there being 59 guns mounted on the batteries. It now becomes a pleasing part of my duty to bring to the notice of your Lordship in Council the very great assistance I have received from Commodore Ethersey (who met me off the island of Kishm, and from his knowledge of this place gave me much valuable information) ; Captains Jenkins and Young, Commanders Macdonald (in charge of all the Transports) and Rennie, and Act- ing Commanders Poulerton and Adams, the latter the captain of this ship, the officers, petty officers, and seamen of the fleet under my command; nor can I ever forget their gallant conduct in this day's battle, or their cheerfulness and activity in carrying out my orders, and in moving their ships into position abreast of the batteries, and I am sure the Government will think with me that this was no easy task to perform, for most of the vessels drew from 15 to 16 feet of water and we had to take them at high water, some way through soft mud, to get near enough to the forts, and this under a heavy fire. Where all have so ably and gallantly performed their duty, it is difficult to particularise individuals, but I desire to express my warm thanks to Captain Griffith Jenkins, the first captain of this ship, for the very great assistance he has afforded me throughout the whole of the operations, and particularly during the action. He was the first officer, assisted by Major Hill of the Engineers and Lieutenant Clerkson, the first Lieutenant of my flag ship, to enter the town and hoist the British flag. I trust, . my Lord, it will not be taking too much upon myself to express my admiration of General Stalker and. his- brave army, the more so as I have had the honor of being associated with them for many weeks, and have been an eye-witness of all their proceedings from the day of landing, as well as on their advance to the town. In doing so, I offer the humble tribute of a British Ad- miral to the brave General, bis officers, and soldiers, whose dashing conduct •on the day of storming the fort of Rashir can never be forgotten. ' ' I cannot deny myself the satisfaction of bringing to the notice of your Precursor, Lordship in Council the excellent manner in which the Poitinger, commanders and officers and crews of the Peninsular Ckusan. * and Oriental Company's ships named in the margin Sir M™ etjee Jejee ' liave conducted their ships during the time they have been with the fleet. They are at all times ready for any hard work, and have rendered me very essential service, and X beg to express my sincere thanks to them collectively and individually. ■sea /nor: . Precursor Poltmger, '■'Qkumn. Sir Jamsetjee Jejee* ■ bhoy. f;ff f ;?■ 1 ‘ | | llllSlSllP®®; !«:«, | landing the force on the following morning, when it was effected in admirable order, though not unobserved by the enemy, small parties of whom were driven * Commanded by Lieu- from their lurking places in the date groves by the tenant Worsley. fire of the gunboats and well directed shot from the steam frigate Ajdaha* Shortly after noon the force was enabled to advance from the beach, and take up an extended front before the enemy, seen at intervals watching our movements, a few miles in advance. Great difficulties, however, had to be con- tended with in landing the cavalry horses and artillery equipage, from a pau- city of native boats, which I had failed in procuring from the Arab coasts owing to the impracticability of dealing with the people in moments of emergency and need. These difficulties were, however, readily surmounted by the skill and activity of the India Naval officers and men, whose exertions on this occasion merit the highest praise. These exertions were fully appreciated by their asso- ciates in arms, not less active in their endeavours to get at the enemy with the least possible delay. Forty-eight hours sufficed to put the troops in motion northward, the sliips- of-war, led by the Admiral, advancing along the coast to their support. This was on the morning of the 9th, and by noon the enemy were observed to be in some force in the village of Rashir. Here, amid the ruins of old houses, garden- walls, and steep ravines, they occupied a formidable position. But, notwith- standing their firmness, wall after wall was surmounted, and finally they were driven from their last defence (the old fort of Raslur) bordering on the cliffs at the margin of the sea. This was carried at the point of the bayonet, the enemy only then flying in despair down the cliffs, where many met their death in their endeavours to escape through the ravines of the south. The nature of the ground, however, rendered pursuit difficult to the horse, though many were cut up in a chase of some distance. Details of this spirited affair will be given by the proper officers. I shall, therefore, merely observe that the enemy received at first a lesson he will not readily forget, for the tribal families of Dashti and Tangistan comprising its ranks are regarded as the most brave as well as the most skilled in the defence of posts like Rashit*, where regular troops cannot work with full effect. Brigadier Stopford, c.B., met his death here, and other loss was experienced. The wounded were received into the ships the same evening, and provisions were thrown into the camp from seaward during tbe . •• night. It had been agreed upon that I should proceed in person to the town of Bush ire in a small steamer with a flag of truce, bearing the accompanying copy of a summons to surrender, with the terms offered to the garrison. While the above was exacting, I proceeded on this errand with the humane object also of receiving such of the merchants and townspeople as might be desirous of shel- ter in the fleet. This was quite in accordance with the wishes of the Govern- ment of India in regard to the inhabitants of Bushire ; and the Major-General, the Admiral, and myself were induced to believe that my presence near them might tend to avert much bloodshed. In this, however, we were disappointed, for on passing through the intricate channel leading to the town, two bat- teries, at a distance of 500 yards, opened upon the Assyria bearing the flag of truce, in defiance of all usage of war. Deeming it might be a mistake, I caused the vessel to stop; but a second and a third shot passing close to us, I was compelled to retrace my steps, and even then two more guns were discharged. I could scarcely account for this conduct, having taken some pains to explain the meaning of a flag of truce in the event of warfare before quitting the town ; if — — — ■ ■I . -it;:. m ■tot while relating the circumstance to Rear-Admiral Sir Henry Leeke, a flag of truce from the shore was reported, and the bearer (Mirza Ismail, Collector of Customs in the town) came off with a written apology f rom the governor, who, with the chief officers of the garrison, were stated to have been outside of the walls examining into the condition of the exterior defences at the time : every regret was expressed ; the act was attributed to the ignorance of an artillery- man, with hopes that it would be overlooked. To this the Admiral and self replied that, so far as we were personally concerned, we were willing to credit the statements of the governor and accept the apology, though the act itself, in whatever way originating, must stigmatise the Persian Government and its officers in the eyes of all civilized states. Mirza Ismail returned with a sum- mons to the shore. While this was going on, a note from the Major-General commanding announced his intention of advancing on the town the following morning, and the Admiral disposed his fleet in order of battle for first dismantling the new- ly-erected outworks, and then moving with the view to breaching the south wall of the town. The following morning, as the tide served, the ships were in the positions assigned them. A second flag of truce had come off, begging 24 hours delay; but this was promptly rejected, and at 8 o'clock tbe signal was hoisted to engage. Shot and shell were aimed at the redoubt south of the town, but with little effect, owing to the great range, though even- tually the enemy, assembled there to oppose the troops, were dislodged, and beat a retreat with their guns into the town. The ships in the meantime had moved upon the town, and such was the ardour displayed to get close into the works, that every ship was laid aground at the turn of high water, and for four hours continued to cannonade the defences, which were" active in replying the whole time. Many of their guns, however, were not of sufficient calibre to reach the ships; but the perseverance of the Persian gunners in firing from the more heavy pieces was admired by every one. Their shot told very often on the hulls of the Victoria ,. Falkland , Semiramis , and Feroze y which latter vessels, under Captain John Young and Commander James Rennie (if comparisons are admissible where all exerted themselves alike), had the posts of honor for the day. Details of the affair, it is unnecessary for me to enter upon. It will suffice for me to report that some of the guns being silenced on the approach of tbe army under Major-General Stalker, C.B., to breach the wall on the gate side before assault, the Persian flagstaff was felled in token of sub- mission. This was at noon. The Persian flag has since been recovered by myself, and presented as a joint trophy to the chiefs conducting the combined operations in this expedition, who, with every officer and men in it, whether soldier or sailor, have certainly won for themselves an honorable name. After surrender, some little hesitation was shown on the part of the gover- nor and garrison to come out of the town. An assuring note, coupled with the threat of an assault in half an hour, was, however, sent in by a freed cap- tive, and on the expiration of the time that officer was seen issuing with his suite from the gate. I moved forward with a party to receive and conduct him to head -quarters, where, after tendering his sword, he met with a graci- ous reception from the Major-General and Rear-Admiral Commanding the Forces. Shortly afterwards, the Sarhang, or Lieutenant-Colonel and Com- mandant, submitted, the entire garrison at the same time laying down their arms on my proceeding into the town with assurances of safety from the Ma- jor-General Commanding-in-Ohief. The British colors were then hoisted at 4-30 p, M. on the Residency flagstaff by Lieutenant Clarkson of the Indian Navy, place. 71 . - ■■ . jy, the troops under orders to garrison the town moving at sunset into th*» Since the occupation, I have been engaged with my assistant, Lieutenant Disbrowe, in giving confidence to the townspeople, securing the magazines, ■ granaries, and other public stores, endeavouring to re-open the bazars, and in adopting measures for the public safety, as well as in taking steps for obtain- : Ing supplies. Owing to the distrust naturally prevailing amongst suspicious people quite new to us, and generally ignorant as to our usages and institu- tions, we have some difficulty to contend with. Time, however, will aid to dis- pel fears, to restore confidence, and eventually, I hope, secure to us all we re- quire. I must not conceal, however, that our chief local supplies of fresh mea% if pn ' — ■ grain, &e., must be drawn from Bassorah and Baghdad, and boats are not. read- ily procurable. A large quantity of coal should therefore be stored, both here and at Bassorah, for the use of steamers, those of small size being best adapted for this service. They should not fail us, for in any case, to ensure cattle living, the voyage should be shortened as much as possible by their taking boats in town. No intelligence of any kind has come in from the interior; but I may be able to glean some in a few days. All is, however, quiet in the town and dis- tricts at the present time. See rough sketch No . 4 and page 106 . No. 219, dated Bombay, January 1857. From— The Adjutant-General, Bombay Army, To— The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force. I have had the honor of submitting to the Cornmaoder-in-Chief your despatch, dated Bush ire, 12th December 1856, No, 17, with its several accom- paniments, and in reply am instructed to acquaint you that His Excellency has perused with the highest pleasure and satisfaction the report of the success- ful termination of the operations before that place. 2. It has been a source of the greatest satisfaction to the Commander-m- Chief to observe the admirable spirit which has animated the soldiers of this expedition during the embarkation and the long voyage to Bushire. ; : 6. This has been displayed in a remarkable manner by the native troops, ©specially artillery, cavalry, and infantry, to whom a sea voyage is replete with prejudices, both personal and religious. Jn no one instance that the Command- er-in-Chief is aware of has a word of dissatisfaction been heard. All this is highly creditable to the troops, and their excellent discipline and organization led to the very successful operations reported by you. 4. From the landing at Hall la Bayou the 7 th till the surrender of Bu- shire on the afternoon of the 10th your arrangements have been as judicious as successful, and the Commander-in-Chief most heartily congratulates you and the officers and soldiers under your command upon the brilliant result of the storm of the fort of Rashir, on the subsequent capitulation of the place against which your operations were directed, with the surrender as prisoners of war of the governor, the commander of the troops, and a large portion of the garri- son of Bushire. 5, It was not to he supposed that active warfare can be made without loss. Brigadier Stopford, Lieutenant-Colonel Malet, Lieutenants Warren and Utterson have fallen on the field of battle in front of their men leading them to victory; and, however much we may mourn the loss of the two first men- tioned highly distinguished officers, and the latter no less gallant young sol- diers, there is nothing to lament in their death, as they have died for their queen and country. i NS'4 L B.. September 1888, Exd. J. A u A. nr* tut wll truce £ Custoir with t£ walls & regret man, w replied &tatem< whatevi officers mons t< Wh announj the Ad ly-ereet wall of In the | 24 hou was ho. of the tually t beat a i moved j works, 1 four hdf the whc to reach the moj often o: latter v< com pari honor £< It will £ approac! the gat« mission, myself, operatic soldier c Afte nor and the thrc tive, an( suite frc him to ous rece Forces, mandant arms on jor-Gene 4-30 p. m OWN The on two washed awa; are rebnildiu’ I. B.. Septee Eatd. J. , 71 . ' 1 Navy, the troops under orders to garrison the town moving at sunset into the* place. ■ Since the occupation, I have been engaged with my assistant, Lieutenant ] Disbrowe, in giving confidence to the townspeople, securing the magazines, ] granaries, and other public stores, endeavouring to re-open the bazars, and in j adopting measures for the public safety, as well as in taking steps for obtain- ing supplies. Owing to the distrust naturally prevailing amongst suspicious j people quite new to us, and generally ignorant as to our usages and institu- i lions, we have some difficulty to contend with. Time, however, will aid to dis- | pel fears, to restore confidence, and eventually, I hope, secure to us all we re- * 3 quire. I must not conceal, however, that our chief local supplies of fresh meat, | grain, &e., must be drawn from Bassorah and Baghdad, and boats are not read- ] ily procurable. A large quantity of coal should therefore be stored, both here ] and at Bassorah, for the use of steamers, those of small size being bestadapted ■ ] for this service. They should no t fail us, for in any case, to ensure cattle living, \ the voyage should be shortened as much as possible by their taking boats in town. j No intelligence of any kind has come in from the interior; but I may be j able to glean some in a few days. All is, however, quiet in the town and dis- J tricts at the present time. See rough sketch No . 4 and page 106 . No. 219, dated Bombay, January 1857. From — The Adjutant-General, Bombay Army, To— The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force. 1 have had the honor of submitting to the Cornmander-in-Chief your despatch, dated Bush ire, 12th December 1856, No, 17, with its several accom- paniments, and in reply am instructed to acquaint you that His Excellency has perused with the highest pleasure and satisfaction the report of the success- ful termination of the operations before that place. 2. It has been a source of the greatest satisfaction to the Commander-in- Chief to observe the admirable spirit which has animated the soldiers of this expedition during the embarkation and the long voyage to Bushire. 5. This has been displayed in a remarkable manner by the native troops, especially artillery, cavalry, and infantry, to whom a sea voyage is replete with prejudices, both personal and religious. In no one instance that the Command- er-in-Chief is aware of has a word of dissatisfaction been heard. All this is highly creditable to the troops, and their excellent discipline and organization led to the very successful operations reported by you. > 4. From the landing at Halila Bay on the 7th till the surrender of Bu- shire on the afternoon of the lOtli your arrangements have been as judicious as successful, and the Commander-in-Chief most heartily congratulates you and the officers and soldiers under your command upon the brilliant result of the storm of the fort of Bashir, on the subsequent capitulation of the place against which your operations were directed, with the Surrender as prisoners of war of the governor, the commander of the troops, and a large portion of the garri- son of Bushire, 5. It was not to be supposed that active warfare can be made without loss. Brigadier Stopford, Lieutenant-Colonel Malet, Lieutenants Warren and XJtterson have fallen on the held of battle in front of their men leading them to victory ; and, however much we may mourn the loss of the two first men- tioned highly distinguished officers, and the latter no less gallant young sol- diers, there is nothing to lament in their death, as they have died for their queen and country. 72 HkJ 6. The report made by Major Hill, Commanding Engineer, of the move- ment of the division is most complete and satisfactory, and I am to request yon will convey to that excellent and efficient officer His Excellency’s thanks for the same. 7. The Commander-in-Chief leaves it to superior authority to notice, in such manner as their gallant conduct deserves, the officers whose names you have prominently mentioned in your despatch; but the special thanks of the Commander-in-Chief are due to one and all, soldiers as well as officers, for their gallantry in the field and patient endurance of much privation and exposure. 8. His Excellency’s sentiments as above expressed yon will be pleased to make known to the division under your command in such manner as you may deem most appropriate, and at the same time yourself accept the hearty con- gratulations of the Commander-in-Chief on your signal and complete success in the operations entrusted to your direction. Field Force Orders, dated “ Semiramis," 27th January 1857. 1. Lieutenant-General Outram, on assuming the command of the Expedi- tionary Force, has much gratification in promulgating the very just-merited acknowledgment of the Governor-General of India in Council of the great ser- vice achieved by Major-General Stalker and the troops under his command in the captuie of Bushire, and especially of the gallant conduct in the action at Bashir •which led to the surrender of the city. ’ The thanks and acknowledgments of the Governor in Council, Bombay, have already been communicated, and the Lieutenant-General trusts those of our Gracious Queen will soon follow. 2. The Lieutenant-General hits great pleasure in announcing to the troops at Bushire that Major-General Stalker will continue to command them as now constituting the 1st Division of the augmented expeditionary army, and he begs to thank that officer for the praiseworthy zeal for the public interest which induced him to afford the .Lieutenant-General the aid of his valuable services by retaining the command of the troops he has heretofore so ably led. Dated “ Assaye," Bombay, 29th December 1856. Despatch from-REAE-ArariBAL Sie H. Lebkb, k.k., e.n., Cowmandinff Naval J'orce, Persian Gulf Expedition, To — His Excellency the Governor of Bombay. * * * * # The provision and ammunition vessels had been taken into the inner roads ; tlie hospital ship into an airy and healthy locality. Gunboats and a small steamer were placed m the creek to support the right wing of the army Position at Bushire. 1“ case of f n , attaek 1 ' rom a lar ge number of Persian . troops, winch may be expected, as many thousands are collecting in the neighbourhood. The General, his officers, and men were all in high spirits and healthy • and on paying a visit to the General and the army the day before I left Bushire it would have appeared to me, if I had not known to the contrary, that "they had been located m the neighbourhood for months, instead of a week so cheerful and contented did everybody seem. ’ General Stalker placed the services of his Chief Engineer, Major Hill an officer of great talent, at my disposal, and with my Flag Captain f JenkinsV I surveyed the creek at the back of the town, and ascertained that by lightening a small vessel (CUre 7 14 gun sloop), and heaving her upon her broadside to a large baglah, I could haul her over the shallows, where there is only 7 feet water, and by replacing her guns and stores she would be enabled to ride in 4 fathoms water within 30 yards of the bank and about 250 yards from the right wing of the army in such a position (assisted by a small steamer and light gun-boats, each carrying two 21-pr. howitzers) as would keep off any number of troops that could be brought against them* ! 1 have also directed one or two of my heavy steamers Feroze and Victoria to be placed on the south side on the left wing of the army ; and as the neck of land is not more than 1J miles across, I feel that the army is so powerfully supported on both sides, that an attack from half the troops of Persia would have but little effect. I left the anchorage at Bushire on the evening of the 16th instant, and in hauling in towards Lingah, a small fortified town belonging to an Arab tribe, and under the dominion of the Shah of Persia, I received information of an army of 5,000 Persian troops being in Mustafi Kuli Khan, Amfr-i-Panj, on shore, and at noon of the 19th instanl groves, on a commanding situation, at artiller it* front, and between them and id way. I liauietf close inland anchored this ship with in 34 fathoms wafer, about 1,200 yards from them, and hieh they instantly returned with a steady fire; the troops drawn up in line ; their tents in the rear. A spirited fire was kept up on both sides for about 35 uns being silenced, the Persian army retreated in great r tents, guns, and killed and wounded behind, the shot ip following them, and cutting off a great many men, 1 destroying their camp equipage. I gave them a parting . , , —g gained my object of making them change their ground, I got under weigh and stood for the anchorage at Basidu. Before leaving Basidu, reports were current that a part of the Persian army meditated an attack upon the naval station there, and which from its isolated and unprotected state is not improbable. 1 therefore ordered the marines of the fleet to be landed, eighty in number, and to be encamped outside the town; and Position at Basidu. at tlie e( % e tiie plateau I have directed two small breastworks to be thrown up, and two 98-pr. guns from the Punjab to be landed and placed in them. The Constance (schooner), mount- * n § 011 pivot a 32-pr. and two 21-pr. howitzers, was to go to the narrow part of the channel by Luft, and prevent all communication between the main land and the island, and the Punjab to take up in such a position as to be able to enfilade the whole valley below the rising ground, I have formed the marines into two divisions, appointing the senior bavildar (a man of excellent character) to act as a native officer, and an acting Lieutenant to command the whole party on shore, all under the orders of Acting Commander Foulerton of the Punjab. Thus I trust that no army will attempt to burn our useful station, nor wilithe}^ dare to make any attack without being certain of a repulse. It was arranged by General Stalker and myself that the three chief pris- oners taken at Bushire, viz., Mirza Hassan All Khan, Daria Beg (Lord Melitar. Governor of Bushire ; Mehtar Khan, late Commandant of Troops and Garrison ; and Mirza Muhammad Raza, late Minister for Foreign Affairs, should be conveyed to Bombay. They were accordingly received from the shore on board this ship n the day after they liad surrendered to the united forces, and I have now the honor to await the orders of your Lordship in Council as to their disposal. The late Governor, Mirza Hassan All Khan, is of a high and celebrated Persian family. His late grandfather, Hajf Mirza All Akbar, Grand Wazir of Persia, and father, who were always friendly towards the English nation, were favorites of the Shah, and I am told that both the father and son were extremely averse to the war. The son has certainly inherited any good qualities his father may have had : he is not only fond of the English, but has never lost an opportunity of doing them a kindness. He is a most amiable and excellent character, and during the time be and his brother captives have been on board the Assaye, they have gained the esteem and kind feeling of every one belonging to her.' In making these arrangements, and throughout the arduous and anxious service upon which I have been employed since our departure from Bombay on 13th November, I have been seconded by the captains, officers, and seamen of the Indian Navy in a way which redounds to their credit and to the honor of the British flag. ! ' iiil! Despatch from Major-General F. Stalker, c.b., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force, to the Quarter Master General, Bombay Army, —dated Bush ire, 20th December 1856. Reports that the force is now permanently encamped near the redoubt and wells, at about II miles distance from the gates of Permanent position be- Bushire. fore Bushire. That the camp is formed on a sandy undulating plain in the form of three sides of a square, with the sea about miles to the rear. That the water generally is very good and plentiful, and after a week's trial the troops have not suffered from the use of it. That the weather is very delightful ; the days moderate, but the nights very cold with heavy dews, and that the tents have been pitelied for some days, although every particle of jgamp equipage and baggage had to be brought up from the beach, a distance of 2 miles, by working parties, only a few donkeys being procurable in the shape of carriage. States that to secure the safety of the position, he has established two cavalry posts at about 2 miles south of the camp — one to watch the ground and patrol from near Rashir in the direction of Halfla Bay, and across eastward ; the other to observe the Shiraz road, and the country to its right in the direction of Halila also. Large parties of the cavalry patrol the country constantly, so that no one can approach the camp without timely intimation being given. The sloop Clive and two gunboats are to be anchored in the creek, and will command the low ground in the neighbourhood of the town, as well as the whole land face of the works. The 20th Regiment Native In- fantry is stationed in the town. Intimates that the engineers are now commencing a deep trench, which will cross the rear, and altogether prevent the passage of horsemen; the other three faces will also be entrenched and strengthened, and with these precau- tions it is considered the enemy will be unable to attempt a sudden surprise. States that from reports sent in, it is gathered that the chiefs of tribes in the neighbourhood are inclined to be friendly, and, Neighbourhood friendly, nn \ eBB CO erced by the Government, will not interfere with the force ; and that there are some regular troops at Firuzabad, but it is thought they cannot advance unless they persuade the tribes to act with them — a most unlikely occurrence. With regard to future movements, remarks that there are two points on which an advance may be made — the one by Mu ham - Ope rations. marah and the Karun river as far as Shustar ; the other on Shiraz ; and for either of these movements large reinforcements will be necessary. States that the route as far as Shustar appears to be practicable enough, if a flotilla of small steamers and boats ehn accompany the army in its inarch along the Karun ; hut that beyond Sliustar the difficulties are said to be very great. The routes to Shiraz are said to be very difficult, particularly that by Kazran and the Kotalri-Mulla; the other by Firuzabad is believed to be much more practicable ; but nothing certain has been ascertained. Requests that 500 more cavalry may be placed at his disposal in order to reconnoitre these routes, and suggests that these be ma de U P of the remainder of the 3rd Light Cavalry and transport required. ^ ^ Qr 25Q o£ the Southern Malmtfca Hor/e under Major Malcolm. Suggests that as the horse transports are returning to * Bombay, these reinforcements should he sent by them : provisions must also he sent for them, none being obtainable in the country. In conclusion, states that the greatest obstacle to an advance into the interior will be the want of carriage, and therefore recommends that the Land Transport Corps should be sent up to join the army. From Major-General F. Stalker, c.b , Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force, to the Quarter Master General, Bombay Army, — No. 41, dated Bushire, 28tk December 1856. Reports that he has received a good deal of information from the interior „ , • , regarding the movements of the enemy, the sense of overaen so e enemy. J s t} ia k f rom 3^000 to 10,000 regular troops about, 2,000 irregular cavalry, and 20 guns are now in movement towards Bu- shire under the Ilkhani, who has been joined by the Shuja-ul-Mulk ; and that another large body is moving on Shiraz, either to support or to join the above. Requests, therefore, that the Commander-in-Chief will despatch a small reinforcement, consisting of a regiment of European and a regiment of Native infantry, with a hundred foot artillery, as an entire regiment has to be kept in the fort at Bushire, and the wet weather may affect the health of the troops, in which case the force would be seriously crippled. Remarks that the tribes between Bushire and Firuzabad profess friend- Friendly tribes. ship, and have been sending in supplies; but that it is Fora S e * doubtful what effect the advance of an army from Shiraz might have on them, and that supplies are abundant so far, with the exception of forage. Intimates that he has been obliged to reduce the camp a good deal to curtail the entrenchments, and to lessen the night duties; and reports having carried out an armed reconnaissance as far as TeiLa-Sya, about 18 miles on the Firuzabad road. The country was found to be an open plain as far as Ahram ; the road good, with good water, and the villagers very friendly. Another party will be sent to Borasjan, as soon as it can be done conveniently, to seize a good depot of grain prepared there. Adds that there is a great want of sweepers in weepeis require . the camp # and requests that one hundred men may be sent up at once. mam .• . ;i j 76 From the Adjutant General, Bombay Army, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Secret Department, — No. 7158, dated 30th December 1856. Consequent on the death of Brigadier Sfcopford, C.B., Commanding 1st In- fantry Brigade, Persian Force, conveys the Commander-in-ChieFs recommend- ation that Brigadier N. Wilson, k.h., of Her Majesty^s 64th Regiment of Foot, at present in temporary command of the Northern Division, may be directed to hand over charge and proceed forthwith as General Stopford's suc- cessor. Dated Bush ire, 22nd January 1857. Beport by Lieutenant Ballabd, Superintendent, Intelligence Department. Since 15th January the following changes have taken place : The Irregular Infantry (TufangcMs) of the Iliyafc tribes, which were assembled under orders of the llkham, have been disbanded, partly to econo- mise provisions, and partly owing to the bad understanding which exists between the llkham and the Shuja-uI-MuIk, who at present commands the Persian force. The enemy have surrounded their camp with a ditch and parapet of small profile, and placed branches of the kuhrtdr , or wild plum tree, on the top of the parapet. There is no water inside the field work, and it is consequently of no use except to guard against a night surprise. The rain which has lately fallen will cause grass to sprout over the plains, and enable the cavalry, who have been suffering from want of forage, to keep together longer than wap anticipated. It was mentioned in the previous report that Sulaiman Khan Afshar, Anur-i-Panj (Major-General), with 500 horse, was expected at Shiraz. He arrived there the Beginning of this month, bringing in addition the Ikhlas regiment of infantry, composed chiefly of Afsharis. His Royal Highness Tahmasp Mirza, Prince Governor of Shiraz, left Shiraz on the 11th. He was at Kazran on the 16th, and expected to reach Boras jan about this time. Sulaiman Khan, with his horse, accompanied the Prince : the former is said to he an officer of considerable ability. The Ikhlas regiment left Shiraz on the 11th, together with 4 guns, the whole under All Khan, Sartip, and overtook two regiments (Karaguslus) at Firuzabad. They are now between Firuzabad and iiorasjau, but at what station is not known. The late rains, by swelling the mountain torrents, would considerably Imu pede their march, as the route is crossed in many places by streams and nul- lahs. Hussain Khan of Dashti, a territory 50 miles from Bushire, has assem- bled a thousand irregulars (chiefly infantry) at Kaki in Dashti, but is very unwilling to join the camp until he can be guaranteed safety from the hands of the llkham, with whom he has an old quarrel. Mustafx Kuli Khan, Amir-i-Panj, is collecting irregulars at Lar, a town ten marches south of Bushire, through a difficult and barren country. There are two regiments in Luristan which have been ordered up to Boras- jan ; but it is not probable they will be spared, as the district has lately been in a disturbed state. The late agent for the British Government at Shiraz, now living in Bu- jphire, lias reported to Captain Jones, Resident, Persian Gulf, that 13,000 mep. Summary of ^Persian Forces, Regulars. Irregulars. Cavalry, Guns. 3,800 ... 1,300 10 2,000 500 4 2,000 150 ... 5,800 2,000 1,950 14 At Borasjan , ••• ." Expected daily from Shiraz ... Expected from Bihbahan and Dashtl or 9,750 of all arms and 14 guns. No. 88, dated Bushire, 23rd January 1857. prom — M ajor-General 1. Stalkbb, o.b., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force, To — The Quarter Master General, Bombay Army. Reports as follows : , ■ , , .... The enemy is still at Borasjan, and is, I believe, entrenching his camp y but I do not learn that he is fortifying 1 the pass behind linn. 1 he Prince ot Shiraz is expected to join the camp about this time with two or three more reo-iments of regular infantry, and, it is said, ten guns. Enemy’s movements. w £j c h num b e r, however, I have little doubt is exag- ger^ed. Amfr _._p an j ig alg0 on march up from Singar with about 1,200 men and six guns. , T i * The whole are expected to unite, and report says we are to be attacked about the 26th instant. . . , T , . As this threat has been held over us ever since our arrival, I do not place much credit in it. I am inclined to think, however, that an attack on our camp mi°ht save both our enemy and ourselves a good deal of future annoy- ance and'trouble, as, if he once attempted it, it is to be hoped the reception he would meet with would induce him to withdraw into the hills, and that he would not venture to face our troops again. The tribes are, I understand, leaving the enemy s camp, and show very little inclination to fight ; indeed, I feel sure that they ■Tribes friendly. would willingly help us if we could ensure them pro- t6Ct Sh James Outram has not yet arrived, hut I am in hourly expectation of There has been a good deal of rain during the last week, hut not enough to inconvenience us at all ; indeed, we are much in want of more. ' There is no sickness among the troops. Agreeably to the suggestions of the Superintending Surgeon, I have been endeavouring to Troops healthy. a g 00( j s j fce this place whereon to erect the field hospital in the event of our moving on. . ., , . The site has not yet been decided on, hut I intend having hospitals for 800 men erected here immediately as a sick dep6t for our rear. I have no intelligence yet regarding our carnage, and have procured none here to speak of. 1 am anxiously looking for the arrival of the Land irans- 1 port Corps officers. A party of officers a few days No transport, since examined the landing place at Skif, about 8 miles north-east of Bushire, beyond Shaikh Sa’ad. The beach is easily ap- proached at high water, and for any operations against the Borasjan force when our reinforcements arrive, we could easily land our infantry at Shait from the small steamers, whence they would have only 24 miles to march to Borasjan. .y; if III; |||: / ;y|y ; :;.;■ ■ y ;'^^ 5 ;y : '|y-WS^|^s|| y- |jjjgjj| | jjj | .