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RĀSHID AL-GHANNŪSHĪ

A Key Muslim
Thinker of the
21st Century

Mohammad Dawood Sofi



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PRAISE FOR *RĀSHID AL-GHANNŪSHĪ*

“This is a fine work that sheds light on the compatibility of Islam and such notions as democracy, transparency and human rights with a particular reference to Tunisian political thinker and activist Rāshid al-Ghannūshī. The book is very timely contribution to the existing literature given the recent success of al-Nahda, a movement led by al-Ghannūshī, in Tunisia after the revolt in 2011 in the political landscape.”

—Cenap Çakmak, *Eskisehir Osmangazi University*

“Mohammad Dawood Sofi provides important insights into the particular ideological and intellectual evolution of Al-Nahda’s ideologue and thinker, Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, and shows how he has engaged with democratic politics.”

—Anne Wolf, *University of Oxford*

“The work of Mohammad Dawood Sofi is a well-researched narrative that provides a detailed account about life, legacy, and intellectual development of Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, a key contemporary Tunisian activist and thinker. While analyzing some of the vital issues such as Islam-West engagement and democracy, Mohammad Dawood explains how diverse influences developed and matured Ghannūshī’s ideology.”

—Abdul Majid Khan, *Aligarh Muslim University*

“The study is a timely and a significant contribution that highlights some concrete reflections regarding the intellectual activism of Rāshid al-Ghannūshī. Besides studying different biographical phases of Ghannūshī, the book opens up our comprehension about his intellectual development, precision, and response

to the various contemporary challenges. From issues about Islam-West relationship and Human Rights to Islam-Democracy compatibility or incompatibility and Power Sharing Theory, the book explores the powerful narrative and idea of this famous contemporary Tunisian Muslim thinker.”

—Sayyid Muhammad Yunus Gilani, *International Islamic University Malaysia*

FOREWORD

Contemporary Islamism, Islamic movements, and particularly political Islam (an elusive and broad ideology ranging from a national scope that seeks to maintain an Islamic outlook in the government to a transnational ambition that promotes elimination of national borders and creation of a universal bond of political brotherhood) have been on the immediate agenda of policy-makers, military services, academia and the press in the West. This interest sometimes manifests itself in efforts toward understanding what Islam is and what it offers for the mankind; however, in most instances, it leads to association of Islam with violence and terrorism.

To mitigate the growing anti-Islamic sentiments in the West, part of the Muslim intelligentsia has developed what could be considered novel and progressive solutions (particularly when compared to the classical era) without undermining the core messages carried by the divine sources of Islam. In most instances, however, these attempts have either failed or fell short to address the normative reconfiguration of the societal and political domain. The major problem seems to be timidity, reflecting itself in avoiding any reference whatsoever to any reformist move; what exacerbates this problem is, on the other hand, the inherent antagonism of the Muslim scholars towards the West which is often cited as the root cause of the moral and actual backwardness in the Muslim world.

The deep mistrust with the West is often shared by lead figures of Islamist movements as well as their immediate followers. Even moderates

have been unable to overcome this State of mistrust, causing a continued schism in the Islam–West (and Christianity) relations. Interestingly, it has always been the Muslims (organized in form of political groups with a strong Islamist tone) who were expected to address the trouble in this interaction because they were considered aggressive to Western norms and values which also constitute the basis of the prevailing political and social framework. It further appears that at least part of the contemporary Islamist movements assumes a job of defending their ideology in the name of Islam vis-à-vis challenges posed by the dominant role of the West in the making and implementation of norms and moral values.

Instead of promoting Islamic precepts in the government and in the society, modernist rulers, influenced by Western revolutions (social, intellectual and religious), have redesigned the State in conformity with the ideals, principles, and institutions of the West. This ambitious and yet unrealistic approach has often led to a failure in different parts of the Muslim world, being rejected by the majority of the people who were pious and traditional enough to see the new tendency as a threat to their religion that constituted a substantial part of their identity and as a contemporary form of heresy.

Roughly speaking, in terms of how Islam should be incorporated in government, two different approaches have emerged in the Muslim world as to whether Western norms and values should be endorsed, imitated, and implemented. One strand, represented by political Islamists, have taken a fairly hostile attitude towards these norms as a strong reaction to the repression of the people by rulers in the Muslim world. Thus, political Islam can be characterized as a response to the Western domination in the early twentieth century, but also a reaction to the national secular administrations in the era of independence. There are many telling examples fitting in this pattern, Tunisia being a prime one. A second strand, represented by ultra-modernists who were impressed by the success of the secular West, rejected the idea of reserving a place for Islam in the government and State administration. Habib Bourguiba's Tunisia experienced a stark transition to a modernist-secular setting where Islamic practices and symbols were vigorously banned.

Similar tendencies were also observed in different parts of the Muslim world, particularly where nations gained their independence in relative recency from their colonizers. In Algeria, for instance, the self-proclaimed liberators presented themselves as designers of the future by

subscribing to the imposition of a secular lifestyle, eventually, however, leading to the emergence of anti-Western Islamic opposition. Tunisia's al Nahda, as a relatively moderate Islamist movement, may also be viewed as a reactionary response to repressive secular style.

But what distinguished this movement is its success, unlike many other Islamist groups including Muslim Brotherhood, in the transformation of the State into a more democratic political apparatus responsive to the demands and sensitivities of the constituents. Tunisia after the Arab Spring is a shining case of success in the Muslim world where an Islamist political movement of the past has been able to accommodate the Western values but still upholds some of the core Islamic principles and values.

This is in fact why al Nahda and its renowned leader Rashid al Gannushi deserves a thorough academic study. Gannushi, a political Islamist in many respects, represents a middle (and balanced) ground in terms of how the Western style and the Islamic priorities should be reconciled in State administration. Present conviction both in Western and Muslim circles endorses his visionary style and approach, often praised and commended because it is an example of sacrifice (for he did not run in the elections to avoid any political trouble even though he has been a lead figure of the revolution) and of political mastery and genius (for his movement has been able to stay in power and contribute to the transformation of the State and society).

To me, three aspects have to be underlined in the study of Gannushi: the fertile interaction between his political cleverness and intellectual abilities and how this interaction contributed to his achievements; achievement of political and social stability in a divided society (in the sense that there are strong currents of secularism and Islamism in Tunisia); and a balanced approach to the interpretation of the interplay between the Muslim values and West-originated norms and principles including human rights, democracy, and transparent government. This study mainly highlights these aspects which are, I am sure, also being studied in political circles as well.

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND OTHER CONVENTIONS

For maintaining consistency, the spelling of Arabic words, terms, and names have been transliterated. Most of the Arabic terms and words, such as *Sharī'ah* and *Shūrā*, that appear at various places in the present work are italicized. At some places, the fuller version of the name of some personality (as in Habib Bourguiba subsequently Bourguiba) or movement (as in *Ḥizb al-Nahḍah* subsequently *al-Nahḍah*) is not used. I have also dispensed with the Arabic definite article *al-* (especially in case of Rāshid al-Ghannūshī). The names of some personalities like Habib Bourguiba and Bin Ali or other terms like Islam and *Salafis* are not transliterated and rather are treated as English words in this work. Moreover, in References, Notes, and Bibliography, I have followed the spelling (in case of English works) as appearing in the publications.



CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract It briefly introduces some of the key developments that Tunisia witnessed through an examination of Postcolonial State formation. It is argued that Bourguiba's policies had a tremendous impact on the Tunisian society especially when viewed in the context of the emergence of Islamic Movement, officially founded by Rāshid al-Ghannūshī in 1981. Readers in this chapter can also find a concise and comparative discussion and idea advanced by some of the leading scholars on the issue of Modernism. This survey has been incorporated for the reason that most of the contemporary Muslim thinkers, including Ghannūshī, endeavor to reconcile Faith with the modern global norms with an aim to reform the society. This section also covers a literature survey which helps to delineate the significance of the work.

Keywords Tunisia · Habib Bourguiba · Rāshid al-Ghannūshī · Islamic Movement · Modernism · Faith

On 20 March 1956, Tunisia gained independence after remaining for more than seventy years under the occupation of France.¹ The twentieth-century Tunisia opens up with one eminent personality, Habib Bourguiba, the leader and forerunner of the independence movement. Even after independence, he continued to lead the country for a period of more than thirty years (1956–1987). After assuming the office of the President, he started to concoct the policies required to lead the country

toward modernization, progress, and development—the very design his French education had taught him. In the words of Esposito, these values were “pro-Western and secular”² and in such a course of action, Bourguiba sided entirely with USA and France.

In the post-independent Tunisia, Bourguiba entirely shifted his attention from “political activism” to “social activism.” While doing so, he replaced the country’s long cherished and enchanted Islamic culture and tradition by the Western one. Highly sentient of the conservative traditions of the majority of Tunisian population, he frequently invoked that he has no intention at all of attacking Islam per se. Rather, what is required is the reorientation and re-assessment of different Islamic institutions according to the changing circumstances, that is in itself inevitable for the society to advance. The post-independent Tunisia witnessed a complete change; French substituted Arabic as the official language of the State, the language of higher education, and the language of elite society.³ Bourguiba cut short, slowly but steadily, the authority of the Islamic teachings in the society through a broader implementation of new policies aimed to hasten the emergence of a westernized state. For him, many of the Islamic institutions were the prime impediments in the way heading toward progress and development. Very shortly, he enacted the Personal Status Code (CPS) that proscribed many of the paramount practices of Islam such as polygamy and divorce.⁴ Esposito and Voll have captioned beautifully the pro-Western policy of Bourguiba in these lines:

Even more symbolic of Bourguiba’s approach to the religion and modernization [social activism] and his whole hearted acceptance of Western values were the abolition of Shariah courts, the ban on the wearing of the *hijab* (headscarf) by women, and his attempt to get workers to ignore the fast of Ramadan. Drinking a glass of orange juice on national television during the fast of Ramadan and thus publicly violating Islamic law, Bourguiba criticized the deleterious effects of fasting during daylight hours and urged Muslims not to observe the fast, which he claimed affected productivity and economic development. The Zaytouna, a famed center of Islamic learning in North Africa and the Muslim world was closed [by merging it with the Tunis University]. The ulama were debilitated, rather than, as occurred in many Muslim countries, coopted by the government. For Bourguiba, Islam [more than thirteen hundred years of traditional legacy] represented the past, and the West Tunisia’s only hope for a modern future.⁵

Bourguiba's rigorous assault on various Islamic institutions, coupled with other policies (mainly related to economy), created a volatile situation in every nook and corner of the country. All these factors when weighed together lend a helping hand in paving the path conducive to the emergence of an Islamic Movement.

It is only because of the policies adopted by the President that buoyed some of the experts to have ample confidence in saying that: "Historically the most open and Mediterranean of the Arab countries, Tunisia is an improbable site for an Islamist upsurge."⁶ There were other experts also, who firmly persuaded that the region of North Africa in general and Tunisia in particular with its strong "Western secular orientation" would have least rather no impact of the contemporary Islamic revivalist phenomena. However, the birth of *Hizb al-Nahḍah* formerly *Harkah al-Ittijah al-Islāmī* proved the latter speculation as hoax. More importantly, the main role in the emergence, development, and shaping of the discourse of *al-Nahḍah* was played by none other than Shaykh Rāshid al-Ghannūshī. Being "modern-moderate," but famous Muslim thinker, his life and thought were shaped by a variety of complex motivations and experiences.

1.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE BOOK

In the contemporary times, Rāshid al-Ghannūshī is believed to be an eminent and distinguished Muslim thinker and activist not only in Tunisia or North Africa but also in the whole Muslim world. He is also viewed as the most moderate among the Muslim thinkers and intellectuals when it particularly comes to the question of Islam-Democracy compatibility. Keeping in view, the global repute of this living Muslim thinker, the book is devoted to explore and understand different dynamic facets of the life of Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, especially the one related to his intellectual understanding and response to some critical contemporary issues. Thus, in a way the work will bring forth an account of a previously little known yet much talked about Muslim intellectual voice in the post-Arab Spring era.

It also attempts to illuminate that how the Muslim thinkers' own perspectives and expectations from Islamic Movement(s) and their interaction with the "western oriented local leadership" and their (secular) policies color their understanding about Islam and the various major issues. It is because of these reasons that these Muslim identities

understand and propagate Islam in various complex albeit differing ways. The chief aim of the book, thus (in addition to study different biographical phases of Rāshid al-Ghannūshī), is to open up our comprehension about his intellectual development, precision, and response to the various challenges. From issues about Islam–West relationship and human rights to Islam–Democracy compatibility *or* incompatibility and pluralism, the book explores the powerful narrative and idea of this famous contemporary Tunisian Muslim thinker. This is discussed and described mostly in the context of Ghannūshī’s own works and debates.

1.2 MUSLIM MODERNISM AND MUSLIM MODERNISTS

“Modernism,” “Muslim Modernism,” and “Muslim Modernists” are such terms that carry no definite meaning and therefore were and are interpreted in diverse ways.⁷ For Khalid Adeeb, Modernism “is a global condition that brings with it new forms of organisation of self and society, new forms of intellectual production and new ways of imagining the world.”⁸ With the evolving of new forms of (sociocultural) development, the reorganization of the society and the acculturation process started whose standards and paradigms were, according to Mona Abul-Fadl, those influenced, governed, and “set by the West.”⁹ He further adds that the West’s reorganization and reorientation are actually the outcome of two things: (a) cultural experience/influence of others (experiencing from the culture of others) and (b) “rethinking” or “relative openness” to its own past.¹⁰ It is not only Abul-Fadl’s view, there are others especially the Western scholars who think on the same lines. For instance, Bernard Lewis and others are of the opinion that “Modernity” is the “exclusive offspring of the West.”¹¹

Having already expressed above that there are various definitions and connotations of Muslim Modernism, however, generally the term represents “an intellectual endeavour attempting to interpret Islam, in varying degrees, within the discursive framework of Western notions of humanism, enlightenment, and rationality.”¹² Islamic Modernism, as per Abdul Kader Choughley, “believes in the sovereignty of reason and repudiates every authority that cannot stand the test of reason.”¹³ Rashīd Riḍā (1865–1935) who carried forward the mission of his mentor Muḥammad ‘Abdūh (1849–1905) emphasized on greater use of reason in order to find solutions to the emerging problems. He, therefore, believed that *‘ibādāt* (relations between Allah and man) which are based on *Qur’ān* and *Sunnah* are permanent and unchangeable while as

mu'āmlāt (relations between man and man), being flexible, need to be reinterpreted through reason in order to work for the welfare (*maṣlahā*) of the community.¹⁴ It means that for Rāshīd Riḍā Islam is permanent (in certain cases) as well as dynamic, and this “dynamism” feature means to rethink and reconsider those principles that are mutable to reconcile with some of the modern issues.

The Muslim Modernist reformers, while endeavoring to revive the Muslim society, heavily emphasize on to reconcile Faith—through continuous reinterpretation of Islam—with modern or in other words Western-derived global ideals like, *inter alia*, democracy, human rights, scientific development, progress, and equality.¹⁵ With an aspiration to make Islam compatible with the frequently changing environment,¹⁶ Muslim Modernists work for developing various institutions fitting the modern situations.¹⁷ Furthermore—arguing that different aspects of Islam are compatible with the above-mentioned Western notions—advocates of Islamic/Muslim Modernism seek to unify traditional and westernized classes that had evolved over the years.¹⁸

In the contemporary times, the legacy of reconciling “Faith” with “modern values” is being carried out by various reformist intellectuals globally. One such prominent voice is of Shaykh Rāshīd al-Ghannūshī. He—the leader, guide, and primary ideologue of *al-Nabḍah*—has emerged, in the words of Esposito and Voll, “the most adroit and flexible of Islamic activist leaders.”¹⁹ In the contemporary times, he is believed to be an eminent and distinguished Muslim thinker and activist not only in Tunisia or North Africa but in the whole Muslim world. He is also viewed as the most moderate among the Muslim thinkers and intellectuals when it particularly comes to the question of Islam-Democracy compatibility. Keeping in view, the global repute of this living Muslim thinker, the present work primarily explores the life and thought of Rāshīd al-Ghannūshī in a detailed fashion. Thus, in a way it brings forth an account of a previously little known yet much talked about Muslim intellectual voice in the post-Arab Spring era.

1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The current work is or will be a very humble effort desired and focused on examining, exploring, and expressing the life, works, and ideology of Rāshīd al-Ghannūshī. In a critical way, his response and approach *vis-à-vis* Islam and the West, democracy, pluralism, and rights of women are

broadly touched in the book. Consisting of seven chapters including *Introduction* and *Conclusion*, the present work is a detailed analytical discussion about different aspects of life and key issues that the Tunisian reformist-thinker addresses. The structure and framework of the book are as follows.

The introductory chapter briefly introduces to the readers an overview of some of the key developments that Tunisia witnessed through an examination of Postcolonial State formation. It is argued in this section that Bourguiba's policies had a tremendous impact on the Tunisian society especially when viewed in the context of the emergence of Islamic Movement, officially founded by Rāshid al-Ghannūshī in 1981. The engagements of Ghannūshī primarily as the leader of *al-Nahḍah* helped him to refine and polish his intellectual enterprise. Readers in this chapter can also find a concise and comparative discussion and idea advanced by some of the leading scholars on the issue of Modernism. This survey has been incorporated for the reason that most of the contemporary Muslim thinkers including Ghannūshī (who can be safely called as modernists) endeavor to reconcile Faith with the modern global norms. Another reason was that the book mainly addresses these modern challenges/norms in the perspective of the intellectual responses given by Ghannūshī.

The analysis of this book on some vital contemporary issues is based on the principle that in order to understand the ideology and thought of Ghannūshī, there should definitely be few chapters devoted to study various transitions and transformations in his life. There is a strong relation between the two entities—the society and the Muslim reformer. Observations suggest that the social setting mostly processes the intellectual setting and formation of a thinker. Ghannūshī, being no exception, also encountered different circumstances and challenges posed by the Tunisian society that alternatively produced a definite impact on him by bringing a transition in his thought and ideology and by helping him to evolve as a refined reformer, activist, thinker, and political leader. As a matter of fact, an important aspect of Ghannūshī's intellectual development *per se* is to understand that how he interacted or continues to interact with his society that was/is facing multiple challenges at local, regional, and global level. In this regard, the recent transformation (21 May 2016) was the declaration of divorcing Islam from politics. Hence, Chapters 2 and 3, therefore, examine in a detailed fashion the biography of Rāshid al-Ghannūshī and evaluate how various trends

and transformations both within and beyond Tunisia affected his life and intellectual formation.

The authority, objectivity, and depth of a Muslim thinker are mainly determined by his artistic expression. This is realized, alternatively, by producing fine works that contain rich theories and debates, functioning as major explanatory variables necessary to understand various philosophies, trends, and problems. Having identified the significance of literary and scholarly works, the next chapter (Chapter 4) identifies the stature and contribution of Rāshid al-Ghannūshī as a writer. Besides, mentioning his various writings and works, this chapter also makes a review, analysis, and assessment of some of his key crosscutting works. The primary emphasis in this chapter has been placed on reviewing those works that deal with and discuss the subjects of democracy, secularism, human rights, and other such issues. In short, this chapter serves as a vital component that describes the inquisitiveness and fervor of Ghannūshī to contribute to the field of academics, on the one hand, and his response to the present-day challenges, on the other.

There is a buzz, for over a century, in the academic circle about the subjects of democracy, pluralism, human rights, etc. A plethora of literature continues to be produced covering, among other topics, the hotly debated issues such as Islam-Democracy compatibility or incompatibility, relationship of secularism with Islam, religious and political pluralism, rights of women, rights of minorities, and relationship of Islam with the West. Muslim thinkers and theorists were/are heavily occupied in the task of giving appropriate and fitting response to the socio-political and economic challenges in light of *Shari'ah*.

In this regard, Chapters 5 and 6 cover some of the aforementioned subjects in a detailed fashion. It is presented by way of describing and critically examining the views, opinions, and arguments of Ghannūshī. While examining the debate about Islam-Democracy compatibility or incompatibility, the first part of Chapter 6 looks at the views of some of the major Muslim (political) theorists and groups who strongly uphold that democracy is inherently adversative to Islam. The standpoint and the key theories of opponents of democracy are broadly studied and illustrated. This part, therefore, serves an opening door for knowing how individuals and groups deal with the issue of democracy. Though, there is a mention of those Muslim theorists and groups who advocate Islam-Democracy compatibility, yet, the focus in the subsequent pages has been placed on the view and vision of Rāshid al-Ghannūshī

regarding the subject of Islam and Democracy. After identifying the claims of both proponents and opponents, it is argued in this chapter that the issues of compatibility and incompatibility of democracy and the process of democratization continue to remain the subject of vigorous debate within the Muslim world. The final part of this chapter offers a detailed overview of pluralism through a critical and deep examination of Ghannūshī's "Power Sharing Theory." The findings of these two chapters are that the philosophy of Ghannūshī whether on the issue of Islam–West relationship, democracy, or pluralism favors flexibility and moderation.

The final chapter or *Conclusion* of the book provides some concrete reflections about the intellectual activism of Ghannūshī. This section covers the findings of the study and thereof summarizes the general approach of Ghannūshī. It also raises some fundamental questions related to his activism *vis-à-vis* response to the contemporary challenges and reformation of the Tunisian society. One of the very vital findings of the study is that Ghannūshī's hallmark, amid responding to the grave challenges, is dominated by the feature of "pragmatism" and "reconciliation" (although a dose of cynicism is also there). Moreover, in case of Islam–Democracy compatibility, Ghannūshī is celebrated for his pro-democratic character and it is for this reason that Tamimi rightly calls him "A Democrat within Islamism" because his discourse is for the most part dominated by pro-democracy feature while remaining active in the process of reformation. The study also shows that his ideology and thought exhibit not lethargy but dynamism.

1.4 BRIEF LITERATURE SURVEY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BOOK

The current book is written with an aim to bring to limelight multifarious facets of a famous and celebrated Tunisian religio-political thinker. Although there are many vital contributions made in this regard, worth to mention is the book of Azzam S. Tamimi titled *Rashid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism*. The book is, on the one hand, a comprehensive and in-depth research and, on the other, a sympathetic but authoritative work on the life and thought of Rāshid al-Ghannūshī. The reliability of the book rests on the author's extensive acquaintance with Ghannūshī; he met and interviewed him frequently in London. Besides,

the book is the upshot of the author's critical analysis of the principal book of Ghannūshī (not excluding his other works) titled *al-Hurriyāt al-ʿĀmah fī al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah* (Civil Liberties in the Islamic State).

The book opens up with the biography of Ghannūshī—covering the first 20 or 25 years of his life—wherein the author has highlighted the different ideological stages and attachments of his subject that started from Nassirism to Ikhwān-Salafism and finally to Islamic activism. However, the main focus in the book has been placed on Ghannūshī's thought as the subsequent sections mainly deal with the author's deep investigation into his views/key concepts mainly dealing with the issues of Islam-Democracy compatibility, civil society, civil liberties, secularism, and rights of minorities. The author in this work definitely endeavors to present through academic arena to the readers that Islam and democracy are not antithetical. The approach of Tamimi, therefore, is to portray the views of a moderate Islamic thinker who absorbed many of the Western concepts (mostly related to democratic principles and ideas) for positive development or for changing the dictatorial *status quo* in the Arab world.

Makers of Contemporary Islam of John L. Esposito and John O. Voll—the two pioneer scholars from the West who have for many decades analyzed and explored deeply history and politics of the Muslim world—is another significant work that contains one fine chapter about Rāshid al-Ghannūshī. The chapter like other chapters makes a scholarly representation of the origin, development, and proliferation of the Islamic Movement in Tunisia and highlights, more importantly, the profile (biography, thought, and role) of Ghannūshī. Therefore, this chapter presents a brooding portrait of history, politics, and society of Tunisia by understanding the intellectual thought/idea of Ghannūshī. The literature survey does not stop here; rather, there are many other works (exploring and evaluating different dimensions of the study) such as mostly book chapters, research papers, and articles published in various edited books, journals, and periodicals. These are, largely, the expositions and colored insights of some of the leading scholars such as Emad Eldin Shahin, Khaled Elgindy, Roy Jackson, and Allaya Allani.

Nonetheless, all this literature produced manifests that most often these works have been directed to understand a particular problem(s) or issue(s) because most of these academic efforts have overemphasized certain areas (of study). For instance, Tamimi's book is a comprehensive work, yet it does not cover many significant issues such as pluralism and

rights of women. Moreover, the book has been published in 2001, thus, needs to be updated and revised keeping in view latest transformations both in Tunisia and in the life and thought of Ghannūshī. Another vital point in this regard is that those works that are mostly book chapters and articles can never be the substitute of a comprehensive book. The reason is that these works related to the subject are brief, thus, reflecting and focusing superficially on either one aspect or very few aspects of the study. To say, there has been a perennial need for producing a work covering if not all but some most significant aspects of the study and the present work is an endeavor to fill this lacuna at an academic level. Therefore, the research problem, dealt with in the current study, carries a significant weight in bringing various aspects (related to the life and/or thought of Ghannūshī) to the limelight employing a serious academic and research-oriented approach. Lastly, this book is written with an important objective in mind that is to make its lucid language and arguments accessible to a wider audience, especially to those who are not specialists but are highly interested in understanding the philosophy of a famous Muslim thinker such as Ghannūshī.

NOTES

1. Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 367.
2. John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 161.
3. John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 92.
4. For details, see, Kenneth J. Perkins, "Bourguiba, Habib," in Robert Wuthnow, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Politics and Religion* (London: Routledge, 1998), 1: 76.
5. Esposito and Voll, op. cit., p. 92.
6. Fred Halliday, "Tunisia's Uncertain Future," *Middle East Report*, No. 163, March–April, 1990: 25–27, p. 25.
7. One of the famous masters of Islamic Modernism is Fazlur Rahman whose philosophy about this hotly debated subject can be best comprehended by going through his work, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
8. Khalid Adeeb, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 2.
9. Abul-Fadl, *Where East Meets West* (Herndon: IIIT, 1992), p. 26.