■ ■-yi^-;* j| From Majob-Genebal F. Stalbeb, o.b., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force, to the Quarter Master General, Bombay Army, — No. 105, dated 26th January 1857, States that the Hugh Lindsay came in from Bassorah yesterday bringing' letters from the Vice-Consul there in reply to those directing him to collect Carriage. carriage. Mr. Taylor hopes to be able to procure large numbers of camels in six weeks* or two months* time, lie intends proceeding at once himself into the districts, and seems to anti- cipate no difficulty in purchasing cattle and camels. . / " , , r ; The enemy is still at Borasjan, The Prince has not yet joined. There have been some disputes between the chiefs and the leaders of the tribes, and I believe a number of the irregulars, both horse and foot, hare left the army. They are entrenching their camp, cutting down date trees for batteries, and placing their guns in position ; so that apparently their in- tention is to act on the defensive only. I believe them is a great scarcity of forage in their camp. Captain Selby reports from Bassorah that when he passed Muliammarah last week, the place was full of Sarbaz, but they did not attempt to interfere with Dispute] in enemy’s the passage of the steamer. Also that they have large stores of grain at Muhammarah, and that it is said they intend to block up the moutli of the Karun. Our supplies still continue to come in, and the tippies. native troops are free of the Commissariat; but grain is very dear, ■ ‘ Dated RusMre, 9th December 1856. Report from — Captain H. Willoughby, 2nd European Regiment Light Infantry, Commanding Advance Guard, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, To — The Assistant Adjutant General, Persian Expeditionary Field Force. Agreeably to Brigade Orders of yesterday's date, I proceeded with the ad- vance guard and marched at half past 7 a.m. towards fort Rashir, having sent out a skirmishing party of cavalry under Cornet Malcolmson to the front. About | of a mile from the fort, I was informed that it was held by 400 of the enemy; and on coming in view at a distance of about 600 yards, I saw two faces lined with men, and othprs coming in from the direction of Bushire. I immediately ordered Captain Forbes to take the cavalry to the right, Lieu- tenant Gibbard to place the guns in position, put the infantry in skirmishing order between them, directing Captain Tyacke to occupy a village on the left, and sent a letter to General Stalker informing him of my position. Observing that a number of men were leaving the fort for a village in front of Captain Tyacke (and which I liad found occupied on my arrival), and assem- bling as if intending to attack him, I ordered Lieutenant Gibbard* s battery to open fire on a party of about 20 men, on which the whole of the enemy in the fort, and many who had remained concealed in the broken ground in my front within a distance of 150 yards, commenced firing, and finding that their shots were falling thick about us, severely wounding Sergeant Blossman and a gunner at their guns, I recalled Captain Tyacke to his former position. This was effected with the loss of one private killed and three privates severely wounded, a housekeeper and horse of 3rd Troop Horse Brigade were wounded, and a troop- er of the skirmishing party of the 3rd Light Cavalry was also severely wounded. 80 mmm ■I mmm 1—1 On being reinforced by the head-quarters of the 3rd Light Cavalry, I was requested b/Major Hill, Commanding Engineer, to send a company to support 1116 I therefore directed Lieutenant Ferguson to take No . 1 Company, remain- ino- myself with the advance guard, till I received Brigadier Honners orders fas he J passed me) to leave No. 10 Company to protect the wounded, when rode on and overtook some of the skirmishers as they jinn 0¥fTWuK ut uuw «?■»** j ^ storming the fort. I woe «nab!e to join Lwr.ten.nt t erpeon hot »n KrTSSoTC wi th. fort with moot of his men along with Her Majesty’s 04th Boot. Dated Camp Before Busluve, 1 2th December 1856. Keport from— Major Him., Commanding Engineers, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, To— The Adjutant General,- Persian Expeditionary Field Force. Furnishes the following epitome of the operations of the force up to the date of theeapture of Busliire. From in formation afforded mein the most hand- some manner hy Commodore Etbersey, Captain Rennie, and other naval officers, 1 was enabled to lay before the Major-General for his approval, while the force Was assembled at Kishm,a memorandum showing the manner in which I pro- posed that the operations against the fort of Buslure should be earned into exe- cution and in which my reasons are given for considering it inadvisable to land near the fort. Owing to the separation of the force on its departure from Kislim in consequence of some vessels being ordered to sail up to Bushire, while others were towed by steamers, it became necessary to make a second rendezvous before operations coitld be commenced, thus rendering a surprise impossible. This entailed an alteration in the plan of operations, which was again made out by Commodore Etliersey, yourself, Cap-jun Wray, and myself on the morning of Saturday, 6th instant, submitted to Major-General and approved by hlI1 A<meablv to the revised plan of operations, the fleet moved down to the bay of Ras Hall la on the 6th instant, and the landing was effected on the 7th instant at daylight. A body of the enemy bad assembled in the date trees near tlie shore to oppose us, but the fire of the gunboats drove them away and we were enabled to take up our position on the lett, resting on the village of Hahla, W1 ^The whotef of* Sunday, 7th, and Monday, 8th, were occupied in landing the troops, and it was not until the morning of Tuesday 9th, that the force was enabled to march on Ras Rashir, a distance of about o| miles from Halxla. On arriving at Ras Rashir, we found the Quarter Master General, who had Preceded the force with a strong party to mark out the encamping ground, hotly engaged with the enemy, who had taken up their position m a very strong old square fort adjoining the village ot Rashir, around which the ground was very strong and favorable for them to act against us I hey had dug long, deep, narrow pits along the summits of the ramparts of the fort, in which they hid themselves, so that neither our artillery nor that of the ships who fired into it from the seaside could do anything towards dislodging them, the Major- General therefore ordered the suburbs of the village to be cleared by our. skirmishers, which was done under cover of the fire of our artillery ; and the fort was carried in the most gallant manner at the poi nt of the bayonet, as the Ma jor- General witnessed j and the way in which the troops sealed the nearly precipi tous m sides of the fort, surrounded as it was by a rampart from 30 to 35 feet high from the bottom of the ditch, excited the admiration of all who witnessed it. It was only by the merest chance that a single man of the garrison escaped : as it was, they suffered severely. I regret time did not admit of my making a sketch of this fort and the surrounding ground ; but the fort was about 400 yards (front face) by 250 yards, with the rear face resting on the cliff overhanging the sea. The troops bivouacked for the night with their left somewhat in advance of the fort of Bushire. On the morning of the 10th instant, at 8 o’clock the force marched on Bushire, its left being covered by the men-of-war. As previously supposed, we found a strong body of the enemy occupying a strong redoubt and retrenchment about miles in front of Bushire, their left bugging their line of retreat towards the interior. The Major-General now ordered the troops to form up in line of battle ; and, while this was being done, the enemy, holding the redoubt and retrench- ments, commenced their retreat towards the interior, but our cavalry and horse artillery drove them almost all back again into the fort of Bushire. At this moment it became apparent to every one bow essentially necessary it was that the small steamers and gunboats should have forced their way up the creek and communicated with the right flank of the army, as it was arranged they should do prior to the landing of the force in Ras Halila Bay, and as I strongly recommended to the Major-General should be done after the capture of the fort of Ras Rashir on the 9th instant. The army having forced up, advanced in the most splendid manner to within J of a mile of the walls of Bushire, when it was observed that the men-of- war had driven the enemy out of the batteries outside the angle of the fort adjoining the Residency, and the sappers and miners, covered by the artillery (half a battery) and four companies of the 2nd Bombay European Regiment, advanced, and, having occupied the enemy’s position there, immediately com- menced constructing a battery and gabionade within 200 yards of the wallsof the fortress. This work was executed in the most expeditious manner under the superintendence of Captain Dickenson and Lieutenant Hancock of the Sappers and Miners and Lieutenant Playfair, Field Engineer, and the fact of their hav- ing in the short space of three hours thrown up works that would have resist- ed the heaviest fire that the enemy could have brought to bear on them, re- flects great credit on the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men employed ; but the enemy having surrendered, further operations became unnecessary. Had the gunboats forced the creek, as it was previously arranged they should (and Commodore Ethersey, Captain Rennie, and Lieutenant Giles of the Indian Navy assured me they could do so), not one of the enemy could have escaped. As it was, they got off in immense numbers across the creek in front of the house of the Governor of Bushire — a point which would have been completely commanded by the gunboats and small steamers. I have this morning examined the whole of the enemy’s defences in the fort, and ascertained that there would have been no difficulty whatever in fore-* ing the creek in the grey of the morning of the 10th instant, when the tide suit- ed admirably for it, the enemy’s defences along the creek being very imperfect, and the four guns bearing on it being so placed, that I do not think it possi- ble that each could have fired more than one round at the gunboats ; and from the elevated position they are placed in, and the immense charges of powder used for the guns in the fort, it is hardly to be supposed that they would have obtained a correct range the first shot. 82 Bated Camp before Bushire, 12th December 1856. Report from— Captain W. B. Dickinson, Commanding Sappers and Miners, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, To ; — Commanding Engineer, Persian Expeditionary Field Force. I have the honor to report to you, in obedience to the instructions conveyed in yesterday's Field Force General Orders, the part that the Corps of Sappers and Miners under my command have taken in the operations which terminate*} with the fall of Bushire on 1st instant. Landing early on the morning of the 7th instant, the sappers joined the advance from the beach at Halfla Bay, and occupied the right of the infantry- in the encampment during the 7th and 8th, and marched in rear of HerMaj-r esfcy's 64th [Regiment in the advance on Ras Rashir on the 9th instant. When the 1st Brigade deployed and changed its front to the left in order to attack the redoubts, the .sappers, being on the right, were unable to get up in time to take part in the assault, and only just entered the fort before the firing ceased. Two sections of sappers with tools were, however, detached * one to accompany each field battery, and remain with the batteries during the assault. One man was here slightly wounded by a bullet, which was our offiy casualty. On the 10th, the sappers marched in front of the column, and occupied the right of the infantry after they formed line and advanced on the fort of Bushire. When the line halted, the sappers were called to the left to join the detachment marching on the deserted position of the enemy on the left, and were immediately employed in constructing a 2-gun battery and a gabionade 110 feet long, about 200 yards in front of the face of the south-east bastion of the fort-, for future offensive operations, when the “ Union Jack/' dying from the flagstaff inside the fort, caused me to order the men, who were very tired, to suspend work. Dated 32th December 1856. Report from — Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Ramsay, Commanding 2nd European Regiment, Light Infantry, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, To — The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force. I have the honor to report, for the information of the Brigadier, that agreeably to orders received, I advanced the regiment under my command on j. t „1.1 ~ ndmrvnnmn ltarnn. in f rl Ow />r\\TOV flu» the old fort of Bashir, three companies being in extended order to cover the column, and charged the opening in front. All the officers and men of the regiment behaved with gallantry. I noticed Lieutenant W. Gillespie was the first to gain the opening. Dated 12th November 1856. Eeport from— Majob PI. R. Manson, Commanding 4th Rifles, Persian Ex- peditionary Field Force, To— The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force. 1 have the honor to report that, on approaching Bashir with the rest of the brigade, I was directed to throw out six companies in skirmishing order to clear* the village in our front, and in support of the guns of Captain Gib- bard's battery. This duty was duly performed, and, after the place was vacated by the enemy, the regiment rejoined the brigade, and took up its position in the lino, pf bivouac. Bated 12 th December 1856. Report from — Captain L. S. Hough, Commanding 2nd Bilucli Regiment, Per- sian Expeditionary Field Force, To — The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force. I have the honor to state that the 2nd Bilucli Regiment, though it was their first action, fully answered my expectations, and behaved admirably in the attack on fort Rashir on the 9th instant. On deploying into line on the left of the 2nd European Regiment Light Infantry, they advanced with an unbroken front to within 200 yards of the fort. Here they were necessarily a little broken in passing through the gardens with stone walls, numerous pits and wells, and in defiling through the extremely narrow streets of the small village abutting on the walls of the fort ; but these passed, they rushed up the steep ascent of the south-east angle, about 150 yards to the left of the 2nd European Regiment, with a loud cheer, and cleared all before them. Dated 12th December 1856. Report from — Brigadier R. W. IIonner, Commanding 2nd Infantry Brigade* Persian Expeditionary Field Force, To — The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force. The Major-General being a witness to the operations of the 2nd Brigade on the occasion in question, there is nothing forme to add further than to bring prominently to his special notice the high spirit and feeling which pervaded the troops on that day. I received the most active assistance from my Brigade-Major, Captain Aitehison, and Lieutenant Finch, Field Engineer, attached to the Brigade, in conveying orders and carrying out the execution of the general operations. Dated 13th December 1856. Report from— Lieutenant-Colonel Shepheard, Commanding 1st Infantry Brigade, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, To — The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force* Having been myself at the time in command of the 20th Regiment Native Infan ty, I cannot say more regarding Her Majesty’s 6 1th Regiment than that their advance over very difficult ground’ on the strong position of the enemy, and their rush up the high, steep, and difficult earthwork under fire, was admirable. I have the pleasure to bear witness to the coolness and gallantry of the 20th Regiment Native Infantry under my own eye, and to add to Captain Macleod’s report that, after an advance over a considerable space, entirely broken up by stone walls, wells, ruins, and large pits, under fire, on arriving close to the ditch my order to storm was responded to by cheers and a rush into the ditch and up the high steep of the east face of the work, which was not checked till the whole regiment was inside. I have only to add that the cheerfulness of both the regiments since the landing at Halila Bay under circumstances of much privation has been unfailing, and worthy of all praise. The death of the lamented Brigadier Stopford has been described to me as having occurred at the moment he had all but gained the top of the steep up which he was leading the men of Her Majesty’s 64th Regiment with his well known ardour. •’ ... ■ ■ f r ' : ; ■ • Dated 13th December 1856. Report from —Captain MacLeod, Commanding 20tb Regimert, Bombay Native In- fantry, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, To — The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force. Having been detached with the Light Company to cover the advance of the line, I am unable to report from personal observation on the conduct of the rest- of the battalion, but I feel sure that Brigadier Shepheard, then in command, will do it every justice in his report to superior authority, as I believe the offi- cers and men of the whole regiment one and all behaved with marked steadi- ness throughout the action. I therefore confine myself to the notice of the two flank companies as brought under my own observation. As regards the conduct of these two companies, I have to remark that they were, as Brigadier Shepheard is doubtless aware, the first troops that entered the enemy’s entrenchments. The steady firing of the Light Company, while advancing in skirmishing order (and specially when close to the breastwork, and exposed to a sharp fire), is well deserving of notice. It had the effect of so on checking very effectually (with the co-operation of the Light Company of Her Majesty’s 64th Regiment) the enemy’s fire from the right of the en- trenchment, and thus the enemy’s flank was completely turned. The enemy, however, in drawing off to the left took up a position out of reach of the fire of our Brigade skirmishers, who (partly owing to their aforesaid favorable position on the right, and their distance for a short time from the line) were not able to cover the centre and left of the 20th Regiment then advancing. To remedy this, I took upon myself to hail Captain Wood (then advancing with the regiment) to bring on his G renadier Company and extend it to our left. He immediately complied, but before the extension was complete, finding him- self near the breastwork, he closed his men, and led them on at once to the assault ; and thus both the Grenadier and Light Companies simultaneously dashed up the breastworks, and the position was won. Dated 22th December 1856. Report from— L ieutenant-Colonel Thomas Tupp, Commanding Cavalry Brigade, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, To — The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force. "With reference to the proceedings of the Brigade under my command on the 9th and 10th instant, I have the honor to state that the 3rd Light Cavalry having been on the advance guard, whilst I was on the rear guard with the Piinah Horse, I am unable personally to report on the former corps in the action of the 9th instant near Rashir, but I have heard from all parties that Lieutenant-Colonel Malet (whose death I have to deplore from sabre and shot wounds received on that day) was acting with great energy and gallantry, and was well supported by his corps. . The squadron of the Piinah Irregular Horse was divided, the greater part having been detached under Lieutenant La Touche, my Adjutant, for the protection of the “ landing place/’ where a part of the field force was still being disembarked; and I had with me but 67 men, who formed the rear guard to the advancing force. Towards the close of the engagement which was going on in our front, I observed that a large body of the enemy, both cavalry and foot (amounting, I believe, to above 500 men, who appeared to have advanced through ravines), was making « very rapid movement over the high ground near the sea, about a mile to my left : and making in a straight line for the “ landing place ■ ' ; " ILetrejcvb of the tx? J&otZiJdU **'*'■*+>, and as the troops and stores still disembarking were very much exposed, I thought it best to put my small force about, and by a quick movement endeav- our to intercept them ; and this, I am happy to say, I was enabled to effect. In the meantime ( whilst I was waiting for infantry and guns which I had hoped to procure from the near ) the enemy turned sharp to the left through the ravines, passed as quickly as the ground admitted over the precipitous ridge, and proceeded across the swamp into Persia. The Major-General will be aware from his knowledge of the ground how- impossible it was for cavalry to bring this force to action, and I most sincerely regret it; b ut I trust that it will be considered that a manoeuvre, which on such emergency, not only covered our landing place, but also turned the enemy clear away, so as to prevent any interruption of our communications, and prevented his interfering with our followers, stores, or cattle, will be considered by the Major-General at least as beneficial to the State as if the same object bad been gained by a bloody victory. The Major-General was kind enough to reinforce me from the front, as soon as his battle was over, with two guns and a squadron of the 3rd Cavalry under Captain Forbes, who brought them at a rapid pace and excellent order; but the enemy had long passed away, and was almost out of sight. I should wish to add that Dr. Rogers, of the Punab Irregular Horse,, having no sick to attend to, was enabled to make himself most useful to me as “staff,” and I feel much indebted to him for his energy and zeal on this day. I also found Captain Oldfield, who had joined me with a small party of his regiment, the 3rd Light Cavalry, of great service. On the approach to Bushire on the 10th instant, the Punah Horse formed * part of the advance guard which was under my command, and, when detached by the Major-General to the right flank to cut off a straggling body of the enemy, we dashed at it so as to intercept all who were mounted, and these imme- diately surrendered. The Infantry, however, with whom they were mixed up, were doubled to rush into the creek on their left, and commenced a very sharp fire ; and as I was separated from them by 60 yards of deep mud and water, and our meu were much exposed, I was obliged to open a fire on them, explain- ing to them, as I did so, that if they came on shore and ceased firing, they should be spared. Many accepted the offer and dropped their arms in the creek, but very many more, endeavouring to cross it, were lost. The enemy’s cavalry, I regret to say, would not face us, and most of them escaped across the same creek later in the day, and under the walls of the town. All my officers and men behaved very well, and I am happy to say the enemy’s fire was so very high that none were hurt. The 3rd Light Cavalry was separated from me during the morning by my flank movement to the right, but when it joined me, it came up in excellent order under Captain Forbes, the officer who now commands it. Dated Camp near Bushire, 10th February 1 857. From — Lieutenant-General Sie J. Outeam, e.c.b., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force, To — His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army. I have the honor to report, for your Excellency’s information, that the Per- sian Expeditionary Force obtained a signal victory over the Persian army, commanded by Shuja-ul-Mulk in person, on the 8th instant. 2. The enemy’s loss m killed and wounded must have been very great ; it is impossible to compute the exact amount, but from the number of bodies which strewed the ground of contest, extending several miles, I should say that full 700 must have fallen. Two brass 9-pr, guns, with their carriages and horses, 1 i fe’ians from the commencement. I have, however, to regret the loss of Lieutenant .Frankland, 2nd European Regiment, who was acting as Brigade Major of Guards 2 Karaguglu regiments Shiraz regiment ... ... _ 4 regiments of Tabriz ... ... 800 the town of Borasjan, 46 miles dis- Arab regiment ... ... 900 tant from Bushire, and entrenched his Kashgai regiment ... ... _S00 position . Th is army was weil sup 5,100 plied with food and ammunition, of which considerable magazines had been Tufangelns , 4 . .«« LOOP collected. It was intended that this Cavalry of Shiraz ... 300 force’ should form the nucleus of a very Ukhani Horse ... , 4 . 500 large army to be assembled for the 800 reca P ture Bu shire. I therefore Guns said to bo ... ... 18 dee . med ^ imperatively necessary to strike a blow in this quarter before pro- secuting operations at Muhammarah or elsewhere. 9. The 1st Brigade, 2nd Division, which arrived on the 31st ultimo and 1st 3rd Cavalry ... 243 | , iq . instant, was landed by the 2nd, and on Punah Horse 17G f 4 sa 1CS * the evening of the 3rd the troops, as per ^Europeans !" 693 2,212 Europeans. m "f 1 “? maXoh f . tMs Wlt ^ 78th Highlanders 739 ) out tents or extra clothing of any sort. Sappers ... 1181 each man carrying his greatcoat, blan- ??, th Tw, aiive Infantry 442 ket, and two days’ cooked provisions, the 26tli E Na e t S ive Infantry 479 \ ^ Commissariat being provided with three Bilucln's ... 460 J days in addition. The protection of the 3rd Troop Horse 1 camp and town of Bushire being duly 3rd A St r Field Bat- ® provided for by a detachment of troops tery ... 6 g s * under the command of Lieutenant-Colo- 6tb Light Field Bat- nel Shepherd, reinforced by a party te *** of seamen from all the ships in the 900 said to amount to 8,500, and subse- quently found to he as per margin, at Tufaugclifs Cavalry of Shiraz llkhani Horse Guns said to bo 3rd Cavalry Punali Horse 64th Foot 2nd Europeans ... 78th Highlanders Sappers | 419 sabres. 780) 693 > 2,212 Europeans. 739) 1181 20th Native Infantry 442 | 4th Bifles ... 523 h 3,022 Natives. 26th Native Infantry 479 | Bilucln's ... 460 J 3rd Troop Horse Artillery 3rd Light Field Bat- tery 6th Light Field Lat- te , b 18 guns. harbour, which the senior officer was so good as to place at my disposal. 111111 8 mules laden with ammunition, and several hundred stand of arms, were taken; and the Persian Commander-in-Chief with the remainder of his army only escaped annihilation owing to the numerical weakness of our cavalry. 3. The loss on Our side is* 1 am happy to say, comparatively small, attrib- utable, I am inclined to believe, to the rapid advance of our artillery and Cavalry, and the well directed fire of the former, which almost paralysed the Per- Cavalry, and was killed in the first cavalry charge. Captain Forbes also, who commanded and most gallantly led the 3rd Cavalry* and Lieutenant Greentree, 64th Foot, were severely Wounded. 4. Returns of the killed and wounded, and also of the ordnance stores taker!, are annexed. 5. I myself had little to do with the action, being stunned by my horse fall- ing with me at the commencement of the contest, and recovering only in time to resume my place at the head of the army shortly before the close of the action. 6. To Major-General Stalker and Colonel Lugard, Chief of the Staff, i& the credit due for successfully guiding our troops to victory on this occasion. 7. The circumstances preceding this satisfactory termination of a brief but arduous campaign, I now proceed to detail for your Excellency's information. 8. On the 27th ultimo I landed at Bushire, and assumed the command of the army. The vast preparations of the Persian Government for the recovery of Bushire then came to my knowledge. Shuja-ul-Mulk, who commanded the Persian troops, had assembled a force, .1 _ r\r%s\ • t j . . ^ ^ ^ . ' 10. Aft* r a march of 46 miles in 41 hours, during 1 which the troops were Camp. exposed to the worst of weather, cold nights and delu- 878 Europeans. ging storms of rain, they reached the enemy's entren- 1,466 Native Infantry. ched position on the afternoon of the 5th, and found Artillery. *t abandoned. The enemy, on hearing of our approach, 14 guns. had evacuated his entrenchments the previous night so precipitately, that his tents, camp equipage, and ordn- ance magazines were left behind; the former were being rapidly carried off by village plunderers operating forsome hours before we arrived. 1 endeavoured to intercept the retreat of some of the Ilkham horse, who had held the camp dur- ing the night and were still in sight; and a little skirmishing took place, but eventually they made off . — See rough sketch No. 5 . 11* The enemy having succeeded in withdrawing their guns to the strong passes, where I did not deem it prudent to follow them, and being satisfied with the moral effect of our occupying their position for two days, I decided, upon moving the troops back to Bu shire. The return march was accordingly commenced on the night of the 7th, first destroying their magazines, found to Contain about 40,000 lbs, of powder, with small arm ammunition and a vast quan- tity of shot and shell, and carrying away large stores of flour, rice, and grain, which the Persian Government had been collecting for a long time past for their army, thereby effectually crippling their future operations. Some of their guns ape supposed to have been east info wejls; and as their wheels and axles fell into our hands, it will be impossible they can be used again for the present. 1*2. At midpight an attack was made upon the regr-guard by the enemy's horse, and parties threatened the line of march on every side; the troops were halted, and so formed as to protect the baggage and resist horsemen in what-> ever direction they might attempt to charge. Four of the enemy's guns of The number of wounded could not be ascertained, but it must have been very large. The remainder fled in a disorganized state, generally throwing away their arms, which strewed the field in vast numbers; and nothing but the paucity of our cavalry prevented their total destruction and the capture of the remaining guns . — See rough sketch No. 6‘. 16. The troops bivouacked for the day close to the battle field, and at night accomplished a march of 20 miles (by another route) over a country rendered almost impassable by the heavy rain, which fell incessantly. After a rest of six hours, the greater portion of the infantry continued their march to Bushire, which they reached before midnight, thus performing another most arduous march of 44 miles under incessant rain, besides fighting and defeating the enemy during its progress within the short period of 50 hours. The cavalry and artillery reached camp this morning. 17. The result is most satisfactory, and will, I trust, have a very bene- ficial effect upon our future operations. IS* The greatest praise is due to the troops of all arms for their steadiness and gallantry in the field, their extraordinary exertions on the march, and their cheerful endurance of fatigue and privation under circumstances rendered doubly severe by the inclemency of the weather, to which they were exposed without shelter of any kind ; and 1 cannot too strongly express the obliga- tion I feel to all under my command for the almost incredible exertions they have undergone, and the gallantry they have displayed on this occasion. 19. To Sfajor-Gejieral Stalker and to Colonel Lugard my special thanks £ire due. 20. To the heads of the several departments, as well as to every officer belonging to those departments, and to my personal staff (including Lieutenant- Colonel Lord Dunkellin, who volunteered his services as aide-de-camp), I am much indebted: from all I received every possible assistance ; and although I $o not now specify by name the departmental and personal staff and other officers alluded to, 1 shall hereafter take an opportunity of bringing them indivi- dually to your Excellency's notice ; indeed, when ajl have behaved so nobly, it is difficult to specify individuals. 21. The rapid retreat of the enemy afforded but little opportunity for deeds of special gallantry I have already alluded to ,* the successful charges made by the 3rd Cavalry and Fun ah Horse under Captain Forbes and Lieutenant-Colo- nel Tupp, and to the very efficient services performed by the Artillery under Lieu- tenant Colonel Trevelyan, the Brigadiers Commanding the Infantry Brigades — "Willson, Stisted, and Homier, — with the several commanding officers of re- giments and indeed every officer and soldier of the force, earned my warmest approbation . 22. To the medical officers of the force, I am under great obligation for their untiring exertions throughout these dangerous operations. 23. I cannot conclude without alluding in strong terms to the valuable assistance I have received from Major Taylor, yriiose services were placed at my disposal by Hon'ble C. A. Murray, c.b. Return of killed and wounded belonging to the Persian Field Force during the action at Khushab on 8th February 1857. Divisional Staff, Lieutenant Fraiiklani ... ... Killed. <8(i.) J. WRAY, Captain, iJ>j Qr. Mr. G'etd., P. E. F. A l. B. September 1888. Exci J. A. A 8 © 3rd Troop Horse Artillery « rx wounded (tliree Europeans) ; one since dead. 1st Company , 1st Battalion Artillery. One killed (European), one wounded, 4th Company , 1st Battalion Artillery, Two wounded (Europeans). 3rd Bight Cavalry. 'Captain "Forbes One killed ; fourteen wounded ; one since dead. Her Wajesty's 64th Regiment . Captain Mockler :> Lieutenant Greentree ) ••• ••• «• Wounded. Eleven wounded (Europeans) ; two since dead. 2nd ^European Regiment Bight Infantry . Ensign Woodcock ... ... ... .... Wounded. ^Europeans) two killed ; nine wounded-; one -since dead. Bunah Irregular Horse, Three killed, eight wounded ; one since dead. 26th Regiment Native Infantry, Assistant Surgeon J. M. Barwell .... • .... Wounded. Four wounded. 2nd Biluch Battalion . ■One killed. Ordnance Department. One killed ; two wounded ; Total killed : Europeans 3, Natives 7. Wounded „ 31 „ 31. Grand total [ ^Imded 62 } 72 ‘ Died of wounds since action — 3 Europeans and 3 Natives. Officers and men. recommended by Lieutenant-General Sir J. Outrat® cc.b,; for the Victoria Cross : — Captain Forbes. Lieutenant Spens. Lieutenant and Adjutant Moore. Cornet Combe. Captain Moore. Cornet Hill. Lieutenant Malcolmson. Jemadar Ranjit Sing. Captain Wray. Trooper Lall Khan. All of 3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry for distinguished braverj at the destruction of the Persian infantry square on the 8th February 1857, action of Khushab, Wounded Dated Camp near Bushire, 10th February 1857. From — C aptain J. Forbes, 3rd Regiment Light Cavalry, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, To — The Chief of the Staff, Persian Expeditionary Field Force. I have the honor to submit a report of the part taken by the regiment in the action of the 8th instant up to the time when wounded. I had to hand over the command to Captain Graves. I go ■ ' : PS 2 As soon as it was sufficiently light to discern the Peisian army fiom our position, Brigadier Tupp, with the Pdnah Horse, advanced at a rapid pace to our right front ; and as I was left without instructions as to hou I was to act, I judged that it was the Brigadier’s intention that I should be guided by CirC 3 m An D oppo rtunity almost Immediately offered of attacking a considerable body of skirmishers, and to do this T advanced with the 3rd Squadron under Captain Moore, having first directed Captain Graves to support with the 1st ^*4. The nature" of the ground sheltered the squadron in this advance from the fire of the enemy’s guns, and the charge was most successful. Surprised in extended order without support, the enemy’s loss was considerable; ours veiy trifling^ ^ pursu i t 0 f the skirmishers, from some rising ground, I obtained an excellent view of the Persian force. . , a Ida 6 It was evident that the forward movement of our cavahy towards Ins left had not been unobserved by the enemy, and troops were m motion to Stle ^One tSinby^regiment, which, in the imperfect morning light, I mis- took for a body of cavalry, was approaching us very rapidly. r , • 8 The squadron was much scattered, the absence of support Captain Graveshaving been impeded in his advance by our artillery dep eying— made iT advLble to retire, which was done very quietly, front rank and officers leading, the men closing in and taking up their dressing. 9 I remained a little in rear to watch the enemy. 10. Soon after we had moved off it, the rising ground before referred to was occupied by the above mentioned infantry regiment. , , 11. The men and horses of the squadron were in high spirits, the ground most favorable for cavalry, the enemy in a position isolated from the rest ot - their army; even if an attack against them failed, the consequences would not he seuoi bordered the squadron to wheel about and attack to its front. The enernv li&lted on tlie slope and formed squat e. , , i ^ i 13. The men saw at once what was required of them, and by a loud chee assured their officers of their determination to meet the odds opposed to the u. 14 The distance between ns and this fine body of men, 700 to 800 strong, armed with musket and bayonet, with confidence awaiting : the i shock m a for- mation they had been taught to consider impracticable to hoisemen, was soo i passed. Without a check, and almost at the same instant along its whole face, was the square dashed upon, broken, and entered, and soldiers, one moment before so perfect an example of discipline, had become a contused mass of fugitives.^ ^ oug action have j witne ssed in so short a time so great a destruction of life as was then inflicted by the straight sword, drawn from a steel scabbard, on this regiment; and yet that only weapon for a cavalry soldi has been called an useless one in the hands of a native dragoon. 16 To the right rear of where this square had stood was a very fine gun with six horses, whose gunners and drivers shared the fate of their infantry 17. This masked gun, had there been any delay in our attack after the enemy appeared on the ground on which they stood to receive the charge, would Have been brought to bear on the squadron. mm 91 18. By this gun Captain Moore’s horse was mortally wounded, and both that officer and Captain Wray, leader of the right troop, of the 3rd Squadron, whose charger I observed was covered with blood from three bullet wounds, greatly exposed themselves in endeavouring to bring it off. 19. I was now obliged to hand over comm md of the regiment to Cap- tain Graves, owing to a wound received in the attack on the square. At the close of the action, 1 was highly gratified to hear of the admirable manner in which all ranks did their duty under that excellent officer. 20. I may mention that, whilst retiring to reform before the attack on the square, I observed Captain Graves’ squadron advancing at a gallop towards the enemy considerably to our left. 21. I* would wish to bring to your notice the gallantry of Lieutenant and Adjutant Moore, In the charge on the square, he dashed in front, and his horse fell dead mi the bayonets, precipitating, bis rider into the midst of the enemy. Lieutenants Maleolmson and Combe are also very promising and gallant young officers. The latter’s horse had three bullet wounds and a bayonet stab. To the assistance afforded to him by the former, do I consider Lieutenant Moore owes his life ; with a sword broken by his fall, he was dragged clear of the enemy by Lieutenant Maleolmson, who, drawing his foot from the stirrup, gave him the leather to hold by. 22. Lieutenant Spens, who so well led the left troop of the 3rd Squadron had also his horse wounded. Dated Bushire, 7th May 1857. , who commanded Left Squadron, 3rd Bombay Cavalry, at Khushdb. Report by Captain Moore, Upon the morning of the 8th February at Khushab, a little before daylight, the 3rd Cavalry were formed up in close column of squadrons — left in front- facing the direction of the enemy. The Pun ah Horse, also in close column, were on our right. * * * At daylight Brigadier Tupp went off to the right at a hard gallop. I heard no previous order given by Brigadier Tupp for this advance, but Captain Forbes immediately advanced, and the squadron was soon employed in cutting up the Persian skirmishers, who had advanced close enough to annoy the line of infantry and guns. After being thus employed for a few minutes, we perceived to our left what appeared to be in the grey of the morning a large mass of cavalry coming in our direction. Captain Forbes instantly ordered the squadron to reform, and we advanced in the direction of what had appeared a body of horse. On getting closer, we observed it was a large body of infantry moving with a gun from the Persian right towards their left. This was a regiment of the Shah’s guard. They halted on the rise of a small hill, and fired volleys at us. When, we got close, they formed a solid square with kneel- ing ranks, and awaited us most steadily. When within 30 yards of the square, I observed Lieutenant Moore, who was Adjutant of the regiment, and then rid- ing in front of Captain Wray’s troop, spur his horse to speed, and in the most gallant and most determined manner rush the horse into the. square in front of the whole squadron. The squadron then in parade order, in a perfect line, rode down the square, and it no longer existed, except as a struggling mass. The squadron had originally consisted of one hundred and twenty men, and it is my opinion that when we entered the square , we were under 100 men, from some having been wounded and several scattered after the enemy’s skirmishers. I am confirmed in this opinion by Captain Wray being of the sum e belief. I am of opinion fiat the square consisted of at least 800 men ; there- fore the bravery and gallantry of Captain Forbes in leading against it entirely on his own responsibility a small body of cavalry, one-tenth’of their number, and quite unsupported by any other body, cannot be over-estimated. The Persian regular infantry bad never been previously met by us • the regi- ment was a famous one amongst them, and well armed with excellent muskets and fixed bayonets ; and the men were the largest and finest looking- body I ever saw, having been enlisted from the northern provinces of Persist Captain Forbes unhesitatingly led the charge, and the whole squadron as unhesitatingly followed ,- and I can only attribute our losing so few men to the- ' excellent order and quick pace that we advanced at ; besides, the enemy, being on the rise of a hill, fired considerably too high. We took possession of a gun which the enemy were driving off to the rear of what had been their square, but the men being scattered in single combat, the gun could not he taken off. Captain Forbes, who was severely wounded in charging the square. Captain Wray, and myself remained with this gun for a little time; but Captain Wray’s horse being dangerously wounded, and mine being mortally wounded at the gun, we were obliged to desert it. I beg to bring to notice here the steady and brave conduct of Trooper Lall Khan, 6th Troop, who dismounted under a heavy fire, on my order, to mount the leading gun horse and attempt to drive it off, in which I have no doubt we should have succeeded hut for my horse being mortally wounded just then, and the enemy being all round us and Lall Khan being the only trooper at or near the gun. * The gunners had jumped off the gun, and ran away on our approach. The three drivers were all killed immediately. I am of opinion that the enemy took out the horses, and never moved this gun from where we had to leave it. • The whole squadron nobly did their duty. Captain Forbes was severely wounded in the charge, Captain Wray very severely wounded by three bul- lets, Cornet Combe’s horse severely wounded by two bullets and a sword cut Lieutenant Spens’ horse was slightly bayoneted. Lieutenant Moore’s horse’ was killed in the broken square, and his sword was broken in his fall. The right squadron (which had been unfortunately unable to support the left from the delay caused by the guns getting between the squadrons), when then- front was clear, advanced, and the left squadron, not being in sight acted independently, and equally distinguished itself by charging and routing ] ar <r e masses of the enemy. During the-action both squadrons united, when Captain Graves took command of the regiment, Captain Forbes having been compelled to leave the field some time previously from the effects of his wound Captain Wray had command of the left squadron until I was able to mount & trooper's horse, my own having been killed,. Beporfc by Captaik Oldfield- On the day of the engagement at Khushab, on the 8th February last I was in command of the 1st Troop, 3rd Light Cavalry. My own troop was ’actin«- in concert with the 2nd Troop,, the squadron being- commanded by Captain Graves, and on each occasion of its charging the enemy, its success was as bril- liant as the courage of the troopers was marked and distinguished Besides the officers with the squadron, I can appeal to Major Ballard, c.b., who assured me himself at the time that with such men one could go anywhere and do any- thing. I wish particularly to state that in concert with the 2nd Troop we I ISfefi f A A “ VO captured one of the two guns taken in the action at Khushab, every man the gun (a 9-pr.) having been slain in acti ve combat for its defence. Where all behaved so nobly, I feel a difficulty amounting to an impossi- bility in making any special selection, but I venture respectfully to suggest that the conduct of the troop I had the honor to command on the occasion in ques- tion falls exactly within the provisions of the nineteenth rule of the regulations for the distribution oi* the u Victoria Gross/* In conclusion, I trust that the* fact of my inability to make any special selections will not be suffered to oper- ate to the disadvantage of the troop, or bar their claim to such favorable con- sideration as the General Officer Commanding may deem expedient. Extract from Supernumerary Surgeon McKenzie $ Report, dated llih February 183?. As I had an opportunity of seeing, I must do myself the pleasure of recording the excellent conduct of the medical officers with the force. All were in their places and discharged their duties with the greatest order and regularity and most efficiently, and this whilst exposed to the fire of the enemy equally with the officers of their respective regiments. The Zealand ability displayed by Field Surgeon Deas were most praiseworthy and deserving my best thanks; and although nearly all the other medical officers belonged to* the first division, and the credit which they merit will no doubt be awarded them by their own Supernumerary Surgeon, I trust I shall be excused when I take the liberty of highly commending the conduct of Surgeon Neilson of the Artillery, Surgeon Wright, 2nd Europeans, Surgeon Inglis, Her Majesty's 64th Regiment, Surgeon Lod wick of the Rifles, and Assistant Surgeon Rogers of the* Punah Irregular Horse, and Assistant Surgeon Corey, Her Majesty's 64th Re- giment — officers who have so lately served with me, and of whose ability and devotion to the public service I have had an opportunity of judging. Assist- ant Surgeon McAlister, Civil Surgeon, Residency Persian Gulf, was also present,, and rendered every aid io his power. Extract from Supernumerary Surgeon StovelVs Report . Several surgical operations were performed on the field, and the conduct of every medical officer was beyond praise ; " and again, “ it will be apparent to the Board that the medical officers of the force have, in common with every- body else, been subjected to great fatigue and exposure, and it will be gratify- ing to be assured that they laboured throughout with unceasing devotion to their duties. Dated 14th February 1857. Despatch from — L ieuten ant-Gen real Sir J. Outbam, k.c.b., Commanding ~ Persian Expeditionary Field Force, To — His Excellency the Governor General of India. I have the honor to inform your Lordship that I arrived here on the 27th ultimo, when I learnt that extensive preparations were being organised by the enemy, which at first I was led fco believe had merely in view to bar our advance to Shiraz ; and as I supposed their troops were immediately under the passes, into which they would retire at our carJhi^ ered by Want ° f approach, I did not contemplate the advisability of " l ^ ’ proceeding against them until the capture of Muham- inarali had opened a supply of carriage cattle, with which we are yet unprovided. 2. Subsequently, however, it became apparent that the enemy were con- . eentrating a far greater force than heretofore it had been supposed they U If IS 1 : >1 i| If f ■ ! : I Kyat Horse Afsharf Horse possiLly could accommodate l-elow the passes, and it was evident iW nt i -cvobectrf, they „„„ld „ fc. » J position t„ ai„p" ,L Detail of enemy’s forces occupying the entrenched Bushire. Moreover, that the FanjiKhals a h £ampatBorasjaU - 800 Persian Commandcr-in- Chief, 4th Fanji Tabriz ". SIiuja-ul-Mulk, had formed an Fauji Shiraz ... 6oo entrenched camp at Borasian Fauj! Kaahkai tnn mil } about 46 miles distant,; Tufanchfa j ® lld 1 Z from the passes, which Two regiments of Karagusliis t i^QO ^ occupied with a force of 8,45 0 Shall Reiman ... ... 400 regular infantry and cavalry fas Slnrazi (or inhabitants of the neighbour- n er m arff j n \ with ] 7 , ^ ' ■» hood of Shiraz) ... 400 * er maigin;, with 17 guns and Ilfyat Horse 500 one mortar, and that reinforce- Afshuri Horse ... ' 750 ^ents froga Tihran and else- Total ? vhere were rapidly approach- Total ... MoO Jng t0 the extent of 12 regi- oe ^ „ ments of regular infantry with ! w m 6 Prepa, ; a i ? ,1 . s T ere maki °S for raising the tribes, of whom 4,000 would be assembled in 24 hours. om _ . Barties of horse had been sent forward, and violent denunciations were } unclaimed, to deter the people of the country from furnishing supplies to our camp, and mistrust and apprehension prevailed in the town. 4. It became imperatively necessary, therefore, to strike a blow in this quaitei before extending our operations elsewhere; and to enable me to effect should £rfv“ ^ “ J,ligade of the iDd Vision so soon as it 5. The first portion of the Brigade in tow of the Polling er anchored in the harbour on the d.st ultimo, and the remainder iu tow of the Precursor on the . st instant, and all were lauded by the evening of the 2 nd in light marchim- order, leaving all surplus baggage on board. ** 6 . On the evening of the 3rd instant, 1 marched with a force of 4,653 men Cavalry (saW >B ) ... 419 of all arms and ii> guns ; but bavins* barely sufWnt sssar-ss *w ^**v*~» ifiri 1 - — da I rs > w ® vvere necessarily without tents or cover of any 4,653 sort beyond what the men carried on their backs, in 18 suns addition to the two days' provisions with which they b ' were supplied. J 7. As we were exposed during the six days occupied in. this expedition to frequent heavy ram, the troops suffered much discomfort in bivouac, and still greater hardship on the march, owing to the heavy spongy nature of the ground they traversed, which they bore with admirable cheerfulness and fortitude The shoes of the greater portion of the infantry were literally drawn off tlieir fee * 111 struggling through the mud, and those which remained so utterly unservice-" able that I have had to issue a new pair to ail European and .Native infantry soldiers, which I have done gratis, and I trust this will meet with your Lord- ship's approval. — See rough sketch No. 7. J 8. My despatch of 11th instant, addressed to tlie Commander-in-Chief Bombay Army, will inform your Lordship of our military proceedings. The’ mord. effect of the defeat of the Shuja-ul-Mulk's army, composed of some of the ilite of the Persian troops, by a British force so numerically inferior the capture of his camp and destruction of his magazines, must prove advantageous to our cause, and will, I think, deter tlie Persian General, when reinforced by the troops and guns now approaching from Tihran, from appearing before Buslnre during my absence at Muhammarak. But I consider it 18 guns. m urgently requisite tbat General Stalker should be reinforced as early as possible by at least another European and two Native infantry regiments, with another troop of horse artillery and a foot battery, horsed, also some guns for positions, to avert the necessity of my detaching to his aid any portion of the force des- tined for Muhammarah, and the subsequent advance on Shustar, which latter movement, indeed, on which I mainly rely for securing healthy summer quar- ters for a portion of the European troops, and for effecting any real impression on Persia (and this chiefly through the organization of the Tureo-Arabian levies, who could only be raised in that quarter), would in that case have to be aband- oned, and our operations would then be confined to the sea coast. * * * * * * * 1 2. By the latest accounts from Muhammarah, I learn that the Prince- Gov- ernor of Burujird (Khanlar Mirza, Governor-General of all Persian Arabistan) hail arrived there with large reinforcements of infantry and cavalry and eight guns, and that the enemy^s force now there may probably be estimated at about 10,000 men of all arms and 16 guns. 13. Assuming that the Golundauze Company will accompany that bri- gade (to be left with General H«M$SSwth ::: 500 stalker in substitution for ; the 26th Native Infantry ... ... 400 reserve company or artillery 23rcl Native Infantry ... ... 750 now here required for the 20th Native Infantry ... ... 300 mountain train), the force for Company Uppers ]" 100 Muhammarah will consist of 1 troop Horse Artillery ... ... 150 3,7 LO men of all arms as per 1 company Field Artillery ... ... 100 margin. Mountain Train with Reserve Company & of Artillery ... ... 60 Grand total ... 3,710 22. There are two routes between Shiraz and Isfahan, which unite about two-thirds of the way. The one called the “ winter route is said to possess » but few natural difficulties, and the wild Bakht&ri on es o ac vauce. generally migrate by the other or <e summer ” route during the winter. 23. Between Isfahan and Tihran the track is fair and practicable for artillery. The march should be accomplished, however, in the cold season owing to the scarcity of water, especially along the “ Valley of the shadow of death. ” Thus the advance to Shiraz during spring would be in time for the further progress to Tihran in the following winter. * " * * * * # * The General complains of political restrictions which have been placed upon him, and strongly condemns proposal to abstain from making use of the _ „ . _ •. .. Ara b tribes, who, he explains, will (if not employed o i ic res lie ions. ^ the British) plunder baggage convoys, and cut off- supplies and information. No. 14- A., dated 16th March 1857. From — Lieutenant-General Sir J. Outram, k.c.b., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force, To— The Adjutant General, Bombay Army. Reports that Major-General Stalker, c.b., died from the effects of a pistol shot inflicted by his own hand on the morning of the 14th instant, and Minute by Viscount Canning, dated 21st March 1857, Persia , that Brigadier Wilson, k.h., has been appointed to the command of the 1st Division of Infantry as a temporary measure, and Lieutenant-Colonel Shep- heard, 20th Regiment Native Infantry, to command the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, in succession. Adds that Brigadier-General Jacob, c.b., will remain in command of Bush ire during his (Sir J. Outranks) absence on the expedition to Muhammarah. The thanks of the Government of India to Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram and to the officers and men under his command for the signal success obtained ' by them over the Persian army in the neighbourhood of Borasjan, and the admiration with which their courage, energy, and discipline have been viewed by the Governor-General in Council, were proclaimed publicly as soon as Sir James Outranks despatches of 10th and 14tli February reached Calcutta, The notification of the 12th March will be conveyed to Sir James Outram forthwith. In the 8th paragraph of the despatch of 10th February, Sir James Outram specifies the reinforcements which, in addition to the second. division of the army, he considers necessary in order to make the position of Major- General Stalker at Bushire secure during liis absence at Muhammarah. Of these, one European regiment left Madras for Bushire in the Oriental on the 17th instant. One company of artillery has already been despatched from Bom- bay, and the remainder of the artillery, with the two native infantry regiments asked for, will be ready for embarkation at that post about the 28th instant. The delay in the arrival at Bushire of one brigade of the second division has, as I greatly regret to see, obstructed Sir James Outranks movements. So far as I can judge from frequent communication with the Government of Bombay, this delay has occurred from no other cause than the want of steapi power, — a want so great that at least two squadrons of Want of steamers. the Sind Horse have been consigned to sailing vessels unassisted by steamers— a mode of transport which at this season is already very tedious, and will soon become more so. But this has been unavoidable. Of all the steam vessels which the Government of India possesses, or can obtain on hire for service in Persia, two only, the Fire Queen and Coromandel , are on this side of India, each engaged on a duty which admits of * Auckland. n0 interruption or postponement ; two* are in China, ■Zcnofoa. ail d every other vessel is in use between Bombay and Bushire. I believe that two of these have been retained in the Persian Gulf, and have not contributed to the transport of the second division ; but this was to he expected and in any case it is certain that the steam vessels at the disposal of the Government of ‘India are not sufficient for the purpose of moving a force of little more than six thousand men, with its proportion of followers and horses, from Bombay to Bushire with the rapidity which the shortness of the seasons for operations, whether by sea or land, render desirable. I trust, therefore, that the Honffile Court will bear in mind the request for an addition to the number of steamers fit for transport of troops which has already been addressed to them, and that the means of the Government in this respect will be increased before the time for the despatch of the larger reinforcements to the army arrives. In the 20th and 21st paragraphs. General Outram raises the question of the time at which an advance upon Shiraz should take place, whether before the winter or in the spring, and he gives his reasons for preferring the latter : * The remainder supposed to have been thrown in the river. cc So far as our Persian foes are concerned, I shall, I trust, with the rein- “ forcemeats I have ashed for be sufficiently strong to maintain the country “ below the passes, namely, Kliuzistan and Lurist&n, and be prepared, to advance “ on Shiraz whenever the additional troops destined to operate in the interior <c of Persia shall have joined. I am now thoroughly informed as to the proper seasons for such movement, and have no hesitation in stating that; if in *■ time sufficiently strengthened in troops, and supplied with baggage cattle, u we can occupy Shiraz before winter, up to which point our sepoys would be <c available, for though Shiraz itself is very cold, they would not, I believe, ** suffer there if properly housed ; at any rate they would suffice to hold Bushire u and the line of communication below Shiraz ; but during the summer and * e autumn the water is bad and scarce, and forage hardly procurable between u those two points. “ all considerations, therefore, it would appear preferable to defer the ic advance on Shiraz until the early part of spring (March)/ - ’ I think the reasons are good. Ko. 5, dated “ J Feroee ” off Muhammarah, 25th March 1857. From — Acting- Commodobe J. W. Young, i.n., Commanding Persian Gulf Squadron, To — The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force. In acquainting- you with my intention o£ attacking the forts defending Muhammarah with t he squadron under my command at early dawn tomorrow morning, I beg to inform you that when the fort appears to me to be sufficiently silenced for the troops to be brought up in the vessels told off for this purpose from the present rendezvous to the place of debarkation be- tween the first and second creek, south of Jabar’s fort, the rendezvous flag will be hoisted by the vessel bearing my pendant, and repeated by the other vessels at the time in company with me. Dated Camp near Muhammarah, 27th March 1857. Despatch from -Lietttenant-Gfneiul Sie J. Odteam, k.c.e., Commandins- Persian Expeditionary Field Force, ° To— The Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army. I have the honor to report, for your Excellency’s information, the successful result of the operations against Muhammarah. The Persian army evacuated their entrenched position and camp about midday, leaving behind all their tents standing, with nearly the whole of their property, public and private, all their ammunition, and seventeen guns. As far as I am able to learn, only five guns* and a portion of the personal effects of the Shahzadah have been carried away. 2. It was my intention to have proceeded against the place immediately upon my return from the Borasjan Expedition last month,- hut owing to the non-arrival of the Requisite reinforcements caused by the tempestuous weather im the Gulf, together with unforeseen causes of delay, I was not able to leave Bushire until the 18th instant. In the meantime, however, I had despatched the transports into the Shatt-ul-Arab from Bushire, as the troops were embarked, so that upon my arrival in the steamer Feroze no further dehv occurred beyond what was necessarily caused by the tides, and by towhm- 1% many large vessels up the river. & * S. For some months past' the Persians had been strengthening their position at Muhammarah ; batteries had been erected of great strength of solid earth 20 feet thick and IB feet high, with casemated embrasures, on the northern and southern parts of the banks of the E.arun and Shatt-ul- Arab, where the two rivers join; these with other earthworks, armed with heavy ordnance, commanded the entire passage of the latter river, and were so skilfully and judiciously placed, and so scientifically formed, as to sweep the whole stream to the extent of the range of the guns up and down the river and across to the apposite shore; indeed, everything that science could suggest, and labour accomplish in the time, appeared to have been done by the enemy so effectually to prevent any vessel passing up the river above their position. The banks for many miles were covered by dense date groves, affording the most perfect cover for riflemen, and the opposite shore, being neutral territory, (Turkish) was not available for the erection of counter-batteries. See rough sketch No. 8. 4s. The accompanying rongh sketch will, I fear, give yonr Excellency hut a faint idea of the great strength of the Persian position, and the difficulty pf successfully attacking them in it without very considerable Joss. I could have landed my troops on the island of Abadan, which was strongly occupied by the Persians, and there is no doubt that, after defeating them, the southern battery eventually would have fallen to us; but the several batteries on the northern bank of the Karun commanded the entire southern bank, as wallas the stream of the Shatt-ul-Arab, and it would have been a serious and an extremely difficult operation to have crossed the rapid current of the Karun in the face of the enemy had the means existed of doing so, hut until our small steamers and boats could round the southern point and join us, we should have been helpless. See rough sketch No. 9 . 5. After mature deliberation, I resolved to attack the enemy's batteries . with the armed steamers and sloops of war, and, so soon as the fire was nearly silenced, to pass up rapidly with the troops in small steamers towing boats, land the force two miles above the northern point, and immediately advance upon and attack the entrenched camp. * 6. I have now the very great satisfaction of announcing to your Excellency the complete success of the first two operations, the third to the regret of the army being frustrated by the precipitate flight of the enemy. 7. The Persian army, ascertained from creditable report to amount Cavalry, Irregulars 1,500 to 13,000 men of all arms, 9 regiments. Regulars, 100 each .. 6,300 With d0 guns, was Com- Arabs and Bakhtians 4,600 rnanded by the Shahzadah, Guimers 600 Prince Khanlar Mirza, in Total ... ... 13.000 P erson * The British force under my Her Majesty’s 14th Dragoons ... Sind Horse « 64th Foot •“ 78th Highlanders 25th Regiment Native Light Infantry 26tli }, j> » » Light Battalion ... ^ Bombay Sappers and Miners Madras „ ,, f 3 Troop Horse Artillery... 12 guns 4 No% a Li ht Field Buttery command, as per margin, was the utmost 1 gg ^ deemed it prudent to with- 303 > 393 draw from Bushire; but with 704 \ the aid of four armed steam - ^ * ' ers and two sloops of war 716 1 2,385 4,886 to effect my landing, I felt 920 ) confident of success, although 1 P 9 1 233 I anticipated some loss from what I heard of the deter- 176 > 343 J m ination expressed by the enemy to oppose our further ' ■- ' , ■ ; ■ : ■ : . r ' V V ' ■ : , . ' .. ; : i . 99 " ’ ■ ! " advance to the utmost of their power, and their extreme confidence of succeed- ing, as evinced by the fact of tbeir having sent away their baggage cattle. 8. On the 24th instant, the steamers, with transport ships in tow, moved up the river to within three miles of the southern battery opposite the Arab village of Hartah; but as some of the large ships shoaled on the way, and did not reach the rendezvous until after dark, I was obliged to defer the attack for another day. During the night a reconnaissance was made in a boat to ascertain the nature of the soil of an island west of and immediately opposite the northern battery, where I wished to erect a mortar battery; bnt as it was found to he deep mud, I determined to place the mortars upon a raft ; this was constructed the following day under the superintendence of Cap- tain Rennie, i.n., and being armed with two 8" and two 5£" mor- tars, with a party of artillery under Captain Worgan, was towed by the steamer Comet, and moored in position close to the island during the night unobserved by the enemy, who from our preparation at the rendezvous, and their confidence as to the impossibility of any vessel being able to pass above their batteries, apparently expected we should land on the southern island (Abadan). The horses and guns of the artillery, a portion of the cavalry, and the infantry, were transhipped into boats and small steamers during the day in readiness for landing the following morning. 9. At break of day on the 26th the mortars opened tbeir fire upon both the northern and southern batteries. The range of the 5| v proved too short, hut the 8" shells were very efficient, bursting immediately over and inside the enemy's works; whilst from the position -of the raft but few of the Persian guns could be brought to bear upon the mortars. At 7 o'clock the several vessels of war moved up into the positions allotted them by Commodore Young, and by 9 o’clock the fire of the heavy batteries was so reduced that the small steamers, with boats in tow, and one large steamer, the Potlinger, towing the transport Golden Era, were able to pass up, and land the troops above the northern battery without a single casualty amongst the troops, although they had to run the gauntlet of both gun and musket fire; two or three native followers only were killed in consequence of their unneces- sarily exposing themselves. . 10. By halfpast one o’clock the troops were landed and formed, and advanced without delay through the date groves and across the plain upon the entrenched camp of the enemy, who, without waiting for our approach fled precipitately, after exploding their largest magazine, leaving, as I have before stated, their tents and baggage, public and private stores, with several magazines of ammunition and sixteen guns behind. The want, of cavalry (only one troop of Sind Horse having been able to land in time) prevented my pursuing them as I could have wished, bnt I despatched a party of Sind Irregular Horse under Captain Malcolm Green to follow them up for some distance, this officer reported that he came upon their rear-guard, retiring in good order, hut that the road in many places was strewed with property and equipments. The loss of the Persians has been esti- mated at 200 killed, among whom was an officer of rank and es tim a ti o n , Brio-a- dier Agha Jan Khan, who fell in the northern battery. ° 11. I beg to annex a report received from Commodore Young, with copy of a letter I had previously caused to be addressed to that officer expressing my entire satisfaction with, the naval operations; indeed, it was impossible for my instructions to have been more ably or more successfully carried out, and the Commodore and every officer and man under his command have nobly earned iiiM 100 my warmest thanks. Prom Commodore Young, ably seconded by Cantarn Rennie, and the other officers of the fleet and masters of transport I have throughout received every possible assistance. * 12. With the exception of the artillery with the mountain battery under Captain W organ, no portion of the military force was actively engaged with the enemy beyond some European riflemen sent on hoard the war vessels : but I am not the less indebted to all for their exertions and. zeal, and especially for the great order and despatch with which the landing of the troops was effected under Brigadier- General Havelock, o.B. j the highest spirit prevailed, and had the large Persian army only awaited our approach out of the range of the ship s guns, I feel confident that it would have received a lasting lesson. 13. From recent information I learn that the Persian force in a very disor- gamzed state is still infull retreat, and I proposed to despatch immediately up the Karan to Ahwaz three small armed steamers, with 100 European infantry “ ea T’ fr ^e purpose of making a reconnaissance, and, if practicable, effect- ing, the destruction of the magazines at that place. 14. I take this opportunity of recommending to your Excellency’s notice Colonel lugard, o.B j., the Chief, and the several officers of my general and personal staff; the Brigadier-General, the Brigadiers, and their respective staff as also the officers commanding the several regiments, batteries and detachments of cavalry, and heads of departments composing this force upon whom much responsibility has devolved, and whose zeal and exertions throughout this expedition have been most praiseworthy. _ 15. To Captain Kemball, Bombay Artillery, Consul-General at Bahgdad, 1 am much indebted for his very valuable assistance ; also to Major Taylor as well as to Lords Dunkellin, Seymour, and Schomberg Kerr, who volunteered" their services on my staff. Deputy Commissary-General reports that he proceeded to the town of Borasjan on the morning of the 7th instant, and removed from the Persian magazine the undermentioned Commissariat stores : . 5 ”? Bariev 2 - 907 . . ::: ;;; ;;; lf Q l Since ascertained by actual weighing: *'* 9 ^ heat flour 10,000 Bariev * "" "" "* *“ ••• 2,1000 ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: Jffi The whole of the above have been brought on or issued on the march with the exception of some rice, which was lost by the upsetting of the 'cart in which it was being conveyed. & Ko. 2692, dated April 1857. Extract from a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army, to the General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force. & * * * * * * The precipitate flight of the enemy and abandonment of their entrenched position and camp, leaving guns, ammunition, camp equipage, and public and private property, without an effort at resistance after the troops were landed speaks strongly against the probability of any future opposition in that quarter, and I am m great hopes that the report of your signal success at Muhammarah will hasten the Shah of Persia to ratify the treaty of peace which was signed by his Ambassador at Paris on the 3rd ultimo. Dated Ahwaz, 3rd April 1857. Despatch from— Acting- Commodoee J. Kennie, i.n.," Commanding Squadron in the Persian Gulf, To— The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force. 3 On arrival near Ahwaz on the morning of the 1st instant, the Persian army was observed posted on a strong position on the right bank of the river, and having reason to believe that whatever force there might be on the left bank did not amount to such a number as would entail serious risk to our force, it was at once determined to carry Ahwaz. Our arrangements for attack were speedily completed, and by 10-30 a.m* Captain Hunt, his advance well flanked by the gunboats, moved off with bis gallant band of three hundred men, and in one hour and a half from the time of the gunboats opening fire he was in possession of Ahwaz ; and the Persian army, consisting of 6, 000 infantry, . 5 guns, and a cloud of Bakhtiari horsemen, were in full retreat upon Dizful, leaving in our possession one gun (a brass 14-pr. field piece), 154 stand of arms, 56 mules, 230 sheep, besides an enormous quantity of grain, wheat, and barley. Captain Kemball requested me to remain at Ahwaz for two days to afford him time to communicate with the Arab tribes, as also to ensure the ‘impossi- bility of the defeated Persians returning to Ahwaz ; they retired so precipitately as to have been unable to carry with them means of subsistence for more than two days. It would be presumptive in me to offer a remark on the gallantry and zeal of those serving with me. I shall therefore merely take the liberty of attaching a nominal list of the officers, with the number of men under their command, composing an expedition that penetrated over 300 miles bevond Muhammarah and which m so short a time compelled the Persian army to aban- don a depot of provisions on which it almost entirely depended for subsistence. In conclusion, I beg -to add that it is to Captain Kemball who planned and to Captain Hunt who executed, this bold stroke that thanks are more especially due. further comments from me are unnecessary. List of officers and men comprising the expedition to Ahwaz. Armed steamer “ Comet'* Commander Selby. 