10. Ibid., p. 29.
11. Omid Safi, “Modernism: Islamic Modernism” in Lindsay Jones et al., eds., *Encyclopedia of Religion*, 2nd ed. (Farmington Hills, MI: Macmillan, 2006), pp. 6095–6102, 6096.
12. Ali Usman Qasim, *Questioning the Authority of the Past: The Abl al-Qur’an Movements in the Punjab* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 35.
13. Abdul Kader Choughley, *Islamic Resurgence: Sayyid Abul Hasan ‘Ali Nadwi and His Contemporaries* (New Delhi: D.K. Printworld (p) Ltd., 2011), p. 57.
14. For a comprehensive insights about the “life” and “thought” of Rashīd Riḍā, see, Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798–1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 222–244; Malcom H. Kerr, *Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad ‘Abdub and Rashid Rida* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).
15. Charles Kurzman, “Modernism” in Richard C. Martin, ed., *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World* (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004), 2: 456.
16. Qasmi, *Questioning the Authority of the Past*, p. 35.
17. David Commins, “Modernism” in John L. Esposito et al., eds., *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 4: 26.
18. The encounter of Muslims with the West especially in the last decades of the nineteenth century resulted in the emergence of two very significant classes among the Muslims, traditional and Western-oriented. The “Muslim Modernists” aspired to bridge the gap between the two by calling the masses on the one hand to follow *Qur’ān* and *Sunnah* and on the other hand to adopt not all but some ideals/norms of the West which, according to them, are consistent with Islam.
19. Esposito and Voll, op. cit., p. 92.



CHAPTER 2

Life and Character: From Birth to the Formation of a Social Reformer

Abstract The chapter is mainly devoted to study various but early transitions and transformations in the life of Rāshid al-Ghannūshī *from birth to the formation of a social reformer*. It broadly explores and highlights various engagements of his early life that include, among other things, traditional upbringing, family problems obstructing early education, impact of the urban atmosphere, making and unmaking of Nassirism, and love for Islamic activism. There is also an important section dealing with how he succeeded in retaining and adhering to his Faith and identity while pursuing his master's degree in philosophy at France.

Keywords Rāshid al-Ghannūshī · Childhood · Education · Nassirism
Syria · France

2.1 EARLY LIFE—THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

In a hamlet not far from al-Hamma, in the province of Gabès in south-eastern Tunisia, a child opened his eyes named Rāshid al-Ghannūshī (often spelled in English as Rachid Ghannouchi) on 22 June 1941 (28 *Jamād al-Awwal* 1360).¹ His father, Shaykh Muḥammad was a religious personality and also one among the few and far in the village to have memorized the entire *Qur'ān*. For Shaykh Muḥammad, it was of paramount exigency that all of his children study the *Qur'ān*. Although he himself was not an *ʿālim* in the real sense, he had that much of

knowledge as to be distinguished by the natives as an *imām*. He would lead them in the prayers and also the people in the village used to send their wards to him to teach them the *Qur'ān*, and obviously, Ghannūshī would have been in no way an exception. It was none other than his father Shaykh Muḥammad from whom Ghannūshī received elementary education and also learned and memorized the *Qur'ān* the way his elder brothers had done.

The bulk-based family composed of Shaykh Muḥammad, his ten children, and four wives, and Ghannūshī was the youngest among them. By profession, Shaykh Muḥammad was a farmer and relied mainly on his children who used to lend their hand in his work in the fields. The family, in terms of economy, was stable to some extent and also highly content and satisfied, as by and large the peasants use to be in the villages. Those who were rich shared their richness as an act of solidarity with those who were impoverished. The family consumed meat rarely, sometimes just twice a year that too on the special occasions of chief Islamic festivals—*Īd al-Fīr* and *Īd al-Duḥā*. In that era, it was a very common practice in the village, and is still in vogue at many places even now, that if someone brought home meat other than the above-mentioned special events he would offer a part of it to his neighbours as well.

Shaykh Muḥammad was one among the few in the village who turned his back toward varied innovations like offering sacrifices to the *awliyā'*. He, time and again, guided his children concerning such innovative practices and inculcated in them the concept that these practices were not in tune with the essence of Islamic teachings. Every now and then, he desisted them from visiting the tombs of *awliyā'* and also from attending the *mīlād* (a ritual of celebrating birthdays). In those days, each family used to associate itself with a *walī* besides they would mention the names of *awliyā'*, at the time of affirming the oaths. For Shaykh Muḥammad, such practices were tantamount to *shirk* (assigning peers with Allah). Therefore, he strived strenuously to shield himself as well as his family from this menace.²

To wish for a stable and peaceful environment in a bulk family is like a dream that hardly turns true. But Ghannūshī's family was blessed with a harmonious, stable, and peaceful environment; thus, this family presented a counter-narrative scene. He called his own mother Zaynah—the youngest of his father's four wives—by the name *dada* and his stepmother—the first and eldest of his father's four wives—whom he respected and loved very much as *ummī* (my mother). The relationship

being overwhelmed by mutual cooperation between his mother and the stepmother helped in maintaining the peaceful environment in the family. He never met his other two stepmothers, of whom one was already deceased and the other being divorced before his birth.³

While staging from infancy to the childhood, Ghannūshī was brought up in a traditional society that had not yet been exposed to the radiance of modernity. But at the same time his mother Zaynah belonged to a cosmopolitan merchant family and thus had a more understanding of the outside world. The type of outlook Ghannūshī today presents, much of its credit goes to his mother. Her role in the family was quite influential and despite the pressures she frequently emphasized on the worth and value of knowledge, the very prophesy that resulted in producing “a professor, judge, and an Islamic scholar activist.”⁴ She frequently accentuated the necessity and importance of getting her children educated and also firmly opined that the education was the only means that would provide her children a window to the world outside. In the later period, this vital factor (education) compelled the family to become a part of the modern urban society and bid good-bye to the rural life.

The family had in its ranks one more eminent member named Bashīr, who was a businessman by profession and also the maternal uncle of Ghannūshī. From the very start, Bashīr had been the keen follower of Arabism and a prominent supporter of its leader, Jamāl ‘Abd al-Nāṣir. In the evening, Ghannūshī’s family used to listen devotedly to Egyptian radio broadcasts and Nāṣir’s speeches. Afterwards, the meeting was followed by the analysis of his uncle about the whole political occurrences in Tunisia, Arab East (*Mashriq*), and the worldwide. Of the entire meeting, the most striking aspect was the analysis of Bashīr about the endeavours of the Egyptian President against “Western foes.”⁵ For Ghannūshī, those evening gatherings were not only his life’s most cherished moments but also the window through which he perceived the world outside the village.

Ghannūshī in his childhood witnessed some incidents that in the long run had a profound bearing on his life. The period from his infancy to childhood was the epoch of the birth of armed resistance against the French Protectorate. It was the period that witnessed an increase in the attacks of the *fallaga* (Tunisian guerrillas) on the French army. On one of the occasions, the latter had martyred four of the *fallaga* personnel. The French army not only desecrated their bodies but also stopped the masses from giving them a proper burial. On that day, Ghannūshī,

while on his way back home, saw the bodies of the martyrs lying on the ground. Such tragic incidents within his country coupled with the atrocities unleashed by the Zionists over the masses of the Palestine not only distressed him the most but had a profound bearing on his life as well. Amid generating an unrestrained hatred for the colonizers, he at the same time desired to fly to the *Mashriq* (East) to support the oppressed ones.

2.2 ACADEMIC ENDEAVOUR

Rāshid al-Ghannūshī's formal education started at a relatively mature age of ten at a school in the village of al-Hamma, where he was taught in Arabic and French. However, by that time, he was able to read and write. At the age of thirteen, his formal education came to a pause, after he had just finished his primary schooling. His father decided to withdraw him from the school for some reasons as mentioned by Tamimi:

The school he frequented was a part of *an-nizam al-gharbi* (Western system of education), introduced to Tunisia by the French [amounting to religious reason]. Ailing Sheikh Muhammad could no longer support the family and his only remaining son at home—young Ghannouchi—had to do his father's work, plowing and harvesting outside the village [amounting to financial reason].⁶

Shaykh Muḥammad, who recognized French as the enemies of Islam, objected to the learning of his son in the French formulated system that too at the expense of Arabic language. He also feared that the French education system would undermine the traditional upbringing of his son.

Shaykh Muḥammad intended to keep his children at home to assist him in the fields, but his wife Zaynah always craved to send them to Zaytūnah. Her prolonged insistence led Shaykh Muḥammad to allow his two elder sons to pursue further education. This obviously meant that the left ones in the family particularly Ghannūshī had to do extra work not only to compensate for the loss of the labour but also to bear the expenses of the two brothers pursuing education in the city of Tunis.

However, to Ghannūshī's good fortune, a year later, his eldest brother after graduating from the law school was appointed to the post of a judge. With his appointment, the family living in the village now no longer required Ghannūshī's labour in the fields. Therefore, at the

age of fourteen, he recommenced his studies, this time in a preparatory school (that was the part of Zaytūnah school system)⁷ in the same village of al-Hamma. In around 1956, the family left for the Gabès, where his elder brother lived. There, he joined one more preparatory school of Zaytūnah. According to Tamimi, “This was the beginning of a new stage in young Ghannouchi’s life. It was here where he saw for the first time the effects of Westernization, or what he calls the ‘features of modernity’.”⁸

Ghannūshī now began to grow in a totally different environment, which presented a contrasting image of the rural life and environment. Outside the family, he never found any support to his domestic and traditional upbringing. He was rather in a dilemma because his traditional nurturing attracted him to eastward and the modern society to westward. The increasing pressures of the new environment and also the new acquired tastes (modern literature) posed another challenge to his very traditional outlook. Here in the new atmosphere, he developed an interest toward Western literature. He now started to read the Arabic translations of the Russian works like *War and Peace* by Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910), *Crime and Punishment* by Fyodor Dostoyevsky (1821–1881), and *Mother* by Maxim Gorky (1868–1936).⁹ Gradually, his religious upbringing began to erode, and now for him, *Ṣalāh* was a burdensome and onerous practice. He used to practice it not because of conviction but because of politeness, respect, and as an act to appease his father. Not only this, Ghannūshī sometimes even pretended before his father in such a manner as if he was still praying. In this way, he progressively distanced himself from his traditional upbringing and values. For him, such a gradual change was simply because Islam was never presented to him within a framework of all-inclusive vision of life and universe that in turn could have responded positively to the challenges posed by the modern society.

The next phase in the life of Ghannūshī was his shift from Gabès to the city of Tunis in 1959. To further his already gained knowledge, he at the age of eighteen enrolled himself at Zaytūnah’s *Ibn Khaldūn* center where he studied the *Qur’ān*, Islamic law, and theology not in French, but in Arabic language. In his last year at the center, he also studied philosophy and enjoyed much while arguing with the teachers about various theoretical issues. He very often used to challenge and tease his teachers by posing different questions to them. Regardless of this, he was never satisfied during all the years of his study at Zaytūnah. The stern conflict

between the religious atmosphere in Zaytūnah and the modern urban society in and around the city anguished him the most. Such a quandary, as his later part of life reveals, compelled him to criticize the Zaytūnah system as outdated by not taking into cognizance the realities of the modern-day world. His own development in Zaytūnah as well as his routine encounter with the outside world probably made him to react to the above system especially the method of teaching and the curriculum used there. Perhaps, it was due to the stagnant curriculum taught at Zaytūnah that, among other reasons, made him to think over the multifarious problems of social life. He observed a massive contrast between the two environs—inside a stagnant and outside a westernized one. According to him, the above system was primarily concerned with such practices performed many hundred years ago that had no connection at all with the modern undertakings of the world. For him, to study at Zaytūnah was as if to “go into a museum.”¹⁰

His appraisal on Zaytūnah system was also based on the grounds of country’s culturally and educationally oriented apparatus primarily designed to produce individuals with Western ideology and outlook. Under such circumstances, Zaytūnah should have provided a counter apparatus and should have also produced the accomplished personalities endowed with the real gift of knowledge. Unfortunately, the institution miserably failed in achieving its exact accomplishments as those who graduated from it found themselves clinging between backward culture on the one hand and the modern but strange on the other. Consequently, for them, it was almost impossible to find any prospect in the society to earn their livelihood.¹¹

2.3 MAKING AND UNMAKING OF NASSIRISM

Intellectually, Ghannūshī grew up as a Nassirist. Throughout the period of fifties and sixties, Nassirism—the ideology of Arab Socialist Union—a form of Pan-Arabism endeavoured by the President Jamāl ‘Abd al-Nāṣir of Egypt, was the fashion of the day that attracted the youth of the whole Arab world together with Tunisia. For him, Nassirism was a Pan-Arab Unionist and anti-colonial movement. Moreover, the country Egypt had a pivotal position for him as such it acted as the largest in the Arab world. So, it was by virtue of the country’s rich culture and its indubitable contribution throughout the history of Islam to the unity and strength of the *Ummah* that attracted Tunisian youth toward the Nassirist ideology.

However, in their own country (Tunisia), the youth was not commonly viewed auspiciously by those who were at the helm of affairs. The reason was indeed the bitter conflict between Tunisian Bourguiba and his counterpart, Egyptian Nāṣir. This was because of the fact that the former felt threatened, observing the support accorded to the latter by the young Tunisians. Despite so much accord to Nāṣir and Nassirism, it had no formal organization or ground in Tunisia, rather the ideology manifested *per se* as an intellectual trend purely based on the sentiments.

Ghannūshī loathed the Tunisian life and was constantly in stalk of an opportunity to emigrate and fly to *Mashriq*, especially toward Egypt—his ideological and sentimental place. Being an ardent lover of the philosophy of Arabism meant abhorrence toward new rather alien Tunisian post-independent system. In Tunisia, what made Ghannūshī and others like him, who studied at the *Zaytūnah*, ineligible in a local university was the French oriented culture and educational system. Those who were determined to continue their studies had no alternative at all other than to leave the country and fly to *Mashriq*.

While in *Zaytūnah*, Ghannūshī did not complete his studies and instead got a job as a primary school teacher and continued to remain associated with it for about two years. However, the position of a primary school teacher did not appease his taste, and he should not have been when both of his elder brothers, whom he considered as models, were more accomplished than him. Consequently, he was always in search of an opportunity to make a visit to the *Mashriq*. In pursuit of the above-mentioned aspirations, he, in 1964, left the job and went to Egypt—the dream place. There, he studied agriculture at the University of Cairo.¹² Initially, he and the other Tunisians in Egypt scraped out the benefit from the animosity between Bourguiba and Nāṣir. But all of a sudden their study was cut short after a brief period of three or four months. The two regimes—Cairo and Tunis—had been engaged in a dialogue aimed at improving the relations between the two. The expulsion of Ghannūshī and others, whom the Tunisian regime referred as “the fugitives,”¹³ by the Egyptian authorities at the request of Tunisian embassy, was seen a positive step in further strengthening the mutual relations.

The incident was the first of its kind that struck deeply Ghannūshī’s preoccupied conviction about President Nāṣir and his ideology—Nassirism. To his ultimate dismay, the brief time he spent in the country revealed a counter-image of Nassirism and of the Egypt as well. He,

during his stay, never witnessed in the country what he always envisioned and thought—“ambition for progress, of Arab solidarity, and of unwavering support for the cause of justice and equality.”¹⁴ While in Egypt, he observed people least concerned in safeguarding and galvanizing the ideas of Nassirism. Rather, they were more serious about satisfying their own desires and caprices. It became apparent to him that the aesthetically alluring songs and speeches he and the other Arabs around the world used to hear were empty ones and nothing more than a propaganda which never corresponded to any of the realities he himself experienced in the Egyptian life.¹⁵ The decision of the Egyptian government to expel him, coupled with what he witnessed first-hand in the country, sowed in him the seeds of disenchantment regarding Arabism—the very ideology that claimed devotion to solidarity, progress, aspiration, and the interests of the larger Arab world.¹⁶

2.4 ISLAMIC ACTIVIST IN THE MAKING

Rāshid al-Ghannūshī¹⁷ at first thought of escaping to Albania. But when he was about to reserve a seat on a plane bound for Tirana, he met at the ticketing office his senior fellow, who advised him not to visit Albania and instead encouraged him to go to Syria. The fellow also explained him that there were ample prospects in Syria to pursue further education. With the result, Ghannūshī changed his mind and accordingly decided to make Syria as his new destination. In Syria, he got enrolled at the University of Damascus, where he studied philosophy instead of agriculture. Despite his growing disenchantment with Nassirism, he still recognized himself with the Syrian Nassirists, who always remained engaged in refurbishing unity between Egypt and Syria. For a considerable period, he fully devoted himself to the ideology of Arabism. During this period, one finds a change in Ghannūshī from a romantic Arabist to a committed ideologue of Arabism, publicized by Satī al-Husrī (1879–1968), the chief propagator of Arabism, whose writings were not only studied thoroughly by the newcomers but also proved to be the important source of inspiration for the Arabists.¹⁷

At the University of Damascus, Ghannūshī found himself in the midst of raging intellectual discussions and debates between various groups like Islamic activists, Nationalists, and Secularists. The occupation of Palestine at the hands of Israel and its implications and ramifications

were the most premier topic of discussion. The debate focussed on the various aspects of the Zionist project and the availability of different ways and means before them to challenge it. The Islamic activists held that the liberation of Palestine from the occupation of Israel was only possible when Islam will be practiced in a comprehensive way. At the same time, they also refused to become part and parcel of un-Islamic regimes even if the latter fought for the above-mentioned cause. The West and the Muslim attitude toward it formed another widely and hotly discussed subject. In this case also, these groups differed from one another as is quite evident from what Tamimi has reflected in the following lines:

The secularists considered Western progress, whether in the natural or social sciences, the ultimate accomplishment of humanity. They looked up to the West as a model. The Islamists, in contrast, [negating the view of the former] sought to highlight the imperfections of Western civilization, exposing its ills and prognosticating its downfall. The emphasis [by the Islamic activists] would be on the spread of atheism and immorality ... the increase in crime and divorce rates, and the rapid spread of drug and alcohol addiction. The Islamists would stress the necessity of dissociation and full independence from all the faces of Western civilization, especially its “atheist Communist face.”¹⁸

Ghannūshī, during his stay at the university in Syria, travelled across various places of Europe (Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Germany, France, Netherlands, etc.) over a seven-month period, and in the course, he served as a stint at the jobs ephemeral in nature. This tour, as Sayyid Quṭb had encountered in America, was to make in the future a strong impression and influence not only on his life but also on his preoccupied perception about the West. He, according to Esposito and Voll, encountered “the other Europe” and had the live experience of the West in its own context and diversity.¹⁹ What he observed in Europe totally contrasted what he had already envisioned about the region. Moreover, the visit made him reflect that the Europe was not a happy and prosperous place. The tour had boundless ramifications on developing the future course of Ghannūshī because his preconceived image about the West became discoloured.

The growing cynicism toward the West forced not only Ghannūshī to revisit his thought about emulating the West as a model of civilization but also his own faithfulness toward Arabism. He questioned both the

ideologies and their underpinning realities. He, at last, concluded that “West” as well as “Arabism” as models are null and void. Prior to this, he had never thought in his whole life that Arabism meant anything other than Islam, and for him, there was no variance between the two. However, his live experience with the nationalist movement exposed to him its inner picture. Now, for him, it was not concealed that Arabism was an “illusion,” a set of “hollow slogans,” and an “empty model” emulated from the West.²⁰ In fact, according to him, it was a replica of the foreign model that had underwent certain developments with the passage of time.

After Ghannūshī returned from the tour of Europe, he busied himself to find a camp which could accommodate both his Islamic Faith as well as Arabism. While traversing the path, he approached various Islamic groups such as *Salaḥiyah*, *Ḥizb al-Tahrīr al-Islāmī*, and *Ikhwān*. The live observation and experience of the West had already strengthened his mind *vis-à-vis* the perception of the Islamic activists about the West. Moreover, he had an opportunity to meet and learn from some of the renowned Islamic thinkers like Adīb Ṣālīḥ (a prominent Muslim intellectual and a leading member of *Ikhwān* in Syria), Shaykh Sa‘īd Ramaḍān al-Būṭī, and Wahbah al-Zuhaylī who were all lecturers at *Sharī‘ah* College at the University of Damascus. He had also an opportunity to get acquainted with Jawdāt Sa‘īd—a member of *Ikhwān* in Syria—a very distinctive personality whom Ghannūshī characterized as an “active volcano.”²¹

The journey (European tour followed by the inquisition to find an alternative of Arabism) proved to be the momentous one that contributed largely to his transformation from the ideology of “Arabism” to the ideology of “Islam.” The closing stages of Ghannūshī with Arabism alleviated his soul with the rediscovery of Islam as is evinced in the lines to follow:

Eventually, my mind rested assured of the wrongfulness of the nationalistic way. While my heart was perfectly reassured of Islam, I realized that what I had been following was not the right Islam but a traditional and primitive version of it. The traditional model was not ideological, nor did it represent a comprehensive system. It was a conventional religious sentiment, a set of traditions, customs, and rituals that fell short of representing a civilization or a way of life. I discovered that I was not a true Muslim and therefore I had to take a decision to re-enter Islam.²²

The night of 15 June 1966 proved a “turning point” and a “land mark” in his life. It was the very night which guided him like the ray of beacon from utter dark confusion to an illuminated path with naked and transparent vision which according to him opened up the real gates of Islam devoid of any adulteration. He offers us a glimpse of what he experienced at this crucial juncture of his development as a Muslim in the best possible and strong terms;

That very night I shed two things off me: secular nationalism and traditional Islam. That night I embraced what I believed was the original Islam, Islam as revealed and not as a shaped or distorted by history and tradition. That was the night I overwhelmed by an immense surge of faith, love and admiration for this religion to which I pledged my life. On that night I was reborn, my heart was filled with the light of God, and my mind with the determination to review and reflect on all that which I had previously conceived.²³

Ghannūshī’s stay in Syria helped him to rediscover a new kind and a new face of Islam—“an Islam that was alive.”²⁴ The very counter of the “stagnant,” “dead,” and “passive Islam” that he always hated when enrolled in Zaytūnah and the one he studied formally. While in Syria, he never attached himself with any of the movement formally, rather busied himself in comprehending the write-ups of some of the prominent contemporary Muslim thinkers and activists. During the last two years of his stay in the country, he read the writings of Iqbāl, especially his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, wherein he “discovered an Islam, informed by a unique synthesis of Islamic belief and Western philosophy that could argue with the West on its own grounds.”²⁵ He also acquainted himself with the works of Muḥammad Quṭb—*Man Between Materialism and Islam*, Ḥasan al-Bannā (founder of *Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*), Sayyid Quṭb, Mawlānā Sayyid Abū al-A‘lā Mawdūdī (prominent Islamic thinker of the twentieth century and the founder of *Jamā‘at-i-Islāmī*), Mālik Binnabī, and others. Consequently, he also attended the lectures on *Tafsīr*, *Ḥadīth*, and *Fiqh* and also joined the group of Shaykh Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī, whose effort and endeavours in *Ḥadīth* literature impressed him the most.

While busy in comprehending these writings on the one hand and experiencing other events on the other, Ghannūshī encountered a “strong Islam” based not merely on belief but on fundamental reasons

as well. It was now that he found answers to all the desolations he had encountered and tasted all the way through various courses of his life, especially the theories of Arabism, Socialism, and Westernization. With the advance of time, he drifted more and more from Arabism toward Islam. Finally, it became evident enough to him that the theory of Arabism was in reality based on the Western philosophy and had no relationship at all with Islam.

2.5 NEXT DESTINATION—FRANCE/LIFE IN FRANCE

After graduating from the University of Damascus, Ghannūshī left Syria in 1968 and moved to the new station, France, to pursue his master's degree in philosophy at Sorbonne.²⁶ For the majority of the Tunisians, France was and still continues to be the natural and fitting choice keeping in view the past connections and relations with the country. Moreover, for the Tunisians, France was a source of cultural authenticity, and for him, it was more desirable to get an academic qualification from the country in order he be recognized in Tunisia.

In Paris, Ghannūshī found himself immersed in a totally alien culture, and it was almost impossible to retain and adhere to one's Faith and identity. The French society presented a complete contrasting picture of the Islam. It seemed to him that the fierce winds which were blowing all the way through may uproot his identity forever. The pressures were unlimited and inexplicable as he himself expressed:

The one year I spent in Paris was the hardest and most trying in my entire life. The test was tough and I was rather anxious that I might fail. ... I would have despised myself and how hypocritical it would have been of me to stand up afterward and admonish others. Praise to be Allah [*sic*] who protected me until the ordeal was over.²⁷

However, such discouraging circumstances assisted him to get hand and glove to Islam. It is in this direction that he frequently got involved in various Islamic activities and the engagement with the *Tablīgh* group was the continuation of the same. The *Tablīgh* group was an offshoot of the original *Tablīghī Jamā'at*—an apolitical organization that emerged in Indo-Pak subcontinent—which mainly thrust on various rituals of Islam. The involvement with the group provided him with the spiritual and moral enhancement as he himself reckoned: “Living with the tabligh

[*Tablīgh*] community provided me with immunity and protection from fierce winds and added a new dimension to my molding. Never ever before had I had such an experience.”²⁸ The attachment with the group had not only a lasting impact on his personality but he also gained for the first time in his life the experience of an organized Islamic activism. He engaged himself actively with the *Tablīgh* work, sauntering and visiting labourers of North Africa in their houses, café shops, and other places with an intention to bring them back to the divine message of Islam.²⁹

The one-year stay in France was the most severe and trying period in his life, not only in terms of sustaining the life but also sustaining the “identity” in an “alien culture” that contradicted the very Islamic one. As he himself acknowledged, whereas in his own country the basic need of Muslims was freedom of speech and other human rights, but here in France the issue at stake was not freedom or human rights, rather to learn the *Qur’ān*, to have a *Masjid* to worship therein, and to find a good Muslim life.³⁰ The fortified accountability of preaching and leading in a storefront *Masjid* for which he found himself ill-prepared, increased the already tough burden on his shoulders. But Ghannūshī fought every challenge with full vigour and remarkable zeal to retain not only his own identity but of the other Muslims as well.

2.6 BACK HOME (TUNISIA) AND SOCIAL REFORMER IN THE MAKING

Ghannūshī after completing one year of study in Paris started comprehending on his thesis for the master’s degree. While he was busy in doing the task, his elder brother namely Mukhtār, who was a judge by profession, came to take him back home. The family had heard about his active engagement with the *Tablīgh* group over which they became immensely distressed and worried. Out of sheer fear, the family decided to send Mukhtār on a rescue mission with a story of serious illness of his mother. There was no other reason to sensationalize the whole situation other than to convince and persuade him to bring an end to what they called the absurd activities. He left his belongings in Paris with an intention to come back within a month. In the company of his brother, he travelled home by road through Spain, and prior to this, he had never desired to return to Tunisia keeping in view the country’s prevailing

situation and also the advice of Albānī. Consequently, he was also very much anxious to complete his master's degree in philosophy without which it was almost impossible for him to get a decent job back home.

Both Ghannūshī and his brother while on their way back home had an opportunity to visit and tour the renowned and historic *Masjid* of Cordoba in Spain and other famous places. In the *Masjid* of Cordoba, he notwithstanding the intervention from a priest moved toward the *mīhrāb* and performed the *Ṣalāh*. Thereafter, on reaching Algeria, he met for the first time in his life the famous Algerian Islamic thinker Mālik Binabbī (1905–1973) about whom he had heard so much in Syria and had also acquainted himself with some of his books.

Ghannūshī after staying in the home village for sometime left his family with an idea of returning to Paris to complete his studies. While on his way, he stopped at Tunis to pay a visit to the *Zaytūnah Masjid*. Till this moment, he remained adamant and serious about the advice of Albānī not to stay in Tunisia as Islam has been uprooted from there. However, there was something different ordained for him better perhaps though. Inside *Masjid*, he once again encountered some *Tablīgh* members, who introduced him to Shaykh ‘Abd al-Fattaḥ al-Mūrū—lawyer, Islamic activist, and co-founder of *Harkah al-Ittijah al-Islāmi* (MTI). To Ghannūshī, the untoward encounter and interaction with some of the persons inside the *Masjid* and also the meeting with Mūrū seemed to be the positive signs. It was the only legitimate and more than sufficient reason that convinced him to abandon his decision of going back to Paris. Moreover, he also felt that his country is more vital than his degree and belongings. At last, he decided to remain in Tunisia with an aim to work collectively with Mūrū and others like him for the reform and revival of the Tunisian society.

Thereafter, Ghannūshī took up myriad roles—the profession of teaching philosophy at a secondary school, Islamic preacher-activist, joined the *Qur’ān Preservation Society*—QPS (*Jam‘ah al-Ḥifẓ al-Qur’ān*), and also assumed the leadership of *al-Jamā‘ah al-Islāmiyyah* (the Islamic Group)—a clandestine organization whose members were attracted from the *Tablīgh* group.³¹ This period signals the beginning and formation of a strong and dedicated social reformer in Tunisia who in the long run would emerge as one of the famous Muslim thinkers greatly engaging the intellectual minds both in East and West.

NOTES

1. Azzam S. Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat Within Islamism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 3; see also, Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, *Huqūq al-Muwāṭanah: Huqūq Ghayr al-Muslim fī al-Mujtama' al-Islāmī* (London: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1993).
2. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.
4. John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 93.
5. Tamimi, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 6–7.
7. Emad Eldin Shahin, “Ghannushi, Rashid Al,” *Islamicus*, retrieved from <http://islamicus.org/ghannushi-rashid-al/>, accessed on 7 April 2014.
8. Tamimi, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
9. Azzam Tamimi, “Rashid al-Ghannushi,” in John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 212.
10. Esposito and Voll, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
11. Rachid Ghannouchi, “The Conflict Between West and Islam, The Tunisian Case: Reality and Prospects,” as quoted in Tamimi, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
12. Munahid Ahmad, “Rashid al-Ghannushi: A Leader of Pure Islam,” *Islamic Scholars World Wide*, retrieved from <http://islamicsscholarsbd.blogspot.in/2012/04/rashid-al-ghannushi-leader-of-pure.html>, accessed on 7 April 2014.
13. Tamimi, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
15. Francois Burgat and William Dowell, *The Islamic Movement in North Africa* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993), p. 57.
16. Tamimi, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
17. Tamimi in Esposito and Shahin, *op. cit.*, p. 213.
18. Tamimi, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
19. Esposito and Voll, *op. cit.*, p. 94.
20. *Ibid.*
21. Tamimi, *op. cit.*, pp. 21–22.
22. Interview with Tamimi, London, March, 1995 as quoted in Tamimi, *Ibid.*, p. 22.
23. *Ibid.*
24. Esposito and Voll, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
25. *Ibid.*
26. See, Ahmad, *op. cit.*

27. Tamimi, op. cit., p. 26.
28. Interview with Tamimi, March 1995, as quoted in Tamimi, *Ibid.*, p. 25.
29. Esposito and Voll, op. cit., p. 96.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Tamimi, op. cit., p. 31; Esposito and Voll, *Ibid.*, p. 97; Roy Jackson, *Fifty Key Figures in Islam* (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 233.



Sociopolitical Activities

Abstract It is very important to know that the social setting mostly processes the intellectual setting and formation of a thinker. Ghannūshī, being no exception, also encountered different challenges posed by the Tunisian society that alternatively produced a definite impact on him by bringing a transition in his thought and ideology. It, thus, helped him to evolve as a refined reformer, activist, thinker, and political leader. So, in continuation with the Chapter 2, in this chapter, Ghannūshī's intellectual development per se is understood in the context that how he interacted or continues to interact with his society that was/is facing multiple challenges at local, regional, and global level. Therefore, first two chapters present, on the other hand, a brooding portrait of history, politics, and society of postcolonial Tunisia.

Keywords Modernization · Qur'ān Preservation Society · Iranian Revolution · Political activism · Hizb al-Nahḍah · Bin Ali

3.1 POST-INDEPENDENT TUNISIAN ATMOSPHERE AND THE EMERGENCE OF A SOCIAL REFORMER

Rāshid al-Ghannūshī founded *Harkah al-Ittijah al-Islāmī* currently known as *Hizb al-Nahḍah*. This Movement primarily represents the sociopolitical engagements of Ghannūshī in Tunisia and abroad. How he was able to become a famous leader, expounder, thinker, and more

importantly an influential figure in the twenty-first century is essentially because of the platform made available to him by *Ḥarkab al-Ittijah al-Islāmī* or *Ḥizb al-Nahḍah*. The surprising reappearance of *Ḥizb al-Nahḍah* as a dominant sociopolitical force in post-Arab Spring Tunisia, on the other hand, represents the remarkable role played by Ghannūshī throughout the Movement's historical development and survival.

Before restarting the exploration of sociopolitical activities of Ghannūshī or continuing the discussion from where we had left in the earlier chapter, it is apt to bring forth in a concise fashion the policies and programs initiated by Bourguiba as well as their impact on the Tunisian society.

In Tunisia, Bourguiba and his State endeavored to co-opt, control, and modify Islam in order to suit their policies and desires. Michael J. Willis has summarized the role of Islam in North Africa and the State's policies toward it, more significantly in Tunisia to take the region toward modernization by transforming the core values of Islam in an eloquent and precise way. According to him:

Islam had been established as the official religion of state in all three countries [Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco] at independence. However, this represented more of an affirmation of independent national identity than anything else. ... At the same time, and despite this official emphasis on religion, significant areas of life came to be 'secularised' during this same period, with the state taking control over issues and tasks that had traditionally been the preserve of independent religious institutions. Control over education, for example, came fully under the ambit of the government and religious personnel, buildings and property were formally absorbed into the state in the years that followed independence. ... In all three states the leaders of the religious establishment—the ulema—were absorbed into the state apparatus, usually as employees and functionaries of newly created ministers of religious affairs, which provided them with an income in return for their loss of independence. These state-controlled ulema were then often called upon to issue fatwas to justify government policy. However, such a role was frequently filled by the political leaders [like Habib Bourguiba] themselves, who increasingly used their own authority to interpret and rule on religious texts as and when it suited them.¹

These religious reforms and changes which were made like the introduction of CPS, integration of the religious courts into the secularized

legal system, educational reform, banning of polygamy, reforming the land, inciting the people to abandon fasting during the month of *Ramaḍān*, the closure of University of Zaytūnah by merging it into the University of Tunis, and above all the monopolization of the power by the President had a mammoth and vast impact on the mind-set of the people of the country.² Right from the word go, Bourguiba and his party members followed the policy of modernization (regarding secularization as a *sine non qua*) which, according to John L. Esposito, was pro-Western and secular. “For Bourguiba, Islam represented the past; the West was Tunisia’s only hope for a modern future.”³ The resentment of the people was further aroused by the growing rate of unemployment, as the number of those with high qualification exceeded the absorptive capacity of the economy that in turn generated possibly a volatile situation. As a final point, these factors along with the combination of wider social and economic problems as created by the bin Šālah’s “Socialist Program” which proved to be a failure forwarded the message that Bourguiba and Neo-Dustūr were totally ineffective to offer a successful and blossoming ideological framework for a workable model of development.⁴

All these factors when weighed together helped in preparing the ground conducive for the emergence and development of an Islamic Movement in the country as is viewed by Esposito:

The development of Islamic movements as a reaction to personal lives, social conditions, and government policies and actions can be seen quite clearly at every stage in the development (from its formation through its major transformations) of Tunisia’s major Islamic organization, the Islamic Tendency Movement or, as it is known today, the Renaissance Party (Hizb al-Nahda or Ennahda).⁵

It is only because of such policies adopted by the State that made the experts to have ample confidence in concluding that historically “the most open and Mediterranean of the Arab countries, Tunisia is an improbable site for an Islamist upsurge.”⁶

The innovative reformation made in some of the basic teachings and practices of Islam⁷ and the wider social and economic discontent that surfaced because of the failure of bin Šālah’s “Socialist Program” created a volatile environment in the country. The people began to realize that the State, President Bourguiba, and the Neo-Dustūr Party failed

desperately to offer a successful and thriving model of development. Consequently, the situation that appeared to be volatile obligated Bourguiba to comprehend that the attitude he and his administration had developed *vis-à-vis* Islam and the socialist program they had envisioned was threatening their own ascendancy and supremacy.⁸ Therefore, not enthusiastically but in a mere compulsion, Bourguiba embellished on a policy of political and economic liberalization that seemed to a certain degree acquiescent to Islam.⁹

Above and over this, there were other reasons as well that prompted Bourguiba to shift the policy. It was the period during which the country witnessed a considerable increase in the power of the leftists and also the influence of the ideology of Nassirism. So in a way, the State attempted to dissolve the power of the leftists, counterbalance the impact of Nassirism, and appease the masses. Waltz holds:

The government, recovering from an unsuccessful decade-long experiment in socialism, was seeking both to stem criticism of policies which in the 1960s had progressively harnessed Islam to the interests of a secular state, and to counterbalance the leftist opposition predominant at the university.¹⁰

As a result, Bourguiba signaled the establishment of different cultural associations and societies such as *Qur'ān Preservation Society*–QPS (*Jamī'ah al-Hifẓ al-Qur'ān*) in the country. Founded in the year 1970 at *Zaytūnah Masjid*, the QPS was extensively supported and encouraged by the State in a reaction to counter the power of those groups noted above.¹¹ The State also aimed through its formation, writes Shahin, “to reverse Ben Saleh’s socialist phase and to project a religious image so to enhance its legitimacy.”¹² To make the same reasons for the establishment of the QPS more conspicuous and noticeable, Willis notes down:

This organisation [QPS] had been set up by the authorities in the aftermath of the end of Ben Salah’s socialist period and aimed to combat remaining leftist sentiment, particularly on the country’s university campuses.¹³

The secretary general of QPS, Shaykh Ḥabīb Mastauī, in an attempt aimed at building a base for the QPS, not only invited but also encouraged Ghannūshī and the others to join QPS. This invitation, that had

far reaching consequences in the long run, provided Ghannūshī, Mūrū, and other founders an occasion to build up the future Movement's structure. Erstwhile, the above figures, especially Ghannūshī, were lacking an authorized platform from which they could, albeit safely, disseminate, extend, and broaden their views and activities.¹⁴ While remaining in the Association, the "Group," besides organizing weekly lectures and distributing among the listeners the Islamic literature, also widened their contact in other parts of the country.

The group carried its activities privately and secretly so much so that its members used the platform of State-sponsored QPS. For many years, Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, 'Abd al-Fattaḥ al-Mūrū, Ṣāliḥ bin 'Abd Allah, Fāḍil al-Balādī, and Ahmidā Enifar travelled every year to meet Mālik Binnabī in Algeria, where they listened to his lectures on philosophy and politics. The annual Islamic Thought Seminar held in 1970, 71, and 72, respectively, was the most memorable meetings. He and his other colleagues were very much anxious not to miss any of these annual seminars. It was none other than Binnabī who supported and encouraged Ghannūshī and his associates to go ahead with their endeavor to rejuvenate the Tunisian society. The relationship and alliance with Binnabī had a profound influence and impact on the future life of Ghannūshī. It was primarily the interaction with Binnabī and his works that profusely influenced the mental faculty of Ghannūshī. This was the period of transition and transformation in his thought from Quṭb to that of Binnabī.¹⁵

Ghannūshī made the best use of his knowledge gained in philosophy and the experience of working among the poor workers in Paris when he assumed the twin roles in Tunis—preacher and secondary school teacher.¹⁶ Very soon schools, universities, and *Masājid* became the major centers of the activities of the *al-Jamā'ah al-Islāmiyyah*. In all these endeavors, he devoted much of his time and energy on the youth, who constituted as his prime target. He had himself witnessed that in those days it would have been no less than a surprise to see someone who is young, praying, especially if he came from the so-called educated society. It was primarily because the State had taken all the precautionary measures to indoctrinate the youth with the materialistic tendency that in turn rendered them useless and servile.¹⁷

With the advancement of time, while delivering sermons and lectures, he attracted huge gatherings, predominantly young ones who were either workers or students. He very often highlighted the ills rooted in the Tunisian society—lack of the identity, that formed the nucleus

of his lectures. To revitalize and invigorate the Arab-Islamic roots and civilization was the main objective of his mission. He side by side excelled in penmanship also, as his write-ups of high literary taste very often began to appear in *al-Maʿrifah*—the Movement’s official publication organ. The articles focussed on the degradation of the society, decadence of morals in the West, and the need to return to Islam.¹⁸ He for the first time gained the attention of the masses when he wrote an article titled *Barnāmiġ al-Falsafah wa Jil al-Dayāʾ* (The Philosophy Curriculum and the Generation of Loss).¹⁹

Ghannūshī’s message, orally or in a document form, overtly or covertly touched the core and fundamental issues of the society. He condemned vehemently the vices that had engrossed the society so acutely and invoked convincingly the need and inevitability to return to Islam. He regarded one and all responsible for the current acute disease—the West, the government of Bourguiba, the country’s westernized and secularized elites, and also the traditional religious establishments that according to him propagated a “stagnant rather than a dynamic Islam.”²⁰ For him, Islam was the only hope—the only and ultimate divine alternative—by virtue of which the society can be transformed and renovated.

In the beginning, the regime developed a policy of fortitude toward the Movement’s activities performed in the *Masājid*, schools, and other institutions of higher learning. The toleration from the government was simply because the degree of Movement’s potential was not threatening and perhaps seemed to be very much ambiguous for the former. Still in infancy and yet to incline toward political desires, the Movement was viewed as the one concerned mainly with the issues of morality and spreading of religious consciousness among the people of the country. During this period, the authorities regarded it in the opinion of Shahin, as a “religious association with reformist tendencies,”²¹ concentrating on the “ethical and religious matters.”²² However, the Movement’s activities started to flourish and boom so much so that the authorities became apprehensive of such a development. Hence, by 1973 those who were at the helm of the affairs decided to exorcize Ghannūshī and others from the State-sponsored QPS.²³ The occurrence made Ghannūshī to revisit the organization’s earlier methodology of preaching and propagating the message, especially in view of the country’s existing political landscape. Afterward, he decided to follow the strategy of *Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*—clandestine-cum-open activism.

All these years, from seventies to early eighties, proved to be very vital not only in the history of Tunisia, but also in the life of Ghannūshī as well. All the developments whether inside or outside demonstrated to be the key sources of maturing and nurturing his political thought. These years, according to Tamimi, “were to witness the undoing of some of his earlier persuasions and the making of new ones.”²⁴

The Movement’s impact on the Tunisian society with the advancement of time enhanced as it is quite apparent by observing an increase in the number of the women wearing the *Hijāb* especially in the university campuses, increase in the readership of the Movement’s journal *al-Ma‘rifah* from 6000 in 1971 to 25,000 in 1979, and also increase in the circulation of the books and cassettes.²⁵ Many observers observed in the Tunisian society during the period of 1970s “a more general increase in piety and a re-identification with Islamic principles that extended beyond the youthful student population.”²⁶ The Movement, in this way, attempted, in the words of Wickham, to fulfill “the desired promise of a restored moral order.”²⁷ However, all the way through from 1970–1978, the Movement circumscribed its objectives, orientations, and activities to the social issues at large and up to 1978 it was yet to broaden its agenda politically.

The developments mainly the government’s brutal suppression of the demonstration in the “food riots” of January 1978 and the subsequent accomplishment of Iranian Revolution in 1979, not only accentuated the failure of the policies of the government and their secularized society, but at the same time boosted tremendously the organization and its idea of “Islam as an Alternative” in the country. During this period, Ghannūshī and other members of the organization started to develop relations with the other organizations present within the country. Thereafter, *al-Jamā‘ah al-Islāmīyyah* commenced to renovate its objectives by taking on board some of the wider issues. All these incidents prompted *al-Jamā‘ah al-Islāmīyyah* to convene a general conference of the organization in 1979. From now onward, this conference came to be remembered by the name *al-Mu‘tamar al-Ta’sīṣī* (the Founding Conference). For the first time, the organization established itself in a more structured way by electing Ghannūshī as the President, forming *Majlis al-Shūrā* (consultative council), and *al-Maktab al-Tanfīdī* (an executive bureau).²⁸

Afterward, open deliberations on varied concerns—political, social, and economic—could be heard in every nook and corner of the country.

The *Masājid*, schools, universities, and other places were transformed from the mere customary conducts to intellectual platforms for the political debates. These places turned out to be the breeding ground for Ghannūshī to disseminate his authoritative message about the current State affairs of the country. He used to say that Islam supports the browbeaten ones and opposes the intimidators—their profligacy and exploitation. According to him, Islam admits thoroughly the existence of the clash between the subjugated and the tyrant and at the same time it stands forever in support of the former against the latter. His direct and forceful message to defend the rights of the oppressed ones attracted to its ranks the sympathy and the support of UGTT (workers union). Subsequently, he never failed to catch the attention of the young ones hailing from the schools and universities, where later on the Islamic student organizations dominated the scene.

3.2 TRANSFORMATION: SOCIAL ACTIVISM TO POLITICAL ACTIVISM

Being devoid of political issues, by and large, the early formation of Ghannūshī and his Movement was obviously dominated by their concern and interest with the issues pertaining to religion, culture, and ethics. However, the years 1978 and 1979 proved extremely vital not only in the history of the country but in the Movement’s “development” and “discourse transformation” and in shaping the activism of Ghannūshī as well. The change—social, political, and economic—that brought about “discourse transformation” of the Movement was not an episode that happened all of a sudden, rather it was manipulated and maneuvered by certain vital events within and beyond the country. In this regard, the Food Riots of January 1978 and the subsequent accomplishment of Iranian Revolution in 1979 commemorate the turning point. “The late seventies saw a progressive politicization of the Islamic Movement” says Esposito “in response to the internal situation in Tunisia and events in Iran.”²⁹ The Revolution boosted the idea of Islam in Tunisia and also demonstrated to be one of the major precursors for the transformation of Movement’s discourse from socio-religious issues to political and economic issues. The Iranian Revolution, explains Mūrū in an interview with Anne Wolf, “was certainly interesting to us, it showed us a totally new dimension of Islam and what role it can have in politics”. Mūrū quoted in Anne Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia: The History of Ennahda* (London: Hurst and Company, 2017), p. 48. It also provided the

Movement, according to Allani, with “political, ideological, and organizational support”³⁰ in the country. In one of the interviews, Ghannūshī later substantiated the same as follows:

As we readied to accept the notion that conflicts other than the ideological existed along the political and social fronts, the Iranian revolution came to give us a new set of Islamic discourses. It enabled us to Islamize some leftist social concepts and to accommodate the social conflict within an Islamic context.³¹

These events, *among others*, not only accentuated the failure of the policies of government and their secularized society but also boosted tremendously Ghannūshī’s idea of “Islam as an Alternative” in the country. Salwa Ismail has rightly observed that the non-seriousness of both Ghannūshī and his Movement regarding the sociopolitical and economic issues turned out to be the very basic subject “of an auto-critique by the leadership in the second phase of [Movement’s] development.”³²

In the next phase, Ghannūshī together with other associates started to renovate the Movement’s objectives and goals by taking on the board some of the wider issues and developments, more importantly the political ones. Previously, they had stayed away from the event of January 1978, but very soon all of them began to revisit their strategy and course of action. Consequently, the rapid developments in the country obligated Ghannūshī and other members to take a rigorous stock of the situation and also to revisit their past activism. The query that: “How could we be that much out of touch with what was actually going on within our own society so that we did not play any role in society?”³³ led to the transformation of the ideology of the Movement’s leadership. It started to realize the inevitability of Islam in all the spheres of the society—social, political, and economic. Further, the new alignment and direction of the Movement entirely transformed it from religio-cultural to sociopolitical activism.³⁴ Explaining the reasons of ideological transition of the Movement, enmeshed *hitherto* within certain issues, Dirk Vandewalle states:

During this period [1978 onwards] of economic difficulties Ghannouchi’s articles in *al-Ma‘rifa* demonstrated how the potent combination of economic hardship, lack of political expression, and Islamic concerns gradually politicized the MTI. The general strike of 1978 and the subsequent repression of the syndicalist movement stood out initially as the two important events in Ghannouchi’s increasing concern with political [issues] ... By 1981, [the Movement talked incessantly] ... about equity and social justice.³⁵

The Movement—previously less arranged, informal in structure, apolitical in nature and preoccupied with religious, cultural, and moral reform—now tended to be more structured, ordered, and organized with its own regulations, course of action, and total dedication toward the cause.³⁶ It now began to address openly the issues of politics and economics of the country. As one of its important members stated that “We were [prior to 1978 riots] concerned with other issues. Later, we began to realize the significance of the social dimension and the importance of bread.”³⁷ Even Ghannūshī himself expressed this in the following words:

Henceforth, [post-Iranian Revolution period] our criticism was no longer just religious or moral as in the past. It had become more profound [by taking on the board socio-political and economic issues]. The rift between us and regime had grown wider. ... The state was for dictatorship and we were now for democracy.³⁸

The country witnessed for the first time open deliberations on multifarious issues in the *Masājid* and other places which were now transformed from the mere customary conducts to the intellectual platforms. These much important podiums turned out to be the breeding ground for the intellectual development of the Movement’s leadership. Welding politics and economics with religion and morality, the Movement reflected that Islam supports the browbeaten ones and opposes the intimidators—their profligacy and exploitation. Islam admits thoroughly the existence of the clash between the subjugated and the tyrant and at the same time stands forever in support of the former against the latter.³⁹ Esposito and Voll in a concise fashion presented the very issues the Movement reflected on:

Ghannoushi and the Islamic Association spoke directly to the issues (workers’ rights, jobs, wages, poverty, Westernization versus a more authentic national and cultural identity, political participation) many Tunisians face [the fruits of the policies adopted by the President], presenting a living Islam, not the “museum Islam” he had encountered and rejected in his student days.⁴⁰

Moreover, the Movement also highlighted these issues in various conferences, communiqués, and in *al-Ma‘rifah* as well. Such a philosophy attracted to its rank, *among others*, the sympathies of oppressed ones

and UGTT (workers union). The Movement continued to catch the attention of the young ones from schools and universities, where later on the Islamic student organizations dominated the scene.⁴¹

To wrap it up, it can be stated that the events of Food Riots of 1978 and the accomplishment of Iranian Revolution of 1979 fostered the Movement's objectives and morale interminably. These events also proved much vital in the Movement's makeover from "social activism" to "political activism" or in the politicization of the Movement. As Ghannūshī claimed that they were responding to the pro-Western policies of Bourguiba who held that the path to development and modernization goes through secularism.⁴² The Revolution also contributed to the idea of Islam as the *modus operandi* and the solution to all the problems. Subsequently, it also shattered—writes Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Jorṣī about the impact of Iranian Revolution—all the fallacious notions that were generally aired in the society coupled with making the Movement's leadership to realize that Islam, which vehemently rebuts the separation of religion and politics, also necessitates the overall development of the society.⁴³ Thus, the ideological renovation that started to gain momentum finally came to be sensed by its vibrant discourse not only on the social issues but also on the issues largely concerned with economics, democracy, and human rights as well.⁴⁴

3.3 FORMATION OF ḤARKAH AL-ITTIJAH AL-ISLĀMĪ AND THE PERIOD ONWARD

Continuing his endeavors to reform the society, Ghannūshī on 6 June 1981 organized a conference of *al-Jamā'ah al-Islāmīyah*, where he announced publicly *al-Jamā'ah's* decision to be a formal political organization.⁴⁵ Renaming the Movement—*Harkah al-Ittijah al-Islāmī* or MTI in its French acronym—better translated as Movement of the Islamic Way (not Tendency),⁴⁶ the organization again endorsed its objective of restoring Islamic identity of the country.⁴⁷ The transformation in the policies of the Movement invited the wrath of the President, who viewed it as a prime threat to his own supremacy and legitimacy. Thus, the political openness of *Harkah al-Ittijah al-Islāmī* did not last long as the President began to cut short the influence of the Movement. Later on, in the month of *Ramaḍān*, Ghannūshī, Mūrū, and some other members of the Movement were rounded up.^{48,49} He remained in prison from 1981 to

1984. For him and other members of the Movement, it was the period of “contemplation and reflection” and the place where they pondered over the whole phenomena—the country’s past legacy, the current menace of the society, and the Organization’s endeavors.⁵⁰ Tamimi has reflected the same in the following lines:

Inside his prison cell, he reflected on the accomplishments of his movement. Despite its young age, the Tunisian Islamic Movement managed to reconnect with its roots of Islamic renaissance as expressed in the thoughts of its pioneers: at-Tunisi, Tahtawi, ath-Tha’alibi, al-Fasi, al-Afghani, and Abduh. ... Ghannouchi agonized over the state of backwardness the Muslims were in. The way forward “was to revive and complement the work of these leading thinkers, and to borrow, as at-Tunisi once put it, from the West a substance that would revive the Muslims.” However, the real challenge was how to realize the gains of Western progress without sacrificing Islam, how to challenge the claim of Westernized elite in his country that fruits of Western “progress” could only be repeated by doing away with Islam.⁵¹

It was in the new environment where Ghannūshī memorized the *Qur’ān* and also sophisticated himself with the light of other sciences—*Tafsīr*, *Fiqh*, *‘Ilm al-Kalām*, etc. He had also made acquaintance with the works of Ibn Taymiyah, Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd, Bāqir al-Ṣadr, and of many more. Further, he continued to embark on developing the writing skills revealed in the form of some new treatises. Out of them some were completed in the same place and some remained to be finished in the near future.