2 acting Masters. 1 1st class 2nd Master. 1 Assistant Surgeon. 21 seamen and 16 massulies. River steamer “Planet” 2 acting Masters. 6 Europeans and 13 lascars. River steamer “ Assyria ” 2 acting Masters. 5 Europeans and 12 Natives. IVo. 6 Gunboat . 1 Lieutenant. 1 Midshipman, 16 seamen. I* . - : 102 No. 5 Gunboat. 1 Mate. 1 Midshipman. 14 seamen. No. 9 Gunboat . 1 Lieutenant. 1 Midshipman. . 14 seamen. Cutters. Falkland's. ‘ Feroze's. Assayes. 1 Midshipman. 1 Midshipman. 1 Midshipman. 11 men. ^ ^ 11 men. 9 men. Assistant Burgeon Asher, in medical charge of gunhoai and cutter from Feroze. Mr. Sims, 3rd class Gunner of Feroze 3 temporarily attached for the expedition to steamer Flanet. Wm iili Nominal Roll of Political and Staff Officers present with the detachment under Captain Hunt, 78fch Highlanders, in the advance upon Ahwas, 1st April 1857. Captain A. B. Kemball, Bombay Artillery, Resident in Turkish Arabia. Lord Schomberg H. Kerr, attached to Persian Mission. Captain J. Wray, Deputy Quarter Master General, Persian Field Force. Captain Malcolm Green, Sind Horse. Lieutenant Baigrie, Commissariat Department. Nominal Roll of Officers of detachment under the command of Captain Hunt, 78th Highlanders. Her Majesty's 64th Regiment Captain W. Goorle. Lieutenant G. H. T. Haldane. Ensign J. J. Pack. Assistant Surgeon E. L. Lundy. 28th Highlanders . Captain G. H. Hunt. „ D. McAndrew. Lieutenant A. Cassidy. „ J.- Finlay. „ G. D. Barker* Detachments consisting of 300 men, being 150 from each of the above regiments. Dated Camp Mukammarak, 4th April 1857. Despatch from— L ieutenakt-Geneeal Sie J. Outeam, k.c.b., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force, To— The Commander-in-chief, Bombay Army. In my despatch dated the 27th ultimo, I announced to your Excellency my intention of immediately despatching up the Karun river to Ahwaz an armed flotilla, being the only means I had of effecting a distant reconnaissance, owing to the total want of baggage cattle ; but as the steamers had to be coaled and seven days’ provisions for the troops put on hoard, whilst all were busily engaged, disembarking tents and stores from the transports, some little delay occurred, and it was not until the afternoon of the 29th that the party could be despatched, 2. The flotilla I placed under the immediate command of Captain- Rennie, ijy aided by Captain Ivemball, Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, who zeaR ously undertook the political conduct of the expedition. Captain Hunt, 78th Highlanders, commanded the military detachment, and Captain Wray, Deputy Quarter Master General, and Captain Green, my Military Secretary, aeeomu panied the expedition for the purpose of reporting upon the country in the vici- nity of Ahwaz. SKETCH OF THE GROUND IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD 0 F AHWAZ ON THE KARITN, Showing 1 the advance of the British Detachment, 1st April 1857. t t / / / / / I. B. September 1888. Exd. J.A.A (Sd.) J. WRAY, Captain t 2-Jy . i^r. ^ r - Cent., P E . P ■ F. 103 My instructions to Captain Rennie were "to steam up to Ahwaz, and acf< “ with discretion according to circumstances. Should the Persian army have “ arrived and apparently be prepared to make a determined stand, the party was “ to return after effecting the reconnaissance; but in the event of the enemy hav- “ ing proceeded beyond Ahwaz, or if they continued their flight on seeing our “ steamers (as I fully expected they would under the impression that the flotilla “ was the advance guard of the British army), it was my desire that the party ft should land, and destroy the magazines and stores which the Persians had “ collected.” 3. By the annexed reports from Captains Rennie and "Wray, which I have the honor to submit, your Excellency will learn how admirably my instructions have been carried out, and the complete success which has attended the ener- getic and judicious measures adopted by all concerned. Indeed, it is impossible to calculate upon the advantages which must ensue from the successful result of this expedition in the effect it will have upon the Arab tribes who in crowds witnessed the extraordinary scene of a large army of 7,000 infantry, with five or six guns,* and a host of cavalry precipitately retreating before a detachment of 300 British infantry, three small steamers, and three gunboats. See rough sketch No. 10. * 4. I feel that I cannot sufficiently express to your Excellency the great obligation I am under to the several officers and men of the expedition. 5. Captain Rennie, i.n., whose gallant conduct at the bombardment of Muhammarah I so recently recorded, has again earned highest praise and warmest thanks for the able manner in which he has conducted the expedition. 6. Captain Kemball, who on this as on every occasion of difficulty and dan- ger upon which I have required his services has rendered me most valuable assistance, materially contributed to the success of the expedition by his coun- sel and energy. Great praise is also due to Captain Hunt, 78th Highlanders who so successfully carried out the military operations ; to Captain Wray* Deputy Quarter Master General, and Captain M. Green, my Military Secretary for the part they so ably performed, and to all the officers and men employed in ' the expedition. I have to thank them all, and beg to reeommeud those spe- cially named to your Excellency’s notice. v Dated Muhammarah, 5th April 1857. Despatch from -Captain J . Weat, Deputy Quarter Master General, Persian Expedi- tionary Field Force, 1 To— The Chief of the Staff, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, The operations against the enemy were conducted as follows under the orders of Captain Rennie, i. n. At3i.il, 1st April, our little fleet left Kut-Umaira, an Arab village on the left bank, where we had remained during the night. Soon after davlio-ht we came m sight of Alnvaz, and found the Persian army collected behind a ridg-e on the right bank. Crowds of horsemen, apparently some guns on rid<m and infantry innumerable anchored at If miles below the place. Some horsemen came down, but a rifle shot sent them off at full gallop, and no one attempted to come very near again. r ,, Heard from the Arabs that Ahwaz was not occupied, and that the troops that had been there had gone up the river the day before frightened by the appearance of the steamers, and that nothing remained now but thirty horsemen • that they had no means of crossing, except by two boats and two canoes It was therefore determined to land ail our party (300 men), advance up the left bank upon Ahwaz, and endeavour to destroy the enemy’s depfit of grain and # One or two guns said to have joined them at Ahwaz 104 ammunition ; and in the event o£ our finding* that we had been deceived, or that they were in force in the town, that we should turn our move into an armed reconnaissance ■ and return to our ships. Meanwhile we captured a bngla, lying under the left bank, with a brass £l-pr. gun, which was taken on board. At 11 a.m», the troops commenced landing, and advanced at once in three columns, covered by skirmishers, the whole party being extended in such a way that they looked like a large body of men. Captain Hunt, 78th Highlanders, commanded, and arranged it all. Left column consisted of the Light Company, 7 8th Highlanders, divided into skirmishers and supports both in one rank. The remainder of the company in column of threes also in single ranks. The 61th Grenadiers and the other company, 78th Highlanders, formed centre and right column in the same way. Two gunboats were sent off in advance up the river, which took up position within shell range of the enemy's ridges, and opened fire. The enemy apparently had some guns in position on the ridge, but the moment the gunners made their appearance, the gunboats opened and drove them away; they consequently did not return a single shot, though they attempted a little musketry, which did no harm. In the meanwhile the troops pushed on, the Persians still collected, though in reduced numbers, on the opposite bank of the river, at about 1,000 yards from us. At 12- o’clock the troops approached the town, when the Arab Shaikh came out, tendered submission, and informed our party that the enemy were re- treating ; and with our glasses we saw a large army of 7,000 men, with a per- fect swarm of Bakhtiari horsemen, and 5 or 6 guns, retreating from a very strong position before a body of 300 infantry, three small river steamers, and three gunboats. The enemy retired in tolerable order, covered by their horse. The Shahzadak himself travelling in a green palanquin carriage, the wheel marks of which we had seen in the several encamping grounds on the river. The town was filled with dour, wheat, barley, &c. Fifty-five mules and a horse were also found, besides fourteen boxes of new flint muskets, Tower-mark, each containing ten. A party crossed the river, examined the enemy's camp, and set fire to the remains of their magazines. The Arabs had plundered it before we arrived, and had carried off the powder, ball ammunition, and muskets, the cases of which were found ; but the enemy had left a great quantity of loose shot on the ground also, which could not be destroyed or carried away. Thus ended a very successful day. It was expected that when our troops reached the town, the enemy would open fire with their guns from the ridge on the opposite bank, but that we should be able to hold our ground under cover of the houses and walls until all the stores were destroyed or carried off ; but in this little or no loss was anticipated ; and as the enemy were unable to cross the river, and it was known that they had never had more than 800 men in the town, there was no great risk incurred in the move. As it was, the enemy commenced their retreat exactly one hour from the time the first shell was fired from the gunboats. No. 2873, dated 20th April 1857. From — The Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army, To — The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionay Field Force. Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the utter fear in which our united forces are held by the Persian army than the fact you have mentioned of 7,000 •°£nn a c 5lost o£ cavall T> precipitately retreating- before 300 British infantry, three small steamers, and thfee gu™ and destruction of their magazines of ordnance stores and Shah of p Ud ? a . n armymust also produce the best effect at at notUi m ±Urfcheranee of the desij ' e ° f our Government Extract fr.m demi-official letter from Brigadier-General Sib E. Lugged, c.b., dated 27th March 1858. There is no doubt of Muhammarah being our crowning victory and eh wLr^i“ l ““ rtotte Iodi “ N ”^ bot e “ 1 AajUt “ .r en T' B ° mbay Am ^’ t0 the Seo «tavy to the Government of Bombay Military Department, No. 1598, dated Poona, 19th June 1858. ■nveys the Commander-in-Chief s recommendation that the word “ Persia" W tf ° n the y. olol8 > standards, and appointments of the different corps m ° the expedition, with the addition of “ Raslnr ” and “ Khushab " to as may have been actually engaged in those actions. * * ■ APPENDIX B. , .. Extracts from Correspondence relating to the object and the plan OF THE CAMPAIGN, AND ITS CONDUCT. Extract from a letter from Captain Kemball, Resident at BnsMre, to Lord Elphinstone, Gov- ernor of Bombay=dated Bushire, 22nd March 1854. Bushire being the principal seaport of the country, and engrossing, as it does almost the whole of the trade with India, its occupation would be attend- ed of Course with a corresponding effect. The chief, it not the only, obstnc e to such a measure is the want of fresh water within the walls of the town; the position, otherwise, is admirably adapted for defence both to seaward and on the land side. It contains a thriving population, numbering from 20,000 to £5,000 souls; the inhabitants are inoffensive and unwarlike^ and nom it 0111 influence could be exerted even to the gates of Shiraz. On reference to letters from my predecessor dated 1838, it will be seen that the force then present at Karachi (total number of troops of all ranks and arms, 561 ) was deemed inadequate to the enterprise ; and although I con- cur in opinion with Colonel Shiel, as recorded in a subsequent letter from the same officer, that a body of from 2,000 to 3,000 bayonets would amply suffice to capture the place and maintain its ground against any odds, I imagine that additional defence of the nature of field works, but of some extent, would still be necessary to preserve the communication with the wells outside. By means of a small steamer or other appliance, a supply of water for the troops could at all times be obtained from Kiiaraj, but it cannot, I think, be denied that a besieger in sufficient strength to invest the place and cope with the a-arrison in' the field, and who should even confine his operations to filling up the wells, would, during the hot season at least, reduce the inhabitants to much distress. That the difficulty referred to is not altogether insurmountable has in more than one instance been shown by sieges of some duration which Bushire has sustained consequent upon feudal broils with neighbouring tribes, or upon the unwilling allegiance formerly rendered by the hereditary Arab governors to the Persian Government authorities. The water m the wells ot the town, though brackish, loses in some measure this quality during the rainy season, and is then readily drunk by the lower orders . Tanks of which a number now exist, and for the construction ot which the nature of the soil is well adapted, might be multiplied under our Govern- ment to any extent; while on emergency the higher classes could provide themselves with water by sea at an expense somewhat in advance of. that at which it is now brought from the exterior. It should be borne in mind, too, that the garrison could always count upon succour from Bombay and Karachi, within a limited period. .. The accompanying rough sketch see page 7 1 presents at one view the outline of the fortress of Bushire as now existing. As from the citadel A on the left, and the bastion B and the battery C on the right, a cross fire could be brought to bear both within and without the main wall upon the only gate of the town, it is evident that, did we once obtain possession of those points, while at the same time we held command of the sea, the place must immediately capitulate. 1,1 ** The attacking force then should, 1 conceive, be divided into three columns, each accompanied by two field guns, of which that of the centre should disembark at E and F on either Hank of the ruined outwork situated at the extreme point of the peninsula, and direct its march at once through* the town upon the land defences, while those of the right and left should effect their landing respectively — the one at D, where the ascent from the beach is "easy and gradual"; , the other at A, in front of the citadel. To ensure complete success, the presence of two river steamers, or rather of two vessels, of the class of the drawing* not more than 6 or 8 feet water, would be desirable, as their services would not only be available to transport the party destined to assail the citadel# ■ the gate of which they could easily demolish with their guns, but also in the first instance to cover the landing of the centre column, and keep down the lire of the bastion on either hand, which might otherwise be directed upon it. ,i he capture .consecutively ■ of the bastions on the two sea fronts, though a work of no difficulty, would occupy time, tend to dissipate the forces unnecessarily, and be attended perhaps with increased bloodshed. Moreover, a well directed fire from two or three gunboats would render them untenable in. as many hours, and their demolition, if considered necessary, should of course precede the assault; but the operation must inevitably inflict much loss of life and property upon the helpless inhabitants, which it is the object of the proposed plan to avoid. ’ I will not presume to offer any suggestions as to the defences requisite to protect the force now, it is to be presumed, encamped without the walls of the town, as ample time would be allowed to the engineers' and commanding officers to form their plans before any serious attempt could be made by the native authorities to dislodge it; but I may .venture to suggest that an ade- quate supply of entrenching tools should be provided to the expedition prior to its quitting the presidency. Neither cavalry nor mounted artillery, at least at the outset, would be required on this service. Harness for a field battery should be furnished from Bombay. Horses or mules could be procured on the spot. Any heavy guns temporarily required in the field works could, it is presumed, be supplied from the vessels of war, as well as men to serve them. Thus far 1 have assumed the coercion of the Persian Government by ’means of a formidable demonstration to be alone contemplated; but if our object were to threaten the provinces in the interior, or if a chance existed of the expedition being opposed by other than the ill-equipped and undisciplined troops of Persia, I should be disposed to recommend the employment of a force sufficiently large to occupy the whole peninsula of Bushire, extending thence to the village of Hall la, rather than the town alone. The tract in question exhibits the form of an irregular triangle, of which two sides, the longest 12 or 18 miles, and shortest 4 or 5 miles, border upon the sea, and the third, 9 or 10 miles, abuts throughout more than half its length in high precipitous cliffs upon a marshy plain, stretching inland a dis- tance of 4 or 5 miles, and itself bounded, on the one hand, by the bar of Bushire ; on the other, by a creek which runs in from the bay of Halila. Beyond this plain, the country for an equal extent is a sandy desert, thus making up a space of not less than 9 miles to be travelled over before w T ater is procurable; and even at that limit the supply is most scanty, and of inferior quality. The accompanying rough sketch (see page 61) may convey some idea of the country described, though I should observe it by no means correctly represents the general outline, which, whether on the sea or land fronts, being everywhere 108 , 1 ; |P irregular, must be surveyed to be properly delineated ; such, however, seems to me to be the strength of the position, that were the heights between A and B crowned with batteries, where required, the gently sloping ground at either extremity covered with forts, and the defences of the town and old Dutch fort sufficiently strengthened to convert them into places of arms, it might, I conceive, if adequately garrisoned, be rendered impregnable to any army that could.be brought against it. Your Lordship will observe that it possesses a long sea board accessible to shipping at every material point ; that the plain on the land side, apart from the absence of fresh water, is hardly of a nature to admit of a besieger's push- ing his attack by regular approaches * and, moreover, did he even succeed in gaining a footing on the table land, his position would not be tenable, nor could he approach or enter upon the siege of the town until he had reduced the outworks to which I have alluded. On the other hand, the space defined is sufficiently ample to afford a secure asylum to a retreating army, or to admit of any army being assembled within its limits without risk of molestation. To these advantages may be added the situation of Bushire with respect both to Bombay and the river Euphrates, as well as being opposite to a harbour (howbeit a nominal dependency of Turkey) on the Arabian coast, and where the largest ships of the Indian Navy, as well as transports in any number, might ride in safety. In a political point of view, the possession of Bushire would place in our hands the complete control of the coast up to the base of the hills (for the most part inhabited by Arab tribes little affected to their Persian masters) from the Karun to Bandar Abbas. * & * * * * * The force necessary to maintain such a position as that I have endeavoured to describe must doubtless be large, and should not, I am of opinion, fall short of 5,000 men; nor, on the other hand, could the requisite defences be raised without a very considerable expenditure. Memorandum regarding Bushire , Sfc^ Sfc^ by Colonel Hennell , late JResident, Persian Gulf \ October 1856 . I assume that an expedition to the Persian Gulf has been decided on, and, in compliance with the request of Colonel Sykes, I proceed to offer a few remarks on what I conceive would be the best mode of employing this force with a view to inducing the Shall to withdraw his troops from Herat. The former expedition to the Gulf in 1838, having in view the same object as the present one, merely occupied the island of Kharaj. This measure was quite successful owing to the exaggerated reports which reached the King of the extent of the military and naval forces sent from India. Under the alarm that a formidable invasion of the south of Persia was contemplated by the British Government, His Majesty raised the siege of Herdt, and returned to Tihran. He was, however, known to have after- wards expressed his deep vexation at having been induced to relinquish a prey which he considered within his grasp by such a paltry demonstration. The mere occupation of Kharaj would not therefore, I conceive, now accomplish the object in view. A blockade of the ports on the Persian coast would be equally ineffective. All the loss and damage arising from such a measure would fall upon the merchants and local authorities ; but these are so far re- moved from the seat of Government' that any injury inflicted upon them IHNfi ' 109 would be treated with indifference at Tihran, as affecting any measure of im- portance, such as giving up its views upon Herat. Of course, in weighingth® effects of any demonstration made in the Persian Gulf, the Court of Tihraa will be greatly influenced by the opinion of the Foreign envoys, and, unless these are satisfied that something serious is intended, their advice may prob- ably confirm the Persian Government in its resistance. Under these circumstances, I consider that the occupation of Bushire, in addition to Kharaj, would be necessary to afford any prospect of inducing the Shah to raise the siege of Herat. 1 do not think that such a measure would inflict any serious loss upon the revenues of the Persian Government, but the moral effect would be great. The Bandar-i-Abushahar is known through- out Persia as the principal seaport of the kingdom, and its occupation by a foreign force would be severely felt. In taking possession of this town, it must, however, be borne in mind that no fresh water is procurable within the walls, the place being wholly dependent in this respect upon the wells outside. It would consequently be absolutely necessary that an invading force should occupy the plain beyond the defences as far as the wells. Those nearest the town are within half a mile, but the supply is scanty and bad. Water of much better quality, and in sufficient quantity for the use of a large force would be found at Jufra, about li miles distant from Bush ire. From this spot, marked A in the accompanying rough sketch No. 5 (drawn from recollection), to that marked B on the backwater on the east, is a line of about miles. The deep backwater on the one side and the sea on the other would cover both flanks, while a few pit works, armed with artillery thrown up in the interval, and covering a force of 5,000 men, would be sufficient against any army the Persians would bring into the field. I would venture to suggest that a few pieces of heavy ordnance to be placed in position, where 'required, should accompany the expedition. If cavalry be sent, European Dragoons and Jacob's Sind Horse would be found the most effective. The climate of Bushire is exceedingly salubrious, and, excepting the few days of the stormy and boisterous weather which generally accompanies the first fall of rain in November, is cool and bracing from that month to March. Judging, however, from the experience of Kharaj, it would be necessary during the hot months of June, July, August, and September to keep the Europeans in barracks or houses. In that island the mortality during the sum- mer under tents was 8 per cent., in mat erections 2 per cent., and barracks nil. The means of subsisting a large force in the Persian Gulf has always pre- sented great difficulties. With the exception of a few bullocks and goats from Mascat and Bahrain, nothing in the shape of provisions is procurable from the Aiahian coast j a few sheep and a small quantity of g’rain, might be obtained from the Persian ports below Kangun ; while in Bushire stores of com to some extent might be found, although these would probably be in some measure exhausted by the extensive exportations which usually take place during the summer months. Wheat is sometimes to be procured at Mashhur, the seaport of K'ab. A large quantity of grain is also exported from Bandar Rig, a small town on the coast, about 80 miles to the noith of Bushire, and which with a view to the collection of supplies, both of sheep and corn, it might perhaps be worth while to occupy. During the cold season the IKyats or nomad tribes of Ears bring their flocks into the low country for pasturage, and unless the Persian Government takes effectual means for cutting off the communication with the coast, they will gladly avail themselves of any opportunity of no •I 111 | disposing of them. Our reputation for liberal and regular payments was so well established during our occupation of Kharaj, that I have no doubt the tribes in the neighbourhood of Bushire will use every endeavour to sell us their dis- posable produce. No sentiment of patriotism will ever prevent a Persian from making money even through an enemy, if he can do so without risk. Bassorah, I do not think, could furnish supplies; but a considerable quantity of grain might perhaps be collected in Baghdad, and towed down in native boats by the Nitocris to Basso rah, and there embarked on board a sea steamer for Bushire. : . ■■ . The question of the supply of carriage is as difficult as that of provisions. It is to be presumed that the Persian Government will occupy the low country and the mountain passes between the coast and Shiraz, and this will, I fear, prevent the collection of the mules and camels which might otherwise be pro- curable. A few camels might be obtained from K/ab and the Arabian coast, while a large number of mules might be collected at Baghdad by the Resident, and sent down the river to Bushire. An advance on Shiraz should, I venture to think, only be contemplated under the failure of all other modes of coercing the Persian Government. To say nothing of the great difficulty of transporting artillery and forcing the ioiah or mountain passes, the climate of Shiraz is, to Europeans espe- cially, most unhealthy, so much so, that the spring and summer months would, I doubt not, send two-thirds of any force into hospital, while the mortality would be fearful. On the other hand, such is the hatred entertained by the inhabitants of Ears to their rulers on account of the tyranny and exactions of the latter, that 1 should not be surprised were such an advance to revolutionize the whole of the province, particularly if the invading force were accompanied by one of the exiled princes of the Shabds family now residing at Baghdad. Should any additional troops be required to garrison the places in rear of an advancing army, I have reason to believe that the Arabs of Koweit on the Arabian coast would willingly take temporary service with us, and their fidelity might, I think, be depended upon. It is now nearly five years since 1 quitted the Persian Gulf; and as I write from recollection and without any documents to refer to, I trust I may be somewhat excused for the crude and scanty nature of the remarks now sub- mitted. P.$. — It will be observed from the accompanying sketch {see page 61) that Bushire stands upon the northern end of a peninsula of about 1 1 miles in length and 3| at its greatest width, formed by Halila Bay to the south, the sea to the west, and the breakwater to the east. This last terminates in what i$ called a * musftecla, 9 or marsh, of about 6 miles wide, which extends to Halila Bay, and during the cold months, particularly after high tides, is almost impassable, excepting at a few points ; but in the summer the centre portion is nearly dried up. The rocky ridge, running almost parallel with the marsh, commands the greatest part of it, while room for the cultivation of grain and the pas- turage of flocks would be found within the limits above specified. It may, perhaps, be a question worth consideration whether the occupation of the whole of this peninsula would not probably produce a more serious impression on the Court of Tihran than only taking possession of Bushire and its imme- diate vicinty. Will you have the goodness to inform Colonel Sykes, the Chairman, that, in speaking in my memorandum of the insalubrity of Shiraz during the summer months, I omitted to mention that from December to April, that place is tolerably healthy, although exceedingly cold even to Europeans. There is, how- ever, a village called Dushakh, about 14 miles from Shiraz, which is noted for i W salubrity even during the worst season at the latter city audits neighbourhood* I may also add that, with the exception of Cbahkuta, Khan-i-Takht, and Kazran, all other stages (or trimuzik) on the route from Bushire to Shiraz are unhealthy during the summer months. From Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Secret Department, — No. 37, dated Bombay, 3rd September 1858* Communicates the amount and nature of the force which, in the opinion of the Government of India, should be at once prepared for operations in the Persian Gulf, and states that the Secret Committee name the occupation of Kharaj and of the district of Bushire as the objects of the expedition. Remarks that the seizure of Kharaj will not produce the same effect now as it did on a former occasion, when the presence of 900 men with four guns sufficed to obtain satisfaction from the Government of Tihran. States that Government are aware that the Persians will abandon Kharaj without resistance, and that the Shah professes indifference even to our occupa- tion of Bushire ; but that, nevertheless, the possession of Kharaj is indispens- able to a British force holding Bushire, if it were only to secure an unfail- ing supply of good water. Remarks that the term ic District of Bushire " may be understood to mean as much of the surrounding country as it may be convenient to occupy ; and upon this point the annexed extract gives full information. States that, accord- ing to the disposition of the Persian army in May last, as reported by Her Majesty's Consul at Tihran, the whole province of Pars, which includes Bushire, Shiraz, and Bandar Abbas, contained only 5,003 troops; but that although this makes it very improbable that our occupation will be seriously contested, the Governor-General does not think the force sent should be limited to the bare number sufficient to take and keep possession of the town of Bushire, but should be sufficiently large to indicate that something further is contemplated to keep the communications open, and to give pro- tection to friendly inhabitants. With this view the Governor-General is of opinion that the force should consist of 5,000 men ; that it should include one European regiment, a small body of cavalry (400 would be amply sufficient), one troop of horse artillery, one' light field battery, and two companies of sappers. Adds that the Governor-General leaves the composition of the force in other respects tojffie Government of Bombay. Dated Fort William,® 1st November 1856. Proclamation %— G. F. Edmonstone, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. The Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India in Council having, un- der instructions from Her Majesty's Government, directed the assemblage of a British Force at Bombay for service in the Persian Gulf, deems it proper to make known the reasons which have rendered this measure necessary. m la the month of January 1853, certain articles of agreement were conclud- ed between Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil, Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of the Shah of Persia and His Highness the Sadr Azina, or Prime Minister of the Persian Government. By those articles the Persian Government engaged not to send troops to Herat on any account, unless foreign troops, that is, troops from the direc- tion of Kabul or Kandahar, or other foreign country, should invade Herat. In the event of troops being sent, the Persian Government engaged that the said troops should not enter the city of Herat, and that on the return of the foreign troops towards their own territory, the Persian troops should be imme- diately withdrawn from the neighbourhood of Herat to Persian soil The Persian Government also engaged to abstain from all interference whatsoever in the internal affairs of Herat, whether “ in taking possession, or occupying, or assuming the sovereignty, or governing, except in so far as in- terference existed between the two parties during the life-time of the late Yar Muhammad.” And, lastly, the Persian Government engaged to relinquish all pretension to, and demand for, the coinage, or the reading of the kkitbak> or any other acknowledgment of allegiance or subjection, on the part of the people of Herat to the Government of Persia. It was, at the same time, stipulated that, so long as there should be no in- terference of any sort whatever on the part of the British Government in the affairs of Herat, the engagements contracted by the Persian Government, as aforesaid, should remain in full force and effect. On the other hand, it was agreed, in the name of the British Government, that “ if any foreign power, such as the Afghans or others,” should wish to interfere with or to take pos- session of Herat, the British Government, on the requisition of the Persian only have Persian troops invaded the territory of Herat, although the contin- gency which alone conld justify such an act has not come to pass, hut they lave laid siege to the city, and have interfered in its internal affairs, while the Government of Tihran has not only assumed the right to nominate the ruler of Herat, but, in addressing the present chief of the city, has declared Herat to he Persian soil. The siege of Herat has now been carried on by the Persian army for many months. Before its commencement, and during its progress, the unfriendly sentiments of Persia towards the British Government have been scarcely veiled, and recently the movements of troops in different parts of Persia have indicated a determination to persist in an aggression which is as unprovoked as it is contrary to good faith. The conduct of the Persian Government has been pronounced by Her Majesty's Government to constitute an act of open hostility against Great Britain. Reparation has been sought, but without success. The withdrawal of the Persian troops from the neighbourhood of Herat to Persian soil has been demanded as a preliminary to the adjustment of differences to which the acts of Persia alone have given rise ; but the demand has been evaded, and, according to the most recent accounts, a Persian army still invests Her fit. Friendly remonstrance having failed, and a reasonable requisition having been rejected or put aside, it becomes incumbent on the British Government to take measures, by which the Persian Government shall be convinced that solemn engagements contracted with Great Britain may not be violated with impunity, and by which effectual guarantees against continuous breach of faith shall be secured. To this end, a force has been directed to assemble at Bombay, and will embark as soon as the necessary arrangements shall have been completed. The further operations of the force, after it shall have reached the Persian Gulf, will be guided by such instructions as the progress of events and the policy of the British Government, may demand. Bv order of the Riffht Hon'ble the Governor-General of India in Council. majesty’s Indian territories, sliall be . to discharge her'cargo, and afterwards and that any such vessel, if met at sea for any port or place in any of Her I permitted to enter sueh port or place an forthwith to depart without molestation, — . by any of the ships of the Indian Navy, shall be permitted to pursue her voyage. The Right Hou’ble the Governors in Council of Madras and Bombay, the Hon’ble the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, the Governor of Straits Settle- ments, the Commissioners of Pegu and of the Tenassenm and Martaban Provinces, and all officers and authorities, whom it may concern, m Her Majes- ty’s Indian territories under the Government of the Last India Company, are required to give the necessary directions herein as to them may respec- tlVe By a order of' the Right Hon’ble the Governor-General of India in Council. «t Dated Fort William, 1st November 1856. Proclamation. by-G. F. Edmonstone, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. The Rio-lit Hon’ble the Governor-General of India in Council, being desir- ous that the hostile operations now about to be undertaken against Persia, should be attended with as little injury as possible to individual interest., is pleased to notify that all subjects of the Shah of Persia residing within Her Majesty’s Indian territories under the Government of the East India Com- pany, and not being Consuls or Consular Agents in the service of the Persian Government, may continue to reside therein without molestation in respect of their persons, their property, or their lawful avocations ; and that they wi enjoy protection so long as they shall abstain from all acts hostile to the British Government, and shall observe due obedience to the laws under which they live, and to all resolutions or orders of the Governor-General of India m (Muuu^ ^ tJie Rigbfc Hon’ble the Governor-General of India m Council. No. 79, dated Bombay, 1st November 1856. From — The Secretary to tbe Government of India, Foreign Department, To— The Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Secret Department. Conveys the following remarks and orders in regard to the object and the conduct of the operations about to be undertaken. • The Governor in Council has reason to know that nearly all the prelimi nary arrangements for the embarkation of the force are comp e ® indulges the hope that the Government of Bombay will have acted upon ti instructions which will have reached it direct, and that within fourteen days from this time the whole force will have left the presidency. The first objeet of the expedition has been prescribed by the _ Hon bie the Secret Committee to be the seizure of the island of Kbaraj, and of the town and district of Bushire on the mainland. I he military and naval operations by which this shall be effected may he left to the General who shall be appointed to command the land forces, and to the officer of the Indian Navy who shall he selected by the Government of Bombay to have charge o naval part of the expedition. These officers will have been furnished or will now be furnished, by the Government of Bombay with all the information which has been collected as to the points of attack and the measures best calculated to secure the object in view. . „ ,, „„ • But assuming that, with the large means at the disposal of the ofiieeis m command, that objeet will be readily accomplished, there are some pom s unon which it is desirable that the views of the Government of India should Should a summons to the Governor of Bushire to surrender the town be rejected, it will be desirable that possession of the place should be obtained, not only with as little loss of life, but, having regard to the future, with as little injury to property as possible. There is scarcely anything in the nature of State property in Bushire or its neighbourhood. Some stores of ammunition and grain are probably all that come within that category. It is believed that public buildings belonging to the State, and even barracks, are altogether wanting: certainly they are so few and insignificant as not to be worth taking into account ; and, therefore, any injury done to the town will fall upon private persons, and every endeavour must be used to render it as light as possible, consistently with the avoidance of all failure or cheek. It is the desire of the Governor-General in Council not only that the inhabitants and merchants of the town should not suffer unnecessarily afc our hands, but that they should understand from the beginning that it is our intention to encourage trade to the utmost, and to leave pace- ful intercourse and avocations undisturbed. The extent of ground to be occupied beyond the walls of the town will be determined by the General in command mainly upon military considerations ; but considerations of health also must be taken carefully into account, and on this head the experience of Dr. Macalister, Civil Surgeon of Bushire, should be consulted. Immediately from the first occupation of the town, the chief authority, military, political, and civil, will rest with the General in command. The Governor-General in Council has confidence in the discipline and orderly demeanour of the Bombay Army, but be cannot impress too strongly upon Major-General Stalker the importance of taking every precaution that the intercourse of the troops with the inhabitants of the town, and the people generally, shall be such as to give confidence and encouragement to these latter, and that it shall be marked by fair and liberal dealing, kind treatment, " and a ready attention to and redress of grievances. This applies equally to all, whether foreign residents, Arabs and natives of the town or of the coast, or Persian subjects from the interior. The functions of Commander Jones as Resident will have ceased, and he will have withdrawn from Bushire on the first declaration of hostilities; but that officer's experience of the country and knowledge of the people will be of This must be done mainly by the Commissariat] Department, but the General in command will have to consider how to contribute to it by fiscal or other arrangements at Bushire. The customs duties levied in the town, though arbitrary and unequal, and varying with the notion of the resident merchants, or of the importers from whom they are taken, are believed to be, on the whole, light. It will be a question whether they should not be reduced still lower to a general and nominal rate, or even altogether relinquished for a time. In this matter it will be necessary for Major-General Stalker to act upon his own judgment in the first instance. As no Persian officer of higher authority than the Governor of Bushire is usually present in that part of the country, it is not probable that any over-, tures or communications of a political character will be addressed to the General in command of the force. 