The rapid developments in Tunisia like the “bread riots” of January 1984, triggering countrywide unrest, compelled the government to adopt a more reconciliatory approach. Hoping to restore the peace and stability in the country, Bourguiba issued a general amnesty to Ghannūshī and the other activists on 3 August 1984. Furthermore, the country witnessed to a certain extent the political liberalization in terms of registering the human rights organizations and legalizing the political parties except *Harkah al-Ittijah al-Islāmī*. In spite of that, the Movement, however, was given more freedom and space. The soft policy of the government toward the Islamic activists was in the words of Hermassi: “a tactical manoeuvre.”⁵² The authorities tried their best to prevent Ghannūshī from resuming his activities, but of no avail. He soon after his release from the prison endeavored yet again by putting into service all the efforts to lead the Movement from the forefront, to reorganize themselves, and to make the most of the conducive situation in the best possible way.⁵³

Nonetheless, the favorable situation did not last long. Very soon the authorities again resorted to the policy of repression and persecution. Bourguiba amid becoming obsessed with *Harkah al-Ittijah al-Islāmī*, once again, began to crush the Movement by laying a major crackdown on its activists. It was a second wave of arrests in which Ghannūshī and other prominent figures of the organization were arrested.⁵⁴ The arrestees were brought before the State Security Court for a trial and all of them were convicted. Most of them were sentenced to prison for a term of two to twenty years; two were executed; and other death penalties including that of Ghannūshī were changed into life imprisonment after a stiff toil.⁵⁵ But for Bourguiba, the verdict was not impressive and satisfactory at all. Therefore, his seriousness to stamp out Ghannūshī and thereof the “Islamic threat” increased manifold. Thus, the President ordered not only a retrial of the case but also reiterated that the eradication of Islamicist poison will be the last service he’ll render Tunisia.⁵⁶ Bourguiba’s terrifying intent to execute Ghannūshī raised very deep and expounding voice against his vindictiveness. The debate raged more and more as the time advanced and the situation was such that it looked as if the country was at the threshold of a popular mass uprising. On 7 November 1987, Bin Ali—fresh prime minister and a former military man—toppled Bourguiba in a bloodless coup, thus, seizing the power from him on the basis of senility.⁵⁷

The new President instantaneously manifested the signs of political liberalization, and democratization for the sprouting of multiparty system. In a speech he stated that “our people deserve an advanced and institutionalized political life, truly based on the plurality of parties and mass organizations”.⁵⁸ The same was illustrated on the ground by releasing Ghannūshī and others. It was followed by the mutual cooperation (National Pact of November 1988) between Bin Ali, leftists, and also *Harkah al-Ittijah al-Islāmī*.⁵⁹ Ghannūshī after his release walked freely with fresh enthusiasm and added strength. He himself acknowledges that: “I walked out of my dungeon with a new momentum and fresh zeal. I returned to the book, which had originally been intended as a dissertation for a doctorate degree at the Faculty of Shari’ah.”⁶⁰

As the time elapsed, Ghannūshī in an attempt to get recognition under the new law changed the Movement’s title from *Harkah al-Ittijah al-Islāmī* to *Hizb al-Nahḍah*—the Renaissance Party, in February 1989.⁶¹ To meet the requirements of the government that no party should be established on the basis of confessional, ethnic, or religious values,⁶² the Movement toned down its reference to Islam mainly by removing the word “Islam” from its title.

Hizb al-Nahḍah sought so intensely the recognition as a political party from the authorities, but for them it always proved a mere dream as in December 1988, Bin Ali emphatically discarded the political recognition of the Movement.⁶³ Nevertheless, *al-Nahḍah* in 1989 elections participated more or less as independents, competing for 129 of 141 parliamentary seats that were at stake. In these elections, the organization emerged as the largest and strongest opposition by winning about 14.5% of the overall vote. According to the official results, Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD)—the government party—got 34% of the votes, the independent candidates 14%, and the rest of the official parties 5% in total.⁶⁴

The performance of *al-Nahḍah* in the elections positioned it as a direct threat to the existing regime. Bin Ali responded instantly to *al-Nahḍah*'s growing charm because it became noticeable to him that policy of political liberalization would undermine his own power and position. At the same time, the victory of *Islamic Salvation Front* (FIS) in the neighboring country Algeria in the municipal elections further aroused Bin Ali to exterminate his opponents, especially *al-Nahḍah*. To him, it was clear that the political liberalization would deliver no fruits at all.⁶⁵ Thus, the electoral process that could have ushered a new beginning in the country in turn generated a series of campaign at the hands of Bin Ali that were designed to completely rip up *al-Nahḍah*.

In the following months, the confrontation between *al-Nahḍah* and the authorities escalated more and more. The authorities began to tighten up their grip on the Movement by closing down its activities to a large extent. This was realized by arresting its members, banning its official publication—*al-Fajr*, and also banning the Islamic student organization. According to Ghannūshī, it was comprehensible that the government's gambit was the continuation of the policies that were adopted by the earlier regime.⁶⁶

On 13 May 1989, Ghannūshī embraced self-exile first in Algeria and then in London, where he made vehement attacks on the Bin Ali's establishment. As a result of his activities and statements, the Tunisian establishment sentenced him to life imprisonment in absentia in 1992.⁶⁷ At the same time, Bin Ali exploited the situation in Tunisia by putting thousands of the Movement's activists into the prison. He (Bin Ali) turned the tables on them by evicting other prominent figures under a well-knitted plot so as to exterminate *al-Nahḍah* for all times to come. The others who escaped imprisonment either went underground or took shelter in the European countries. With his self-embraced exile, it looked as if *al-Nahḍah* also went into exile.

Thereafter, Ghannūshī embarked on the career of *da‘wah*, thought, and academics, probably for which he found himself better suited and better accomplished. Taking in a way the responsibility of what happened to *al-Nahḍah*, he possibly thought it wise to leave the job of accomplishing Movement’s political struggle to someone else. During exile, he had the opportunity to further enrich his scholarship and also to finish the unfinished tasks especially the book titled *al-Ḥurriyyāt al-‘Āmah fī al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah* (Civil Liberties in the Islamic State).⁶⁸ His Engagement and stay in London made some scholars to conclude that it helped him to ‘deprovincialise’ or in other words enrich the domains of thinking for he was now exposed to a multiplicity of Islamic discourses.⁶⁹

Momentarily, Ghannūshī thought of distancing himself from *al-Nahḍah*, but the other members were adamant about him to continue the Movement’s leadership. They opined that keeping in view the prevailing situation of both the Movement and the country, it is obligatory on him to devote most part of his time and energy in the field where he is needed the most.⁷⁰ In a conference held in 1995, he was again elected as the head of *al-Nahḍah*.⁷¹ While staying in London, he frequently travelled to other places, delivered lectures, widened his academic pursuits, and also had the opportunity to enrich his thought and discuss the ideas with the thinkers of both the regions—*Mashriq* and *Maghrib*. He remained in London for about twenty-two years in Hempstead and other places in the UK and returned to his homeland—Tunisia, few years back after the ousting of Bin Ali in January 2011. Now in the contemporary period, Ghannūshī is recognized as the most influential figure in the world of politics.

In the concluding remarks, it can be well established that Ghannūshī encountered a number of diverse challenges throughout his life. The different circumstances and challenges that he met had a definite and everlasting impact on him that eventually brought a transition in his thought and ideology and led him to evolve as a reformer, activist, thinker, and political leader. With his intellectual and academic capacity, he succeeded in establishing and leading a political party, *Ḥizb al-Nahḍah*—a pragmatic exposition of his religio-political ideology—that in the current times forms one of the dominant political denominations in Tunisia. With his prolific writings and appealing intellectual discourses, he has maintained his unequivocal leadership in the party and has thereby profusely spread his views regarding various issues of diverse natures that have highly engaged the contemporary world’s intellectual class.

NOTES

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46. I. William Zartman, professor at Johns Hopkins University, Washington, translates MTI as Movement of the Islamic Way. However, the author has described MTI in the work as Movement of Islamic Tendency for most of the writers and scholars on the subject have translated it in the same way.
47. Willis, op. cit., p. 164.
48. Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi*, op. cit., p. 60.
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Works of Rāshid al-Ghannūshī: An Exploration

Abstract The chapter, although brief, identifies the stature and contribution of Rāshid al-Ghannūshī as a writer. Besides mentioning his various writings and works, the chapter makes an analysis and assessment of some of his key crosscutting works. The primary emphasis in this chapter has been placed on reviewing those works that deal with and discuss the subjects of democracy, human rights, and other such issues. In short, this chapter serves as a vital component that describes the inquisitiveness and fervor of Ghannūshī to contribute to the field of academics, on the one hand, and his response to the present-day challenges, on the other.

Keywords Rāshid al-Ghannūshī · Writer · Works · Al-Ḥurriyyāt al-‘Āmah · Al-Mar’ah Bayn al-Qur’ān · Ḥuqūq al-Muwāṭanah

Rāshid al-Ghannūshī is a famous political leader, activist, thinker, reformer, and at the same time intellectually a highly productive writer as well. He has emerged in the recent years as the most famous and most influential leader. His stature as a writer is as equivalent as his stature as a leader and guide of an Islamic Movement. As a writer, his role that too on diverse topics can never be undervalued. Perhaps, there might be no exaggeration at all in saying that his prominence as a political leader and reformer rests to a great extent on his penmanship.

At a very early age, Ghannūshī with reading side by side developed the taste of writing. Within a very short span of time, his write-ups of

high literary taste attracted the attention of the masses. His zeal and zest about writing can be discerned from his endeavor of establishing a periodical called *al-Ma‘rifah* (The Cognizance) in 1970s. The purpose of writing or other concerned activities was not to get public applaud; rather, the sole intention was to highlight the basic issues confronted by the Tunisians. His writings touched the fundamental concerns like, *among others*, education, identity loss, civil liberties, human rights, freedom, modernization, westernization, democracy, and pluralism. In a conscientious attempt, an introduction of some of his chief works is given albeit briefly in the following pages.

4.1 *AL-HURRĪYYĀT AL-‘ĀMAH FĪ AL-DAWLAH AL-ISLĀMIYYAH* (CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE ISLAMIC STATE)¹

Ghannūshī embarked on this treatise for the first time in 1983, during his incarceration. Prior to this accomplishment, he had already produced in the same environment (prison) several other works like *al-Mujtama‘ al-Tūnisī: Taḥlīl Ḥaḍārī* (Tunisian Society: A Civilizational Analysis), translation of Binnabī’s book on “Islam and Democracy”, articles on Palestine Issue, relations with Iran, etc.² While embarking on the treatise, *al-Hurriyyāt*—a priceless endeavor—his objective was to have “a characterization of a model modern Islamic society”.³

The task was taken into the hands only after observing deeply the attempts—taken within or without—that were aimed to distort the real picture of Islam, especially its teachings about the rights of individuals, women, and religious minorities. Besides this, the image of Islam was being presented in such a way as if it was a threat to the very modern civilization and an obstacle in the path of development. These and many other reasons compelled Ghannūshī to rise to the occasion not only to present the true picture of Islam but also to refute all the allegations raised against it. After the release, he himself felt very much obliged to complete what he had already started in the prison. But unfortunately, he was again incarcerated by the authorities and as a result the task remained unfinished.

At last, it was only in the new home (London), where Ghannūshī again embarked on the job and did not left it before its completion. In the year 1993, *Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al-‘Arabiyyah* (Center of Arab Unity Studies) in Beirut published the book. The book is regarded as a principal reference work on the topic of modern Islamic political

thought. It consists of six chapters that are preceded by, *among others*, “Introduction”—wherein Ghannūshī has highlighted the necessity and importance of the work—and followed by “Conclusion” and “Appendices”.

The book discusses in detail the hotly debated issues like Islamic State, *Shurā*, *Ijmāʿ*, *Ummah*, democracy, freedom, public liberties, equality, justice, Apostasy, and rights of Muslims and non-Muslims in an Islamic State. In this book, Ghannūshī discusses in a comparative way the Western and Islamic concept of freedom. While dealing with Islamic concept of freedom, he is of the opinion that Islam recognizes and guarantees the basic needs of human beings and among all these basic needs the first and foremost right that Islam guarantees is the freedom of belief. He has based his argument by citing the *āyat* of the *Qurʾān*:

لَا إِكْرَاهَ فِي الدِّينِ

“No compulsion in Din”⁴

Ghannūshī in *al-Hurriyyāt* has also examined and explored the issues of democracy, political liberties, system of governance, and Islamic concept of the State. Ideal system of governance, for him, is the one that recognizes and protects the honor of man. In this system, the gaps whether political, economic, or social between the ruler and the ruled evaporate, and the one who rules is the servant of his subjects with no edge at all over them.

4.2 AL-MARʾAH BAYN AL-QURʾĀN WA WĀQIʿ AL-MUSLIMĪN (THE WOMAN BETWEEN THE QURʾĀN AND THE MUSLIM REALITY)

Published from London by *al-Markaz al-Maghāribī li al-Buhūth wa al-Tarjumah* (Maghreb Center for Researches and Translation) in 2000, the book *al-Marʾah Bayn al-Qurʾān*⁵ discusses in a detailed manner the various issues of a woman. This 132 page book is divided into two main headings—Woman in the *Qurʾān* and Woman in the Present Conditions of the Muslims—and these two main headings are further divided into several sub-headings.

In this work, Ghannūshī, besides espousing vehemently the gender equality, believes that the man has no edge over the woman. Through

a series of sub-topics, he dispels the doubts and misunderstandings concerning some texts from the *Qur'ān* or the *Sunnah* that apparently seem to be about the inferiority of the females. According to him, there is no doubt that male has his own specific features and female her own, and these specific features make them fit for specific situations, but overall both the genders are equal. He goes as far as to assert that a woman can work outside, take part in politics, and can become the head of the State as well.

4.3 *HUQŪQ AL-MUWĀṬĀNAH: HUQŪQ GHAYR AL-MUSLIM FĪ AL-MUJTAMA' AL-ISLĀMĪ* (THE RIGHT TO NATIONALITY STATUS OF NON-MUSLIM CITIZENS IN A MUSLIM NATION)

Primarily based on the rights of non-Muslims (*Ahl al-Dhimmah*); this 136 page book was first published in Tunis in the year 1989. Later on, in 1993 the famous institute *al-Ma'had al-'Ālamī li al-Fikr al-Islāmī* (The International Institute of Islamic Thought) in Herndon brought out its next edition. M. El Erian rendered the book into English under the title *The Right to Nationality Status of non-Muslim Citizens in a Muslim Nation* and was published by *The Islamic Foundation of America* in 1990.

The book is actually compilation of a lecture series which the author during his incarceration delivered in the *Masjid* of the prison *Barij al-Rūmī* in the year 1984.⁶ In the book, Ghannūshī puts forth the view that Islam guarantees fundamental rights to one and all irrespective of color, caste, creed, race, or any other conventional label. While discussing about *al-Dawlah al-Islāmīyyah* (Islamic State), he says that it stands for *al-Dawlah al-'Ālmīyyah* (Universal State) that rises above from all inequitable distinctions based on gender, nationality, or language. He further elaborates that the *Qur'ān* lays emphasis on the unity of human beings and the difference in color or gender that Allah has made is not to spread rancor and discrimination; rather, the sole purpose is to know and become familiar with one another. For him, those residing in *Dār al-Islām* (Abode of Islam) that is Muslims as well as non-Muslims signify “one community”.⁷

Ghannūshī goes on to point out that Islam guarantees fundamental rights to one and all and among them the foremost is the “right to equality” (*Haqq al-Masāwāt*) followed by “right to freedom” (*Haqq*

al-Huriyyah). According to him, “right to freedom” covers both freedom of thought and freedom of Faith.⁸ In short, the book is a comprehensive debate on diverse topics like equality, justice, freedom, community, rights of non-Muslims (for which he uses the term *Huqūq al-Muwāṭanah* and not *Ahl al-Dhimmah*), religious rights, and property rights that are guaranteed and recognized by Islam.

4.4 MUQĀRIBĀT FĪ AL-‘ILMĀNIYYAH WA AL-MUJTAMA‘ AL-MADANĪ (APPROACHES TO SECULARISM AND CIVIL SOCIETY)

Maghreb Center for Researches and Translation based in London published the book *Muqāribāt* in the year 1999. This 204 page book is a comparative analysis between secularism and Islam *vis-à-vis* the various important concepts necessary for the establishment of a truly civilized society. The high-sounding hypes the West is propounding to show that their philosophy of ethics, politics, and economics is ideal in building a civilized society are discussed in the book. Ghannūshī crosschecks the various aspects of an ideal society and how well each is accomplished on the bases of secularist and Islamic principles. The book deals with such issues as freedom, justice, the national society, the civil society, equality, politics, culture, and modernism. Apart from other observations, the book figures out that the Western civilization and laws are partial, chauvinistic, egocentric, and materialistic in nature.

4.5 MIN AL-FIKR AL-ISLĀMĪ FĪ TŪNIS (FROM THE ISLAMIC THOUGHT IN TUNISIA)

Divided into volumes, the work⁹ is an attempt to diagnose and characterize multifariously the retarded situation of Tunisia in particular and the Muslim World in general. The author in this work describes the etymology of the illness and reaches the conclusion that the problem lies in the Tunisian man who was forcefully uprooted from his natural Islamic environment to a diametrically different Western cultural environment. The secularist westernized elites tried to replace the Islamic culture with a Western one, by means of arms, intelligence, etc. All governmental systems were oriented in such a way so as to de-Islamize the Muslim society, and as a consequence, the Islamic Movement was suppressed despite its

wide public acceptance. Therefore, Ghannūshī in this work criticizes the Western lifestyle the elites were offering as an alternative to Islam. The author associates the false call to democracy and secularism with despotism and tyranny. The Western example proved to be inefficient since it is only concerned with man as a body, divesting him from spirituality and morality. Moreover, man was viewed and exploited as a device of production.

Ghannūshī's aim is the upliftment of man from the abyss of materialism, capitalism, and secularism to a higher level where he secures a strong relation with his Creator—Allah. In this work, he successfully and convincingly proves that the Islamic model is aptly capable of establishing a civilization, wherein man is truly dignified and coexists with the others in peace, tranquility, and harmony, and wherein justice, equity, and freedom are realistically implemented.

4.6 *AL-QADAR 'INDA IBN TAYMIYYAH* (PREDESTINATION: IBN TAYMIYYAH'S PERSPECTIVE)

Maghreb Center for Researches and Translation based in London has published this book in 1999.¹⁰ In this book, Rāshid al-Ghannūshī examines and explores the concept of “predestination” in the context of the ideas professed by one of the leading Islamic thinkers, Ibn Taymiyyah. Ghannūshī in this work argues that Ibn Taymiyyah, who lived wholeheartedly for the revival of the spirit of Islam as the religion of progress and civilization through his zeal-inspiring writing, realizes that dependence, passivity, and fatalism were among the notions that led to the civilizational degeneration and deadlock of the Muslims. This is the case of the Muslims which set them at the back of the file of nations. Exploring the beleaguered history of Islamic civilization, it seems that he discovered that the Muslims middle ages were an epoch of retardation and regress due to some reasons. However, at those times there were some voices which were aware of the debacle and therefore took some steps to correct the erroneous notions that were responsible for inhibiting renovation and revival. One of such largely audible voices was that of Ibn Taymiyyah who lived when self-denial, fatalism, and passive following of Islam were rampant and represented the seminal cause for the intellectual and civilizational setback.

People at those times fluctuated between two notions: first, fatalism which sets man as a receptive agent in this world where he is compelled to be what he is by fate and is therefore not responsible for the mishaps that betide him, and second, unlimited free will of man where the

Creator is reduced to a watching spectacle having no power over man's actions and portraying man as able to effect things in the dimension of Allah against His will.

Ibn Taymiyyah, the active revivalist man, tried to demonstrate through his discussions of "Qadar" or "Predestination" from the true Islamic perspective, the misunderstanding of which undermined the Muslims' intellectual and civilizational vigor and impaired sweeping progress of the earlier centuries.

To confront the two extreme tendencies or trends, Ibn Taymiyyah had to investigate and comprehend the schools that existed and whose understanding of "Qadir" was erroneous and incomplete according to his understanding of Qur'ān and Sunnah. For that, he had to launch a severe campaign against Jahmism (representing extremist fatalism), Mu'tazilism (extreme upholders of man's free will), and Asharism which tried to strike a middle path between but was not totally clear of the influence of either. This school affirmed that Allah is the creator of man's actions who is merely an earner of those actions by means of the power that Allah creates in him during his actions. This school went as far as to deny the causality law which seems to govern every iota of existence. Things that coexist such as fire and burning, water and extinguishing, and the like are made like that by the will of Allah but not that the first is a "cause" for the other. They opted this in order to negate any power to be attributed to these causes. Allah is the creator of everything.

It was a brief description and an account of some of the important works of Ghannūshī that was presented above. In addition to these works, he has authored a plenty of other books as well and some of them along with their publication details are mentioned below:

- (I) *Al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyyah wa Mas'alah al-Taghyir* [The Islamic Movement and the Issue of Change] (London: Maghreb Center for Researches and Translation, 2000)
- (II) *Al-Mabādī al-Asāsiyah li al-Dimuqrātiyah wa Usūl al-Hukm al-Islāmī* [The Basic Principles of Democracy and the Fundamentals of Islamic Governance] (Casablanca: Al Furqan Publications, 1994)
- (III) *Ṭarīqunā ilā al-Ḥaḍārah* [Our Way to Civilization] (Tunis: al-Ma'rifah Publications, 1975)
- (IV) *Al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyyah wa al-Taḥdīth* (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1980)
- (V) *Maqālāt* (Articles) (Paris: Dār al-Karāwān, 1984).

These works themselves represent the inquisitiveness and fervor of Ghannūshī to contribute to the field of academics on the one hand and his response to the present-day challenges on the multifarious issues on the other. His writings broadly encompass social, religious, political, philosophical, and other important issues. One of the significant features of his works is their popularity among the academicians, politicians, analysts, and researchers, who are heavily engaged in understanding the pros and cons of his thought and ideology. This is manifest enough from the fact that many of his books have been translated into different languages such as English, French, Turkish, Urdu, and Persian and have been published from the reputed academic institutions and publishing houses of the countries such as Egypt, Iran, Tunisia, Turkey, and Algeria.

In the concluding remarks, it can be well established that Ghannūshī encountered with a number of diverse challenges throughout his life. The different circumstances and challenges that he met had a definite and everlasting impact on him that eventually brought a transition in his thought and ideology and led him to evolve as a reformer, activist, thinker, and political leader. With his intellectual and academic capacity, he succeeded in establishing and leading a political party, *Ḥizb al-Nahḍah*—a pragmatic exposition of his religio-political ideology—that in the current times forms one of the dominant political denominations in Tunisia. With his prolific writings and appealing intellectual discourses, he has maintained his unequivocal leadership in the party and has thereby profusely spread his views regarding various issues of diverse natures that have highly engaged the contemporary world’s intellectual class.

NOTES

1. Rāshid al-Ghanūshī, *Al-Ḥurriyyāt al-‘Āmah fī al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah* [Civil Liberties in the Islamic State] (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al-‘Arabiyyah, 1993).
2. Azzam Tamimi, “Rashid al-Ghannushi,” in John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 217.
3. Azzam S. Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat Within Islamism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 62.
4. Al-Qur’ān, *Sūrah al-Baqarab*, Āyat: 256.

5. Rāshid al-Ghanūshī, *al-Mar'ah Bayn al-Qur'ān wa Wāqi' al-Muslimīn* (London: al-Markaz al-Maghāribī li al-Buhūth wa al-Tarjumah, 2000).
6. Rāshid al-Ghanūshī, *Huqūq al-Muwāṭanah: Huqūq ghayr al-Muslim fī al-Mujtama' al-Islāmī* (Herndon: *Al-Ma'had al-'Ālamī li al-Fikr al-Islāmī*, 1983), p. 30.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 65–66.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 66–67.
9. Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, *Min al-Fikr al-Islāmī fī Tūnis* [From the Islamic Thought in Tunisia] (*Dār al-Qalām*, 1992).
10. Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, *Al-Qadir 'Inda Ibn Taymiyyah* (London: al-Markaz al-Maghāribī li al-Buhūth wa al-Tarjumah, 1999).



Rāshid al-Ghannūshī on Islam–West Relationship and Human Rights

Abstract It critically explores the views, opinions, and arguments of Rāshid al-Ghannūshī presented to define and solve the issue(s) of Islam–West relationship and human rights. It first discusses the historical relationship between Islam and the West and then focuses on how Rāshid al-Ghannūshī deals with this issue. The chapter, next, describes the debate on human rights. In this part, major focus is placed on the issues of Apostasy and rights of women in light of the rhetoric of al-Ghannūshī. The main argument in this chapter about “Islam-West relationship” is that while in the style and approach of Rāshid al-Ghannūshī the dose of “pragmatism” dominates the dose of “cynicism,” the need and acceptability of selective synthesis of Islam and Western global norms is preached.

Keywords Islam · West · Human rights · Freedom · Apostasy
Status of women

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The contemporary Muslim thinkers and reformers such as Shaykh Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, while endeavoring to revive the Muslim society, heavily emphasize on reconciling Faith—through continuous reinterpretation of Islam—with modern or in other words “Western derived global ideals” like democracy, human rights, pluralism, scientific development,

progress, and equality.¹ With an aspiration to make Islam compatible with the frequently changing environment, Ghannūshī together with other like-minded reformers is engaged in developing and framing various philosophies and responses fitting the modern challenges.² In the words of Graham E. Fuller:

Islamists are struggling, like so much of the rest of the developing world, with the genuine dilemmas of modernization: rampant change of daily life and urbanization at all levels, social dislocation and crisis, the destruction of traditional values, the uncertain threats of globalization, the need for representative and competent governance, and the need to build just societies and to cope with formidable political, economic, and cultural challenges from the West.³

From one country to the other, Islamic Movements and activists, embarking on reform and revival, represent a variety of forms and spectra. Yet, according to Esposito, there are recurrent themes that broadly characterize all these movements and reformers. Such themes include: failure of prevailing sociopolitical and economic systems; a disenchantment with, and at times a rejection of, the West; a quest for identity; and the conviction that Islam provides a self-sufficient ideology (*al-Islām huwa al-Ḥal*) for State and society—a valid alternative to secular nationalism, socialism, and capitalism.⁴

The Muslim reformers, including Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, thus, endeavor to reconcile Islam with the modern issues. The fact is that the encounter of Muslims with the West especially in the last decades of the nineteenth century resulted in the emergence of two very significant polarities among the Muslims, “Traditional and Western-oriented.” “Muslim views of the West and responses to its power and ideas” according to Esposito “varied from rejection and confrontation to admiration and imitation.”⁵ With an objective to improve the lot of the Muslims, the Muslim reformers and activists aspired to bridge the gap between the two by calling the masses to follow the *Qur’ān* and *Sunnah* and also adopt not all but some ideals and norms of the West which, according to them, are consistent with Islam.⁶ They, while condemning Western cultural aggression, call for the acceptance of science and technology and the pace of which, according to them, is to be subordinated to Islamic belief and values.⁷

The philosophy of Ghannūshī reflects one of the voices that call for reconsideration, rethinking, and reorientation of Islamic traditions, values, and institutions. He deserves, in this regard, unrestricted appreciation and credit for his earnest intellectual endeavors and efforts coupled with social activism as well. It is he who has brought about the transformation of *al-Nahḍah*'s worldview from *old* to *new*. Apart from being the founder of the Movement, he has also maintained his position and status in the party as its foremost leader and the principal ideologue. Therefore, seen in this light, it entails to make a profound observation and analysis of Ghannūshī's views *vis-à-vis* contemporary challenges.

5.2 ISLAM–WEST RELATIONSHIP

The history of Islam–West relationship and interaction is long; represented more or less by contempt, conflict, and confrontation—political and theological. This relationship was dominated in the old times mostly by the legacy of Crusades and in the modern times by the modern colonial and neocolonial heritage. The decline of Muslim power shaped the dependence of the Muslim world on the West politically, economically, and culturally and also formed one of the basic repercussions of the European colonial legacy. It compelled the Muslim intellectuals to delve deep into the malaise and come up with a new inspiring model. Moreover, the significant impact and the influence of the West affected the Muslim reforms so much so that it became inevitable to have its remedy “now or never.” Subjects like Western politics, economics, and social setup were the main themes discussed within the circle of Islamic groups and reformers. *Ḥizb al-Nahḍah*'s leader, Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, produced books and articles touching extensively the theme—relation of Islam with the West. It seems that the circumstances demanded to deliberate on such an important issue in order to find satisfactory answers to so many fundamental questions, for example, Why the Muslim society became an early prey of the West? Why the Muslims lost their status of being torchbearers for all? And how the West progressed?

Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, as a Muslim thinker, endeavors to revitalize the Muslim society and in doing so, unlike the other Islamic reformers especially those belonging to *Ḥizb al-Tahrīr* and *Salafis*, he follows a moderate approach toward the West. The fact is that Ghannūshī is recognized in the contemporary times as the most moderate Islamic activist, for he not only

acknowledges many key concepts of Western philosophy but also urges the Muslims to emulate them. Islamic activists “may have lot of criticism of Western values” argues Ghannūshī “yet we are seeking refuge in such atheist countries because we appreciate the benefits of freedom and the value of democracy.”⁸ Though moderate in approach, yet, he does not fail to point out the “vices” the West has cultivated while it was emerging as a “supreme force” in the world. He while admiring democratic character, progress in the field of science and technology, and the various freedoms available in the West, duly cautions Muslims about West’s malevolent consequences as well. In this regard, Esposito and Voll opine that:

He sees a West that in its dark ages turned to Islam (Islamic philosophy and sciences), and subsequently a Muslim world that in seeking to overcome its years of decline has turned to the West and its institutions. He acknowledges the sources of Western superiority, its science and technology, fostering of a sense of personal responsibility, individual rights, and freedoms, and the belief that government is a servant of the people and that people have a right to rebel against a government that denies their rights and independence. However, he also condemns the radical individualism of Western society, which leads to an “enslavement to an earthly paradise of materialism”.⁹

Moreover, for Ghannūshī, Western society is basically “human centered” or “man god” in its outlook, while as Islamic society is “Allah centered” or “man—the vicegerent.” The West considers man as the master of the universe—a vision contrary to Islam that posits Allah as the central and ultimate power and value in the universe.¹⁰

Ghannūshī actually attempts to reconcile positives of the West with that of Islam on the one hand and rejects its gloomy dimension on the other. While acknowledging the ascendancy of the West in the field of science and technology, he and his Movement disapproves its radical individualism, capitalist exploitation, and moral corruption. He criticizes the West and the westernized intellectuals on some issues but at the same time appreciates and upholds their role in proclaiming the values of freedom and equality. Evidently, in light of this, his Movement, *al-Nahdah*, is ambitious to preserve and safeguard Tunisian identity by reconciling Islam with modernity and development.¹¹ Moreover, Ghannūshī’s approach toward the West is ambivalent one—of admiration and condemnation—desiring genuine coexistence and at the same time remaining critical of its intentions and values. He maintains: “What sets the two

worlds apart, however, is the difference in their perception of the fundamental concepts, or ‘effective ideas,’ that move their cultures: the value and the place of humanity in the universe.”¹² At another place, he warns of the danger underlying West’s dark face as follows:

I am not one who calls for closing the door to other experiences, but the bottom line is that our societies in the Islamic world are based on other values than those of the West. In Western societies, secularism is a sort of religion. The worship of the mind in France, for example, is a religion. In Islam there is no such option.¹³

According to Ghannūshī, secularism can be ideal for the West as they have limited the role of religion up to the four walls of Church only; however, there is no such need in the Muslim world where the relation between Islam and political power is not obviated. If the Muslims have to progress and have to change their dreary situation, then according to him, the way forward is to revive the endeavors of the pioneers like Khayr al-Dīn al-Tūnisī (leader of the reform movement in Tunisia who warned against total rejection of that what comes from the other, i.e., West), Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ‘Abdūh, and ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Tha‘alibī. Muslims have to borrow from the West, as Khayr al-Dīn used to say, “a substance that would revive the Muslims.”¹⁴ The major concern in this regard that continuously agonized Ghannūshī, as presented by Tamimi, when he interviewed him, was:

[T]he real challenge was how to realize the gains of Western progress without sacrificing Islam, how to challenge the claim of the Westernized elite in his country that the fruits of Western “progress” could only be reaped by doing away with Islam. Such a task, he thought, required an enormous amount of collective effort on part of contemporary Islamic thinkers and Islamic movements worldwide. The objective would be to realize, within the framework of a modern Islamic *ijtihād*, the gains Westerners had accomplished and then seek to surpass them. The concern of the Muslims, therefore, should no longer be how to resist modernity [or] how to destroy the accomplishments of the Western mind. ... [Rather, according to him] the real challenge [is] to find ways and means for incorporating such accomplishments, and then excelling them, without undermining the foundations of Islam or the independence and identity of the Muslims.¹⁵

In fact, with the help of *Ijtihād* or by reinterpreting various institutions of Islam, Ghannūshī acknowledges the democratic system of the

West and recognizes it as a method of running the society in a smooth way. He also affirms that the problem of the Muslims is not with democracy and its institutions per se, rather with the secular and nationalistic values operating in its backdoor.¹⁶ At another place, he stresses that the unwelcome thing in the Western democracy is that it “separated body and soul, then ignored the soul, killed it, declared war against God and fought ferociously to put the human being in His place” as quoted in Mohamed El Hachmi Hamdi, *The Politicisation of Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia* (Colorado: West view press, 1998), p. 104.

Amid praising the West, Ghannūshī in a critical tone highlights its double standard. He alleges the West for its “hypocritical approach,” while dealing with the Muslims. He further maintains that the West failed to understand the issues and challenges the Arab region is currently encountering are actually a response to decades long oppression and injustice. The main feature of his thought is his critique of the West not through the lens of Islam but through the latter’s own formulated values and ideals. According to him, West’s biased approach is evident—seeing its continuous support to the oppressive regimes on the one hand and its false commitment to support democratic movements in the world on the other. To quote him:

We have an apologist tendency to plead the Western case, giving them the benefit of the doubt, for not understanding us or current events in our region. Yet how can the West be excused its alleged naivetè when they consider even the concept of a single party parliament abhorrent? If the disease is vaccinated in their system, is it not clear that the tyranny in Tunisia has no relation to democracy and must also be cured?¹⁷

Ghannūshī here actually criticizes the West not on the ground of philosophy but on its permanent backing to the undemocratic regimes, oppressive in character. The West, argues Ghannūshī, was not true to its own pledges, promises, and principles to support the democratic personalities and movements, as claimed most of the times. Ghannūshī’s critical tone about the West continues:

[The Western] Ethics and human rights are subservient to interests; values are only necessary if they will bring to power ‘liberals’ ... but they are dispensable [as the case of Algeria stands witness] if the result is power for the genuine and sincere children of the land ...¹⁸

Although criticizing the West for its biased approach, Ghannūshī never calls for a complete closure of relations of the Muslims with the West.

There are two possible trends, according to him, for the future of Muslim–West relationship. The first trend, *hitherto* continuing, is West’s “hostility” and “hypocrisy” toward Islam and the Muslims. It is being sponsored by portraying Islam and the Muslims as adversative to peace, prosperity, and development. A variety of factors, argues Ghannūshī, are responsible for such a representation. These range *from, among others*, historical Muslim–West relations, hostile media, dogmatic-prejudiced Western scholarship undermining Islam, and conspiratorial attitude against the Muslim world *to* Muslim antipathy toward West’s accomplishments in the field of democracy, civil liberties, and human rights. The rhetoric, therefore, suggests that Ghannūshī spares neither West nor Muslims and blames both for such a *status quo* between the two currents.¹⁹ He says that if such an attitude—on both planes—continued then, possibly, it will have damaging effect on the already polarized–precarious bilateral relationship.

Hoping and aspiring for profitable and productive Muslim–West relations, the second trend according to Ghannūshī is to improve and develop the mutual relations. In this regard, while calling for reconciliation, the statement quoted below embodies his concern and future aspiration:

... we [emphasizing on his movement, *al-Nabdhah*] have chosen to renew our efforts for a constructive dialogue [between the West and the Islamic world]. Everybody knows that our movement has always been striving to achieve this goal. We are confidently continuing our efforts to eliminate the reservations and the intolerance existing between Islam and the West: on one hand, an Islam hastily judged to be a threat to democracy and freedom, on the other hand, a West hastily judged to be a dominator and oppressor. We hope that, for the sake of peace and harmony in the world, we can increase the level of mutual understanding, peaceful coexistence and cooperation.²⁰

The above discussion unveils, in short, as highlighted by Khaled Elgindy, that two things characterize the approach of Ghannūshī and his movement toward Islam–West relations. He says: “*Pragmatism* combined with a dose of *cynicism* characterizes Ghannushi’s approach to relations with the West. His attitude toward the West is ambivalent, desiring genuine coexistence on one hand while remaining critical of [not all but some] of Western intentions and values [like secularism, radical individualism, and moral corruption] on the other.”²¹ Overall in the style and approach of Rāshid al-Ghannūshī toward the West, the dose of “pragmatism” dominates the dose of “cynicism,” wherein the need and acceptability of selective synthesis of Islam and Western global norms is thoroughly preached.

5.3 HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights, the hotly debated issue in the 1970s Muslim world, set into engagement the diverse denominations like governments, political activists, civil society members, intellectuals, thinkers, and even common people. Though not a novel development,²² the phenomenon rather represented a renewed interest in many issues including democracy and secularism. The idea of human rights as is claimed by the West originated from the *Magna Carta* of Britain.²³ Paradoxically, *Magna Carta* came into existence six hundred years after the advent of Islam. It, therefore, speaks about the level of West's of attributing everything, which is good, to itself. West had no concept of human rights at all before the seventeenth century, says Abū A'lā Mawdūdī.²⁴ He further states that although the philosophers and thinkers talked about these ideas still the representation of these concepts can be found in the proclamations and constitutions of America and France that too at the expiry of eighteenth century.²⁵ About the ideological and institutional arrangements of human rights, Farid Esack, a South African Muslim thinker, is of the view:

Human rights are only two hundred years old. The ideology and the institutional arrangements of human rights were born after unprecedented forms of social and personal deprivation took root among the "developed" peoples of the world. The regime of the nation-state fusing nationalism and statehood was constructed at this same time, to keep the social order in a society exposed to forces of the modern market reducing the human condition to that of *homo aeconomicus*.²⁶

This was followed by the passing of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in the twentieth century by the United Nations. The Declaration (of 1948) is just an expression of a pious hope without any pragmatic observation.²⁷ Moreover, UDHR or the rights conferred by the legislative assemblies, argues Mawlānā Mawdūdī, are ephemeral and evanescent. On the other hand, the rights granted by Islam are not only lasting but also devoid of alteration and change. No one has the authority to abrogate or to withdraw them for these rights are part and parcel of the Islamic Faith.²⁸

The pertinent issue now at the hand is to explore and examine the approach and philosophy of Ghannūshī toward the concept of human rights. Consequently, significant is also to find an answer to the very question that whether he stands for compatibility or incompatibility of

Islam and human rights. His book, *al-Hurriyyāt*,²⁹ in this regard, will definitely represent the core strand of thought. Therefore, in the subsequent sections, the engagement will mainly revolve around Ghannūshī and the book mentioned.

In this book, Ghannūshī has presented a general paradigm of human rights in Islam, and according to him, it is based on people's welfare. The general welfare should not be breached, and therefore, what is needed is to maintain both individual and communal rights. Ghannūshī further states that whenever individual rights encroach on the rights of the society or community, the rights of the latter should be given precedence. Further, the whole legislative system, which is based on the "Intent of *Shari'ah*" (*Maqāṣid al-Shari'ah*), is the criterion against which every right or duty should be checked. He says that the individual can enjoy limitless freedom and rights unless he opposes truth or violates the rights of the community.³⁰ He has divided these rights into headings and subheadings which include, *among others*, right to freedom of religion, right to freedom of thought and expression, right to work, right to build family, right to social security, and right to own property.³¹

Al-Hurriyyāt is a concentrated effort by Ghannūshī aimed at underscoring that Islam guarantees individual rights, public liberties, and protects the rights of political and religious minorities as well as the rights of the women. It was the period (when Ghannūshī had started this work) that witnessed heavy engagement and interest in, *inter alia*, the issues of Apostasy and its relationship with individual, political, and religious freedom and the compatibility of Islam and democracy. He, therefore, attempted to provide the answers to the challenging questions raised and respond to those who had started a malicious propaganda against Islam.³² This was the time when, according to him, "the presentation of unequivocal answers to the challenges facing Islamic thought ... had become an indispensable epistemological necessity for the Tunisian Islamic Movement."³³

5.3.1 *Concept of Freedom*

In his book, *al-Hurriyyāt*, Ghannūshī, while elaborating the "Western concept of freedom (حول مفاهيم الحرية في الغرب),"³⁴ opines that (to emancipate man from all types of restrictions that deprive him of fulfilling his needs and desires) freedom in West is seen to be man's ability to revolt against the societal system to fulfill his own caprices. This has endangered, says Ghannūshī, the interests of the whole society. On the

other hand, contemporarily much space has been provided for the individual freedom reflected in the constitutions and laws of the so-called advanced democratic countries. However, there are no practical steps, according to him, taken for the individual to realize such rights, therefore, limiting his freedom to theory only. The fact is that the political power, means of education, communication, and economy are concentrated in the hands of few. These people by virtue of these powers manipulate and govern the thinking and conviction of the subject(s) who are theoretically equal to him or them.³⁵

An individual's nature is characterized by the philosophy that he aims to be his own master. He, therefore, desires that his decisions should be his own—devoid of any influence or interference from external forces. However, it is inevitable that there should be some agency that would check and balance his empirical bundle of uncontrolled human desires. Islam recognizes the realization of human desires in a lawful and controlled manner that would obviously lead and guide an individual toward the servitude of Allah alone.

Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, while discussing Islamic concept of freedom, associates human rights and freedom with *‘Aqīdab* (Islamic Faith) and says that it means belief in Allah alone. *‘Aqīdab*, for him, is the highest source of legal authority that provides the believers sense of equality and intimacy. It is a revolt against all idols of worship and sinking into the servitude of Allah alone.

إن الحرية في التصور الإسلامي أمانة، أي مسؤولية، وعي بالحق والتزام به،

“Freedom in Islamic view”, according to him, “is a trust or responsibility (*Amānah*), understanding the truth, committing to it and devoting oneself to it.”³⁶

Ghannūshī has presented the definitions of freedom of some eminent scholars such as ‘Alāl al-Fāsī, Ḥasan al-Turābī, ‘Abbās al-Madanī and has tried, thereof, to evolve his own views about the subject. For instance, discussing and drawing on the Turābī's view of freedom, he says that: “(مخلوق في الطبيعة وكلما زاد إخلاصاً في العبودية لله زاد تحرراً من كل) the more an

individual demonstrates servitude to Allah the freer he becomes from all created beings.”³⁷

Comparing and contrasting the evolution of freedom and human rights in the West and in the Muslim world, Ghannūshī says that the former represented the realization of human rights based on the transition of power from the “church” or “politics” to the “masses” who later had absolute right of legislation. However, the situation is different in the latter even in times of regress. There was no such separation in the Muslim world, maintains Ghannūshī, between ruler and the ruled; therefore, all reformation attempts sought to go back to the original sources. The ruler was bound by them and had no authority to formulate new laws or levy taxes beyond Islamic ordinances.³⁸ So, at the theoretical level, for Ghannūshī, freedom in Islam means absolute servitude to Allah and at practical level Muslims did not fall into the abyss of concentrating authority of legislation into the hands of fallible men.

5.3.2 *The Question of Riddah (Apostasy)*

Ghannūshī has dealt with this issue by starting with the definition of *Riddah* (Apostasy). He says that it is an act of conscious and deliberate reversion from *belief* (Islam) to *unbelief* (*Kufr*) by abnegating Islam’s fundamental beliefs (*‘Aqā’id*) and rites (*Sha‘ā’ir*). Its various forms include abnegation of Prophethood, authorization of prohibitions, and negation of obligations.³⁹ While discussing this significant issue, Ghannūshī offers and introduces the views of two groups. His treatment of this matter actually revolves around two questions: Is *Riddah* a religious offense that men cannot intervene in? And is it a political crime left to the discretion of a ruler or a *Qādi*?⁴⁰

The first group—which forms the majority in every period (classical, medieval, and modern)—are of the opinion that *Riddah* is a “religious offence” related to Allah; therefore, no one has right to decide otherwise. According to this group, the retribution to an apostate is that he or she is to be killed because no one is entitled to embrace Islam except with full awareness. Thus, none has the authority to abjure Islam after embracing it. This does not fall within “compulsion,” for it means forcing people to leave their religions and embrace Islam forcefully.⁴¹ This notion is absolutely alien to Islam according to the famous command of the *Qur’ān* that reads *there is no compulsion in Dīn*.

The second group, who mostly belong to the modern period, accept *Riddah* as a “political offence” tantamount to raising arms against the State. For this group, *Riddah* is an act of sedition, mutiny or treason, and the retribution of which is not predefined. So, according to this group (small in size), the punishment should be left to the decision of the ruler or a *Qāḍī*, keeping in view the preservation of community and maintenance of law and order.⁴²

Ghannūshī’s saying that “we subscribe to the opinion of the second group (نرجح الرأي الثاني ونحن)”⁴³ explicitly demonstrates his standing on the critical issue of *Riddah*. Stating that the *Ashāb* unanimously agreed on fighting an apostate (عنهم على قتال المرتدين وأجمع الأصحاب رضي الله)⁴⁴ together with avouching the preponderance of the view of the first group and yet subscribing to the opinion of the second one is really strange—keeping in view that it dismisses the argument of the majority. It shows that he either fails to absorb the pressure—within and beyond—posed by the West and “Westoxicated” minds or for some petty gains or vested political interests he consciously is sticking to the opinion of the minority. Perhaps the reasons provided may be far from truth or may be inadequate; the position of Ghannūshī in this regard is also far from being justifiable as well.

5.4 STATUS OF WOMEN

From last two centuries up to now, the issues ranging *from* segregation of the genders, *Hijāb*, and woman’s place in the home as faithful wife, to the working of women outside their homes continue to be a disturbing topic for one and all. In the contemporary societies and in the name of status and rights of women, it is witnessed that women’s empowerment is linked and interlinked with the slogan that they need to come out of their houses, uncover themselves, and do whatever they wish. Such a predicament posed a serious challenge to the Muslim scholars to have an appropriate and fitting response. The voices that were, thus, raised by the Muslim scholars represented a variety of explanations and approaches. The scholars with traditional approach produced vast literature warning as well as condemning the participation of women in sociopolitical matters—resulting in free mixing of opposite genders (an act strictly prohibited in Islam). This group, representing the opinion of the majority, maintain that the role of women is to run the affairs of the home as good mothers and good wives.

5.4.1 *Rhetoric of Rāshid al-Ghannūshī on the Status of Women*

For Ghannūshī, the status of women was a critical issue that needed to be discoursed thoroughly. Therefore, he demonstrated his position about the women rights in a detailed manner in his own book titled—*al-Mar’ah bayn al-Qur’ān wa Waqī’al-Muslimīn* (Women: Between the Qur’ān and the Present Conditions of the Muslims). In this work, while remaining much concerned about promoting anti-secular ideas among the Muslim societies in general and among the Tunisians in particular, it is observed that Ghannūshī propounds almost the same views as propounded by the earlier pioneers like Muḥammad ‘Abdūh.⁴⁵ He touches almost all the issues related to the rights of women, but here it is desirable to mention briefly some of them that are hotly discussed and debated: (a) polygamy, (b) dress, (c) education, (d) work, and (e) mixing of the genders.

In the first case—polygamy, Ghannūshī adheres to the arguments of the modern Muslim thinkers. According to him, monogamy is “original,” but not always. In certain specific situations wherein the proportion of men and women gets disturbed, polygamy is a fitting and a proper remedial option. He regards polygamy as the very basic and safe mechanism to overcome the crisis,⁴⁶ emerging out of some untoward situations. Islam is a religion, he claims, that is in total conformity with the human nature. In certain cases where some unevenness prevails in such a natural State, the circumstances at that time demand men to have more than one wife. But this is only in extraordinary situations; otherwise, the original is “monogamy” says Ghannūshī.⁴⁷ He not only emphasizes the “distinctive nature” of polygamy but also maintains that the practice is legal provided a man has no apprehension at all of committing injustice for the *Qur’ān* explicitly declares (فَإِنْ خِفْتُمْ أَلَّا تَعْدِلُوا فَوَاجِدَةً) *But if you fear that you will not be able to deal justly, then only one* [al-*Qur’ān*, al-*Nisā’*: 3].⁴⁸

Muslim thinkers have recurrently debated over the public appearance of women, the dress, and the place where they appear. Deliberating on the issue of dress, Ghannūshī not only favors a long dress for the woman covering her whole body but also affirms that her head too should remain covered. He regards such type of dress highly valuable in terms of virtuousness (*Iffāh*) and decency (*Hismah*). Moreover, while taking into consideration the working of women with men outside their homes, he validates that women have every right to work actively in the process of social production as long as they put on Islamic dresses and behave in accordance with the teachings of Islam.⁴⁹

Scholars differ in their opinions about providing the education to a woman. Some believe that a woman should be given that quantum of education which will qualify her to be a good housewife. Ghannūshī, however, differs from this line of thinking and argues that such thinking is totally incompatible with the precepts and dispositions of Islam. He goes on to say that Islam has posed no such restriction at all on the education of women, for there are ample evidences that suggest, encourage, and motivate them to enrich themselves as well as their societies with the pearls of knowledge. Nevertheless, they should seek that sort of knowledge which is beneficial for them in both lives (this life and life to come).⁵⁰ He maintains that education is vital in many aspects:

[It is] through education, both women and men can be liberated from the dominant age of *inhibitat* and the horizons of women can be significantly expanded and their bondage to their present world of trivialities broken. Education can also offer an alternative model of a well-cultivated Islamic female to counter what he describes as Bourguibist permissiveness.⁵¹

The issue of a woman working outside is another issue vigorously debated and discussed. Concerning this subject, Ghannūshī safeguards his position by calling home as a perfect setting for a woman. However, he permits her to work outside although with certain prerequisites. He advocates that women can work outside, but it should not be at the cost of men's employment, as Islam never admonishes female employment especially at a time when the males are unemployed. He regards home as the woman's "natural place" where she can raise, in a better way, her children and thereof strengthen the family structure. Her prime role in the society, he says, is to take care of the family, and if need arises, then she can work outside as long as her employment is regulated in accordance with the precepts of Islam.