4 . . But if anything of this kind should be received by him, he will refer it to the Government of Bombay for communication to the Governor-General in Council, making no change meanwhile in his position at Bushire. The Governor-General in Council is not aware that any further instruc- tions are required at present. His Lordship is confident that Major-General Stalker will conduct the operations with which he has been entrusted with energy, discretion, and success, and that he may rely upon receiving from the Government of Bombay all the advice, assistance, and co-operation which it can afford. Basidu was ordered to be carefully protected, it being useful as a port of call and coaling station. No. 180, dated Bombay, 11 tn November 1856. Prom — H. L. Anderson, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Secret Department, To — Tbe Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. Acknowledges receipt of letter on the subject of the selection of Bandar Abbas as the rendezvous of the British forces intended to operate against Persia, and states in reply that the objection against this arrangement men- tioned by the Government of India appears to be equally applicable to Basidu, since His Highness the Imam of Mascat also holds from the Persian Govern- ment the island of Kishm on which Basidu is situated on terms similar to those on which lie occupies Bandar Abbas. Intimates that the Government does not deem it at all probable that the authorities either of Kishm or of Bandar Abbas will raise any objection on behalf of the Imam to the assemblage of the British fleet in their road- steads, and the arrangement could not fairly be made a ground of complaint by Persia against His Highness, he having received no previous notice of the intention of the British Government to assemble its forces in the vicinity of Bandar Abbas, and being manifestly not in a position to oppose the arrange- ment, even if he had the inclination to do so. States that a considerable number of steamers and transports had, before receipt of Government of India letter, left for Bandar Abbas, and it would, therefore, be impracticable now to alter the rendezvous. Adds that copies of the Government of India Proclamations have been addressed to the Imam, showing that hostilities against his territories are not contemplated; and as he is now at Zanzibar, these will be forwarded to his son, fSayyid Soweyni, the Governor of Mascat. 117 ^ ^ From the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Secret Department, to General OSfoel Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force, — No, 477, dated Bombay , 1 lth Novem- ber 1856, Forwards instructions o£ the Governor-General in Council relative to the expedition, and requests him to address all correspondence connected with the political complications which may arise on the occupation of Bushire to the Secret Department, and all correspondence connected with discipline and interior economy to the head-quarters of the army. Intimates that Commander Jones, the present Resident in the Persian Gulf, will be instructed to place his services at the General's disposal as Politi- cal Agent, and authorizes him to expend such sums as secret service money as may seem to be necessary in order to conciliate the various tribes around Bushire. . From the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Secret Department, to Rear-Admiral Commanding Naval Foree, Persian Gulf Expedition, — No. 480, dated Bombay 11th November 1856. j > Intimates that the Governor-General in Couneil has stated that the first object prescribed for the expedition is the seizure of the island of Kharaj and of the town and district of Bushire on the mainland, and that the military and naval operations by which this object is to be effected are to be left to the guidance of General Stalker and the Admiral. Points out that if a summons to the Government of Bushire to surrender the town should be rejected, it will be necessary that possession of the place be obtained with as little loss of life, and, having regard to the future, with as little injury to property as possible. Adds that on the occupation of the town the chief authority will devolve on General Stalker, and requests him to co- operate heartily with the General in the performance of his important duties. Foreign Office Despatch to the Board of Control,— dated 19th November 1856.’ States that the withdrawal of Her Majesty's mission from Persian territory renders it expedient that Sir James Outram should be entrusted, if necessary, with the conduct of any negotiations. Remarks that General Outram will receive instructions for his guidance in his military capacity from the Government of India, but that Her Majesty's Government consider it desirable that he should he apprized that the measures of coercion they have had recourse to are to be strictly limited to bringing the Persian Government to take a just view of its position, and renounce for the future schemes of aggrandisement hostile to England, and to adopt a more becoming line of conduct towards Her Majes- ty's mission at the Court of the Shah, J Points out that Her Majesty's Government do not seek to subvert the dynasty of the Shah, or to encourage rebellion, &e.; but they would not hesitate to avail themselves of the aid of independent tribes. Remarks that Sir J. Outram will have been fully informed of the particu- lars of the rupture, and that he will have seen that the reparation and security to be obtained are twofold in their character. * “ The most important point by far, unquestionably, is to put an end to the ambitious projects of Persia in the direction of Afghanistan, and so to if oktaan security from foreign aggression for the countries bordering on British India. Besides this condition sine qua non , it is a matter of great moment “ with a view to the permanence of friendly relations between the British and ‘Persian Govei'mnents, and to the discouragement of attempts which might be made af Tihram to produce distrust and dissension between the two countries, that the Persian Government should be made to feel that it cannot r ?r with impunity show disrespect to the British Minister, or infringe upon the -rights and privileges of British subjects, and refuse to do justice to their well- -founded claims.” Points out that Sir J. Outram will learn by telegraphic despatch of 25th October, and communication delivered by Her Majesty's Ambassador to the Persian Charge d’Affaires at Constantinople, the nature of the reparation with which Her Majesty's Government were then disposed to be satisfied. Since that time, however, the British Government has been repeatedly in- sulted and British subjects wronged, and for all these acts some public redress must be given by the Court of Persia. States that Mr. Murray will be instructed to communicate any informa- tion be possesses to Sir J. Outram, and that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Con- stantinople will be directed to discontinue his communications with the Persian authorities, who must address themselves to Sir J. Outram, the sole direction of all military and political questions as regards Persia having been exclu- sively confided to him. Foreign Office Despatch to Viscount Stratford de Redeliffe, — dated 19tli November 1856. Remarks that nothing having been heard from him since the 3rd instant? It is concluded that he has not arranged terms with the Persian Ambassador. Informs him that the direction of all negotiations has been confided to Sir J. Outram. Therefore instructs him to break off any negotiation in which he maybe engaged, unless there is a prospect of its being brought to an immediate and satisfactory conclusion. Conditions imposed on the Persian Government. The Sadr-i-Azam to write in the Shah’s name a letter to Mr. Murray expressing his regret at having uttered and given currency to the offensive imputations upon the honor of Her Majesty’s Minister requesting to with- draw his own letter of 19th November and the two letters of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of 26th November, one of which contains a rescript from the Shahrespecfcing the imputation upon Mr. Murray, and declaring in the same letter that no such further rescript from the Shah as that enclosed here- with in copy was communicated, directly or indirectly, to any foreign Mis- S1 ° n A^opvof this letter to be communicated officially by the Sadr-i- Azam to each of the Foreign Missions at Tihrau, and the substance of it to be made PUb Thrortgilnetter to be conveyed to Mr. Murray at Baghdad by the hands of some high Persian officer, and to he accompanied by an invitation to Mr. Murray in the Shah’s name to return with the Mission to Tihran, or His Majesty’s assurance that he shall be received with all the honors and consideration due to the representative of the British (government another person of suitable rank being sent to conduct him as Mehmandah on his 3 ' 0U mT Murray* omLppr caching the capital, to he received by persons of high rank deputed to escort him to his residence in the town. . Immediately on his arrival there, the Sadr-i-Azam to go m state ^ to the British Mission, and renew friendly relations wil-h Mr. Murray leaving the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to accompany him to the Boyal Palace, the Sadr-i-Azam receiving Mr. Murray and conducting him to the presence of the Shah. At noon on the following day, the British flag to be hoisted immediately afterwards, which Yisifc Mr* Murray will return at latest on the following day before noon* Satisfaction being thus given and friendly relations restored, the settlement of the questions of Herat, of Mirza Hashim, and of his wife remains to he stated. Should Herat be occupied by the Shah’s troops. His Majesty to engage r? withdraw them without delay. Should that city be in any way menaced* though not occupied by the Shah’s troops. His Majesty to engage not to allow them to occupy it on any account ; in either ease the engagement teng solemnly given. The British Mission to defer to His Majesty’s wish, if renewed, respecting Mirza Hashim by not insisting on his appointment at Shiraz ; the Mirza s wife, however, to be restored to him, and himself to eD i°3' t the security, emoluments, and position offered by the- ment m a former stage o£ the question. The whole of the correspondence respecting Mirza Hashim may then be mutually withdrawn and cancelled, it being understood that no objection mil be made by the Persian Government to the appointment, as heretofore, of a British correspondent at Shiraz till that and other matters can be finally arranged by a suitable convention. . J Secret Despatch from the Board of Directors, Hon’ble East India Company, to the Governor of Bombay m Council,— No. 1685, dated London, 19th November 1856. The Board deem it advisable that the expedition should be commanded by an officer who can also be implicitly entrusted with the important duty of conducting the negotiations which, it is hoped, will speedily follow the mili- tary demonstrations. Their choice has fallen on Sir James Outram, and the Queen has been pleased to grant him the local rant of Lieutenant-General. States that General Outram has received full instructions, and it is hoped that every assistance will be afforded to him in the constitution of his staff and with respect to his allowances, &c. Secret Despatch from the Board of Directors, Hon’ble East India Company, to the Governor of Bombay in Council, — No. 1690, dated London, 24th November 1856. If the occupation of Bushire should not at once have the effect of inducing the Sliah to express his readiness to' withdraw all pretension to sovereignty over any portion of Afghanistan (and the most recent advices from Imran represent him as boasting that he was unshaken in his designs for the annexation of Herat), it will, in the opinion of Her Majesty’s Government be necessary to threaten, at any rate, an advance into the interior of the country. 2. Sanitary considerations would also render it advisable not to retain the European portion of the troops in a view, therefore, I think that we must, at as early a date as of Shustar on the river Karun. , 3 - In order to maintain the menace above mentioned, it will be advisable to keep adding by degrees to our force in the Persian Gulf. 4. Her Majesty’s Government believe, moreover, that to occupy Shustar would very much facilitate the organization of the Arab levies, for whose services, if hostilities are prolonged, we shall have continued need. the neighbourhood of Bushir both to strategy and to health, Her Majesty’s Go maybe practicable, take t ' ^ ^ V; '• * V”"*' ' * • '* ' ■• •• ' • ■■. ■■"■v.-' i But for the purpose of occupying Bushire and Shuster, of threaten- aS and Isfahan, and of keeping open the communications of the a considerable addition to the British troops is requisite. Lieutenant- . Qutram calculated the necessary addition at net less than of native infantry, with some artillery, and at least one ’ v The cavalry are, according to his judgment, , force essentially necessary in themselves, but as a •* , larger body of horsemen to be raised on the General Ontram is most anxious to have the services ' j of their gallant and energetic leader; and he &wS“jiob stall b. placed i» command < «. ;** in the present operations. You will, we doubt not, ‘ made to you by General Outram. army. General Sir James three regiments c. regiment of irregular cavalry required not only as a force nucleus whereon to form the .spot. For this purpose C of the Sind Horse, with those has suggested that C. — of the cavalry employed .. give due weight to any representation Minute by the Bight Hon Me the Governor of BomhaV in Council-dated the 24th Decern- Concurred In by the Council . mi a ™ ^ iha Hobble the Secret Committee conveyed to ns m their i«bta H r«h S .Emo must be re.p.ud.d to on on, part wrth ‘S' SstoL »d° “SLnmamb, and to threaten from those point. Shiraz and Isfahan. . memorandum of the reinforcements w bS* ™?d«“o:Ss|1o Utru to™" JJgSJ dS"o”tbefcvoo already^despatcbed r.maiaing at Bosbiro aod » it. *»»* * * Artillery . orders of the Government of India upon 1 troop Horse. these reinforcements ; but as time is of l company Foot. ^he utmost importance, I think that we must take upon ourselves to anticipate their sanction so far as to engage the additional shipping which will be required (beyond the number of transports already taken up and expected to return shortly from Bushire) for the conveyance of the cavalry and artillery horses, to # order the pre- paration of all commissariat supplies tor the increased force, and to direct the march of one of the regiments of Sind Horse to Karachi. I have, indeed, already warned Colonel Jacob, in a private letter which I sent by tbe steamer yesterday, that his services, and those of one of his regiments, would be needed. •<re additional force can be supplied by this Madras or Bengal. I have great confidence Cavalry. Her Majesty’s Utli Dragoons. 1 regiment Sind Horse. Arab Levies. Under Colonel Jacob. No. 7, dated 8th January 1857. From Major J. Hill, Commanding Engineer, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, To — The Assistant Quarter Master General, Persian Expeditionary Field Force. Estimate of force required for expedition to Shusiar. The following points will have to be considered in the preparation of the estimate, viz, : (1) What garrison will be .efficient to leave at Bushire. (2) What force will be sufficient for the expedition to Shustar, including the posts it may be found necessary to leave to keep up the communication between that place and the sea, and also for protecting our right flank and rear from the direc- tion of Bfhbahan, Ram Hurmuz, and Dorak. (3) Ordnance and Engineer Parks. (4) Commissariat Department* (5) Land Transport Department* (6) Sea and River Transport. With regard to the garrison to be left at Bushire, the only difficulty is the supply of water, which at present is only found at 14 miles from the town. There is a tank in the town which would contain sufficient for a garrison of 1,21.0 men for three months, but incase of a blockade there would be no sup- ply for the inhabitants. To meet this contingency, it will be necessary to leave a garrison of 1,650 men, divided in the following manner : — 450 infantry and 50 artillery to garrison a fort to be constructed on the conurandinsr ground over the wells. s 75 infantry and artillery to garrison a strong redoubt between the fort and the town of Bushire to ensure the communication not being cut off. 750 infantry, 50 artillery, and 200 cavalry to garrison the town of Bushire itself The brig Euphrates and two gunboats to command the creek and cover the anuroach to fchft town rrnm ttm 1nr>rl cirfr* ** ' Ther$~catr be no doubt that this arrangement will effectually secure the safety of Bushire, but ample time must be given for the construction of the proposed works, as the ground is rocky. Seamen might be substituted for artillerymen, as the. latter would be much needed with the expedition to Shustar. 2n&ly . — What force will be required for tbe expedition to Shustar. Artillery- Infantry, Cavalry. To garrison Muhammarah at the entrance of the river and guard the depots, one regiment Native Infantry. 4 ships’ guns and 50 sea- men. To garrison Borak, 30 miles from Muhammarah, situated near the head of a creek branching from the left hank of the Kanin, 8 miles above Muham- marah, one regiment Native Infantry. To garrison Ahwiz, 2 regiments Native Infantry. (The country between Ahwaz A battery of 9-prs. with Golundauze. A battery of 9-prs. with Golundauze. and Dorak is described as a desert.) To garrison Band-i-Kir at the confluence of the Ab-i-Gargar canal with the Kanin. 2 medium ships, manned by seamen, (The country between Ahwaz and Band-i-Kfr also described as a desert.) To besiege Shustar 2 squadrons Dra« goons. 2 troops Horse Artillery. 6.000 Europeans 3.000 Natives 3 European Light Field batteries. 1,000 Native Cava- 300 Europeans. 1,600 Native Cav- airy. 2 troops Horse Artillery. 5 batteries, besides ships guns. 200 men Reserve ‘Artillery. 4 companies of Sappers and Miners- Ordnance Pari. Siege train—* ^S^Wwitzers * ' With 600 rounds o£ shot and shell per gun and mortar, with mOTtara 4) proportion of other ammunition. (ran platforms and all other requisites for the siege train will, as a matter of course, be provided for by the Ordnance Department. Engineer Parle. ' Eight Engineer officers, exclusive of those with the Sappers and Miners, thirty carpenters and ten smith's forges, a full proportion of entrenching, cutting, sapping and mining tools, laboratory stores, carpenter’s and smith's tools, miscellaneous stores, such as sandbags, scaling ladders, &c., drawing and surveying instruments. Pontoon equipment from Punah, seven rafts. In addition to this, superstructure will be required for 100 yards of bridge. It may be presumed that river boats will be procurable on the Katun river, or, if not, they must be obtained from JBassorah and .Baghdad, these being required for carrying stores np the river as well as for the bridge. Carriage for about *2o tons of engineer park stores, exclusive of the pontoon and bridge equipments. Commissariat Department . The Assistant Commissary. General will furnish reports of the manner in which he proposes provisioning the above force. It would appear that the navigation of the Karun is not difficult for small craft. We may therefore take advantage of it to convey a great portion of our supplies, stores, &c., and depots may be established at Ahwaz and Band-i-Kir in addition to that at Muhammarah. Land Transport Department. This, it is supposed, will be shortly placed under the superintendence of the officers who are expected to join the force from Bombay for the express purpose of organizing a Land Transport Corps. The number of bago-ao-e animals required will, however, be comparatively small in consequence of water carriage being available for the heavy stores, &c. Sea and River Transport . The Commodore Commanding Persian Gulf Squadron should be called on to turmsh a report on this subject. The only thing connected with it requiring any remark from me is the urgent necessity of procuring the aid of some of the lightest steamers and flats from the river Indus to he employed on the Kanin, which, it is believed, is navigable for vessels drawing J^over 0 feet water to Ahwaz, and for vessels drawing less considerably * Ia tho foregoing, I have, I believe, enumerated all the forces and depart- ShSir eqUmng ° rgamzafcion in 0rder to ensure a successful expedition against * These estimates are framed upon the idea that Shnstar is a availed fortress, and not nractic. ally an open town commanded by elevations within easy camion ran ere ^ Tho force is considerably over-estimated. — M. S. JB. fo ‘ Tor corrections, refer to Gazelter of Persia . I i Considering the distance of Shustar from the sea coast, the comparatively unknown' nature of the country, our limited knowledge of the forces the enemy could bring to oppose us, and the necessity of keeping up strong posts of communication with our rear, I do not think I have over-estimated the force required. A portion of this, amounting to two European and three Native regiments, a troop of horse artillery, two European field batteries, two companies sappers and miners, and 350 cavalry, the force already here, would proceed from this, their places being taken by 1,275 infantry and 200 cavalry of the force which is to come from Bombay. Gunboats would be valuable stationed at Ahwaz, Band-i-Kir, and Muhammarah, and in case of the banks of tbe Karun proving to be fertile in- stead of desert, it will be necessary to have a considerably larger and moveable force at Ahwaz, and in such case it may be matter for consideration whether Dorak might not be left with a much smaller detachment placed in a strong position merely to watch the road, and the bulk of the force proposed for that post joined with the post at Ahwaz. I add a rough estimate of the probable force that would be required to go to Shiraz by Firuzabad. The easiest way of forcing our passage would be to seize tbe first pass, and establish a depot at the nearest good watering place in front of it. From this dep&t it would be necessary to render the road to the foot of the next pass practicable for artillery ; the pass might then be forced, and a second depot established. In this manner, by establishing depots about 40 miles apart, and im- proving the road as we advance, all difficulties on the route might be sur- mounted. It would be necessary to leave 1,500 men with each depot in our rear to guard the stores and keep our communications open. Taking all the difficulties of the route into consideration, the same force as set down for the Shustar expedition would suffice. On the march from Bushire to the valley of Shiraz little baggage should be taken ; and as, when there, we should have the entire command of the Shiraz and Bushire road, the troops guard- ing the depots might be reduced to 500 men each, and tbe army before Shiraz strengthened by those withdrawn. APPENDIX C Intelligence collected relating to Bushire and Mdhammarah and th® ADJACENT COAST DISTRICTS. Confidential Circular Memorandum containing approximate replies to a number of questions put by the Bombay Military Staff Officers in communications they addressed to Captain Jones, i.n;., on 28th September 185th • • Grain and provisions . — Wheat and barley are procurable in considerable quantities at the Persian ports to the north of Bushire, more particularly at Hindian, Dilam, Gunawa, and Bandar Big. In the Bohi 11a districts much also is to be found. The country to the south of Boh ill a yields likewise large supplies of these grains. To the north I should say some 500 konas of each could be collected in a short time. To the south two-thirds of that quantity. All ram and Khormuj, distant from this port 7 and 12 farsakhs respect- ively. boast dour mills, and it is at these places that is ground the bulk of the wheat converted by the inhabitants of the neighbourhood into flour. The streams the above inland villages are situated on are at all times sufficiently powerful to enable the mills to keep working. Wheat and barley abound at Ba sso rah, but the Persian produce is superior, and proport ionately dearer. Kali , or straw, for bullocks and horses generally plentiful in the country. Sheep are principally brought from the Bihbalian district, Kuhgehlu, and the hills inhabited by the Bakhtiari Iliyats. They are plentiful enough. Probably from 9,000 to 10,000 could be collected, when demand was excessive, in the space of two months. Oxen . — Somewhat scarce. One thousand head of oxen could perhaps be procured from different places round Bushire, and not farm the interior, in 50 or 60 days. Ghee chiefly brought from Bihbihan. From 400 to 500 kegs, each weighing 120 lbs. more or less, could probably be obtained in a month. Vegetables generally scarce ; onions plentiful ; rice scarce. Firewood exceedingly scarce in the neighbourhood of Bushire. Must all be procured from sea. It superabounds between Khumir and Suft in Kislim. Baggage animals. — Few mules round Bushire to be obtained either for pur- chase or on hire. In Borasjan a very limited number could be procured. In the Bihbahan, Kazran, and Shiraz districts collectively perhaps 500 mules could be got together for purchase in three months. Their selling price would average from 25 to 35 tomans a head (ft's. 100 to Rs. 140). On hire it is impos- sible to state even approximately how many of these animals could be collected. I may observe, however, for your information the system that obtains in respect to charges for their hire. For every 100 Tabriz maunds they carry, the party hiring the mules would pay the sum of 20 krans, and on each mule would be laden an average weight of 4 maunds. Asses would mostly carry a load of half that weight, and could be hired at 7 or 18 krans per 100 Tabriz maunds to be carried. Asses are pretty plentiful. I dare say 1,000 head could be collected for hire in two or three months from Firuzabad, Maimun, Kazran, and the low country adjacent to Bushire, The general price of an ass may be stated at 25 krans. , _ / , pf ff; -'t ,iJ \ m M *&&&>-* **« WHI m gp tj'i < Camels. From 400 to 500 could perliaps be procured in two or three months between Borasjan and Bushire. Equipments for baggage animals.- ; It is generally understood these are not kept in large quantities ready made up, but in Bihbahan, kazian, and Shiraz ihuldazs abound, who eould speedily make up as many as might be ordered. The majority of the baggage animals, 1 may observe, would possess their own equipments. ■Carriage for sick.— An important consideration for ourselves, because seldom dreamt of in Persia. No such thing as a regular Utter is made use of for the conveyance of an invalid on the simple line of march. The person sick, n a common soldier, would probably either remain behind or ride on a donkey, it he could get or steal one. If the invalids were entitled to more consideration from position or otherwise— for instance, the non-commissioned officer ot highest erode— would either possibly be accommodated with a kujawa, or some rude apparatus would be rigged up to convey him to his destination. A Persian of rank, however, such as a sarhang or sartip, would ride comfortably in a takhUrowan. K u jawas and iakU-rowans ready made are scarce, ihe former are simple affairs, and could be quickly and easily got ready on the spot were the timber available. A supply, to commence with, should most certainly, however, be brought up. Small craft. — Some SO or 40 bnglas are at this moment available m or close to Bushire harbour. This account includes those obtainable from ship hard by. They are tolerably adapted for plying between the ships and the shore. At Baraki, a small port situate in a creek, distant from Bushire about 7 farsakhs and from Tangistan 40 or 50 more, could be found, besides 5 or 6 bultils and 3 or i ghaehas. . Water and water mnssacks.