From this description, it can be discerned that he does not reject woman working outside; however, at the same time, he believes "home" a better or to be more appropriate a desired place for her.⁵² This view is further substantiated by Fāṭimah al-Ghannūshī, who relates that she had to say good-bye to her university career at the birth of her first child, when her husband persuaded her that a natural place for a woman is her home.⁵³

About the gender intermingling, Ghannūshī recognizes "complete segregation" something that is foreign to Islam. While discoursing on

the issue, he draws a sharp distinction between two types of gender mixing. He indicts the intermingling in such conditions conducive to sexual seduction—the presence of a man and a woman in a “suspicious circumstance.” Amid totally disapproving and rejecting the above-mentioned type of gender mixing, he promotes and advocates the presence of women in the circumstances where sexual temptation is most unlikely to arise, for example, gathering in a *Masjid*, in a battlefield, or in a session of learning.⁵⁴

In an article titled *Deficiencies in the Islamic Movement*, Ghannūshī has criticized Islamic Movements on several grounds. Drawing on the reasons amounting to the failures and deficiencies, he highlights that Islamic Movements have not addressed the issues of the women perfectly. He goes on to say that many Islamic activists have created a different atmosphere by spreading that women means veil, seclusion within the house, and fulfilling the desires of the men.⁵⁵ These people, according to him, have not only degraded the status of women but have also circumscribed their role in the social welfare activity—that is why many of them looked to the West as a “hope” for realizing their freedom and rights.⁵⁶

Criticizing these people and their ideology, Ghannūshī, in contrast, views that women like men have rights as well as duties to endeavor actively for a more viable and expedient sociopolitical and economic order.⁵⁷ This is practically apparent as well because Ghannūshī and his party *al-Nabḍah* have given more space to women, as compared to other political parties, to represent themselves in the sociopolitical affairs of the country. This viewpoint also suggests that many injustices were perpetrated against women that not only stopped them to realize their human potential but denied them the right to play their positive role in the society as well.

Such a stand of Ghannūshī regarding the issue of women has evoked both welcome and censure. However, at large, such rhetoric has opened the gate for the Tunisian women to engage themselves in sociopolitical affairs and also proved to be the beginning of a greater role of women in the society coupled with the amelioration of the bond between *al-Nabḍah* and the Tunisian women. Ghannūshī and *al-Nabḍah* have reiterated their statement that they, unlike other groups, believe in the equality of rights between men and women. In the words of Ghannūshī, they applied this principle in societies and in organization—manifested by the representation of its female members in Constituent Assembly.⁵⁸ The role of women within *al-Nabḍah* is continuously being

strengthened. The extensive (political) space given to the women further facilitates its female activism philosophy of Ghannūshī. Through this cloak of political activism, many females are now in a position to express themselves at various podiums regionally and globally that too on a level equal to that of males. In this way, it can be voiced that Ghannūshī makes them to remind that they are *or* can become an effective force in the struggle of reform.

NOTES

1. Charles Kurzman, "Modernism," in Richard C. Martin, ed., *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World* (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004), 2: 456.
2. David Commins, "Modernism," in John L. Esposito et al., eds., *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 4: 26 [Hereafter abbreviated as *OEIW*].
3. Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. xii.
4. John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 12.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
6. There are actually four significant approaches and responses from the Muslims that took shape while responding to the West: rejection; withdrawal; secularism and Westernization; and Islamic activism. The first one is rejection and opposition in *toto*; the second one is the approach of indifference (that is neutral approach); third one venerates the West fully and calls for its complete emulation and imitation; and the final one aspires to take that ingredient from the West which is fruitful and beneficial and accordingly, reject and refrain from that which is detrimental and fruitless. For more on this see, Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, *ibid.*, pp. 50–59; Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi, *Western Civilisation Islam and the Muslims*, trans., Mohammad Asif Kidwai (Lucknow: Academy of Islamic Research and Publications, 1979), pp. 9–11.
7. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
8. Ghannūshī, interview with Youssef M. Ibrahim, "An Islamic Fundamentalist Abroad Talks Freely on Limits of Freedom," *New York Times*, 9 January 1994, Section 4, p. 7.
9. John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 111–112.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

11. Katerina Dalacoura, *Islam, Liberalism and Human Rights: Implications for International Relations* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), p. 170.
12. For details see, Emad Eldin Shahin, “Ghannushi al-Rashid,” in John L. Esposito, et al., eds., *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 2: 310.
13. Khaled Elgindy, “The Rhetoric of Rashid Ghannushi,” *The Arab Studies Journal*, 3: 1, Spring, 1995: 101–119, p. 114.
14. Azzam S. Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat Within Islamism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 61.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Shahin, *Ghannushi al-Rashid*, op. cit., p. 310.
17. Rachid Ghannouchi, “The Battle Against Islam,” *Middle East Affairs Journal*, 1: 2, Winter, 1993, p. 37.
18. Rachid Al-Ghannouchi, “Secularism in the Arab Maghreb,” in John L. Esposito and Azzam S. Tamimi, eds., *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East* (London: Hurst and Company, 2000), p. 103.
19. Rachid Ghannouchi, “Islam and the West: Realities and Potentialities,” in Ahmed bin Yousef and Ahmed Abul Jobain, eds., *The Politics of Islamic Resurgence Through Western Eyes: A Bibliographic Survey* (Springfield, VA: United Association for Studies and Research, 1992), pp. 48–51. This paper was presented at a seminar sponsored by the *Centre for Democratic Studies*, London, University of Westminster, 6 October 1992. For publication purposes, Ahmed Abul Jobain, while utilizing both an existing literal translation done by Azzam S. Tamimi as well as the original Arabic text, translated and edited this paper.
20. See *The Renaissance Party in Tunisia: The Quest for Freedom and Democracy* (Washington, DC: American Muslim Council, 1991), p. 4.
21. Elgindy, op. cit., p. 114. The emphasis added in the quoted item is that of the author.
22. Simonetta Calderini, Senior Lecturer in Islamic Studies at Roehampton University, argues that many human rights organizations in the Islamic world date back to the 1930s; however, it is in the 1980s that these organizations not only proliferated but also established themselves more frequently in the legal and political arenas. See, Simonetta Calderini, “Women, Gender and Human Rights,” in Andrew Rippin, ed., *The Islamic World* (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 626.
23. *Magna Carta*, meaning “The Great Charter” (also called *Magna Carta Libertatum*—the Great Charter of the Liberties), issued by King John of England (r. 1199–1216) as a practical solution to the political crisis he faced in 1215, is one of the most famous documents in the world. It embodied that everybody, including the king, was subject to the law. Moreover, it granted “right to justice” and a “fair trial” to all the free

- men. Some of its core principles are echoed in the US Bill of Rights (1791), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and the European Convention on Human Rights (1950). For more information on this see, Claire Brey and Julian Harrison, "Magna Carta: an introduction," *British Library*, retrieved from <http://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-an-introduction> accessed on 5 November 2015.
24. Abul A'la Mawdudi, *Human Rights in Islam* (London: The Islamic Foundation, 1976), p. 13.
 25. Ibid.
 26. Farid Esack, "The Contemporary Democracy and the Human Rights Project for Muslim Societies Challenges for the Progressive Muslim Intellectual," in Abdul Aziz Said, Mohammed Abu-Nimer, and Meena Sharify-Funk, eds., *Contemporary Islam: Dynamic, Not Static* (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 120.
 27. Mawdudi, op. cit., p. 14.
 28. Ibid., pp. 14–15.
 29. Rāshid al-Ghanūshī, *al-Hurriyyāt al-ʿĀmah fī al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah* [Civil Liberties in the Islamic State] (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al-ʿArabiyyah, 1993).
 30. Ibid., pp. 42–43.
 31. Ibid., pp. 42–68.
 32. Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi*, op. cit., pp. 68–69.
 33. Ibid., p. 69.
 34. Ghannūshī, *al-Hurriyyāt*, op. cit., p. 31.
 35. Ibid., pp. 31–33.
 36. Ibid., p. 38.
 37. Ibid.
 38. Ibid., p. 39.
 39. Ibid., p. 48; Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi*, op. cit., p. 78.
 40. Ghannūshī, *al-Hurriyyāt*, ibid.
 41. Ibid., p. 49.
 42. Ibid.
 43. Ibid., p. 50.
 44. Ibid., p. 48.
 45. Muhammad Mahmoud, "Women and Islamism: The Case of Rashid al-Ghannushi of Tunisia," in Abdel Salam Sidhahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds., *Islamic Fundamentalism* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. 252.
 46. Ibid., p. 260.
 47. Anne Sofie Roald, *Women in Islam: The Western Experience* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 209.

48. Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, *Al-Mar'ah bayn al-Qur'ān wa Waqī'at-Muslimīn* [Women: Between the Qur'ān and the Present Conditions of the Muslims] (London: al-Markaz al-Maghāribī li al-Buhūth wa al-Tarjumah, 2000), p. 90.
49. Mahmoud, *Women and Islamism*, op. cit., pp. 259–260.
50. Ghannūshī, *Al-Mar'ah bayn al-Qur'ān*, op. cit., p. 89.
51. Mahmoud, *Women and Islamism*, op. cit., p. 258.
52. Ghannūshī, *Al-Mar'ah bayn al-Qur'ān*, op. cit., pp. 83–85.
53. Susan Waltz “Islamist Appeal in Tunisia,” *The Middle East Journal*, 40: 4, Autumn, 1986: 651–670, pp. 662–623.
54. For more on the issue of “Gender Intermingling”; see “Qaḍiyat al-Ikhtilāf,” in Ghannūshī, *Al-Mar'ah bayn al-Qur'ān*, op. cit., pp. 81–83; see also Mahmoud, *Women and Islamism*, op. cit., pp. 259–260.
55. Rachid Ghannouchi, “Deficiencies in the Islamic Movement,” *Middle East Report*, July–August 1988: p. 24.
56. Ibid.
57. Ghannouchi, *The Battle Against Islam*, op. cit., p. 7.
58. Speech delivered by Rāshid al-Ghannūshī at Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, on 8 April 2015. In this event, the author was present there and has recorded the statement himself. It should be noted that—as the lecture was in Arabic—wherever the reference will be cited, the translation will be that of the author.



Rāshid al-Ghannūshī on Democracy and Power-Sharing Debate

Abstract The first part of this chapter explores the views of some of the major Muslim (political) theorists and groups who strongly uphold that democracy is inherently adversative to Islam. Though, there is a brief mention of those Muslim theorists and groups who advocate Islam-Democracy compatibility, yet, because of the scope of study, the focus in the subsequent pages has been placed extensively on the view and vision of Rāshid al-Ghannūshī regarding the subject of Islam and Democracy. The final part of this chapter offers a detailed overview of (political) pluralism through a critical and deep examination of Ghannūshī’s “Power Sharing Theory.” The study also attempts to find out that on what grounds and what sort of motivations and contestations made him to favor the theory of “coexistence and cooperation” among the various political identities.

Keywords Islam · Democracy · Compatibility · Sovereignty
Pluralism · Cooperation

6.1 DEBATE: ISLAM-DEMOCRACY COMPATIBILITY OR INCOMPATIBILITY

Currently, there are two strong trends flowing in the Muslim world: Islamization and democratization. A serious debate, *hitherto* going on, within Islamic Movements, activists, and thinkers was and/or is

about Islam-Democracy relationship. The discourse revolved round two parameters as whether democracy did or did not challenge Islam. An investigation into the position adopted by various Islamic Movements and thinkers *vis-à-vis* democracy reveals liking/compatibility and disliking/incompatibility of democracy. For anti-democracy group or opponents, democracy is inherently adversative to Islam and for pro-democracy group or proponents, democracy is also inherently not adversative but in harmony with Islam. In the words of Kāmraṅ Bukhārī:

There exists a diversity of viewpoints ranging on one hand from those who view democracy as a value-neutral operational mechanism on the basis of which a modern Islamic state can be constructed, to those who see democracy as a value-laden concept that tries to elevate human reason above divine revelation and is hence seen as being tantamount to *kufṛ* (disbelief).¹

The issues of compatibility and incompatibility of democracy and the process of democratization, therefore, continue to remain the subject of vigorous debate.

Various Islamic currents and the reformists—associated with them or independent of them—if benefitting or in other words impressed by the thought and writings of the personalities like Sayyid Qutb, ‘Abd al-Qadīm Zallūm (1924–2003), Ayman al-Zawāhīrī (b. 1951), Taqī al-Dīn al-Nabhānī, etc., or the groups/movements like *Hizb al-Tahrīr*, *Salafis*, *Tanzīm-i-Islāmī*, *Taliban*, *National Islamic Front* of Sudan, *Jihādī* groups, etc., would then vehemently insist upon the antithesis of Islam and democracy. This trend rejects the theory that Islam and democracy are *or* can be compatible. It also argues that democracy is an ideology alien to Islam, therefore, has no recognition at all.

Sayyid Qutb, born and educated in Cairo, is not only considered to be the principal ideologue of *Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* but also regarded to be the most prominent modern-day Islamic thinker. For many, he is “the most significant thinker of Islamic resurgence in the modern Arab world”² rather, according to Esposito and Voll, in the whole Muslim world.³ Qutb believed that mankind was “on the brink of a precipice” because it sought refuge in Western civilization “devoid of vital values.”⁴ Western beliefs, institutions (including democracy), and way of life are, in the view of Qutb, inconsistent with Islam for it is totally “unable to present any healthy values for the guidance of mankind” and

also “it does not possess anything which will satisfy its own conscience and justify its existence.”⁵ Maintaining that only Islam owns such values and also the real way of life,⁶ Qutb, hence, makes it obligatory for the Muslims to “restore the umma [*Ummah*] to its original form in order for Islam to play its decisive role”⁷ and fight “those oppressive political systems which prevented [or prevents] others from freely choosing Islam.”⁸

Qutb also forcefully rejected any notion of popular sovereignty as a usurpation of Allah’s sovereignty and a form of tyranny for it subsumes the individual to the will of other individuals. He reminds that the only solution is to get engaged in duty of restoring the supremacy of divine command.⁹ The obligation, in his opinion, is not democracy (a value not in Islam) but the implementation and enforcement of *Shari‘ah*. Therefore, according to him, political system of any type can claim Islamic legitimacy provided it applies and enforces the *Shari‘ah*.¹⁰ “It is necessary,” believes Qutb, “that the believers in this Faith be autonomous and have power in their own society so that they may be able to implement this [Islamic] system and give currency to all its laws.”¹¹

‘Abd al-Qadīm Zallūm (one of the founding members of *Ḥizb al-Tahrīr*¹² and successor of Nabhānī) believes democracy to be the “System of Blasphemy” (*Nizām al-Kufr*) having no connection with Islam whatsoever. Democracy, according to him, “completely contradicts the rules of Islam whether in the comprehensive or partial issues, in the source from which it came, in the ‘*Aqedah* [‘*Aqīdah*] from which it emanated, in the basis on which it is established and in the thoughts and systems it has brought. That is why it is definitely forbidden for the Muslims to adopt, implement or call for it.”¹³ He actually argues that democracy, incommensurate with Islam, is a value of the *other* (Western word and a Western term) implying for the “ruling of the people, for the people by the legislation of the people.”¹⁴

The democracy of the blasphemous West failed to realize what it claims for; it never represents the “will of the people” or “majority” rather personifies the “business interests.” “The big capitalists” argues Zallūm “are the ones who bring to power or into the representative assemblies those who will realise their interests.” Thus, “[t]he laws passed in these parliaments, and the decisions issued by these states, take into consideration the interests of those capitalists more than the interests of the people or their majority.”¹⁵ Severest brassy *cum* brazen face of democracy is its idea of public liberties and general freedom. A disaster for humanity, this idea, besides disintegrating family structure, has

transformed the humans into the herds of beasts and animals (rather worse than them). West, which is free of moral and ethical inhibitions, is blatantly involved in animalistic promiscuity and homosexuality. Such a culture—in which West takes pride in and call people to—portrays nothing except the corruption, stench, and rottenness.¹⁶ It is not allowed at all for the Muslims to adopt democracy or Western culture or what emanates from this culture, since it is based on awarding absolute sovereignty to the people and excluding religion from life and from the State. Moreover, Muslims should reject democracy because according to Zallūm: “It is filth. It is the rule of *Taghut*. It is *Kufr*, thoughts of *Kufr*, systems of *Kufr*, [and] laws of *Kufr*, which have no connection to Islam whatsoever.”¹⁷

Ḥizb al-Tahrīr's primary ideologue, Taqī al-Dīn al-Nabhānī, is another prominent voice vehemently rejecting democracy and democratic system. In his work titled *Political Thoughts*, he, besides presenting a detailed exposition of the political system of Islam, calls democracy a man-made fanciful idea propagated by the West.¹⁸ The adoption of democracy—a sort of cultural invasion—not only leads to disaster but more importantly amounts to the rejection of the system of Allah. Democracy, wherein man's fallibility is given precedence over Allah's infallibility, is a system of *Kufr*, and ruling by the democratic system is tantamount to calling for a system of *Kufr*. Democracy contradicts the very ruling system of Islam, it is, therefore, according to Nabhānī, *Ḥarām* (unlawful and unauthorized) to adopt it or call for it.¹⁹

Ayman al-Zawāhirī (Egyptian *Al-Qā'idah* leader) thinks along the same lines as far as democracy is concerned. His ideology, in this regard, is based on the concept that democracy is a blasphemous thought designed by the West, particularly, against Islam. He opposes or is hostile toward democracy for the reason that it is *Shirk bi Allah*—assigning partners with Allah.²⁰ Differentiating between Islam and democracy, Zawāhirī maintains that in the former sovereignty rests with Allah whereas in the latter sovereignty rests with the people. *Tawḥīd* (monotheism), as Zawāhirī puts, means Allah is the legislator and democracy, in contradiction, corresponds to the legislator is the people. Therefore, democracy is a form of *Shirk* as it usurps the prerogative of legislation from Allah to the people. Subscribing to the idea that only Allah can be sovereign makes Zawāhirī to call democracy to be inimical to Islam. According to him, those who believe in democracy and thereof accept the rule of the people, like the present-day *Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*, commit *Shirk*. He further argues that the parliamentarians are the idols,

and those who elect them commit, by doing so, the arch-sin of *Shirk*. Participating in the process of democracy or in democratic elections, irrespective of stage and level, is, therefore, *Ḥarām* (unlawful) in Islam. Therefore, those involved in it are apostates and infidels.²¹

‘Abd al-Rashīd Mutin, Professor in the Department of Political Science, International Islamic University, Malaysia, who not only criticizes democracy but also expresses its incompatibility with Islam, by calling it “a Western construct”.²² The West, according to him, is making efforts constantly and earnestly to enforce and impress upon the Muslim countries the value of democracy, representing West’s program of extending and strengthening its cultural hegemony.²³ Therefore, those (to whom he calls) westernized Muslim thinkers and activists²⁴ who stand for democracy and call people to embrace this value do no service to the Muslims, rather represent and serve the interests of the West at large. Besides emphasizing that Islam has its own unique political or governing system, Mutin cynically attacks the westernized Muslim thinkers—who are heavily engaged in devising the theory of Islamic democracy—of trivializing the fundamental values of the political system of Islam. The seriousness of attack against these thinkers gains pace when Mutin alleges that such Western-educated elites neither enjoy the rank of an *‘Ālim* (religious expert) nor their views and opinions are considered by the Muslims as authentic and unadulterated Islamic responses to the Western onslaught.²⁵

Ḥizb al-Tahrīr, *Salafī* movement (by and large), *Jihādī* currents, *Tanzīm-i-Islāmī*, *Taliban*, etc., are the groups that repeatedly denounce democracy as godless. Their subject matter, in this regard, signifies that Islam and democracy are inherently antithetical. For these groups, democracy is *Shirk* (idolatry or assigning partners with Allah) and a system of *Kufr* contradicting Islam’s code in all matters, major or minor.²⁶ The ideology and doctrines of these movements evince that Muslims have to liberate themselves from the ideas, systems, and laws of other civilization if they envision for re-establishing the Islamic society established by the Messenger Muhammad (peace be upon him).

The second trend, i.e., democratization (and it includes the efforts, ideas, and perspectives of secularists as well), represents those voices that stand for Islam-Democracy compatibility or try to come to terms with democracy. Excluding secularist vision, there are some activists, reformists, intellectuals, and academic scholars within mainstream Islamic groups or movements who too aspire for an Islamic reform in the Muslim world but differ from the above thinkers and groups

according to their methodology and response *vis-à-vis* democracy and pluralism. This trend believes in reconciling some Islamic universal principles with democratic political system and likewise endeavors to establish democracy or Islamic democracy, as they repeatedly call it, in the Muslim countries. The trend is represented by, to mention a few, ‘Abd al-Karīm Sarūsh, Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, ‘Allāmah (Dr.) Yūsuf al-Qarḍāwī, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Sachdīnā, ‘Abd al-Wahāb al-Affandī, Khālīd Abū al-Faḍl, and Raḍwān Masmūdī and movements like *Ḥizb al-Nahḍah*, *Iklwān al-Muslimūn*, *Islamic Salvation Front* of Algeria, *Al-‘Adl wa al-Ihsān* of Morocco, etc. The supporters of this trend utilize and interpret (by way of reorientation) various concepts and institutions of Islam like *Khilāfah*,²⁷ *Shūrā*,²⁸ *Ijtihād*,²⁹ *Ijmā’*,³⁰ *Bay‘ah*,³¹ and *Maṣlahah*³² and values such as freedom, justice, equality, human rights, and tolerance for giving credence to democracy in Islam or “Islamic democracy” and for evolving or developing “Islamic forms of parliamentary governance, representative elections, and religious reform.”³³ In this regard, Ḥāmid ‘Ināyat says that “the exertions of some Muslim writers either in devising a theory of Islamic democracy or in demonstrating the democratic temper of Islam cannot be dismissed as an unfounded and desperate presentation of Islam.”³⁴

The subsequent pages or section are or is predominantly devoted and dedicated to canvass in a better way the subject at hand—Islam-Democracy Compatibility: View and Vision of Rāshid al-Ghannūshī.

6.2 RĀSHID AL-GHANNŪSHĪ ON ISLAM-DEMOCRACY COMPATIBILITY OR INCOMPATIBILITY

In the contemporary times, Ghannūshī, *among others*, has emerged as one of the dominant entities who cogently express Islam-Democracy compatibility and advocate pluralism, thus, are championing the trend of democratization. Seldom does Ghannūshī give an interview or deliver a lecture without expressing complete loyalty to democracy. The thought and thinking of Ghannūshī reflects his strong passion and commitment to democracy and pluralism. Most of his statements, interviews, and lectures are in fact democracy loaded. Therefore, in the current times, he is one of the leading Muslim figures heavily engaged in blending Islam with democracy.

Ghannūshī believes that democracy is a mechanism for certifying the sovereignty of the people and for supplying safety valves against

corruption and hegemonic monopoly of power. He says that many reformers spoke high of democracy in nineteenth and twentieth century. However, most of the Islamic groups opposed and rejected democracy as an alien norm and a product of the imperial West that has nothing good to offer to the Muslims.³⁵ He, moreover, admits democracy as among the productive contributions or accomplishments of the West.³⁶ According to him:

Democracy is an authority practiced [by the people] through a set of constitutional techniques that may differ in their particulars in any system but agree in terms of equity, selection, separation of authorities, political pluralism, freedom of expression, freedom of gathering, setting up of associations, acknowledgement for the majority to decide and rule, and for the minority to oppose for the sake of reciprocation. This ends up in allowing the citizen a set of social securities.³⁷

Hākmiyyah (Sovereignty; divine vs. popular) remains the key issue around which the discourse of Islam-Democracy compatibility or incompatibility predominantly revolves. Those who are strictly inimical toward democracy base their theory, mentioned in the above pages as well, that Allah alone is the sovereign. Khurshīd Aḥmad, a Pakistani renowned scholar, economist, and an Islamic activist, who though regards the *operational mechanism* dimension of democracy in line with the Islamic values of *ʿAdl* (justice) and *Shūrā* (consultation), contradicts, however, with the other dimensions, i.e., *philosophical roots* of democracy. In his paper titled, *Islam and Democracy: Some Conceptual and Contemporary Dimensions*, Khurshīd Aḥmad sees the philosophical roots of democracy embedded in “the concept of popular sovereignty and consequent principle of legitimacy based exclusively on popular support.”³⁸ He rejects this dimension, as he understands, that the popular sovereignty or people as the sole legislator challenge the notion of Allah—in Islamic political system—as the absolute sovereign or as the “Supreme Law-Giver.”³⁹

Hākmiyyah, a thorny issue for the Islamic activists who support Islam-Democracy compatibility, has been dealt with by Ghannūshī thus:

When we say “God’s rule,” we do not mean that God comes down and governs directly. Divine law, as applied by the Muslim state, is based upon constitutional statutes conforming to Islamic ethics. In addition it disallows monarchies or oligarchies from controlling governmental affairs. ... [I]t is, [therefore], clear that “God’s rule” correlates to the rule of the people or their representatives.⁴⁰

At another place, Ghannūshī, while criticizing those who reject democracy on the basis of *Hākmiyyah*, says that these people (besides having no specialization or adequate knowledge or are indoctrinated with some shallow literature on Islam) have not understood the concept of *HukmAllah* (the rule of Allah) appropriately and accurately. *HukmAllah* is a revolution, opines Ghannūshī, in a sense that it restricts and circumscribes governor's powers, therefore, rendering them more executive in nature than legislative.⁴¹ Elaborating further the concept of *HukmAllah* almost on the same line as above, Ghannūshī notes:

[*H*]ukm[*A*]llah does not mean that God comes down and governs humans, but means the sovereignty of law, which is fundamental of the modern state, the state of law and order. If, according to this conception, a government in Islam is not to be monopolized by a despot or an oligarchy, it follows that [*H*]ukm[*A*]llah refers to, and implies, [*hukm al-sha'ab*], that is the rule of the people or their representatives.⁴²

'Abd al-Fattāh al-Mūrū, while affirming his authentication to democracy, argues on the issue of *Hākmiyyah* that "laws come from God, but sovereignty is that of the people."⁴³ In an attempt to mark a demarcation between the general principles of the *Qur'ān* which are enduring and the human legislation, Mūrū affirms that the legislation has to be within the gambit set by these principles. Mūrū further reminds that such a "legislation, in an Islamic State as in a secular State, is the responsibility of the people."⁴⁴

Undoubtedly, such views disclose intense appreciation and admiration of Ghannūshī for democracy. He does not oppose the notion that Allah is the sole Sovereign, however, he stresses on the position conferred on *Ummah* as *Khalīfah* (vicegerent on the earth). This point sufficiently substantiates Ghannūshī's claim that Islam is attuned with democracy and the idea of sovereignty of people.⁴⁵ The ruler and the *Ummah*, according to Ghannūshī, are bound by a contract wherein the former pledges to implement the law and administer the affairs of the latter and is accountable to them as well. He further says that the ruler is not legitimate until and unless he has been "commissioned or contracted to do the job by the *Ummah*, to whom the ruler is accountable."⁴⁶

Like other Muslim intellectuals and leaders (who support Islam-Democracy compatibility), Ghannūshī finds agreement between democracy and traditional Islamic tenets such as *Ijtihād*, *Ijmā'*, *Bay'ah*,

Maṣlahah, and *Shūrā*, which govern the relationship between the political authority and the people.⁴⁷ He and other thinkers reinterpret these key Islamic institutions for developing “Islamic forms of parliamentary governance, representative elections, and religious reform.”⁴⁸ During the period of *Aṣḥāb* (Companions of the Prophet Muḥammad, peace be upon him), *Majlis al-Shūrā* (consultative assembly) operated for electing the successor of the *Khalīfah* by the process of *Shūrā* (consultation). Highlighting the significance of *Shūrā*, Ghannūshī says:

Shūrā is the second source of Islamic system, next only to the scriptural text. *Shūrā* is in itself a statement acknowledging the deputized community’s right to participate in ruling matters. It is one of the legal duties because it is a special feature of Islamic state and the Muslim community. It is, therefore, absolutely right to say that it is the state of *Shūrā* and the community of *Shūrā*. Islam is unique in this regard because it has adopted the principle of *Shūrā* as a general practice and as a method of public administration.⁴⁹

Shūrā is the expression of the idea of human deputation on the Earth and in authority the deputation of the *Ummah* conducts its affairs according to the dictates of consensus (*Ijmāʿ*).⁵⁰ Therefore, it is significant for Muslim thinkers in the contemporary times to “reinterpret and extend this notion to the creation of modern forms of political participation, parliamentary government, and the direct or indirect elections of heads of State.”⁵¹ In redefining and institutionalizing *Shūrā*, Ghannūshī further acknowledges that benefit can be derived from Western traditions such as elected parliaments or councils, plebiscites, and Western ideals of freedom.⁵²

Ghannūshī accepts the view that the system of democracy is a direct outcome of a particular Western experience. Perceiving democracy as not merely a method of government but also as a philosophy, to him, Muslims don’t have any problem with democratic institutions and mechanisms, rather they are concerned with the secular and nationalistic values operating behind the garb of democracy. The real problem with the Western liberal democracy lies, maintains Ghannūshī, not in its institutions and mechanisms but in “the materialist philosophy that eventually transformed these mechanisms, through the role played by finance and the media, into ploys, ultimately producing choices that represent not the people but influential financial and political centers.”⁵³

Islamic democracy is distinguished from other systems by its moral content as derived from the sublime principles of *Sharī'ah*. He also states that Western institutions of democracy are good, yet, they need much improvement. The contribution of Islam, in this regard, would be, according to Ghannūshī, in the form of a code of ethics—a transcendent morality that seems to have no room in current democratic practice and process. Transcendental morality deficiency has turned democracy into “rule of the people by the rich and powerful for the interest of the rich and the powerful.”⁵⁴ The challenge as well as the need of the hour, therefore, is to develop Islamic democracy or Islamic model of governance that will represent “marriage between the Islamic value system and code of ethics on the one hand and democratic procedures on the other.”⁵⁵ The model of Islamic democracy, according to the rhetoric of Ghannūshī, will help not only to solve the issues of authoritarianism⁵⁶ rampant in the Muslim world but will also fulfill the many broken promises of liberal democracy as well.⁵⁷ All this implies that Ghannūshī, as reminded by Tamimi, “seeks to prepare the ground for launching his model of Islamic democracy, most appropriately on the ruins of liberal democracy. Hence is his oscillation between acclaiming the ideal and denouncing the real.”⁵⁸

In an attempt to find a historical link between development of Western democracy and Islam, Ghannūshī maintains that democratic notions and liberal democratic values were derived from medieval Europe, which in turn was influenced by Islamic civilization. Democracy offers the means to implement the Islamic ideal today and “Islam, which enjoins the recourse to Shura (consultation) ... finds in democracy the appropriate instruments (elections, parliamentary system, separation of powers, etc.) to implement Shura.”⁵⁹ ‘Abd al-Rashīd Mutin challenges the view of those (including Ghannūshī and ‘Abd al-Karīm Sarūsh) who stand for Islam-Democracy compatibility and who endeavor to place democracy at par with the Islamic ideals like *Shūrā*, *Ijmā'*, and *Maṣlahah*. In his words:

The practice of *shūrā*, meaning people’s participation in governing themselves, was turned into parliamentary democracy; *ijmā'*, denoting consensus of the *umma* or of the leading ‘*ulama*’ on a regulation was held to be synonymous with public opinion; and *maṣlahah*, referring to the adoption of a course which is considered to be in the best interest of the community, was developed into the liberal notion of utility.⁶⁰

Ghannūshī, like others, sees the concept of *Ijmā'* and *Shūrā*, which are deep rooted in Islam, compatible with the Western tools of democracy. However, when asked that how far it is appropriate and justified to equate divine concepts like *Ijmā'* and *Shūrā* with a human concept like democracy, Ghannūshī's reaction was:

The collective opinion which is adopted both in Islam and democracy make the two compatible with one another. If the consultants/voters are Muslims, then they will naturally come up with an Islamic counsel. However, if these people do against or adopt anti-Islamic elements, then the way and solution is to educate and make them aware.⁶¹

Ijmā' (consensus), according to Ghannūshī, provides the basis for participatory government or democracy in Islam. He believes that democracy in the Muslim world as in the West can take numerous forms. In an interview with Esposito and Voll (1993), he revealed that he (himself) favors a "multiparty system of government."⁶²

While talking on the Civil Liberties in Islamic State, he presents his contention that the democratic values of political pluralism and tolerance are perfectly compatible with Islam. His Islamic system accommodates majority rule, free election, and multiple political parties, religious or secular alike, freedom of expression, equality of all citizens and women's rights and gender equality.⁶³

Rāshid al-Ghannūshī rejects theocracy or the rule of *mullahs*, arguing that government in Islam "embodies a civilian authority whose political conduct is answerable to public."⁶⁴ According to him, both individuals and groups are enjoined with the task of opposing and criticizing the policy-makers if their policy-making is ill-advised or if they do wrong. The famous injunction (*enjoining what is good and forbidding what is wrong*) of the *Qur'ān*, as one of the foremost duties, in this regard, binds the individual(s) or group(s) to stand up against the rulers and authorities when they commit wrong. In order to institutionalize and implement *Shūrā*, a fundamental Islamic principle governing the relation between the ruler and the ruled, it is perfectly advisable, claims Ghannūshī, to adopt democracy together with its instruments (elections, parliamentary system, separation of powers, etc.). Moreover, Islamic Movements should advocate democracy⁶⁵ because it not only represents a peaceful means of empowerment but also "a set of mechanisms that Muslims can greatly benefit from today in order to re-establish their own

modern *shura*-based system of government.”⁶⁶ Regarding the Islam-Democracy relationship, he maintains:

If democracy is meant the liberal model of government prevailing in the West, a system under which the people freely choose their representatives and leaders, in which there is an alternation of power and in which civil liberties and human rights are guaranteed, Muslims will find nothing in their religion to prevent them from applying democracy.⁶⁷

He deems firmly that once the “Islamists are given a chance to comprehend the values of Western modernity, such as democracy and human rights, they will search within Islam for a place for these values where they will implant them, nurse them, and cherish them.”⁶⁸ In a recent speech delivered at Aligarh Muslim University, he affirmed that his party *al-Nahḍah* not only advocated democracy but also played a significant role in establishing it in the Arab World in general and in Tunisia in particular.⁶⁹ He went on to say that he together with *al-Nahḍah* believes in democracy, reconciliation, and regard for human rights.⁷⁰

Ghannūshī also advocates an Islamic system that features majority rule, free elections, a free press, protection of minorities, equality of all secular and religious parties, and full women’s rights in everything. Furthermore, in his article *Self-Criticism and Reconsideration*, he makes it clear that many Islamic activists relate democracy with foreign intervention and non-belief. Democracy is not disbelief or foreign intervention but a set of mechanisms to guarantee freedom of thought and assembly and peaceful competition for governmental authority through ballot boxes. He accentuates further:

The negative attitude of Islamic movements towards democracy is holding it back. We have no modern experience in Islamic activity that can replace democracy. The Islamization of democracy is the closest thing to implementing *shura* (consultation). Those who reject this thought have not produced anything different than the one-party system of rule.⁷¹

Moreover, Ghannūshī also argues that democracy, popular sovereignty, the role of the State, multiparty elections, and constitutional law are all part of what he calls “new Islamic thinking.”⁷² Its roots as well as legitimacy are found, according to him, in a fresh interpretation or reinterpretation of Islamic sources.⁷³

Since 1981, leadership of *al-Nabḍah*, according to Susan Waltz, “has seized every available opportunity to affirm democracy as the framework within which they would work to advance their goals.”⁷⁴ Raymond William Baker, a Carnegie scholar in 2006, writes in his article *Degrading Democracy*⁷⁵ about the key engagements of various Islamic Movements (not excluding *al-Nabḍah*) that surfaced in 1970s in the Arab world, relates:

[Islamic activists like Rāshid al-Ghannūshī] have produced an extensive body of scholarship that shows how the resources of their heritage can be turned to the positive end of fostering democratic development. In these works [books, articles, lectures, interviews etc.] they elaborate key questions: How should Islam be understood in its call for a community that is at once moral and political? In what concrete, practical ways does democracy respond to the needs of the nation at this historical juncture? What character will democracy take when bent to the larger purposes of Islam? And finally, how will democratic reforms in turn enhance the capacity to turn Islamic values into the lived experiences of all, including non-Muslims, who are also members of democratic, Islamic communities?⁷⁶

William Baker’s assessment principally revolves round, more or less, the issue of democracy, its implementation, and nature in Islamic societies. In this wholesome process, the major role is played by the Islamic Movements and if they have to realize their moral mission, then Baker suggests that democracy can be a significant tool. This whole discussion, after making a thorough analysis of Ghannūshī’s views on Islam-Democracy compatibility, leads us to conclude that Ghannūshī frequently tries to convey that several Islamic practices and traditions like *Shūrā*, *Ijmā’*, and *Ijtihād* are attuned with democracy. Moreover, it is one of the best tools that can guarantee the sovereignty of the people and can also help to end corruption and hegemonic monopoly of power in the Muslim world.

6.3 PLURALISM OR POWER-SHARING THEORY

In the contemporary globalized world, the idea of complete homogeneous or monolithic society is something that a modern mind does not believe in. This is because of the fact that different people with different religious, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and political backgrounds are

mutually living in various parts of the globe. More important is the fact that in the wake of globalization nothing is isolated. Every individual whether living in any part of America, Africa, Asia, or Europe is part and parcel of the globalized village. “End of Geography”, a concept that some scholars put forward, therefore, represents the State of people being heavily interdependent on one another irrespective of their so-formulated boundaries and geographies.⁷⁷ In comparison with the earlier societies, in the current atmosphere one observes the mingling of people representing diverse identities. So, it has become imperative to respect and tolerate one another, including their views and affiliations despite disagreement.

On the other hand, this “closeness” of the different denominations is with the passage of time giving birth to a plethora of grave problems. In a globalized world or for the matter to be more precise, in a particular pluralistic society questions ranging from its stability and vulnerability to conflict are vociferously visited and revisited.⁷⁸ Some scholars favor the concept that a pluralistic society is more stable and viable, say, for example, Humayun Kabir.⁷⁹ While as theorists such as Samuel Huntington, the author of the Clash of Civilizations, observes such developments finally leading to the conflict. Therefore, one cannot outrightly reject the views of both the camps. Because history stands testimony to the fact that the stable heterogeneous societies do exist. Likewise, on the other hand, in the context of growing Islamophobic trend it is witnessed that the cordial relations, tolerance, and mutual respect in such societies continue to deteriorate. In such a global fashioning, scholars from diverse backgrounds throughout the world are heavily engaged to discuss the issue of pluralism and the challenges that emerge thereof. In the next section an attempt is made to discuss the approach and opinion of Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, the primary ideologue of *Hizb al-Nahḍah*, regarding the debate on pluralism or to be more specific the standpoint of Islam *vis-à-vis* participation in non-Islamic government. However, before discussing his views and opinions objectively, it is rather tempting to briefly elaborate the meaning and concept of pluralism with an aim to make things more comprehensible for the readers.

6.4 PLURALISM: MEANING AND CONCEPT

Derived from “plural,” the word “pluralism” etymologically refers to that “containing more than one; consisting of, involving, or designating two or more; concerning or being one among a plurality of persons or

objects.” According to the New Webster’s Dictionary, the term “pluralism” means “the quality of being plural; the nature of a society within which diverse ethnic, social and cultural interests exist and develop together” and the term “plurality” means “the state of being plural; the greater number; a multitude.”⁸⁰

Similarly, The New Encyclopaedia Britannica defines “pluralism” in the perspective of sociopolitical thought as “the autonomy enjoyed by disparate groups within the society—such groups as religious groups, trade unions, professional organizations, or ethnic minorities.”⁸¹ Regarding the significance of pluralism, the Encyclopaedia mentions that the “term also refers to the doctrine that the existence of such groups is beneficial, a major element in the ideologies of both the liberal Western nations and the Communist nations.”⁸² Seeking to highlight that how this term developed in the West, especially in England, it argues that in the beginning of the twentieth century, the vociferous emphasis on the concept of pluralism was the effort by a group of writers (including F. Maitland, S. G. Hobson, Harold Laski, R. H. Tawney, and G. D. H. Cole) reacted against what they alleged to be the alienation of the individual brought by the unrestrained capitalism. According to this group, the situation demanded that in order to give the individual a sense of community his integration in a social context was imperative. The group who advocated pluralism further asserted that some of the negative aspects of modern industrial society can be overcome by economic and administrative decentralization.⁸³

These definitions and elaborations, therefore, suggest that it is a term with multifaceted connotations that takes into account the importance of the State of being two or more in a society in terms of ethnicity, language, culture, etc. It also establishes the fact that a pluralistic society dominated by the features of peace and cooperation is not only a necessity but at the same time it is also beneficial so as to promote and raise the status of the alienated individual and thereof the diverse groups in the society. Thus, in this way, pluralism recognizes autonomy of an alienated individual or group(s) in order to maintain his or their identity and interest.

As has been highlighted above, the term pluralism can be used in various contexts that explain various shades and modes of it. They may be broadly classified as: (a) political pluralism; (b) religious pluralism; (c) cultural pluralism; (d) legal pluralism; and (e) ethnic pluralism.

This paper mainly deals with the political or power-sharing dimension of pluralism, so for convenience only this type of pluralism is defined

here. Political pluralism refers to the activeness of the various individuals and groups engaged in political activities. It can also be defined, in political terminology, as the system of power-sharing among a number of political parties.⁸⁴ In case of political pluralism, everyone is free to express his/her political thoughts and actions. In this regard, Adnan Aslan is of the opinion that political pluralism “nurtures plurality of political parties and associations, a free press, freedom of expression and a minimalist approach to censorship.”⁸⁵ Soraj Hongladarom in his article opines that political pluralism represents such a system wherein “a wide degree of tolerance for different political opinions and persuasions” exist simultaneously.⁸⁶ Similar views are expressed by Deegan that pluralism actually means disagreement between diverse competitive groups over certain issues. No matter what the level of disagreement would be, yet the opposition neither undermine nor eliminate the structure of the State.⁸⁷

So, in a culture dominated by political pluralism one group or a single political party cannot dictate the terms, rather, representation of various competing groups that share the power form the basis of such a system. More importantly, as far as politics is concerned, the active participation of conflicting forces is what actually pluralism stands for. Therefore, it is a battle of idea or ideas (ideological pluralism) fought dogmatically and meant to make a particular agenda of various political groups more conspicuous and more appealing. That is why political pluralism is frequently referred as an inevitable value or norm of democracy because of the reason that it gives due prominence to the various groups who can express their thoughts and views freely.

6.5 RĀSHID AL-GHANNŪSHĪ ON POLITICAL PLURALISM OR POWER-SHARING THEORY

Though not a novel problem (in case of Islam), the issue of pluralism in the current global scenario is engaging the Muslim scholarship profoundly. Since the very inception of Islam, Muslims confronted and responded to a large number of religio-ethnic and political varieties. As Sayyid Ḥusayn Naṣr maintains: “[I]t is important to mention that before modern times Islam was the only revealed religion that has had direct contact with nearly all the major religions of the world.”⁸⁸ Nonetheless, in the modern global era, experiencing the current contexts, the problem of pluralism has attained centrality, so has its various dimensions

(political, religious, ethnic, lingual, etc.). Keeping this in view, pluralism, therefore, is being continuously visited and revisited by the Muslim scholars, thinkers, and movements. Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, like others, is heavily occupied in making his contribution to solve many questions related to pluralism. His article titled *Participation in a Non-Islamic Government*,⁸⁹ in this regard, will serve the purpose of the current study to the maximum possible extent.

The article, amid highlighting the issue of political pluralism or in other words power-sharing theory, is actually an attempt on the part of Ghannūshī “to answer the question related to the position of Islam regarding the participation of its followers in establishing or administering a non-Islamic regime.”⁹⁰ His inclusive approach, as in other matters as well, here also favors the theory of coexistence and cooperation. Believing pluralism as a value inherent in democracy, he says that Islamic civilization always emphasized on the implementation of pluralism. For instance, the treatment received by Jews and Christians in Islamic lands and the *Qur’ānic* weltanschauung commanding that there be “no compulsion in religion” can be seen as powerful evidences supporting pluralism. Khalid Elgindy has rightly highlighted (and it is quite observable as well) that Ghannūshī endeavors to connect pluralism with both Islamic heritage (*Turāth*) and Islamic law (*Shari’ah*).⁹¹ Since, Ghannūshī strongly emphasizes that the “fundamental values inseparable from Islamic law, religious, cultural, political and ideological pluralism are emphatically sustained within Muslim societies.”⁹²

Further, while responding to the aforesaid question, Ghannūshī says the concept of Islamic government exists; however, the prevailing circumstances are not suited for its establishment. Hence, in such situations, a Muslim is enjoined not only to make efforts but also to cooperate with non-Muslim denominations to fulfill Allah’s command of establishing and administering justice on the earth.⁹³

Favoring realism and flexibility instead of passivism, idealism, and isolationism, Ghannūshī argues that the purpose of Islam is to safeguard as well as fulfill the needs and interests of mankind. Therefore, what is needed is to bridge the gap between ideal and reality—Islam and the present reality of the Muslim society. The principles and values of Islam should be, rather must be, employed to the changing realities of Muslim life. “What we need,” declares Ghannūshī, “is a realistic fundamentalism (Usuliyah Waqiyah), or if you like, an authenticated realism (Waqiyah Muasalah)”⁹⁴ Supporting and establishing a *just* government is necessary

and advisable, in case establishment of Islamic government is not possible, according to “the principle of balancing between the better and the worse and opting for that which seems to best serve the general interests of the people.”⁹⁵ Ghannūshī further suggests that for setting up of a pertinent social order, political pluralism or power-sharing in a Muslim (majority situation) or a non-Muslim (minority situation) atmosphere under extraordinary situations is inevitable. In the exceptional situation when “the community of believers is unable to accomplish its goal of establishing an Islamic government directly” (even when it is in a majority situation), power-sharing becomes a necessity.⁹⁶

Writing on the legitimacy of participating in non-Muslim regimes, Rāshid al-Ghannūshī points to a Muslim’s duty to advance whatever Muslim goals are within his power or accomplish whatever can be accomplished. The promotion of values and ideals such as independence, development, compatriot solidarity, public and individual political freedoms, human rights, political pluralism, independence of the judicial system, freedom of the press, and freedom for *Masājīd* and for *Da‘wah* activities obliges Muslims to participate in the establishment of a secular democratic regime, in case the establishment of a Muslim one is not possible.⁹⁷ What Ghannūshī actually aims to convey is that when the situation is not favorable, then according to the *Qur’ānic* principle that “No soul shall have a burden on it greater than it can bear” (*Al-Qur’ān: Al-Baqarah*, 233), the Muslims are obliged to do only that what they can afford and what they can achieve practically. Therefore, if the aforesaid values are promoted in such a government or system, no matter secular or pseudo-secular, the Muslims are then duty bound to participate in its establishment and thereof lay the foundation of a strong social order. This activity of the Muslims, although and essentially, may not be based on Islamic law yet it will give due consideration to *Shūrā* which is one of the important principles of Islamic government. The main aim of the foundation of such a government, as highlighted by Ghannūshī, will be twofold: (a) to end the rule of dictators, foreign domination, and local anarchy; (b) to promote humanistic values or in other words to pursue noble objectives.⁹⁸ This implies that without any doubt, Ghannūshī duly acknowledges the significance of Islamic form government; however, the current circumstances demand to look for the alternative and the best possible alternative, he regards, is the secular democratic government.

Ghannūshī substantiates and justifies his practice of power-sharing or participation in non-Islamic and/or secular democratic system

by citing events and examples from *Qur'ān*, *Sunnah*, and Islamic history. From *Qur'ān*, he puts forward the example of Prophet Yūsuf (may Allah's mercy be on him); from *Sunnah*, he gives mention of two important events: (a) migration of *Aṣḥāb* to Abyssinia; (b) signing of *Hilf al-Fudūl*; and from Islamic history, he cites the example of 'Umar bin 'Abd al-'Azīz.⁹⁹ All these evidences which are embedded in *Sharī'ah*, argues Ghannūshī, go well with the concept of power-sharing or participation of Muslims in non-Islamic government but under exceptional circumstances. He concludes:

[All these examples show as well as endorse] that the community of believers may participate in an alliance aimed at preventing injustice and oppression, at serving the interests of mankind, at protecting the human rights, at recognizing the authority of the people and at rotating power-holding through a system of elections. The faithful can pursue all these noble objectives even with those who do not share the same faith or ideology.¹⁰⁰

Ghannūshī expresses that “justice” and “human welfare” are the basic objectives of an Islamic government because justice is regarded as “the law of Allah” and therefore, there is no harm to fully support even un-Islamic government which pioneers in the implementation of these noble values. In fact, this represents the central theme of his philosophy as far as the question of pluralism is concerned. He declares that it is wrong notion to say that the solution to every problem is specifically, clearly, and categorically mentioned in the *Qur'ān* and *Hadīth*. If that would have been the case, then many actions of the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them) of the Prophet (peace be upon him) could be considered wrong. So, in response to new developments and new circumstances, such measures which totally conform with the Islamic law, which prevent evil to spread, and which provide solutions to the various societal issues are advisable to pursue.¹⁰¹ Ghannūshī strongly criticizes the scholars who oppose this view and who insist not to pursue such measures. He blames that such attitude of these scholars unnecessarily makes the life of Muslims difficult and miserable. To quote:

With due respect, these scholars make life difficult for the Muslims unnecessarily. Their opinions impose restrictions on a policy which is definitely permissible and lawful, and which is intended to equip the Muslims with the ability to react positively in situations that can be very difficult indeed.¹⁰²

Besides this, Ghannūshī, while criticizing the views of those who reject the concept of power-sharing, draws attention toward two other important issues: (a) Muslim minorities living in non-Muslim countries and (b) Islamic Movements operating in Muslim countries. In the first case, Ghannūshī suggests that the best option for Muslim minorities is to enter into alliance with secular democratic groups and then endeavor for the establishment of a secular democratic government. Such an establishment, views Ghannūshī, will ensure essential requirements of mankind that Islam has come to fulfill and these include, among others, respect for human rights, ensuring security, freedom of expression, and freedom of belief.¹⁰³ Likewise, it is also best suited, in the opinion of Ghannūshī, for the Islamic groups in Muslim countries, under unfavorable circumstances, to cooperate, coordinate, and forge alliance with non-Islamic secular groups in order to establish “pluralistic secular government” in which power will be held by the majority. This government will, among other things, topple the dictatorship, preclude aggression, deter external threat, lead to socioeconomic development, respect humans, and guarantee their liberties.¹⁰⁴

It is important to mention that Ghannūshī’s ideology that evolved over so many years was particularly influenced and shaped by the various developments taking place in the Arab world, especially in Tunisia. Both during the rule of Bourguiba (the first president of independent Tunisia) and Bin Ali, Ghannūshī and other members of his party *Hizb al-Nabḍah* were the primary target of the Tunisian State. The State continuously barred them from any political participation until the ousting of Bin Ali in January 2011. Ghannūshī accordingly developed his philosophy that primarily targeted the Tunisian establishment in general and Bourguiba and Bin Ali in particular. He frequently used to call them and other Arab rulers in almost all his writings and speeches as dictators and despots, their rule as hegemonic and oppressive, and their policies as evils of despotism. This is how Ghannūshī developed his philosophy and how he dealt with the State oppression. More importantly, his complete loyalty toward pluralism and power-sharing becomes more comprehensible when viewed in the context of the existential threat faced by *al-Nabḍah* in Tunisia. This dramatic display of ideas put forward by Ghannūshī represents actually a well-framed policy to help *al-Nabḍah* and other Islamic Movements operating across the Arab world to get State recognition as a legal political party and engage thereof in the various democratic processes. This becomes evident thus:

The real problem lies in convincing the “other,” that is the ruling regimes, of the principle of “the people’s sovereignty” and of the right of Islamists—just like other political groups—to form political parties, engage in political activities and compete for power or share in power through democratic means.¹⁰⁵

At some other place, highlighting the role of al-Nahḍah, he says that the party aims to shoulder the responsibility of reforming society by advocating modernity, freedom, dignity, and effective power-sharing. Tamimi, Rachid Ghannouchi, pp. 170–171. In the post-Revolution Tunisian atmosphere, the public statements of Ghannūshī and those of other *al-Nahḍah* members have been consistent with pluralism politics. Compatibility in theory and action, in case of pluralism, dominates the politics of Ghannūshī and *al-Nahḍah*. Many public statements of *al-Nahḍah* like the party “is open to negotiations with all willing partners”¹⁰⁶ and “the importance of reconciliation even if [*al-Nahḍah*] did not win a plurality”¹⁰⁷ followed by its practical cooperation and coordination with secular parties in government formation and constitution making, marks a crucial step toward the institutionalization of pluralism and democracy in the country.¹⁰⁸ “We believe” addressed Ghannūshī “in reconciliation, collaboration, partnership, and sharing of things with the other parties. Notwithstanding an environment surrounded by hostility and animosity, we tended toward consensus building. We are, therefore, learning how to reconcile differences and diversity of opinions in our country.”¹⁰⁹ These statements—that were realized practically as well—in short, as apparent indicators unfold the overly theoretico-practical support of *al-Nahḍah* and its leadership for power-sharing and pluralism.