— The water at the wells close to Bushire is exceedingly brackish, but those distant 3 or 4 miles from the town afford very good drinkable water. Further inland its quality varies considerably I am I know that in some places it is anything but sweet, and incline to the belief that between Bushire and Shiraz it is, on the whole, rather brackish than sweet. Simple boring apparatus for sinking fresh wells would be essen- tially necessary to a force advancing through Persia Rain deposits the accumulation of winter falls, are supposed to be plentiful at divers depths beneath the sedimentary strata, which are situated among the hollows m t e Ropes, blocks, and hides for buckets would also he in great requisition for the working of these wells. Every soldier should have in his possession a mussack or water skin. These might on emergency prove of invaluable ser- vice to him. They are light and portable, and are capable, when stuffed with, fighting clothes, ammunition, and eatables, of conveying him and his musket afross any unfordable river or torrent. By joining them in considerable num- bers together, too, rafts would hear the weight of the heaviest guns and stores, and transport them in safety. A few general remark**— The natural resources of Persia, it will he observed, are on the whole, extremely scanty. A British force coming up, therefore, to the Gulf should arrive having at its command everything necessary to start with. If permitted to venture an opinion, I should say not less than three months* provisions of every sort and kind should be within actual reach of every man in the force. )f that period, supplies would be wus iii Persia, The low country aut once arrive at the passes, and themselves ; all the roads through are said to be impracticable for How far this may be true it is impracticabilities to Persians might prove to V hour and difficulty* . guns of 18-pr. calibre have been brought by that route, and that lighter fieldpieces ° — ia. , ■' ' |||| sui mount these mountain difficulties should, however, ^ with every appliance that might be requisite r guns over and out of trying positions. Indeed, more than the usual complement of such necessaries should be supplied them. Once beyond the mountains, the roads are tolerably practicable, I am told, in every direction save the east and north-east, which swarm with deserts untraversable W presents no obstacle to artillery whatever, inconceivable difficulties, I believe, present the mountains between Bu shire and Shiraz artillery, save by the way of Firuzabad. impossible to say. Possibly enough, what are i t ' * able pioneers mere works of great labour and All I can now observe is that down the passes by the Persians L, ■are. frequently taken to all parts of Persia., A force destined to s it is clear, be amply provided to move tkei Supplementary Remarks, Leechees are procurable in large quantities from Kazran and Shiraz Limes also to be obtained in abundance from the Oman coast, south of Khfr- i-Fakan, as far as Mascat. Warm clothing fitted for the soldier decidedly scarce. Everyman should arrive armed with apparel adapted to resist the effect of both wet and cold and not trust to obtain the needful in Persia. Numdas could no doubt be collected in due course of time from the in- terior, and aids, warm and thick, are to be procured in the neighbourhood of Muhammarah ; but for immediate use few or none would be available Meso- potamia, so soon as the Arabs could be taught to perceive the advantages of a regular traffic, would probably afford a large supply of sheep, camels, oxen buffaloes, and grain ; but much tact, forbearance, and knowledge of Arab charac- ter would be requisite to deal successfully with the independents of these regions. From Mi TOR J, Hti/l, Commanding Engineers, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, to the Assistant Quarter Master General, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, —No, 1, dated 1st Strongly recommpnds the supply of boring apparatus to the force, as the well water in Bushire is not drinkable, and a large force is required to guard the wells 1 1 miles from the town. Extract of a private letter from Captain Kemball, Political Agent, Baghdad, to Captain Felix Jones,. I. N., Political Resident at Bushire,— dated 28th November 1856. Fort* at mouth of H afar river . — These much spoken of forts constructed by the Persians are absolutely contemptible. On either side of the Haf&r river, there is a mud structure capable of mounting three or four guns, but differing only from the common mud forts of the Arabs in that it is pierced with embrasures, Muhammarah^er! 6 6 or apertures intended as such. On the Jazfrah* the defences are mere mngars . From their unfinished state one would suppose that the Persians had abandoned the construction as useless. All that we shall require is one or two small vessels constantly stationed on the spot to guard our commerce and suppress any propensity to plunder engendered in the minds of our quasi- Arab allies (for one and all declare themselves the servants of the Iwgleez) by the arrival of the expedition. Memorandum on Muhammarab and the River Karun, by Major-General Sir W. F. Williams, In the event of hostilities being prosecuted against Persia on the part of the Indian Government by the capture of Bushire and the advance of a British army into the interior of Persia on the line of Shiraz and Isfahan, I consider a diversion through the Hafar canal and up the river Karun to be highly desirable. Our means of annoyance would be very formidable, as we should be enabled through the agency of Indian officers speaking the Persian language to enlist into our service all the warlike inhabitants of the western slopes of the mountains of the Bakhtiarfs and of Liiristan. These tribes are constantly at war with the Persian authorities, and the British agents acting from Mnhammarah in the direction of Shapur, Shu star, and Bizful, and from Baghdad in the direction of Ka rind and Karmanshah, would with ready money rally round their standards vast numbers of hardy foot and admirable horsemen. The climate of Muhammarab from the month of June to October is very deadly to Europeans. During the remainder of the year, it is well adapted for the opeiationsof warfare. The Hafar is navig- able up to the quay of Muhammarab for the largest sloops of war, and two or three well placed redoubts would protect any depot established at the town of Muhammarah. During the hot months, these forts should be guarded by sepoys and Arabs in our service, while our European • troops should be encamped in the hills to the east of Shustar and Dizful, where my camps have passed the summer. Large supplies of buffaloes and sheep can always he had from the Arabs for ready money ; and wheat and barley by timely precautions can be floated down the Tigris from Mosul and Baghdad, and down the Euphrates from Hillah and other cities. Two or three small steamers upon these rivers could 1 x 0 advantageously employed in towing and guarding these supplies, and with respect to land carriage, almost any amount of camels can be with ready money procured from the neighbouring tribes. With reference to the navigation of the Karun, small steamers can run between Muhammarah and the bund of Ahwaz during the winter and spring. Great numbers of Arab boats from the Tigris and Euphrates can always be procured for ready money, especially the canoes of the Bam Lam Arabs, who beep up their own internal communication through the great inundation by these means of transport, which is never interrupted by sand banks and want of water in these rivers. As the whole population of Persian Arabistan* as well as the aforementioned mountaineers of Luristan, &e., detest the Persian rule, I consider that operations judiciously undertaken, and followed up in this direction, would cause greater inquietude — indeed terror — at Tihran than even the capture of Bushire. In fact Muhammarah is a point of such vital importance that I should recommend both the Imperial and Indian Governments never to lose sight of it, either in the present conjuncture, or in a general scheme of future pol i t i cal combi natio ns . Dated Bushire, 3rd January 1857. From — J. E. Taylor, Esq., Yiee-Consul at Basrah, To— The Lieutenant EL Ballard, c.b.. In charge Intelligence Department, Bushire. The climate of Muhammarah is unhealthy, although boasting of water unequalled in any port of Turkey or Persia. Its situation is, however, favorable in other respects ; and situated as it is, on the banks of the Hafar, which is capable of admitting ships of a large burden close to the walls of the town it is the port for Shustar, Dizful, and the surrounding district, as well as an entrepot for the pastoral tribes of Southern A rabis tan, for the disposal of their produce and the supply of their wants. The grain grown in the neighbourhood and about Ahwaz is largely exported, and its quality is scarcely inferior to the best sorts obtained to the north of Baghdad. The upper country as far as Shustar is proverbially fertile, and abounds in hocks of sheep. Shustar itself is a most desirable position. It is situated in a fertile basin, and its only drawback is the intense heat prevailing in summer. The town is walled, and there are about eleven guns in the place, capable, I understand, of being put in position. I am unaware of the number oi held guns available there or with the Persian force in Luristan and Arahistao ; but it is well known that, in common with all Eastern nations, this arm is a favorite branch of their service, and we may safely calculate that in this respect the Persian army will not be deficient. The force at Shustar may still be estimated at 3,000 men and 11 guns; at Muhammarah, where reinforcements have arrived within the last ten days, there are now four fauj of S.irbaz amounting, should the fauj be complete, to 3,200 men; the whole force in. Luristan and Arabistan may still be computed at 11,000 men ; but from the disturbed state of the tribes, and inefficient, state of communica- tion, I do not think one-half would be capable of concentration at Shustar and Dizful. I may add that considerable stores of provisions have been collected between Muhammarah and Ahwaz, as also at Hawizaii. The chief command of the troops at Muhammarah has been confided to Eller Mirza, son of Khan- ka* Mirza, the Prince Governor of Arabistan. His sartfps are Jabir Khan and ■MBM Haji Isabir Khan ; but the latter is not trusted, as I believe he of lukewarmness, if not treachery, to the Prince's cause. I em of Arab tribes called for. El Mattur El Hallalat El Morazijeh El Derarijeh Al-bu-Mare£ Arab Tribes tributary to the Persians . K’&b. — Living on the Aal Shatt-ul-Arab », "Aal ul Aveydh Al-bu-Mehsen Minejat El Ramdban “banks of the Shatt-ul-Arab, K^riin Felahiyah, Jerrahi, Hindian, and Bahr-ul-Mashir - The Muhaism Shaikh Haji Isabir-el-Mudan, divided into 16 divisions, viz,, Al-bix Ferhan, Shaikh Hussain, Ebn Ali-ez-Ziara, and Haji Sulbukh : M Shaikh Mdsa-ul-Mui AH and Yusuf-el-Ghanam, and Say y id ebn Sayyid and Yusdf ebn Muh&mmad-el- Jassan, and Muhammad -el- Kenan Shaikh Sufteh ebn Abd-el-Nehhi, and Abdullah ebn Mai Allah* and Shenaneh ebn Hussain », Shaikh Sangur ebn Mahmud and ebn Sirhan Mt Shaikh Abbas ebk Abud-el-Dehlemine "***' Shaikh Muhammad ebn Salem ... ’** -** Shaikhs Naseh and Hashim, sons of Mir Saod ebn Mutrakh .. Shaikh Hamid ebn Ahmad *», .. Shaikh Khereh ... ... # *[ - Shaikh Yusuf ebn Muhammad Pastoral Tribes of Muliaisin. Al-hu Atnf, Baghlanieh, Hussainat, Zuneidat, Soweilat El Ay dan ... - Mo’avvlyah (at the Ismailiyah) ... Aal-el-iianaz Under Hdjl Isabir M ughala Mojaddim El Khan^firah El Mushasekeh Al-bii-Ghubaish *Asakirah Hazbah ... Two divisions. Jduda and Mughal a. • Shaikh Hamfd ebn N&sir, Serban ebn Hamid, Saleh ebn Salem. ... Shaikh JDanvesh ebn Seleh, Ibrahim ebn Mamd, and Ahmad ebn G nth ban ... Shaikh Sulaiiuan ebn Guthban, and Musa-ei-Jendil (refugees in Turkish territory) ... Small Tribes of Felahiyah. , Shaikh Rahmah ebn Mubammad-el-Sabi Shaikh Hamdan . Shaikli Ahdarideh Shaikh Rayyld ebn Khalil •Shaikh Zair Kraidi Shaikh Mul’Mulla ebn Nusrut* Carried over 900 ' : ; v - ; -v; 131 5 1 Ml Bdwu Brought Over m tMwi and El New&ser K1 A aider El Zerkfin El Hu maid. El JSallamat . Shaikh of the whole Akhil ehn Daod Mut-h R dr. ebn Kahmah Zoberra and ebn Sameh Muhaihes ebn D<tod ' . Thahevo ebn Dagher and his sons Asad, Hussain, and Hamad hi . Shaikh Algum ehn Mulla .... . Shaikh Snwaiti. . " ..y , Shaikh fChdbir ' ... , M . Shaikh Fudhl , Shaikh Shti I ahi . .... ... ■ V- Others exiled from the tribe* viz., Jabbir ebn Tullab and Murad ebn Sulaiman , M Bani Semlm Ml A mare hi , Shaikh Mfr Mfhuna ebn Rashad Mir Abdullah and others Shaikh of H Indian Savyid -el- Abdullah AH Bandar Mashhur Sayyid Muhaihes Small scattered tribes in number • ■ o ■ ■ §00 200 70 0 600 500 300 300 500 100 200 : , ! i I ! ■1 4,300 ! * ■ 500 600 300 loo 1,000 I 1 10,840 m. These Arabs have Umoiigst them about ?,000 muskets and about 3,000 horses. Tho proportion o£ armed men is equal in each tribe, but the Bawl tribe have the largest proportion of horse, say 1,600* and they are capital horsemen, and well armed with a small Persian carbine, pistols, and sword. Their horses are of good breed and well trained. Amongst the above tribes are 5,000 camels, 100,000 sheep* and 3,000 buffaloes * the latter principally about Muhammarah. Ay' ah Tribes about Mawizah subject to Persia. Es* Sakieh Shaikh Shellahi ebn Mir Sayyid Es* Saadeli-Ahbel Turf Shaikh Sayyid Abd ebn Sayyid Hamid Ah-el-Kuat Shaikh Assad ebn H^ji Abbas ... Nees Shaikh All Kh£n ebn Shaikh Hamid ... Sein Seleh Shaikh Sayyid ebn Sabin ... Esh* Shurrufa Shaikh Abbas-el Hamid ... ... * El Hurdan Shaikh Shaiyaa-el Misser Allah El Qaataa Shaikh Abd -es’ Saeed ... El Echresh Shaikh Bertan ebn Ghuleb and Cherny an ebn Hiissain ... Villages under Sayyid Isa, Musa, and Muhammad, sons of Sayyid Shebib ... ... Beni Hurruf Shaikh Abbas-el- Abd Allah and Metani ebn Sendai Es’ Suaree Shaikh Sueydej-ibn Abu Hemdee Es’ Soudan Shaikh Quataa-el Abd Allah Albu Ghurba Shaikh Aswed ebn Shebib and Sufteh-el-Hamacleh Bereyha ■.»*« *«* »•* ... 300 300 200 200 800 800 300 400 600 .. 1,500 800 400 1,000 400 200 Total ... 8,600 These Arabs have 2,000 horses, 2,000 catnels, 20,000 sheep, 1,000 buffaloes. Arabs about Shudar. El -Atiafeja SliaiHi Magh&oses e r A Zetidi and his son Mutlnb A ban MaiJeli ’these have — Men ... “* Horses Camels Sheep Arabs about JJizfiU. El Kethir Shaikh Fares-el-Hasbi. These have — Men *»* Horses Camels ... «"* Sheep Buffaloes Under Persian rule, or in Persian territory These have — Men Horses ... **• *•'» Camels ... ... Buffaloes... Sheep 4 , 00 ?? lyOOO 1.500 12.000 (unclemrteci) 5,000 25,440 6.500 9.500 9.000 i42,<XX> (underrated.} No. 5?, dated 5th January 1857. Prom— L ieutenant J. Teonson, i.n., Commanding Corvette Falkland , To— The Assistant Resident, Persian Gulf. ^ I have the honor to submit the following observations made by me during oar recent cruize to northern parts. , Shah Abul Shah is the commencement of the H Indian territory, ana at present has a blood feud with the people of Bandar Dilam. Its position on the chart is incorrect : instead of 2 4 miles from Bandar Dilam, it is 8 miles The soundings are most regular in Duhnt Dilam, but they are one fathom less than marked on the chart. The soundings gradually decrease to about one fathom, a quarter of a mile from shore. The rise and fall five days past the new moon was from 7 to o leet. Ine water is verv smooth, and the bay would afford good shelter to ships in a nor - wester, and tolerably good in a south-easter, if, for the hitter, it did not blow to the southward of south-south-east. The best anchorage is with Bandar Dilam bearing east in :3| to 4 fathoms. . The wells which supply Bandar Dilam with water are situated one mile to the northward of the place, and are protected by a large fort called Bandar Hamid. At 1 \ miles from Tonara the wells are situated, and the natives say that extensive ruins extend in that distance from the beach. There is a remarkable tree here which is a good mark for making the place. We were at anchor in three fathoms mud, with town north-east, distant about 1 mile. At Bandar, Rfg we anchored with the Shaikh's house N. 39° E., entrance to creek E. 11 N.°in 3 fathoms; the latter l\ miles distant. At Khur Hussaini, anchored with the village of the same name IN. Go K Rohilla S. 77° E. about 1£ miles off shore. . . , . , A remarkable clump of trees S. -75° E. The bearings taken of Kharaj at these places placed them 6 miles to the north of their position on the chart. , ^lie soundings aloit: coast is a good deal out ig the coast apppar to be very correct, but the 'Hoc at being* in some parts li too far west* Extract from report by Lieutenant H. DisSbowb, Assistant Political Agent to the : Force, Persian Gulf, — dated 44 Berenice,” Oth January 1857* To Lieutenant H. Ballabd, c*b., In charge Intelligence Department, Bushire. • I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter with queries ■attached, ■■■and''. in reply to send you the accompanying answers. Q. 1 * — Much doubt has been thrown on the salubrity of Muliammarah during tbe hot weather. Do you retain your opinion regarding its possessing a good climate? A.~l am still of opinion that the immediate vicinity of Mu ham in a rah, on the banks of the Kanin, possesses a good climate as compared with all adjacent country south of Kurna ; and why ? The groves of date trees on which Muliammarah itself stands, with irrigating ditches filled and emptied by flow and reflux of tide, together with other cultivation, only extends along banks of Karun at most 2 miles above Muhammarah. There pure air of the desert and dry soil commence. Again, the water at Muhammarah, from July to Octo- ber inclusive, is that which drains from the marshes between Suk-es- Shaikh and Bassorab, divested of all vitality by probably six months' stagnation, and heated, as I have proved, to a temperature of 9-1° Fahr. The Kanin, on the other hand, m its short course of some 160 miles from the mountains, comes ilrnost pure > and, if I remember rightly, its temperature is seldom above 82 With pure air, and cool, fresh, and excellent water, I seek m vain for causes of unhealthiness in the locality 1 refer to, say 5 miles ab'Ve Muhammarah, on the banks of the Kanin. . . . , , p At Rassofah three months ago, where the poorer classes drink the watei ofc a muddv creek leading from river to town, and m which all filth is thrown, about 700 died of cholera out of a population of 5,000 At Maifl, a large village on the river, about 3 miles from Basso rah, two inhabitants fell victims 'to it. I have mentioned in my memoir published among the Royal Geographical Society’s reports that I attribute the healthi- ness <>f the Assyria ere# under my command in 1 84.2 to the fact that w hen duty called me to the vicinity of Bassorah, 1 always ran a few miles up Karun rather than remain at that place. The medical returns of the vessel would attest the same if more proof is needed. .. , n 2 —Could large ships unload at any point (not necessarily a town oi village) higher up the Karlin which might be more healthy ? j -Six fathoms (36 feet) water are matked m my chart, some 6 miles above Muhammarah, more than sufficient for the largest vessels that eouid pass the Mian, a bar at the month of the Shatt ul-Arab or Bassorah river. n 3 —Would the force of the current and windings of the river prevent the river steamers towing boats? If not, how many tons could a vessel like Assyria, with boats in tow, convey ? , „ _ j _i r phe windings of the river and force of current would offer no obstruction to river steamers towing boats, even in the highest tide, as far as Ahwaz Above this point, I find 1 made against a very strong current and high tide, on an average ft* miles an hour, and I remember I cut my own fuel as I went along. 1 have no doubt, such a steamer as the Comet would to# a boat carrying 150 tons, herself laden to a certain extent (say 50 tons without her armament) at the lowest rate of 1* miles per hour against the strongest current to he found south of Band-i-Kfr; if not, a few trackers would over- come the difficulty^ ^ Shustar by Ab-i-Gargar current not above three miles an hour. . , , . . , 0 n 4 m — Does the river overflow its banks at any point f . A— l wa s up the Karun in the highest season, and did not find the river overflowing its banks ; an extraordinary high rise might cause it to do so; and, indeed, I find a statement to that effect in my memoir, viz., that m hebiuaiy (1842) the river overflowed its banks. Q. 5 .— Can troops march on both sides of the river uninterrupted by jungle, &c., &c. ? Yes. q $ What amount of supplies could be obtained below Shustar on the march, or would the troops have to depend on the river steamers for bringing up supplies from Muhammarah? , ,, The whole country about Shustar on the north and Felahiyah on the south' beino- ^rain-producing countries, it would entirely depend on the will- ingness or otherwise of the inhabitants. I myself confidently believe that as "much grain and cattle would be brought in as an army would require. The inhabitants of Band-i-Kfr unroofed their houses to sell me the raft- ers for firewood at 5 kraus the 1,000 lbs. The fact of ready money paid for their produce would have an effect which cannot be understood but by those who have been in this country. v The best place for collecting supplies preparatory to the occupation o M uham ma rah in November would decidedly be Bassorah; but if the preparation be much earlier, uo place seems at once safe and healthy nearer thai Baghdad. • The quantity of supplies in the K'ab district is abundant, the transpor about 4,500 camels. Baghdad and Bassorah could probably procure froir ^,000 to 10,000 mules, and an equal number of camels with six months notice. In the event of an advance on Shustar and a threatened attack front the rear, the most desirable point for a depot or detachment would be Ah. waz. It is remarkably fertile, and, being situated on the river, could ii required, be protected by steamers. * * I take this opportunity of mentioning that since descending the Shatt- ul- Arab a month ago, the Persians have been, and still are, working most industriously at Mubammarah. The fort on the northern side of th< Hatar has been strengthened by stumps of date trees placed slantinc against the wall, and the interstices filled up with earth after the manned of a buttress. It seemed pierced for three guns, at which point th< wall did not exceed 3 feet in thickness; but the embrasures wen diagonal, apparently with the object of firing the moment a steamer attempt- ed to turn up the Hafar. They are also working very hard opposite tin town. This is entirely new, and consists of a ditch and parapet on an ole mound, or rums of walls. There is no doubt that in a short time the plac< will be of considerable strength, but at present could easily be destroyed The most desirable point for landing troops is on the island south of Muham- marah, anywhere between 5 and 10 miles. The water is deep under tlic bank, and the men would merely have to walk from the vessel to the shore The garden walls are mostly in ruins, and the date trees scattered. Nc defences have been pat up on this side. If the landing be effected to the north, the ships would be exposed tc fire in passing, and the ground now held by the regular infantry would be very difficult to carry, the date trees being much thicker than the south side and walls in good order. I have been informed that the insalubrity of Muhammarah is confined to the cultivated tracts, so that in all probability an eligible site might be foil tic a few miles higher up the stream. There will be difficulty in bringing tin camels from Bassorah, but they could be made to swim across — a mode occasion- ally adopted by the Arabs. Dated Camp near Buslxirc, 12th January 1857. Beporfby Lieutenant H. Ballard, c.b., Superintendent, Intelligence Department, . J Bustiire. In compliance with tie orders of the Major-General Commanding, I have prepared the following report regarding the countries through which a force marching on Shustar or Bihbahan respectively would have to pass ; and although extremely imperfect, it seems desirable to furnish it at once, because many reports have been spread regarding the fertility of the country near the Karfin river, the correctness of which a more close exam ination renders doubt- ful. Unfortunately it is from natives alone that much of the information must come, as few ’Englishmen have explored these parts. The points to be considered are — ^ , 1st .— -The injury which an occupation of Khuzistan could inflict on the Persian Go vernment. Snd.-JThe facility with which we can carry out an expedition for that purpose. . , . The injury which would be inflicted on the Persian Government is a poli- tical question. It would chiefly arise from the effect which the presence of invaders would have on the turbulent population of the mountains. An occupation of Khuzistan itself would be but a small triumph compared to the difficulties attending it, and the disadvantages in a strategical point of view which attend a march to Shustar. The province is thus described by hraser : <1 Khuzistan, the ancient Susiana, which lies to the north-west ot bars upon the northern hank of the Tigris, may be divided into two portions, essentially differing from each other in character and climate. „ m * , ' , % , r , • r, t, 137 yielded the best crops of cotton and sugar, of rice and grain, to a condition little better than a forsaken waste.” This account is exaggerated ; there is a good deal of cultivation about Shustar and Dizful, but the subject will be considered further on under the head of supplies. The superfluity of core cannot be great, as the trade on the Karun is Bawlinson. small, and Muhammarah, the natural enitepit for its Kernball produce, has an insignificant population and trifling The Baron de Bode estimates the revenue of Shustar (not including Dizful, but including Akilf, where most ora is grown) at £10,000. > The whole revenue of Khuzistan probably amounts to about £20,000. I will now proceed to a more detailed account of the Karun river and the requirements of an enemy advancing on Shustar, reserving a few remarks on the military advantages or disadvantages of the expedition for the conclusion. c ... , .. , Previous to an expedition to Shustar. the town of mara k Muham mar ah must first be seized. ’The climate of Muham marah is described as most unhealthy during the OHmate. summer months; in fact uninhabitable for Europeans. ^ Captain Selby, however, considers that by ascending the Karun for a few miles, a more endurable climate could be obtained ; even if it could not, the obstacle is not insurmountable, for an army would not assemble there before November, when the climate is healthy; and, after the advance, it might be entrusted to natives and some gunboats. If Mu ham marah is occupied this spring, it would still be better to form depdts at Bassorah and Baghdad than there, because these places are in Turkish territory ; and it would only be necessary to send a few officers and conductors to collect the supplies and means of transport, which could afterwards be transferred to Muhammarah, An abundance of cattle for slaughter can be procured at Muhammarah, but Supplies at Muhammarah. there ai ] e Afferent accounts of the amount of grain to be obtained in the immediate neighbourhood. The whole adult male population of the large district of K'ab only amounts to 11,000, a small proportion of whom are village Arabs. This fact alone would seem conclusive that no large quantity of grain can be grown ; and Colonel Rawlinson, the highest authority on these subjects, states : “ The country at the month of the Euphrates, although prolific in rice and dates, does not pro** dace wheat and barley enough for the consumption of the inhabitants. Large supplies, however, might be obtained from Shustar down the Karun, and from Mosul and Baghdad down the Tigris. Mosul is overflowing with corn, and could send any quantity down the river by rafts at a moderate price ; that is, at half the average price that rules in India.” These remarks were made regarding Bassorah in Turkish territory, only 40 miles from Muham- marah, so there would be no difficulty in arranging for an abundant supply to be brought down the Tigris to Shatt-ul-Arab. The tribes of K'ab are said to possess 5,000 camels; a thousand of these Land transport. might be available for inland transport; but if a depot was made at Bassorah, they could be collected there in any numbers and taken across the river in rafts, as swimming camels is a troublesome business. The journey to Muhammarah could be accomplished by land in two days after crossing the river. lt« Colonel RavHinson says tc that in a few weeks he couH colled from 10,060 to 20,000 camels, 2,000 mules, and 2,000 donkeys at Baghdad,” and a number would be found nearBassorah itself. From Baghdad to Bassorahis 250 miles. Precautions must be taken for guarding the convoys along this route from the predatory tribes who infest the banks * but this would not be difficult. Most of the horses sent to Bombay from Bassorah come by land from Baghdad. 1 On this important subject the authorities l have bad access to are General XT. • ^ + 4 ^ tt ' Williams, Colonel Rawlinson, and Captain Selby. NaVlgatl ° n ° f the Karun ‘ Major Estcourt has published a survey of the Karan from Muhammarah to Ahwaz, which 1 beg to suggest be applied for from Government. The ascent of the Karun divides itself into three stages. From Mtthammarah to Ahwaz, where there is an ancient bund, past which steamers must be dragged by hawsers, is 80 miles. From Ahwaz to Band- i-Kir, where the Karun and an artificial canal drawn from it higher up unite, 25 miles, and from Band-i-Kir to Shustar, which is most easily affected by the Ab-i-Gargar canal above mentioned, 35 miles. This is as troops march the windings of the river would add another 20 miles for steamers, or 160 miles in all. Captain Selby ascended to within two miles of Shustar in the spring of 1842 with the steamer Assyria. He states that the river is navigable to Ahwaz at the lowest season for vessels drawing 5 feet water, and to Shustar all the year round for vessels drawing 4 feet. General Williams says u small steamers can run between Muhammarah and Ahwaz during the winter and spring. Great numbers of Arab boats from the Tigris and Euphrates can always be procured for ready money, especially the boats of the Bani Lam Arabs, who keep up their own communications by these means, which is never interrupted by want of water in these rivers/' Colonel Rawlinson says another avenue into Persia may be supposed to be up the Karun; but this I leave for the present out of consideration, as the river is only practicable for steamers during two months in the year. As General Williams and Colonel Rawlinson must both have seen Lieu- tenant Selby's report, the conclusion is that neither of these experienced officers, who at the moment of writing had in view the passage of an army, considered it would be safe to trust to receiving supplies From Muhammarah during the low season by steam navigation. It would therefore be desirable to reach Shustar as early as possible after the beginning of the high season, in order that our requirements there might be known, and, as far as possible, provided for before the river began to fall. There is plenty of fuel on the banks according to Lieutenant Selby. Until depots were made some inconvenience would be found from the wood being green. As kafilas move with ease along the banks, there seems no reason to Native authority and apprehendaity difficulty to toops marching. A creek Lieutenant Selby. on the left bank which runs up to liorak would re- quire a bridge of boats; it is from 15 to 20 yards wide. From this creek (8 miles above Muhammarah) the country on both sides of the river is desert, or covered with brushwood and dwarf poplars as far as Ahwaz ; there are only two villages, Idrisiah and Ismailiah, in this long distance. (See reu oh sketch No. 11.) From the right bank to Hawizah the country is badly supplied with water, and thi nly i nhabited. On the left bank there is a large, on y. but still scanty, population of nomad tribes. Itmayba ISfiSE.il fairly conjectured that any cultivation would be found near the banks, and that the Arab tribes live chiefly by their flocks and herds, A supply of fresh meat, and at certain seasons green grass for the horses and mules, might be found ; all the other necessaries for an army must he brought from Muhammarah. We have no account by personal knowledge of Ahwaz, except from Lieutenant Selby, who indicates the country as a desert, which agrees with accounts I have had from natives Mr. Taylor of Bassorah and Major Taylor say the country about Ahwaz is fertile; but this applies more to its capabilities, if cultivated, than present resources. The reports regarding its produce of corn probably arise from the fact that, owing to the bund across the river, all the corn brought from Shustar must here be transhipped from one boat to another, and there depdts of grain are made ; hence the merchants at Muhammarah and elsewhere are accustomed to hear of their boats being laden at Ahwaz, and imagine the corn is grown there. Lieutenant Selby's map From . AFw »z to Band-i-Kir, the banks of the (Native authority). river are in the same unprofitable state. Kinneir “ says from Ab-i-Zal and the Tigris to the river which I consider Gyndes on the western side, and from the banks of the Karun to those of the Shatt-ul-Arab, it is dreary and desolate, and from the eastern side of Shustar a lonely wild, upwards of 60 miles in extent, extends from that city to the entrance of the valley of Ram Hormuz. “ Even between Band-i-Kir and Dizful, just mentioned as the most flourishing part of the country, the corn when I visited Khuzistan in February 1810 was principally raised by the officers of Government, aud the principal inhabitants of Shustar and Dizful ” Above Band-i-Kir the Karun and Ah-i-Gargar canal enclose an is] nd called the Mian-ab, 35 miles in length by 5 broad. A good deal of corn is grown on it; but this might be removed for the use of the garrison, and stored in Shustar before our arrival. The chief supplies of grain are obtained from <he plains of Ak Kala, 12 miles beyond Shustar, whence, says Lieutenant Selby, Shustar aud a vast extent of adjacent country is supplied with corn. This would not be available before we had taken the town. Shustar contains at present 8,000 inhabitants. KInneir reckons them in his time at 35,000. W hen we have occupied it, there would be a sufficiency of food for the men ; but if the cavalry aud artillery force was large, we cannot feel confident of procuring forage, always scarce in the low country, where few horses and mules are used. If Shaikh Hakim Ibin Gheis at Dorak and his relative Haji Jabir at Muhammarah could be bought over, it would save much trouble. The latter must, indeed, from self interest be friendly ; and if it is necessary to coerce the former, a force could march from Muhammarah (while the Shustar expedition was preparing) to Dorak, 30 miles, following a creek by which small boats can go; but our communications world still be threat- ened from Bihbahan (described further on) in a manner which, even if the K’ab chief was our faithful ally, could not be disregarded, and would require a force to protect them. It will be seen by the sketch representing the sup- posed movements of the enemy's troops, appended to this report, that a formid- able force could assemble on the K'ab frontier in our right rear, and we must be prepared to meet it before it approached the Karun Moreover, it is certain that we must have intercourse more or less intimate with some of the K^ab chiefs; and if they had been assisting us, the Persians would have little scruple in carrying out on the Arab tribes the horrible threats they have lately mamtam hi NHS 1 ' I issued to those Bear Bu shire who "might be found favoring the English. We would be bound to protect those people if our friends, and to have a strong guard over them if our enemies, : * When that was settled, there would not be any fear of opposition till we reached Band-i-Kir; a well placed redoubt at the extremity of the Mian* ab would effectually bar the upward passage of our steamers and boats, and we should requite a pontoon train to carry by land to some other point where the enemy were less prepared. Colonel Rawlinson once took guns across the Karun on rafts supported by inflated skins, but this would not be safe in the presence of an enemy, and under any circumstances we must carry the super- structure for a bridge complete. Supposing our progress stopped at Band-i-Kir, there would be two courses open — 1st, to bridge the Ab-i-Gargar canal higher up; 2nd, to cross the Dizful river, where we would probably not be opposed, and then to cross the Karun, ^ The following is Lieutenant Selby's account of the Ab-i-Gargar; u Like all streams running through a similar soil, it is rather serpentine, and winds from side to side of the valley/' This valley is formed by steep marl cliffs, which gradually approximate, until, at the junction of the canal with the other rivers at Band-i-Kir, they form the immediate banks, and tower perpendicularly overhead to the height of 130 feet. The depth of the Ab-i-Gargar is nearly uniform, being in the channel from 12 to 18 fert ; in the lowest season the breadth varies from 60 to 120 yards, with a current of not more than 2| miles an hour, till near Shustar. This is clearly seen in the map, and it will probably be found easier to Cross the Dizful and force the passage of the Karun, where some deep re- entering angles and a command of position offer a facility for the manoeuvre. The Dizful and Karun, according to the map, are about the same size as the canal. The Mian-ab occupied, there remains Shustar itself contaning a gar- "Tice- Consul Taylor rison of 3 ’ 000 men and 11 S uns > but whicb mi g bfc be Captain Kembatl. ' increased to 8,000. Small reinforcements o£ artillery could come from Bihbahan and Karmanshah. The town is thus described : Shustar is built on a small hill, which rises gradually from the south-west- ward, and increases in elevation towards the citadel, which presents on the north-east side an* abrupt face of 130 feet in height, having the river immediately beneath it. Having" the river on both sides, and on the other a wet ditch which might easily be put in order, the place itself, naturally strong, might be rendered sufficiently so to resist any other than a well appointed European force. Shustar once taken, it would be necessary to follow up by occupying the plains of Ak Kala. The direct route is very diffi- Tnferenees from Colonel CU ]t, but it can be turned by Baitavand, 15 miles BawUiyon and the Baron de distant; it would also be necessary to occupy Dizful, o e ( a wean on y. containing 20,000 inhabitants, the capital of the pro- vince, 35 miles from Shustar; the army recruited at Shustar could effect that without reinforcements. It remains to add to this report an account of Bihbahan, as it is from this that one rear would be threatened in an expedition to Shustar, “and that the Misfiia 1 « r 1 * , * / J **' ' wm% relative advantages of an expedition there or to Shustar may be compared as far as imperfect information will permit. I will also give some extracts from Colonel Rawlinson regarding the passes’from Shustar to the interior: “ Bihbahan, the second capital of the Fars district, lies in a plain watered by the streams of Khanabad and Shir, from which the town is supplied by artificial means. ^ The governor is Soft All Mirza, son of Tahmasp Mirza, Governor of Shiraz. Four hundred sarhaz under Yaour (Major) Hussain Khan and 400 horse of the Sevan tribe under All Khan were stationed here at the beginning of the war; but these may at any moment be changed. Thera are seven or eight guns of: position, but no moveable artillery. Bihbahan is 50 miles from Bandar Diiam ami 65 from Hiudian, posts 70 and 85 miles respect- ively north of Bushire.” Mr. Kinneir says: “On leaving Bandar Diiam and ascending the mountains, the first town which presents itself is Zaitun, containing about 2,000 souls, situated in a pleasant valley fertilised by both branches of the Zab, which here form a junction ; 15 miles further on is Bihbahan, containing, according to the governor, 10,000 souls. The plain of Bihbahan is of consider- able extent and highly cultivated.” All native accounts agree in stating that there is a large quantity of grain and cattle to be had near Bihbahan. This must to a certain extent be true, as grain of all sorts and ghee are exported from Bandar Diiam and Hindian, An intelligent native, who has been of much use in collecting supplies for the Commissariat, told me he stayed for some time at Zaitun, and that there was plenty of supplies there and draught cattle to be had in the district. An itinerary is appended, by which it will be seen that both the roads from Bandar Dflam and Hindian are practicable for guns. The climate of Bihbahan is said to be healthy, and not so hot as Bnshire. The fortifications of Bihbahan consist of a wall with bastions in dilapidated state. There was once a ditch, but it has filled up in course of time. The most advantageous position for an enemy to take would be where the road passes through the hills to the westward of the town. Reinforcements of troops, including artillery, can be sent from Shiraz, ISO miles, and from Isfahan (but with great difficulty for artillery), 170 miles. The roads in both cases badly supplied. It is not probable that in the unsettled state into which an invasion would throw the Arab tribes, any force could be spared from Shustar, 120 miles. If the troops in the province of Fars were concentrated, as at present, in Far rash band, or any other point on the route from Bu shire to Shiraz via Firuzabad, they could go to Boras j an by Kazran, 140 miles, or by Borasjan, 150 miles. Looking at an expedition to Shustar and Bihbahan respectively purely in a military point of view, and without any reference to political con- siderations, the following appear to be some of the inferences regarding it : That the road to Shustar is objectionable, as exposing the flank and rear of an army to attack. This arises from its running parallel to the frontier, whereas in a line of march perpendicular to the frontier, the enemy must meet the invaders in front. Shustar is no strategical point for future operations, as the passes to the interior are impracticable. It is in fact a cul de sac. The advantages attending it are that there is water carriage most of the way, and supplies to be obtained when the army was settled. If it was ordered by Government to extend our operation for the purpose of further coercing the Shah, the troops necessary for the occupation of Shustar would remain inactive at a tim.e when their services could be least spared. ■i I sas I if ■H In the case of an expedition to S hustar, some force must be posted to guard our right rear. If the Persians concentrated troops on Bihbahan, this would be seriously threatened, as the country between there and the Karun is passable . for troops, and in the direction of Dorak not destitute 0 f supplies for a Persian army. Dorak itself would not answer for this station, as it is unhealthy. Natives say that the Hies there in summer form an intolerable pest. It would, therefore, either have to be on the lowest healthy point of the Karun, or at Bandar Dilam or Bihbahan itself; in all eases fully equipped for the held. The coun- try between Bihbahan and Shiraz is so badly supplied, except near the former place, that the Persian Government would find it exceedingly difficult, if not quite impossible, to command the resources necessary for moving a large body of troops along it at once; and if they came down it in small bodies, an active force at Bihbahan could attack them in detail ; t his is equally true regarding the road from Isfahan. A force to operate on Bihbahan should assemble at Bushire, and, while making preparations, could also be employed in demon- strations towards Firuzabad, in which direction lies the best route to Shiraz. This would induce the Persians to concentrate on that line, of which their present preparations indicate great jealousy. When ready, the troops would embark, and in ten hours be at Bandar Dilam or Hindian. They could disembark altogether at Bandar Dilam or form two columns, and, marching from the above named ports, unite at Zuitun, thus more easily obtaining supplies. It is beyond Zaitun that the difficult ground com- mences ; but as Bihbahan would certainly be denuded of troops, its occupa- Native authority. ^ 0n would be easy. From Bihbahan to Fabliau, on the Shiraz road, is 60 miles through a country well watered and wooded, but thinly populated even for Persia. The road does not present any insurmountable impediment to the advance of an army. Fahliun is a point of considerable strategical importance, as from there roads lead to Kazran, Dasht-i-Arzan, Mian-i-Kotal ‘(half way station of the Kotal-i- Pi rzan), and direct to Shiraz. Guns can be taken to Shiraz from all these places. On the subject of the roads to Shiraz, I shall lay before the Major-General a separate memorandum of the information which has been collected at present, merely offering the following remarks. If we are to ascend the passes, Shiraz must be the point on which to direct our forces. A direct advance on Isfahan by other routes is impracticable. If it is determined at once to ascend the passes, the Far rash band route is the best, and Bushire, being then in our rear, would require a very small garrison to protect it. If we advance on Shustar, it should only be on the understanding that no further operations are probable, or it would be a clog on further move- ments. An occupation of Bihbahan is the easiest movement of all, and would be of use whether future operations are contemplated against Shustar or Shiraz. In the one case, the force there would defend our right rear ; in the other, effect a diversion in our favor by the route of Fahliun. But this would only be a diversion; the real blow would be struck by Firuzabad, and, unless the invad- ing force was very large, they would be more weakened than assisted by a division of their numbers. The remark regarding Shustar applies, though in a less degree, to Bihbahan, namely, that whatever may be the political or other advantages of effecting its occupation, there would be none in a strategical point of view for invading the country on! a large scale. The direct passes from Shustar to the interior are of so ragged a char- acier, that they are not followed by the caravans* PaSSeS t0 tbe These make a long rou nd by Mala mi r and Dih-i-Diz, a Tillage about 50 miles from Bihbahan. The distance by this route to Isfahan is upwards of 250 miles. Guns have been brought down it by the Persians, but they were 6-prs., and the difficulties experienced were extreme. Colonel Raw! in son says regarding Shustar: The great difficulty is the communication with the interior; the passes between Shustar and Isfahan cannot be traversed even by a laden mule. The only routes practicable to an army with guns, both long and difficult and badly supplied, are one which runs easterly by Ram Hormuz and Bihb$h&n f .; and debouches on the plains of Persepolis ; and the other which follows up the valleys of the Karkhah and Kashghan rivers, till it reaches the high plateau of Central Persia near Khuramabad.” Elsewhere he says : u The passes beyond Shu -tar and Dizful are of the utmost difficulty. I have mvself, it is true, carried t’-prs. up the valley of the Karkhah. from Dizful to Karmanshah, but I was obliged to rely almost entirely oil manual labour, telling off a regiment to each gun.” The latter route independently of these considerations is an ineligible one, being a long march on the skirts of the kingdom ; and the former leading to the plains of Persepolis, and thence to Shiraz, is not so practicable as those which lead direct inland from Bush ire. See Sketch No . 8 showing supposed movements of the enemy on English army seizing Mukammarah preparatory to ascending Kdrun y page 98. Dated Camp Mukammarah, 5th April 1857. Despatch from — Captain J. Wray, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, To — The Chief of the Staff, Persian Expeditionary Field Force. According to the instructions received from you, I have the honor to forward the following report upon Ahwaz and the country in its vicinity, with a brief account of the military operations of the expedition. Ahw&z is situated on the left bank of the Kanin river, at about 100 miles from its mouth. The town is in ruins, and not more than one-third of the houses appear to be occupied. There is no fort or defence of any kind beyond an old ruinous stone wall round part of it. The inhabitants number about 1,200, chiefly Arabs of the Arab tribes. Close to the town are two old broken down bunds across the river, through which the water rushes with great rapidity. One of these is just opposite the town • the other considerably below it. These bunds are impassable for boats drawing more than a few feet water, and the strength of the current renders the passage of any boats a matter of great diffi- culty ; indeed, we did not ascertain satisfactorily that boats could pass at all. The river is from 90 to 140 yards wide, and there are several low islands in the middle covered with low tamarisk jungle ; the banks of tbe river are general- ly high, and the water so deep that onejsmall steamer could lie close alongside. The country of the town side of the river is a bare plain, with very slight patches of cultivation here and there ; and on the south-east side of the town is a range of sandstone hills perfectly bare. The country on the opposite side of the river is much the same-r-a barren plain without a tree, and the most desolate looking place imaginable. A few hundred yards above the bank is a ridge, which, when we approached Ahwaz, we found occupied by the Persian army. 9Wi II MmmmM ■ § is . The nver passes round this point, rendering the position very strong- • but ah the same time, a force driven out of it by an enemy attacking at A, and bein» obliged to embark and retire down the river in boats or small steamers would be exposed to the lire of batteries or musketry from the river banks from anv point which an active enemy might select. J The advantages of this site for a cantonment for our troops are first that our commissariat and stores coming by land from Muhammarah’ could join pur camp without having to cross the river; second, the strength of the position. & : '■ * Ifc is impossible to form any idea of the healthiness of the place. There had been a good deal of ram when we were there, and the surface of the ground was very heavy ; but there is no reason to suppose that troops stationed here would be otherwise than healthy. At present the climates is very pleasant, the mornings delightful, and the days, though warm quite bearable. The Arabs furnished us with sheep in abundance, milk, ghee, &c. ■ The Karun river has already been reported on by Captain Selby, and I found the map drawn up by that officer perfectly correct. The river is gen- erally from 90 to 180 yards wide— a fine stream, with very rapid current, the banks tor the first fe.sv miles after leaving Muhammarah covered with date trees • afterwards with cypress or dwarf poplar. Jungle for a hundred yards or so from the water s edge, the interior a barren desert. We passed a few Arab Villages on the left bank at long intervals, and anchored for the night at two of them to get supplies. Excepting here, we did not see a single soul the whole way. The country on the right side appears an uninhabited wilderness. Irom the Chief of the Staff, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, to Quarter Ma-ter General Bombay Army,— No. 14-Q., dated 28th April 1857. , .Reports that, after a very careful examination, the Lieutenant-General has decided upon forming a standing camp for the second division on the ground now occupied by that force, about 2 miles north-east of the town of Muhammarah. It has also been decided upon to make the transports in the river avail- able for temporary barracks, where the sickly may be accommodated and where companies of Europeans may alternately enjoy a change of air, or in the event of any epidemic breaking out, or other immediate necessity occurring for such a step, enable the Lieutenant-General to remove the whole force from Muhammarah to Karachi or Bombay. From CaFTJlin J. Weay, Deputy Quarter Master General, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, t0 i. th <L?w f °u\ h oJ taft ’ Perslaa Expeditionary Field Force,— N o. 164, dated Muhamma- ran, Zoth. April loo7* . Reports that he proceeded on 24tli instant to inspect the ground for some distance along the banks of the Karun with a view to the selection of a o-ood- site lor the cantonment of the troops. States that the country for 8 miles after leaving Muhammarah is dry, but after crossing the wide creek at Bjusbih, and turning to the right towards the river bank, the surface of the ground becomes more and more damp, and the soil so heavy that their horses sank over the hoof at every step - That he examined the whole of the ground from the village for about 5 miles up the river, but the result was the same ; the ground the whole way •long the bank to the depth of half a mile is crusted with salt, several inches , deep in mud, and never dry. Beyond that distance from the waters edge, there are open spaces here and there of dry hard sand ; But even these are crossed" ! by ridges of the salt muddy soil, which appears to run in veins across the plain ' in every direction, rendering it quite unsuited for a cantonment. Intimates that about 5 miles above Sabla he found a small patch of good ground on a high bank of the river, hard, free from mud, and covered with tamarisk jungle, but of so small extent, about half a mile long by 200 yards in depth, that it would not answer the purpose, and, moreover, at such a distance from building material that hutting the troops there must be attended with, great delay and difficulty. Remarks that the only other spots at all suitable are the open spaces ■ ; between the villages of Kusbih and Sishan and between Sishanand Deymt Ali" . Pasha. The country on theSabIasi.de also appears to be an open desert, level, with ridges of muddy soil. From Beioadier-Gkxebal Havelock, Commanding 2nd Division, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, to the Chief of the Staff, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, — No. 200, dated 25th April 1857. Entirely disapproves of any movement from Muhammarah on sanitary grounds, also on account of its accessibility from the ships, and its value as a strategical position. Recommends erection of huts and enforcement of strict sanitation, &c., at Muhammarah, after which the chances of sickness will prob- ably be less than if the division moved further up the river.* ■ From Chief of the Staff, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, to Assistant Adjutant General, 2nd Division, Persian Expeditionary Field Force,— No. 49, oated 26th April 1857. Superintending Surgeon Mackenzie states that there is no suitable locality for the encampment of troops near Muhammarah, and that the main thing is to get the troops under cover in Muhammarah itself before the heat sets in, their health being carefully watched, and severe cases removed at once to the ships. Summary of information obtained on the 24th and 25th of April 1 857 from several Arabs as, to the respective salubrity of different localities between Sabla and Muhammarah. 1st. — From a Native of Sabla. “ Sabla is tolerably healt hy, more so than Muhammarah. * By Muhammarah I mean the town and its immediate vicinity. The high ground 2 miles beyond the town is as healthy as Sabla. Sabla is occasionally flooded, with the excep- tion of a small hill upon which the ruin stands. Such floodings occur after very heavy rains in the interior. “ The rainy season does not terminate till the end of this month (Ramadhan). The mud you speak of as now existing is in consequence of the late heavy rains. It is always damp here and there owing to the saltness of the soil in different places. The chief sickness with us is continued fever, but not many die of it, because we are so few in number. The country beyond Sabla as far as Ahwaz is much the same as this, no better." * . iit! ■HHHHMMliiMHiii , 140 ; 2nd. —From the OMca and two others of the milage of Stshan, 3 miles below Sahla , mi the right bank* i€ We have lived here all our lives, and consider it more healthy than the port of Muhammarah. The spot where the ShahzadalPs camp was pitched is as healthy as this. We know it because we frequent the town and its vicinity every day, and have occasionally resided there for weeks. This spot, and the district beyond it for many miles, is sometimes, but not often, covered with water. Such floodings take place in consequence of an extraordinary rise of the river, when it is swollen by heavy rain. It was thus flooded last year, and again this year when the Commissioners were here; but such has not occurred this year. It may yet occur, because the rainy season will not be over till the end of Ramadhan. Fever, chiefly hot (remittent), is the most prevalent disease, hut is confined to the autumn (September) after the dates are gathered in. There are many snakes and scorpions here, and mosquitoes abound. It is the same higher up and lower down the river. The ground hereabouts is muddy now in consequence of the rain. No troops have ever encamped here to our knowledge. Darwesh Pasha, the Turkish commander, encamped at Omm-et-Telool, 4 miles lower down ; u Omm-Et-Telool. “ The river frequently rises to within a short distance of these ridges : the ridges are wet because of the rain, and because the soil is bitter (impregnated with saltpetre). We do not say that it is preferable to the .spot lately occu- pied by the Shahzadah, hut we thought you wished to come higher up. This place has frequently been selected by a portion of the Persian garrison. They came here when sickness broke out among the troops who were located on the other side of the river opposite Muhammarah.” Of JSd-duna near Muhammarah , lately occupied by the camp of the Shdhzdddh. u The floods have never been known to rise as high as this spot. u The Persian soldiers have encamped therefor years. All Pasha of Baghdad, when he took the place, fixed his camp there. He arrived in, autumn and left in the spring. No particular sickness prevailed in the Tur- kish army. We know of no occasion when the Persian troops suffered severely but when they were encamped near the fort on the opposite side of the river. The left of your present camp is in a bad spot, for the ground there is some- times flooded. You should make your extreme right your extreme left, and then you would be on the best position. We prefer mud to reed huts ; but many of us are too poor tq build with mud. We prefer mud huts to tents, unless the tent is double and a wall built round the sides to keep the heat off. Hot winds prevail here during the summer, more so we hear than at Bushire ; but our climate is better, and the water here makes us healthy,” 3rd. — From Abd-er-Hedha of Khdraj , an old Pilot , who has been in the service of the Indian Navy Qulf Squadron for many y ear s t and from several other Pilots well acquainted with Muhammarah . (< I have frequented Muhammarah at intervals for the la st 25 years, and these, my companions, are equally conversant with the place. My father and grand- father used to relate to me that two English regiments under General Fisly (Paisly ?) occupied Muhammarah for two years.” 1 1 : : > fill Mr. Maoist* jr was the agent at B&ssorah. There were also from 1*2 to 18 ships here; they remained at the month of the Shat t-ul- Arab for some time* because the authorities at Basrah objected to their going higher up. Thep. they anchored half way between the month of the river and the Hafar, and finally they came up to Muhammarah, where they remained for some months* The soldiers were encamped in tents there, where the Shahzadah's regiments were lately located. AM Pasha's army was also encamped there. Several of ns know it because we saw it. AM Pasha came here just when the date harvest was being gathered, and he left in the winter. We never heard that the English soldiers suffered from sickness. The Turks under AM P&dha, we know, 'did not suffer. The Persians on the. island of Abadan lost 800 men from diarrhoea and dysentery, and one of their commanders, named ■ Yawar, died about 8 years ago. They then removed to this side, and became healthy. They went higher up on the river because another force occupied the site where the Shahzadah's camp lately stood, and besides it was deemed imprudent to bring them in too close contact with the healthy troops. We never heard of the site we now speak of being unhealthy. True the town is so, but it is very dirty and very close. Persians frequently come here from Bassorah for change of air, and also for change of water, because the water in the Kanin is the best in the world. The heat here is less than at Bushire, but the hot winds are more frequent ; and the mosquitoes are so troublesome that a man must sleep under cover to get any rest. Fever is the prevalent disease, but it is confined to the season when the dates are gathered. From our own experience, and from what we have heard of others, the place where AM Pasha's troops were is tolerably free from it. Your present camp is too near the Shafct- ul-Arab ; you should move it to the right. A very large tent with double lining would be as good as a mud hut, but it should have a wall round it. Barracks, such §,s the English built at Kharaj, would be a thousand times better than any tents. Those are built of mortar and stones ; but mud would be as good. From what we know of both places, you will be better off here than at Bushire ; but you must get water from the river, not from the canals. (Sd.) G. P. BADGER, /" v Arabic Interpreter* ■Ell tali Abstract of correspondence relative to the neutralization of the Coast Shaikhs, and the enlistment of the Coast Tribes in our service. All the coast Shaikhs sealed a secret compact of friendship and to furnish supplies, hut were refused all written guarantee of indemnity for so doing on ;©ur'part. ' '' \ " ' , ■ ; ^ ^ , 1 , , ' , » ' , v Ko. 67, dated 14th January 1857, from General Stalker, to the Secretary to Government, ■ 1 : ", ' " ' , : 1 Bombay. Forwards report by Lieutenant Disbrowe on the various ports of the Persian shore and intimates that allowances have been granted to Shaikhs as under who have promised to assist the British, and for whom protection can- not be guaranteed : Banker Khan Tangistum Shaikh Muhammad Hussain of Borasjan; Shaikh Hussain of Ohahkuta, Shaikh Bulimy ar of Tel-i-Sfah. Mulla Ahmad ben Tahir of I )i\£m. Ahmad Khan hen Murad of GunawsC, Shaikh Abdulla hen Shaikh Muhammad, and Shaikh Abdulla ben Bahraah of Bandar Ho. 49, dated 28th March 1857, from General Outram, to Lord Clarendon (On board the “ Ferooz” near Hartep, 4 miles below Muhammarah). Intimates that Rashid Pasha, Governor of Bassorah, declared Muhammarah to be disputed territory and objected to any attack there by the British, in virtue of the claims put forth by the Porte. A further difficulty arose with the Turk- ish authorities, namely, the removal of an Ottoman ship of war stationed in the channel before Muhammarah. Captain Kemball was despatched to settle these points, the first of which fell through in consequence of an unprovoked I jfy attack by the Persians on the “ Comet” despatch boat, and in the case of the p second, Rashid Pasha consented to order the removal of the war ship. This, 1 1' the General looks upon as a sign of the friendliness of the Turkish authorities. f Captain Kemball was further directed to secure, if possible, the neutrality W of the Arab tribes and overtures were made to the undermentioned* chiefs to If abstain from assisting the Persians and to withdraw their followers, in order r to avoid collision with the British army. No guarantee was held out to them, but they were promised an ample reward if found deserving. The success of these negociations was displayed as the “ Ferooz ” steamed up to its present anchorage. At several of the villages the Arabs, male and female, approached the river unarmed, waving their flags and when the vessel anchored, several came on board volunteering to give any information in their power, as to the numbers and disposition of the enemy, * Shaikh Faris al Ghadhan chief of Kellahiah. Mdlla Abdulla, Chief of Hawizah. Shaikh J abir-el-Murdao Chief of the Mohaisen tribes. Shaikh Suwaila, Ferhan and Darwish Chiefs of the Nasara tribe Khnshab, ■■■■■■■■■■■■I ! : .4: chiefs copy of General Outranks ill proclamartion was sent to the following : Mmmin hen All, AH Bu Ferhan. Zusuf ben Gbanam. ■ ■' .‘ ; ■' ' -'K,: Mii 11a hen Mtilla All. Simgur hen Ferhan. The Shaikh of the AH Bii Mnlinrzeh. 9t „ Klin lif eh. „ „ Mahmutl Shatait* tS ' ' j, ■ Elm wauls. » „ Amlra — Hirtah. n i, Kasabah. mmbb arn^ Despatch from General Outram to Earl Clarendon, dated Muhammarah, 11th April 1857. Forwards translation of letters* deceived from Shaikhs Faris of FelMM&h * The communications and Jabir of Muhammarah and states that a visit were to assure Sir James from these Sheikhs to the camp would have been at- ami lo' " obtain ' promises * of tended with many advantages but before this could immunities on the occasion b© arranged, news arrived ox the conclusion of peace at of the visits which they Paris, and the out wal'd hearing of the chiefs has in proposed to make. consequence undergone a change owing to their dread of vengeance on the part of the Persian Government. He marks that the Turkish authorities appeared to labor under the impres- sion that Muhammarah would be handed over to them, but that this delusion was not in any way countenanced or encouraged. Letter from A. B. Eemball, Esq., Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, to T. G. Taylor, Esq., British Agent. Directs him to discountenance any schemes of rebellion against the author- ity of the Persian Government on the part of its subjects, while approving of his reply to Muhammad-ez-Ziaruth, the confidential agent of Mulla Abdulla. Remarks that Mulla Abdulla is no longer de facto, as indeed he is not de jure Governor of Hawizah, as it was reported that he had been deposed of his government by his nephew Mulla Muhammad, aided by a military force under the command of the son of Khauler Mirza. m SiiiB lilt lit ip i !■ Ilillli 1 Extract froth despatch of Viscount Canning of 21 si March 1857. Sir J . Outram points out in the 24th and following paragraphs, certain political restrictions which he fears will so hamper his proceedings as to render nugatory liis proposed advance to Shustar, referring to that part of the instructions which debars him from seeking the aid of ’any but “inde- pendent" tribes. Her Majesty's Government adverting to this point have declared that they do not seek to subvert the dynasty of the Shah or to encourage insurrection on the part of his subjects ; that they have no wish to weaken the hold which he may have to the allegiance of his people, or to enlist the subjects of Persia in the ranks of the British Army, but that they would not hesitate to avail themselves of any assistance which may be obtained from independent native tribes. Sir J . Outram observes that there are no such independent tribes ; that all are either Persian or Turkish subjects; but that as regards the former, they will become virtually' our subjects when once our army is in possession o£ their territory* and that tbe objection to enlistment will then lose its force. I feel it necessary to say that I do not think that in acting upon this view the spirit of the policy laid down by Her Majesty’s Government would be carried out. . So far indeed as regards our right as belligerents* and the practice of war, examples may be found of arms placed in the hands of native population, and of recruits drawn from it by an invading army. But in such cases the subversion of the dynasty and the weakening of the government of the country invaded have been objects sought, not shunned. ^ . In the present instance, seeing how decidedly, and I believe wisely, Her Majesty's Government deprecate any dismemberment of Persia,— seeing how mischievous an example would be given to Russia in dealing with the subjects of Persia, and having regards to the future embarrassment which we should lay up for ourselves, I am of opinion that the enlistment should not take ^ I fear it is impossible to contend confidently that although we should effectadismembermentfor the moment, we should be able, upon the re-establish- ment of peace to restore to the Persian empire its integrity. This, when we have once fanned the flame of rebellion may be beyond our power, unless indeed we should be prepared hereafter to coerce into re-subjection to the Shah, the tribes of whose aid in the field we wish to avail ourselves : and such a course is not to be thought of. _ ..... , It must be remembered that enlistment into our ranks, and submission to the discipline and command of our officers, implies a service in a great degree voluntary, and of a nature far more offensive to the Persian Government than those smaller services which, as a matter of necessity, and for the sake of subsistence and self-defence, an invading army is compelled to exact. Such a service as enlistment into the British army, is not I apprehend contemplated in Art? VII of the draft of the proposed treaty between Her Majesty and the Shah, lately received from the Secret Committee of the H. C. which stipulates for an amnesty in favor of those who, from tear of " damage to themselves and families, have afforded “ supplies and .iris! cnvuioo fn flip invadino* forces, whom they were unable to raHyBBHHb to seek the permanent weakening of the Shah's authority in a portion at least of Ills own dominions* and so far our object is opposed to theirs* not Jut unison with it. There is certainly no political bond between us. They would be our mercenaries* not our allies* in a cause* and I think there are grave objec- tions to taking our mercenaries from the Shah's own subjects. As to the future* the fierce denunciations which the Persian authorities have issued against all who allow the invaders to obtain the smallest article of supply, might lead to the conclusion that we should not compromise the future safety of the Shah's subjects to any greater extent by taking them into active military service, than by t radioing with them. ' But it is scarcely possible that this should be so. There' is* notwith- standing the big threats of the Persian Commander, a real and wide difference between the two kinds of aid ; and if the opportunity and power of punish- ing a tribe for taking up arms in the British ranks should present themselves to the Shah's Government, it is not to be supposed that the vengeance would not be sharper and more determined than if the offence should have been the mere sale of provisions or camels. Possibly the Bakhtiari and K'Ab tribes may be strong enough to defend themselves unaided against the ultimate consequences of their junction with the British force* but it is not to be expected that this will lead them to forego their claim to protection from us. If We meet that claim by requiring that they shall be included in the amnesty* we must watch the observance of that amnesty in regard to them* with more than usual care* and we must be prepared to enforce it. Our obligations to the men who had stood in the ranks with our own soldiers would not be light. We should owe something more to them than to the peasants who had supplied our camp, and our debt would be greater from the fact that they would have gained nothing by the success to which they would have contributed. Upon the whole the enlistment of tribes from within the Shah's domin- ions, and whom we must acknowledge to be under his rightful authority* appears to me to lead directly to the future protectorate of a portion of his subjects. An embarrassing condition of things at best, and one which in this* instance would be of the worst example to Persia's neighbours. It is impossible not to foresee with Sir James Outram that an important means of success will be lost by abstaining from using the aid in arms* of those subjects of Persia who are hostile to its Government. But probably it is not necessary that their assistance should be entirely foregone because we refuse to take them into military service* or that unless enlisted into our ranks they should be actively opposed to us. Their aid in furnishing supplies and carriage, their forbearance from molestation of our convoys and sources of information* and from any maraud- ing upon ground from which our supplies are drawn* might* I should hope* be secured by money and by friendly and judicious treatment. As regards the Shah's troops I see no reason why the tribes should not be left to take their own course. I would not attempt to enforce their neutrality. ■ y: A: If the Shah has misgoverned and alienated them* he must take the consequence. All that is necessary for us to do is to make it well under- stood by the tribes that we do not seek to put them in collision with the Shah's forces ; that it is not for this purpose* but for the purposes above mentioned that we pay them and seek friendly relations with them. That for such. S8T vices as we aslv ? an amnesty will 1)6 required of the Persian Gov- eminent, but that beyond this we have no intention to interfere between the Shah and his subjects. It requires more information than the Govern- ment of India has at present at command, to judge whether, any impedi- ment to this course will be found in the character of the tribes in their relations to their Government- and to. each other, or in our position towards them. So far as my knowledge goes I see no reason to think that such a course will be impracticable. ■ . These are the views which present themselves to me upon a consideration of this important Subject as set forth iu Sir James Oil tram s despatch. If they meet with the concurrence of my Honourable colleagues, I propose that they be. communicated to Sir James Gutram, not as instructions, because these will come from Her Majesty's Government who can alone explain, or if thought necessary, modify the instructions which they have already given; and therefore Sir James Outram, has most properly addressed Her Majesty s ' Government upon the subject, but because in a question of much di.Iicmry arising in such circumstances as the present, it is not right that the opinion : of the Governor General in Council should be withheld from him. Minute by the Honourable J. P. Grant, dated 22nd March 1857. important question regarding the policy of enlisting Persian o our ranks, to make war against their own sovereign, I have only ; ' m y ™ e concurrence in the view taken by the Right Hon’bte the G-ovemor General, for all the reasons stated in His Lordship’s minute We have no quarrel with Persia excepting in the matter of her external relations and we have no intention of taking the subjects in question under permanent British protection. Sir James Outranks argument that a tempo- rary military occupation of a country warrants an inhabitant in throwing off f I s aile £' ancp ’ and ta W , arms against his sovereign, because it warrants tem P°^ a ^ su ^ missl011 in matters civil to an irresistible power, is 1 th'nkthe proposed course would be unjustifiable, would be inexpedient* m the highest degree. On tlie question of communicating to Sir James Outram the opinion of the Governor General upon this point, on which that officer has received in- structions immediately from Her Majesty’s Government, I observe that this opinion is consonant with those instructions, wherefore the communication V" *:! n a T r P r °P° sed s f ms t0 “? proper. The expedition which Sir James Outram commands is an Indian expedition. The utmost effect of such a communication will be to confirm the General in acting upon his present instructions, so long as they shall remain unrecalled and unmodified oy the high authority from whom they issue. APPENDIX E 3NDENCR RELATING TO THE ACQUISITION OP INTELLIGENCE AND TH$ FORMATION QE AN INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT. tied I Btli September 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to Captain Wray* Assistant Quarter Mastei* General. s him that the Commander-in-Chief has directed his despatch to Gulf in advance of the force in view to the coDection of intellL that he is to be accompanied by Lieutenant Holland, 13th Native is Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General. i him to hold himself in readiness to enabaik at the shortest notice jr in which some officers of the Commissariat and Bazar Depart- ; also proceed to prepare for the troops. [lowing* information to be obtained ? Arrangements for landing the troops . jtion of prevailing* winds, of the rise and time of tide, of the depth n various parts of the coast and facilities fo'r landing either in face jy or for taking them or their defences in flank or reverse; the boats and their condition, &c., procurable either by management or J650, dated 17th September 1856, from the Military Department, to the Commissary 3 General# : ■ States that it has been resolved to despatch two Commissariat Officers to Persian Gulf to consult with the Resident at Bushire and to make arrange- ts for collection of supplies on arrival of the force. Intimates that it is intended that these officers shall actually purchase stores until there is & certainty of the expedition proceeding to its destination, this information can be furnished by the Resident, who will also supply funds and all necessary aid. Remarks that detailed orders should be issued for these officers* guidance and such native assistance attached to them as may be deemed expedient. Appoints Captain Rigby, Bazar Master; and requests that he may be de- spatched in advance and furnished with detailed instructions for his guidance. Adds that the Resident, Persian Gulf, will be requested to obtain the services of Naval Officers to be placed in communication with the Commissariat Officers for the more effectual carrying out of the object of their mission. (Sd.) FELIX JONES, Resident , Persian Gulf \ 28th September 1856. General No. 39. dated 29th September 1856, from the Resident in the Persian Gulf, to the Quarter Master General. A want of time compels me to acknowledge in a circular the receipt of your letter of yesterday's date, enclosing copies of the instructions <riven for your guidance. These will be considered and such information as I possess or can obtain will be forwarded to you at Bassadore. m By the Steam Frigate Assay e I furnished to Government a memorandum containing much of the information sought both in the Quarter Master Gen- eral s and Commissariat Departments. I am not aware if you possess a copv ot this memorandum, but 1 send the original of the prices current in this Bazar. This can be copied and returned to this Office by the Falkland . , ■*/ g I Hftf 1,1 ‘ 1 it It would be desirable that one of the Commissariat officers should return by the Falkland to this port for employment in the Bassorah and Baghdad districts from whence our chief supplies of men and animals must be obtained If it were possible to proceed to that port at once, it would be still more desirable, but aware as you are of the suspicions caused by your presence in the town yesterday, I see no plan for adoption but the above course. The officer named for duty in the above districts would then have to remain afloat until means of proceeding to Bassorah were available. The Senior Commissariat Officer had therefore better consult Commodore Ethersey on this point, as if be can spare the Constance schooner from Bassa- dore she can be detached at once on this duty to Bassorah. The officer pro- ceeding^ there will find Mr. Taylor, Her Majesty's Vice Consul, in possession of all requisite information, and I presume will be able to supply him with funds by drawing bills direct on India. In the meantime I shall address Her Majesty's Consul-General in Baghdad on the subject. Residency in the Persian Gulf, Buslilre, FELIX JONES, 29th September 1856. Resident , Persian Gulf, Secret Department No. 43, dated 29th September 1856, I find that I have time briefly to acknowledge the receipt of your respective communications wherein you report your arrival, and whilst setting forth the nature of the duties you have severally been deputed to perform, request me to furnish you with instructions and information calculated to facilitate the performance of these duties. The short period at my disposal, I regret to say, will not admit of my addressing you separately as 1 would otherwise have wished, nor will it even allow me to supply you with details as full as are desirable, I will hasten, however, to string together in the form of a confidential memorandum addressed to you collectively, such remarks as appear to me likely to be of immediate and general use to you, and to give you some insight into the amount of supplies probably to be found in these parts, the difficulties to be contended with, &e., &c. I may here observe that the Bombay Government have already been placed in possession by me of the matter in bulk now communicated and that I endeavoured to impress upon them, whilst transmitting the informa- tion, the fact that any remarks I had offered were merely applicable to the natural resources of the country in times of peace, when buyers and sellers might be plentiful and no obstacles were thrown m their way. You will be good enough to bear carefully in mind, therefore, that I by no means intend to imply that the supplies mentioned as available in these tracts would be forthcoming in the event of hostilities. Far from it. It is much to be feared that, so far as Bushire and its neighbourhood is concerned, little or nothing would be obtainable in the outset, and farther in the interior literally nothing. A Persian army retreating from its pursuers would scarcely fail to resort to its customary mode of dealing with a powerful enemy, which as you are doubtless aware, consists simply in refusing to face its antagonist and leaving him to pursue it through tracts it has designedly laid waste in its flight. This is a point that deserves your special consideration, and already shows that no hostile force, when first planting foot in Persian soil, lias a right to count on receiving even a particle of sustenance or assistance from Persia or Persian ft-'. WK , resources. I would further wish you to remember that in the confidential memorandum to your address, I do not even propose to be exact in the inform- ation I am therein conveying to you. It is merely approximative and derived from such sources as could with most safety be relied upon. Shortly after your arrival at Baskin, I trust it will be in my power to supply you with more definite instructions. In the meantime it shall be my endeavour quietly to obtain the services of a few intelligent and trustworthy Persians, who shall be deputed to join you and assist you in collecting information. This, however, pray remember, is a matter you must keep inviolably secret, for did my intentions once get abroad, so suspicious is the Persian, that not only should I find the greatest difficulty in finding and obtaining the people I required, but considerable irritation would likewise be created in the minds of the authorities. Whilst negotiations are still pend- ing, it appears to me too much caution cannot be exercised by us, 1 would recommend yon therefore on the arrival of these agents simply to eno’a^e them as domestics, and whilst culling from them" the information they are able to impart, to warn them for their own sakes to conduct their proceedings with the utmost secrecy and deliberation. For the rest, your own discretion and judgment must be your guides whilst carrying into effect the duties you have been instructed to perform. ^ In conclusion,! would suggest, (I refer more particularly to supplies), that the plan we have in view would be most successfully attained, did one of the •Commissariat Officers after obtaining such information as be required at Bussadoie proceed and station himself at Masoat : and the other, so soon as No. 2035, dated 13th Oetober 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to the Military Depart- ment. • • Requests that report by Captain Wray, Assistant Quartermaster-General, may be submitted to the Right Honourable the Governor, and states that the Commander-i»-Cliief considers it very much to he regretted, supposing the slate of affairs to have been such as to justify the Resident in sending the officers deputed by Government away in somewhat unseemly haste, that the opportunity was not taken of detaching Captain Wray and his assistant to some quarter on the frontier of Persia where useful information might have been obtained, in lieu of banishing them to a desert island, where their use- fulness is altogether paralysed. Adds that His Excellency desires that in case of any mail preceding the despatch of the force, this error may be rectified. Lieutenant Ballard, in charge of the Intelligence Department, was assisted by a small staff of clerks and draftsmen. No. 2112, dated 18th October 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to the Military De- partment. Requests submission to Government of an application from Abdulla ben Hassan, an Arab horsedealer, to Major-General Stalker, to be allowed to ’} - w'-Zi l' 1 '£j im-imh § m | l ■ilf I f fr ; i 1# Hi i 1 5 LdgStes mm accompany him to the Persian Gulf as an assistant. Remarks that Major General Beresford/ Commanding Mysore Division, testifies to the man's respectability, and states that he is a person of considerable ability and a -member of a powerful tribe on the confines of Persia, and this testimony is concurred in by General Stalker. Recommends his appointment as interpreter on a salary of Rs. 250 per mensem. Ho. 3396, dated 3rd November 1856, from the Military Department, to the Quarter Master General. States that Government, although sensible that the services of Abdulla ben Hassan might possibly be very useful, cannot consider that an Arab horse dealer is exactly the person on whom so confidential an appointment as that, of interpreter should be conferred. Adds that if General Stalker, how- ever, is himself desirous that the appointment of interpreter upon his personal staff should be so filled, the Governor is prepared to accord his sanction subject to confirmation by the Government of India. No. 3478, dated 5th November 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to tbe Military De- partment. llHiil Intimates that Major General Stalker states that from his personal know- ledge of Abdulla ben Iiassan, he conceives that his services with the expedi- tion would he most valuable. Adds that the Major General further states that if Government should be pleased to place the services of this person at his disposal, he proposes employing him in the Intelligence Department, for which he considers him admirably fitted, and that occasion may arise when his services would he very valuable in assisting the Commissariat Department in procuring supplies. [Abdulla ben Hassan was employed by the Intelligence Department in Persia.] No. 1772, dated 25th September 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to Government, Military Department. Bequests sanction to the following office establishment for the Quarter Master General’s Department: 1 Writer 1 » 1 „ 1 Draftsman 1 Stationery, Ac. Rs. 1 20 per mensem. 80 SO 100 80 50 In regard to the Intelligence Department recommends that instead of the kossids usually entertained, such persons, natives of the country he employed as may be found necessary. J> ji > - ■ ■ | ® 81 i! 811 lll Prom the Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 6493* dated 8th November 1856. Recommends the appointment of Lieutenant Ballard, r.b., as head of the Intelligence Department, he being a well qualified officer for the post. % This appointment was made No. 3527 of 10th November 1856, (from the Military Department, to the Adjutant General) the remark it is to be under- stood that tins appointment is not to Interfere with any departmental arrange- ments already made among the officers of the Quartermaster General's De- partment. Lieutenant Ballard will have the position and the allowances of an Assistant Quartermaster General in the Field, but he is to be regarded as only temporarily attached to the Department and for the purposes of the pending service only. Bushire, 21st January 1857, No. 1 authorised to entertain the following { furtment : One Mnnshi at T wo Peons, at each 80 from 21st December 1856- 10 from 20th instant. From the Quarter Master General, Bombay, to the General Officer Commanding 1st Division, Persian Field Force, No. 11 06, dated 9th February 1857. States' that his recommendation to attach Lieutenant Brydon of the Artillery to the Intelligence Department has been referred to Lieutenant- General Sir James Out ram ; also that the draftsman applied for by Lieuten- ant Holland has been sanctioned at a salary of Es. 100 per mensem. Order, dated 16th March 1857, by Lieutenant-General Sir J. Outram,K.c,B., authorised the entertainment of such native .establishment for interpreters and guides' on such pay, as Brigadier General J. Jacob, c.b,, may deem expe- dient. From the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India, No. 689* *», dated 4th December 1857. Intimates that the Governor in Council cannot confirm so vague an order as the foregoing, and that it should be explained what Interpreters, Guides, and establishment were entertained under the order, and what object is to "be subserved by formal confirmation being accorded to it at this distance erf time. From Brigadier-General J. Jacob, to the Adjutant General in India, No. 450, dated Camp Jacobabad, 14th December 1857. Intimates that the Interpreters, &e., were engaged for the proposed corps of irregular cavalry, and as it was not known what the numerical strength of the corps might be it was impossible for the General-in-Chief to determine the number of guides and interpreters required. Points out that on Sir J. Outram leaving him in the neighbourhood of the enemy he considered it necessary to retain the services of these men for the Intelligence Department* and later to assist him in the daily prosecution of his political and military correspondence and other duties. States that the order for these men's entertainment was forwarded with other papers by a French Frigate and these papers were lost en route . The following was the establishment entertained as interpreters and guides for the corps of irregular cavalry ; Two Munshis or Interpreters from March to June Inclusive. One Mnnshi from middle of March to close of May at Bs. 80 per mensem. .Pwc) Mtrnshis or writers from April to October in< Guides in tbe Intelligence Department T;in'iag in to 12, and salaries averaging about Ks. 12 inclusive. From Brigadier-General J. Jacob, to the Political Department, No. 451, dated 14th Decern her 1S57. Brings to notice the annoyance to which he is sn Department in connection with the Persian expect! ease of the order about interpreters, guides, &c.. noinf ; lost in transit i r ^ ’ " ' . - --O— • wuu IMAV> C quentiy^not sanctioned by Government at the date o£ sanction which was refund (see ante) . l. v against the charge of vagueness, the orders il ; serving, and explains that the establishment absolutely necessary to enable the < that as Sir J. Outram had authority fr tain any number of irrej; orders of Her Majesty Finally requests that Council ] Military Secretary inflicts on him, . t v r \ — . > a u,uuo j puiuiw cut tnac rms order was : 0 i ndl ^ :l ^ forei £ n vessel, and the establishment was conse^ i 3 ~ — — — y -vvuxuuirut uie uare of his return. A copv was obtained from the Adjutant General’s Office, and submitted for Government ‘ ^ ““ * i e ) • Remarks that it is not for him to defend of the General under whom he was in question was found to bo operations of the force to proceed. Also „ f ' rom Her Majesty's Government to enter- ^ular troops the charge of vagueness must rest on the s ministry if anywhere. } consideration of his services the Governor in may be moved to relieve him from the continued annoyance which tb APPENDIX F, Abstract of Correspondence relating to the- Composition and Des- patch of the Force. Memorandum by Commanded ti-Ckief, dated Punah, 8th August 1880. To transport an army of 5,000 men of all arms, it was calculated would uire 13 steam vessels and 8 transports of 1,000 tons each ; 1 transport in addition, for ... ... ... Hospital Ship. z. . ** , » ... ... Ammunition. 5 transports „ ... ... ... Provisions. Hie tents to go on the orlop deck of each merchant ship. Letter from the Quarter Master General, to the Secretary to Government, Military Depart- ment, Bombay, dated 24th August 1856. Submits the following Island of Kh; Assuming and that it r and that for any tilt mander-in-Chief including* a la available, and on [g opinions and suggestions on the occupation of the araj and District of Bushire in the Persian Gulf. l 5 the duty of the force is to be limited to the above objects, opposition at one or possibly both places s it will be largely reinforced, the Com- a force of not less than 5,000 of all arms arge proportion of Europeans and of field artillery should be made 1 y every account he considers the numbers named the least that should be provided. States that the annexed table shows the composition of tbe proposed force and other information in connection therewith. The total shown amounts to more than 5,000 men, and if necessary, a regiment of native infantry can be omitted. J States that the average length of ship passage to Bushire in October and November, is about 30 days, and therefore recommends that as large a portion of the force apossible may be sent in steamers. The Punah Horse may be sent on Arab baglahs. But some place of rendezvous should be selected in order to ensure the arrival of the entire force simultaneously off Bushire. Recommends the provision on each transport of a large number of boats for landing purposes, &c., and platform boats in addition for use as gun boats and for landing guns without dismounting. Remarks that some bunder boats sent from Bombay in 1819 to Ras-uh Khan were found very useful, those furnished by the Imam of Maseat drawing too much water to be of any use, but if the former are sent the crews should be well selected and bound to do their duty. 9 Points out that in selecting transports and allotting troops to them the rules as to space and baggage should be carefully attended to, and great 'care should be taken m stowing the artillery and ordnance stores, the latter being under the superintendence of an ordnance officer, and the stores put away in such manner as to be at once available in presence of tbe enemy. Recommends the provision of liberal supplies of warm clothing for all troops and public followers, as the climate of Persia is understood to be severe for natives. ' 162 States that the Commander-in-Chief believes that ample supplies are to bo had in the country, but in case they may not he available, our Agents in Meso- potamia must be depended upon to meet the wants of the force. Remarks that it is desirable to reduce the number of followers as much as possible, and one class, dooly hearers, can be dispensed with, mule litters and camel kaja- was being used for the sick, and in order to aid in their construction as well as in case the force has to he hutted, the Commander-in-Chief recommends the despatch of an artificer establishment on a much larger scale than usual, and also advises the establishment of a large depot of tents, ammunition, and stores of all kinds, including shoes and clothing on the island of Kharaj or on the mainland, as may be found most expedient. Among minor matters the Commander-in-Chief recommends the issue to the cavalry of leathern chaguls, altered as taken to the Crimea by the 10th Hussars and also of forage nets, as well as tin or wooden canteens to the remaining troops, and havresacks to all. As the Commander-In-Chief considers an advance into the interior out of the question, states that report of all further requirements can he made by the officer in command of the troops as soon as he has ascertained his wants. Adds that although the troops can he ready for embarkation by the time specified if the transports are ready to receive them, yet it is considered desirable that longer notice should be given to enable departments, &c., to do their work in a complete manner. g d B g W ft 3S8SS g r(HHH : 300 1 008 006 1 1 s o> f .... : ■on « «r Abstract of Statement showing strength of Force. European officers European and native non-commissioned, rank and file Fol lowers ... ... Horses Guns Bullocks ... ... ... Statement showing the probable tonnage that will be required . Provisions, forage, grain, &c., for the voyage about Do. <?ra»n, &c., for the march ... Dead stock calculated at half of the tonnage of the provisions Water 3,200 butts about (4 lacs gallons) Commissariat followers and cattle about ... To meet contingencies, about ... ... Ho. 2407, dated 27th August 1856, from Military Department, to Quarter Master G eneral. Approves of tlie arrangements made by the Commander-in-Chief, but states that it seems to the Right Honourable the Governor to be doubtful whether for the first and immediate object of the expedition, it is necessary or desir- able to send so large a number of cavalry and mounted artillery as the Cora- maBder-in-Cliiet has proposed. His Lordship in Council thinks that for the present at all events, the Dragoons and one troop of horse artillery may be regarded as supernumerary, and be reserved to form part of a second divi- sion. Further recommends the substitution of a line regiment (Native) for the Baluch Battalion ; and adds that the Commander-in-ChieFs recommenda- tion as regards warm clothing, provision of transports, boats, and formation of an Artificer corps, will receive due attention. Letter dated Puuah, 28th August 1856, from Quarter Master General, to Military Depart- merit* States that the Commander-in-Chief in recommending the despatch of the Dragoons and of so large a body of horse artillery, was and is, under the con- viction that it is necessary to be fully prepared after disembarkation, not only against probable attempts at surprise from the enemy, but to be able to seize and hold the wells, about two miles from Buslxire, to send out patrols and to support foraging parties, and for all these duties the Commander-in-Chief does not consider the force proposed , numerically strong. Further it is considered advisable to give the native cavalry the support of European cavalry, with which they will acquire the requisite confidence, owing to their not having heretofore met the Persians as enemies, and to the size and bravery of the latter. No. 899, dated 30th Angus! 185(5, from the Quarter Master General, to the Commandant of Artillery. for I"/ 0 ™ 8 1 ' i , m S afc . the fo !’ owin § stre »Sth of artillery has been sanctioned tor service m the Persian g-ulf ; — o 3rd Troop Horse Artillery from Punnh, 6 gnus. A European Horse Artillery from Ahmednugger, 6 guns. ^ 4 ... ( 2— IS Pounders. Leserve Artillery European, dittos No. 1774, dated 2nd September 1856, from the Commissary General, to the Quarter Master General. , f ta |f tba * °l A V' S ha rl | een served upon the boat contractors to supply Arab baglahs for 400 Irregular Horse. When tendered, they wilPbe surveyed, and provisioned, aud will be ready within 6 or 8 days. liemarks that the probable length of passage by Arab “ baglahs” is from 45 to 50 days. 2(1 rl«v? l i at < tr00pS P roeeedlD g in the steamers will be provided with 20 days rations for use on the passage, and a month's stock of shorer ations for use of the force will also be despatched. The sanction to employ Arab “ baglahs” was eventually negatived onhfa 1 1, 10 ^ receipt of letter stating that under instructions from Cal- trieted ^ Z f frr a ry ^ part 0f tlie ex P ed itionary force is res- trieted to 300, and of European infantry, to one regiment ; and states that nnt a tT- D PTn- S 5 aviDg beenaItered > His Excellency 5 the Commander-in-Chief now. thinks it his duty to represent that in ease of hostilities he does not pu / ey milltar y grounds the number of either arm as now restricted ■I— Points out that a force of 5,000 encamped on a plain requires a large body of cavalry to protect supplies and foragers and to watch over its safety, 300 men would therefore soon he knocked up by disease engendered by hard work. With regard to European soldiers, states that every authority, His Excellency has consulted, is of opinion that the force should be particularly strong in this arm. The numbers will probably be greatly reduced by sickness, &c., and the impression made on the people will be infinitely weakened if J the proposed reduction be carried outs Memorandum on the requirements of a Division to he embarked for service to Persia.' It will be highly necessary that the troops proceeding on this service be ; furnished with perfectly serviceable arms and accoutrements. The muskets of the 2nd European Regiment (if I remember right) and most of those with the fusiliers are as bad. It would be well if the troop could be completed with the new description of belts. Should the 4th Rifles be ordered for service, it will be necessary to look to the service ammunition. That issued for the 60th Royal Rifles at Karachi in 1848 was too large and the whole was re-made by Captain Finnimore, Deputy Commissary of Ordnance. It is understood that the baggage animals for the force will he mules and camels. The efficiency of the force will be materially influenced by the arrangements which may be ordered for packing the men^s kits. Nothing destroys animals so quickly as carrying ill-arranged bundles. The method of packing the canvas bags should be laid down as respects the rotation in which the different articles should be placed in it ; so that all may be uniform. It will be necessary at once to take in hand the marching order for the soldiers, European and Native. The perishable portion of the soldiers uniform and necessaries should be placed in the knapsack and when this is determined upon, it should be made known for the guidance of all. . The orders for the Field Force will, it is supposed, emanate from the Com- mander. The Bombay column, Army of the Punjab took for its guide, the orders of Major-Oeneral Robert Crawford, modified to the requirements of campaigning in India. Regiments proceeding to Persia should be increased to 800 effective pri- vates by selected Volunteers from other Corps. Depot companies should be established at Bombay and Karachi to the extent of 100 men for each regiment and 25 men for each Troop, Company and Battery of Artillery and sappers and miners, embarked on this service. These should be completed also by volunteers or drafts and the depot be attached to a regiment at the before mentioned station. The vacancies occasioned by this measure to be filled up by recruiting without loss of time. As opportunities occur, drafts from the depot, should be sent to join the service companies. By these means regiments and detachments would be kept complete, and the depot companies would entail no expense beyond the small native staff required for their discipline. Men proposed to be brought before the annual invaliding committee should be examined without delay. The retention of weakly men with Regi- ments proceeding on field service is most baneful They fill the hospitals and doolies* ‘ V.'"'- '“.VV" r ' 7 ' ' . ! • Station. Natives, 3 Troops Horae Battery 4th, Company 1st Battalion 6 6* Pounders Pun ah. Artillery „A Reserve Ahmednaggar. 2 8-inebes Howitzers. : Engineers Cavalry ..2 Companies, Sapper i 4 Troops Punah Horse ... Her Majesty’s 64th Regi- ment. 2nd European Light Infantry 4th Native Infantry Rifles 6th Native Light Infantry , 20th Native Infantry ..... Punah. Seroor. Belgaum, Hyderabad. Punah, Bombay. Belgaum. Europeans Natives 18 Pield. Grand Total Punah, 31st August 1856. Above was stated to be estimated strength only, as the corps would he completed to their proper establishment. r No. 4008, dated 31st August 1856, from the Adjutant General, to the Military Department (Bombay). By direction of the Commander-In-Chief I have the honor to convey Hh Excellency s recommendation to the Royal Highness the Governor in Counci that the undermentioned staff be sanctioned for the field force under prepara- tion for service m Persia : r 1 Commands . A General Officer to command the force. A Pield Officer to command the Artillery. Two 2nd Class Brigadiers of Infantry. Divisional and Brigade Staff, 1 Assistant Adjutant General. 1 Deputy Assistant Adjutant General. 1 Assistant Quarter-Master General. 2 Deputy Assistant Quarter-Masters General. 1 Deputy Judge Advocate General. 1 Paymaster. 1 Assistant Commissary General. 1 Deputy Assistant Commissary General. $ Sub-Assistant Commissaries General. I Commissary of Ordnance. 1 Commanding Engineer. 2 Field Engineers. 4 Assistant Field Engineers. 1 Brigade Major of Artillery. 2 Bridgade Majors of Infantry. 1 Superintending Surgeon. 1 Field Surgeon. „ 0 I Deputy Medical Storekeeper and Staff Surgeon. 1 Chaplain. The officer commanding the force to appoint one Commissaries to the charge of Bazars and to make sue may deem requisite, with respect to the appointment Masters, Provost Marshal, &c., &c., submitting his non quarters in the usual manner for confirmation. 3 same scale for the Divisional eld Force sent to the Punjab in 18*4*8, as ed for service in Persia is of somewhat less to believe that it will be eventually, in- Exeellency has proposed an additional * , of a third officer will on the present oeea- The Commander-in-Chief has proposed the S taff that was sanctioned for although the force at present total strength, there appears r creased to a still greater one. His - Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General as the services he think he absolutely necessary, with that Department sion. - V No. 4012, dated 31st August 1856, from the Adjutant General, to the Secretary, Medical ■ Board. " Bequests them to nominate Medical Officers for the following appoint meats: Superintending Surgeon. Field Surgeon. Deputy Medical Storekeeper and Staff Surgeon. And states that the Commander-in-Chief considers Superintending Surged Collier the most efficient medical officer available for this service. Also requests them to make arrangements for completing the medica establishments and for providing the additional medical officers and Dieli Establishment which they may consider requisite. No. 2260, dated 2nd September 1836, from the Secretary, Medical Board, to the Adjutant General. Furnishes list of Medical Officers, See., recommended for appointment. List as under received sanction of Commander-in-Chief : Surgeon Mackenzie ... ... Superintending Surgeon. Surgeon Stovel ... - Field Surgeon. Assistant Surgeon Mills ... Deputy Medical Storekeeper and Staff Surgeon. Surgeon Ward ... ... In charge of the Artillery. Assistant Surgeons. Hammond and Dick ... ... To be appointed to the 2nd European Light Infantry. "Glasse ... ... To join the force. Plumptre ... ... To accompany detachment of Artillery from Nuggar. Wheatlez ... ... To proceed to Bombay to join the Force. General J Bell ... ... To accompany the Sappers, duty. J McConnell ... ... To accompany 3rd Troop Horse Artillery. Box well ... ... To be attached to 4 — I with Horse Battery from Karachi. Cruicksbank ... To join the Force. l^E. T. Burrowes. To be attached to the Field Force. Hospital Steward J. Cross ... With the rank of Acting Apothecary. Assistant Apothecary P. T. DeSouza, With the rank of Acting Hospital Steward. „ „ J. Nazareth ... General duty, Punah. „ „ J. D. Thompson „ „ Sind. » » W. Pmto ... )) ,, h », A. Pereira ... Medical Store Department. 1st Hospital Assistant N. Agostino ... General duty Presidency Division. Acting Hospital Assistant Bhica Prub General duty, Punah. 2nd Hospital Assistant A, Barretto ... With the rank of Acting 1st Hospital Assistant. „ „ P. J. De Silva Marine Battalion, u Bacher Sing 6th Regiment Native Infantry, Tanna. No. 2477, dated 3rd September 1856, from Military Department, to the Adjutant General. In reply to 4O0S states that the- Governor General in Council generally approves of the scale of staff for the force, subject to such modifications as may hereafter be found expedient, to suit the employment of particular officers, whose services it may be deemed desirable to employ upon the expedition. Staff' of Expedition. Major General F. Stalker, c.b., to command the Force. Brigadiers , 2nd Class. Colonel J. Stopford, C. B. ... Her Majesty’s 61th Foot. „ R. W. Honner ... ... 4th Pvegiment Native Infantry (Rifle Corps). Staff. Captain (Brigadier Lieutenant-Colonel) R. R. Younghusband * * Captain J. A. Collier „ J. Wray Lieutenant W. V. She well „ T. J. Holland Captain (Brevet Major) H. Boye « » 3, H. J. Barr Major G. Pope Lieutenant W. F. Gordon 9f W. Gray ** M. W. Willoughby 99 EL L’Estrange 99 D. D. Thain Captain C. P. Rigby ... „ B. K. Fxnnimore hi Superintendent of Bazars, m. Commissary of Ordnance. Commanding Engineers. WmBBm Lieutenant J. W. Playfair J. 0. B. Close - J* S. Trevor „ C. J. Merrimen „ C. W. Pinch W. W. Goodfeliow Surgeon T. Mackenzie ... „ M. Stovell „ Assistant Surgean J. Mills Revd. G. A. F. Watson... | Pield Engineers. Assistant Field Engineers. Superintending Surgeon. . Field Surgeon. Deputy Medical Storekeeper and Staff Sur- ■ ■ goon. ■ Chaplain. Letter dated 4th September 1856, from the Secretary to the Government with the Right Hon- ourable the Governor (Bombay), to the Secretary to the Government of India. Forwards copy of No. 954 (foregoing letter) and recommends the addition of 300 more cavalry to the force, and states that two squadrons of a native cavalry regiment now at Rajkot in K at t-y war can conveniently he embarked at Porebunder. Recommends the substitution of a British infantry regiment for one of the native regiments, as the Military authorities concur in the opinion that the force should contain a large proportion of Europeans. States that in order to diminish the expense of transport, it has been proposed to send the Irregular Horse dismounted, and procure horses for them in Persia, but that this plan has not received the concurrence of the Comman- der-in- Chief and has been laid aside because it is neither practicable nor desirable as long as the irregular horse, are the only cavalry attached to the force; should however, 300 regular cavalry be sent, the whole might he despatched without necessitating any additional number of transports. No. 954, dated 4th September 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to the Military Department. Adds a strong expression of the Commander-in-Chiefs disapproval of the reduction in question. No. 2505, dated 8th September 1856, from the Military Department, to the Quarter Master General. States that the Governor in Council approves of the strength and compo- sition of the force as detailed, subject to modification. With regard to the Punah Irregular Horse observes by desire of the Governor that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief is aware that Govern- ment has pointed out to the Government of India the advantage of sending the men of that corps dismounted, in the event of 300 regular cavalry being added to the force. Adds that for the present more need not be determined, than that the Punah Horse, if sent with their horses will be transported without their baggage cattle at the public expense^ No. 88, dated 8th September 1856, from the Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines, ‘ to the Adjutant General. 4 With regard to request that the spare or reserve wagons of the 3rd Troop Horse Artillery and of Nos. 3 and 5 Horse Field Batteries may be equipped with harness for horse or mule draft as circumstances may render expedient, states that he will make application to Government for the requisite sanction to the above arrangement; but points out that horse harness is the only kind recognised ' 171 and provided for in the Army accoutrement contract. Mule harness would therefore require to be made up and the contractor could demand whatever price he pleased for it, horse harness could however be issued at once from the arsenal stock. No. 5, dated 8th September 1856, from the Military Auditor General, to the Adjutant General. Intimates that the Superintendent of Family Payments is ready to make all the necessary arrangements respecting the family remittances of the Native Troops, ordered on service, and that Lithographed Forms are prepared and will be forwarded on application. Adds that the women may be permitted to reside at any station in the Presidency where troops are located, or pensioners receive their stipends. No. 4235, dated 12th September 1856, from the Deputy Adjutant General, to the Ins- pector General , Ordnance. In reply to No. 88, communicates the desire of the Commander-ia-Chief that Horse harness should be prepared for the batteries in question. No. 733, dated 17th September 1856, from the Commandant of Artillery, to the Adjutant General (Bombay). Suggests that the Royal Pattern store cart attached to Light Field Bat- teries which is equipped for Bullocks (for which description of draft it is best adopted) may for the present service be fitted with loops and swingletrees for horse draft, in case of such draft only being available. No. 2015, dated 8th September 1856, from gthe Military Department, to the Adjutant General. Governor in Council sanctions transfer from the Remount Depot attached to the 14th Dragoons to the Horse Brigade of such number of horses as may be required to complete the Troop proceeding with the Field Force under preparation for Persia. No. 1062, dated 19th September 1856, from the Adjutant General, to the Military Dep irtment. Commandant |of Artillery represents, having seen horses at the depot attached to 14th Dragoons some horses better suited for foot batteries than for Dragoons therefore recommends that they may be made available if their cost is not much in excess of regulations. As No. 1, Light Field Battery, was horsed up to the Field complement with trained horses from Battery at Sholapoor, thinks it necessary that the latter should be completed at once and accordingly. Commander-in-Chief recom- mends that Lieutenant Colonel Scabie, Remount Agent, and Lieutenant and Adjutant Wallace, Horse Brigade, may be permitted to point out the horses alluded to and make further selections as His Excellency considers, that a few horses of a more powerful description than those which can be purchased for the sum laid down, are required for the wheel Ko. 2918, dated 3rd October 1856, from the Military Department, to the Adjutant General, Approves of the above. No. 107, dated 13th September 1056, from the Officer Commanding 1st Baluch Battalion, to the Bridge Major. Karachi States that the officers and men of all ranks have volunteered for active service, and as the battalion was raised for service within the province, hopes that the soldierlike feeling which prompted the request may obtain for it, the favourable consideration of Government, Extract of No. 2618, dated 16th September 1856, from the Military Department, to the Adjutant General. Captain Rigby (Superintendent of Bazaars at Punah} is to be appointed Bazaar master to the expeditionary force, and it is desired that he should pro* ceed in advance together with officers of the Commissariat Department and one of the Quarter Master General's Department. Letter from Captain Rigby, dated Bushire, 30th December 1S56, to Military Department. Requests that a decision may be arrived at regarding the amount of staff allowance granted him in his present office,' as