To summarize the whole discussion, it can be argued that a society where various dissimilar groups, representing a wide variety of identities, live together peacefully and amicably form an example of a stable pluralistic society. By this characteristic feature, these distinct varieties because of their positive coexistence tend to be interdependent politically and economically. However, in case of Muslims, whether living in Muslim-majority or Muslim-minority regions, Islam has provided a broader guideline regarding how to live and interact with the various sociopolitical and ethnic diversities.

Muslim thinkers whose treatment to the issues related to various forms and shades of pluralism though varies considerably yet they have tried to explain, elaborate, and guide the Muslims about their duties and obligations in a pluralistic society. In this regard, as far as Ghannūshī is concerned, his discussion and understanding on (political) pluralism lead to certain conclusions. Ghannūshī, theoretically, believes in the concept

of Islamic government and its existence and calls the Muslims to establish it wherever attainable. But, he practically endorses and supports pluralism, power-sharing, and multiparty politics. Acknowledging pluralism as a subject of both acceptance and rejection, Ghannūshī, however, aligns himself with that group of Muslim intelligentsia who stand for the acceptance of pluralism in Islam.¹¹⁰ His idea of forging into alliance with the secular forces for the establishment of pluralistic secular government denotes, in other words, that after Islamic government secular government is the best option to opt. Moreover, justifying the idea of secular government on the basis of “realization of essential requirements of mankind that Islam has come to fulfil” would imply that secular system in principle is based upon Islamic ideals and values.

Although Ghannūshī believes that justice and welfare of the society should be the fundamental target of a government, however, he remains silent what if the same objectives are promoted in a Muslim State ruled, for instance, by a monarch or a dictator. Further, pluralism- and democracy-loaded writings and speeches of Ghannūshī should be studied in the context of what was happening sociopolitically in the Arab world, particularly in Tunisia, since 1960s. As the political space in Tunisia and other parts of the Arab world was severely minimized, it can be said that Ghannūshī tried to champion the trend of democratization and pluralism in order to gain the support of those calling themselves as democrats, to create the political space for various Islamic or other groups, and to show that Islamic activists were always ready to operate within the pluralist democracy. In short, the philosophy of Ghannūshī demonstrates that he always prefers the policy of reconciliation over the policy of confrontation and such an attitude which can be termed as “inclusive” defines the mood of his explanation and reasoning.

NOTES

1. Kamran A. Bokhari, “Islamist Attitudes Toward Democracy,” in *Islam, Democracy and the Secularist State in the Post-modern Era* (Center for the Study of Islam & Democracy, 2001), p. 174.
2. Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi, *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World* (State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 93; Sayed Khattab and Gary D. Bouma, *Democracy in Islam* (New York: Routledge Books, 2007), p. 73.
3. John Esposito and John Voll, *Islam and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 60.

4. Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*, 1st ed. (Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Islami, 1981), p. 7.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
7. Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 9.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
9. John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam," *The Middle East Journal*, 45: 3, Summer, 1991: 427–440, p. 435.
10. Muhammad Muslih, "Democracy," in John L. Esposito et al., eds., *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 2: 54 [Hereafter *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World* is abbreviated as *OEIW*].
11. Qutb, *op. cit.*, p. 58.
12. *Hizb al-Tahrīr* (The Islamic Liberation Party) is an Islamic political party that has established itself, according to its members, upon the 'Aqīdah of Islam. Its aim is to revive the Islamic way of life by establishing the *Khilāfah* and then carry the message of Islam to the rest of the world through *Da'wah* and *Jihād*. For a detailed note, see *The Method to Re-establish the Khilāfah* (Britain: al-Khilafah publications), p. 123. For more on the ideology of *Hizb al-Tahrīr*, see Zeyno Baran, *Hizb ut-Tahrir: Islam's Political Insurgency* (Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, 2004).
13. Abdul Qadeem Zalloom, *Democracy is a system of Kufr*, 2nd ed. (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 1995), p. 5. This document, originally published in Arabic under the title *Al-Dimuqrāṭiyyah Nizām al-Kufr*, has been translated into many other languages including English and Urdu as well.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 11–12.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 14–17.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
18. Taqī al-Dīn al-Nabhānī, *Political Thoughts* (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, ND), pp. 124–125.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 125–126.
20. Ayman al-Zawāhirī, *Al-Hasad al-Murr: al-Ikbwān al-Muslimūn fī Sittina 'Aman* (Jordan: Dar al-Bayariq, 2002), p. 8; vide Khattab and Bouma, *op. cit.*, p. 79; Azzam S. Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat Within Islamism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 182.
21. Zawāhirī, *ibid.*, pp. 11–13; vide Khattab and Bouma, *ibid.*; Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi*, *ibid.*, pp. 182–183.

22. Abdul Rashid Moten, "Democratic and Shūrā-Based Systems: A Comparative Analysis," *Encounters*, 3: 1 March 1997, p. 17.
23. Ibid.
24. Mutin criticizes Muslim activists such as Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad 'Abdūh, Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, and 'Abd al-Karīm Sarūsh for advocating Islam-Democracy compatibility which, according to him, "lend further credence to the false belief in the eminence of the democratic system." Ibid., p. 11.
25. Ibid.
26. Khattab and Bouma, op. cit., p. 80.
27. *Khilāfah* (vicegerency/representativeness/stewardship) is an Islamic principle which determines, on the one hand, the true status of the man and shapes, on the other hand, the sociopolitical order of the society. The concept of *Khilāfah*, i.e., Allah's delegation of authority to the *Ummah* to maintain peace, justice, and prosperity on earth, is universal because every individual of the *Ummah* is duty bound to ensure the proper execution of the delegated authority. Moreover, the *Qur'ān* (*al-Baqarah*: 30) refers to the Prophet Ādam as the *Khālīfah* (representative or vicegerent) on earth and *Khilāfah* (*al-A'rāf*: 4) is the other name of the Allah's trust (*Amānah*) bestowed by Allah to man. Cyrill Glassee, *Concise Encyclopedia of Islam* (London: Stacey international, 1989), p. 84.
28. *Shūrā* is derived from the root word of *sh-w-r* (*shawara*) which literally means mutual consultation or to express opinions with each other or consideration, advice, counsel, conference, and deliberation and discussions with other individuals or groups. *Shūrā*, associated with the derivation *Tashāwur*, means mutual advice or deliberation. According to this purely linguistic meaning, *Shūrā* is no more than a procedure of making decisions. Hence, it means the process of making decisions by consultation among those who have an interest in the matter on which a decision is to be taken or others who can help them to reach such a decision. See, C. E. Bosworth, "Shūrā," in Bosworth et al., eds., *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 9: 504 [hereafter abbreviated as *EI*]; Aḥmad Mubārak al-Baghdādī, "Consultation," trans., Brannon M. Wheeler, in Jane Dammen McAuliffe, ed., *Encyclopaedia of the Qur'ān* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2001), 1: 406; Ibn Manzūr, *al-Lisān al-'Arab* (Beirut: Dār al-Sadir, 1968), 4: 434–437.
29. *Ijtihād* is derived from the root word *j-h-d* (*jahada*) which means "struggle." *Ijtihād*, an Arabic word, is generally defined as the process of serious effort spent on a particular activity. In technical legal sense, it denotes an exhaustive endeavor of the jurists' mental faculty in solving or finding solution(s) to certain problem(s). This technical term of

- Islamic law, therefore, represents the process of making a legal decision by independent interpretation of the legal sources—the *Qurʾān* and the *Sunnah*. See for more details, Wael Bahjat Hallaq, *A History of Islamic Legal Theories* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 178–181.
30. *Ijmāʿ* is derived from the root word *j-m-ʿ* (*jamaʿa*) meaning “to gather” or “to collect” and is referred to “consensus.” It is regarded as the third fundamental source of Islamic *Sharīʿah*, after the *Qurʾān* and *Sunnah*. The term, already prevailing among the Arabs before the advent of Islam, represented “the formal consensus of the tribal community on a particular issue.” It is an Arabic term which refers to the consensus of the scholars of Islam. Ideally speaking, it is the result of the “consultative process and collective opinion reached.” For more information see, Wael B. Hallaq, “Consensus,” in John L. Esposito et al., eds., *OEIW* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1: 487–489.
 31. Literally, *Bayʿah* means “pact” or “oath of fealty or allegiance” or “consent.” Technically, the term, in a broader sense, refers to the act by which “a certain number of persons, acting individually or collectively, recognize the authority of another person.” In the legal perspective, *Bayʿah* is a “contractual agreement” in which on the one side there is the will of the electors, expressed in the designation of the candidate, which constitutes the “offer” and on the other side the will of the elected person which constitutes the “acceptance.” See, E. Tyan, “Bayʿa,” in Gibb et al. eds., *EI*, op. cit. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960), 1: 1113; Emile A. Nakhleh, “Bayʿah,” in John L. Esposito, ed., *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 1: 205–206.
 32. *Maṣlahah* (pl. *Maṣāliḥ*) like *Manfaʿa* means “utility.” Generally, speaking the term denotes “welfare” and is used by the jurists (*Fuqahā*) to mean “general good” or “public interest.” It is a concept in traditional Islamic Law which is invoked to prohibit or permit something on the basis of whether or not it serves the “public interest.” Therefore, it can be defined as the establishment of legal principles recommended by reason of being advantageous. For more on this, see Madjid Khadduri, “Maslahah,” in Bosworth et al., eds., *EI*, ibid. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), 6: 738–739; Tauseef Ahmad Parray, “The Legal Methodology of “Fiqh al-Aqalliyat” and Its Critics: An Analytical Study,” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 32: 1, May, 2012: 88–107, p. 95.
 33. John L. Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 145.
 34. Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), p. 120.

35. Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi*, op. cit., p. 69.
36. John L. Esposito and John O. Voll., *Makers of Contemporary Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 113.
37. Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, *al-Ḥurriyyāt al-‘Āmah fī al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah* [Civil Liberties in the Islamic State] (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Wahdah al-‘Arabiyyah, 1993), p. 77.
38. Khurshīd Ahmad, “Islam and Democracy: Some Conceptual and Contemporary Dimensions,” *The Muslim World*, Vol. 90, Spring 2000: 1–21, p. 2.
39. Ibid., p. 14.
40. Rachid Ghannouchi, “The Battle Against Islam,” *Middle East Affairs Journal*, 1: 2, Winter, 1993, p. 38.
41. Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi*, op. cit., p. 185. *Hukm Allah*, Ghannūshī goes on to stress, is a liberation movement and a revolution against despots who monopolize wealth, power, and law-making and against clerics who monopolize the right to interpret and who claim to speak in His name.
42. Ibid.
43. Interview of ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ al-Mūrū published in *Arabies*, no. 33 (September 1989), p. 36. *Arabies*, founded in 1987 in Paris, is a leading French-language magazine and a well-informed reference shaping opinions of the Arab world (especially of the North Africa) in French-speaking Europe, North America, and North Africa. Vide Esposito and Piscatori, op. cit., p. 437.
44. Esposito and Piscatori, *ibid.*, pp. 437–438.
45. Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi*, op. cit., p. 101.
46. Ibid.
47. Esposito and Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, op. cit., pp. 113–114.
48. Esposito, *Unholy War*, op. cit., p. 145.
49. Ghannūshī, *al-Ḥurriyyāt*, op. cit., p. 108.
50. Abdelilah Belkeziz, *The State in Contemporary Islamic Thought: A Historical Survey of the Major Muslim Political Thinkers of the Modern Era* (New York and London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), p. 174.
51. Ibid.
52. Esposito and Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, op. cit., p. 115.
53. Azzam Tamimi, “Islam and Democracy from Tahtawi to Ghannouchi,” *Culture & Society*, 24: 2, March, 2007: 39–58, p. 54.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Authoritarianism or despotism, according to Ghannūshī, is a “modern form of slavery” which can be dispensed with democracy provided it is found on sound philosophies and noble humanistic values, recognizing

- both spiritual and ethical dimensions of man. See, Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi*, op. cit., p. 89.
57. Tamimi, *Islam and Democracy*, loc. cit.
 58. Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi*, op. cit., p. 88.
 59. As cited in Esposito and Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, op. cit., p. 114.
 60. Moten, op. cit., p. 11.
 61. Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, interview with the author, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, 8 April 2015.
 62. Rachid Ghannouchi, interview with Esposito and Voll, London, 5 February 1993; as cited in Esposito and Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, op. cit., p. 114.
 63. Dr. Bustami Khir, “An Islamic Critique and Alternative of Democracy,” *The Islamic Quarterly*, 47: 1, 2003: 773–779, p. 74.
 64. Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi*, op. cit., p. 90.
 65. Ghannūshī’s stress on Islamic Movements to adopt democracy is not something out of box but is the direct outcome of repression and persecution coupled with the denial to work within the system.
 66. Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi*, op. cit., p. 90.
 67. Rachid Ghannouchi, “Islam and Freedom Can Be Friends,” *The Observer* (London), 19 January 1992, p. 18; as cited in Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi*, ibid., pp. 89–90; see also Esposito, *Unholy War*, op. cit., p. 146.
 68. Robin B. Wright, “Two Visions of Reformation,” in Larry Diamond et al., eds., *Islam and Democracy in the Middle East* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003), p. 230.
 69. Speech delivered by Rāshid al-Ghannūshī at Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, on 8 April 2015. In this event, the author was present there and has recorded the statement himself. It should be noted that—as the lecture was in Arabic—wherever the reference will be cited, the translation will be that of the author. [Hereafter cited as Ghannūshī, AMU].
 70. Ibid.
 71. Rachid al-Ghannouchi, “Self-Criticism and Reconsideration,” *Palestine Times*, Issue 94, 1999, as quoted in Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 61.
 72. Esposito and Piscatori, op. cit., p. 437.
 73. Ibid.
 74. Susan Waltz “Islamist Appeal in Tunisia,” *The Middle East Journal*, 40: 4, Autumn, 1986: 651–670, p. 658.
 75. Raymond William Baker, “Degrading Democracy: American empire, Islam, and Struggles for freedom in the Arab Islamic world,” in Samer S. Shehata, ed., *Islamist Politics in the Middle East: Movements and Change* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012).

76. Ibid., p. 46.
77. G. R. Walker and Mark A. Fox, "Globalization: An Analytical Framework," *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, 3: 2, 1996, p. 337.
78. Parvaze Ahmad Bhat, *Pluralism and Diversity in the Sirah Literature: A Study of the Contemporary Scholars on Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W)*, p. 2. It is the author's unpublished thesis submitted in the Department of Islamic Studies, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, 2013.
79. Humayun Kabir, "Minorities in Democracy," in Charles Kurzman, ed., *Liberal Islam* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 145.
80. "Pluralism," *New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language* (Delair Publishing Company, 1971), p. 732.
81. "Pluralism," *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. 9, 15th ed. (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc: 1994), p. 528.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. "Pluralism," *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English*, 9th ed. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 1052.
85. Adnan Aslan, "The Concept of Ahl al-Dhimmah and Religious Pluralism," *The Islamic Quarterly*, xlvii: 1, 2003, p. 40.
86. Soraj Hongladarom, "Basing Political Pluralism on Epistemology: The Case of Thailand's Southern Violence," in Göran Collste, ed., *Implications of Pluralism: Essays on Culture, Identity and Values* (Bangi: Institute of Ethnic Studies University Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2011), p. 32.
87. Heather Deegan, *The Middle East and Problems of Democracy* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p. 23.
88. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "Islamic Attitude Towards Other Religions in History," in Suhayl Umer, ed., *The Religious Other* (Pakistan: Iqbal Academy, 2008), p. 121.
89. Rachid Ghannouchi, "Participation in a Non-Islamic Government," in Charles Kurzman, ed., *Liberal Islam: A Source Book* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
90. Ibid., p. 89.
91. Khaled Elgindy, "The Rhetoric of Rashid Ghannushi," *The Arab Studies Journal*, 3: 1, Spring, 1995: 101–119, p. 112.
92. Rachid Ghannouchi, "The Battle Against Islam," *Middle East Affairs Journal*, 1: 2, Winter, 1993, p. 40.
93. Ghannouchi, *Participation in Non-Islamic Government*, op. cit., pp. 89–90.
94. Rachid Ghannouchi, "What We Need Is a Realistic Fundamentalism," *Arabia*, October 1986; vide Esposito and Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, op. cit., p. 108.
95. Ghannouchi, *Participation in Non-Islamic Government*, op. cit., p. 91.

96. Tamimi, *op. cit.*, p. 153.
97. Ghannouchi, *Participation in Non-Islamic Government*, *op. cit.*, p. 92. Moreover, Ghannūshī contends that as a religious duty it is incumbent upon the Muslims, as individuals and as communities, to contribute to the efforts to establish a secular democratic system in case Islamic democratic system is not possible.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
99. *Ibid.*, pp. 92–93.
100. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
101. *Ibid.*, pp. 93–94.
102. *Ibid.*
103. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
104. *Ibid.*, pp. 94–95.
105. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
106. Melanie Cammett, “The Limits of Anti-Islamism in Tunisia,” in Marc Lynch, ed., *Islamists in a Changing Middle East* (Foreign Policy Group, 2012), p. 41.
107. Aaron Y. Zelin, “Ennahda’s Tight Rope Act on Religion,” in Lynch, *ibid.*, p. 43.
108. The pluralism or power-sharing theory was further strengthened by many other similar statements. For instance, Ghannūshī voiced emphatically that: “We will congratulate the winner and will collaborate with them just as other parties should do the same if we end up winning; Tunisia is in need of everyone. The keyword is reconciliation; our foremost concern is reconciliation in composing the upcoming government without regard to ideological differences.” Zelin, *ibid.*
109. Ghannūshī, AMU.
110. As cited in Esposito and Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, *op. cit.*, p. 116.



Conclusion

Abstract It provides some concrete reflections regarding the intellectual activism of Ghannūshī. This section covers the findings of the study and thereof summarizes the general approach of Ghannūshī. It also raises some fundamental questions related to his activism *vis-à-vis* response to the contemporary challenges and reformation of the Tunisian society.

Keywords Muslim reformers · Reinterpretation · Approaches
Shari‘ah · Ijtihād · Values

Currently, Muslim reformers, thinkers, activists, and political leaders of Islamic Movements are profusely engaged in “reinterpreting” and “reapplying” the principles and ideals of Islam with an aim to formulate “new responses” to the sociopolitical and cultural challenges of the West and of modern life. Hence, to envision the dream, they accordingly adopt different approaches *vis-à-vis* contemporary challenges ranging from conservative, moderate, ambivalent to liberal. The authenticity and genuineness, nonetheless, of interpretive and illustrative approach of these thinkers on various debatable issues will be determined by a broad framework offered by Islam. The discussion follows that the true vision, spirit, and thought of Islam (Islamic System—cultural and epistemological) will always have superiority and preponderance over the changing sociopolitical and economic environment. The fact is that this vision and thought—having its own unique structure—is based on firm,

permanent, and immutable teachings. No matter how much demanding and compelling circumstances may be, the general conviction upheld by the Islamic scholars is that the interpretation and ruling on the challenging issues should not supersede or oppose the principal teachings of *Shari'ah*.

While endeavoring to reform the Muslim society, a few points are very significant which need to be taken care of. It is well established that every civilization has its own values and principles upon which its structure is based. It entails that “norms” and “values” do have a rock-solid relationship with a particular “civilization” or “ideology” that influences others in one way or the other. Democracy, secularism, pluralism, empowerment of women, freedom, and so forth are predominantly the values and lackeys of the *other* civilization, having deep philosophical roots in that civilization, and therefore, it will certainly put their impression and imprint on the Islamic culture and civilization. All this discussion generates the point that Islamic reformists and activists should be well aware of the extent of the danger while illustrating or propagating the ideologies and values of the *other*. They should formulate, while answering these challenging issues, certain rules in order to draw a clear demarcation between what is permanent and what is temporary in Islam. Another very important point in this regard is exercising *Ijtihād* over different issues pertaining to the Muslim society. The practice of *Ijtihād* on various issues should also be according to the permanent principles of Islam and incongruity with the understanding of the pious generations (*Salf al-Ṣāliḥīn*). Such an approach aimed at reformation continues to remain the *weltanschauung* of most of the Muslim scholars and movements. The issue of exercising *Ijtihād*, however, raises some fundamental questions that demand genuine answers. For example: What are the issues on which *Ijtihād* is required? Is every person entitled to carry out *Ijtihād* or is it subjected to certain prescribed qualifications for an individual or a group?

In spite of that what has been expressed above, a myriad of vital questions still surround the subject of activism of various Muslim reformers. The fact is that the critical issue before reformist(s) and Islamic Movement(s) is how to deal with the new norms that have come to replace the old ones. Certain questions, in this regard, are highly significant. How much compromising tendency Islamic thinkers and movements should exhibit in a crisis situation? What are the issues and problems on which there can be some sort of compromise? After compromise, do the reformative ideology and activism of Islamic reformists and movements

possess the capacity to deliver, *or* are they themselves unsure, mistaken, or mislead? How and where to incorporate these new norms if they are valuable? Will this new experiment introduce as well as promote “divine goals” and “divine values” at a larger level in society? These are some of the basic questions that arise in the context of contemporary challenges and the response of Islamic thinkers and movements.

Now shifting the attention from general to specific, the main objective of the current work is to study and examine, *among other things*, the ideology and thought of Ghannūshī⁷ regarding some critical contemporary issues and challenges which were discussed widely in the earlier chapters. Tamimi highlights Ghannūshī⁷'s intellectual precision and character in the following words:

Rachid Ghannouchi's importance emanates from the high standard of his political discourse, which is distinguished by daring attempts to innovate and to introduce new dimensions in contemporary Islamic thought. The impact of his ideological and intellectual standing has extended well beyond the frontiers of Tunisia [especially after the forceful reappearance of his Party, *al-Nabḍah* in the Tunisian political landscape in 2011]. His contribution to modern Islamic thought lies in his comprehension of both traditional Islamic literature and modern Western concepts and in his strong belief in the theory of compatibility between Islam and Western thought in matters concerning the system of government, human rights, and civil liberties.¹

Ghannūshī⁷ forms a dominant voice, calling for reconsideration, rethinking, and reorientation of Islamic traditions, values, and institutions. His hallmark, amid responding to the grave challenges, is dominated by the feature of “pragmatism” and “reconciliation” (although a dose of cynicism is also there) *vis-à-vis* the West. In case of Islam-democracy compatibility, Ghannūshī⁷ is well known for his pro-democratic character. Tamimi has rightly called him “A Democrat within Islamism” because his discourse is for the most part dominated by pro-democracy feature. He has highlighted, in case of democracy, the importance and application of *Shūrā* that forms one of the very significant traditions of Islam. He tries to convey to the Muslim population that several Islamic practices and traditions like *Shūrā*, *Ijmā'*, and *Ijtihād* are attuned with democracy and thus, in a way persuades them to look for common objectives and goals between Islam and the West. In fact, his politico-intellectual activism is targeted at praising certain positive

Western global constructs and then incorporating and assimilating them into the Muslim cultural system. It signifies that his style and approach regarding Islam-Democracy compatibility or incompatibility is quite different from that of other Muslim thinkers, particularly when viewed in the context of his emphasis and acceptance of Western form of multi-party system that neither marginalises nor rejects religion.

Furthermore, the discussion on pluralism and power-sharing leads to certain concrete conclusions. Ghannūshī, theoretically, believes in the concept of Islamic government and its existence and calls the Muslims to establish it wherever attainable. But, he practically endorses and supports pluralism, power-sharing, and multiparty politics. Acknowledging pluralism as a subject of acceptance and rejection, he, however, aligns himself with that group of Muslim intelligentsia who stand for the acceptance of pluralism in Islam.² Compatibility in theory and action, in case of pluralism, dominates the rhetoric of Ghannūshī. It is evidenced by the practical cooperation and coordination with secular parties in government formation and constitution making in the post-revolution Tunisia, which marks a crucial step toward the institutionalization of pluralism in the country. His idea of forging into alliance with the secular forces for the establishment of pluralistic secular government denotes, in other words, that after Islamic government secular government is the best option to opt. Moreover, justifying the idea of secular government on the basis of “realization of essential requirements of mankind that Islam has come to fulfil” would imply that secular system in principle is based on Islamic ideals and values.

Moreover, it is also significant to point out that in the beginning (when his thought was at the initial stage of its development) Ghannūshī rejected democracy, secularism, human rights, emancipation of women, and other such notions as imported Western traditions incompatible with and antithetical to Islam. However, after the riots of 1978 and Iranian Revolution of 1979, his thought witnessed a transformation; expressing concern over the issues of democracy, pluralism, and human rights, in addition to social and cultural ones. Ghannūshī’s noninvolvement in politico-economic matters became the dominant subject of auto-critique, and the rapid developments (political, social, and economic) in the country further accentuated and augmented the transformation of his ideological discourse. Further, from 1980 onwards or after the ideological and intellectual transformation and molding, a thorough consistency is seen in his discourse on the issues touched in this work, a commendable

feature indeed. More importantly, his ideology and way of thinking witnessed a gradual yet deep refinement particularly during his stay in London and because of deprovincialisation and exposure to a myriad of discourses there in London, he mostly adopted a pragmatic line with regard to various challenging issues.

The objective study conducted offers that Ghannūshī's *weltanschauung*—sometimes evasive—reveals his kind indebtedness to most of the Western global norms like democracy, pluralism, and human rights. He is profusely engaged in reinterpreting and reapplying the traditional views with an aim to accommodate the modern global values in order to address the modern challenges faced by the Muslim world. The society of the Muslims, which is currently going through a critical stage of history, can be secured—as Ghannūshī envisions—provided that the Muslims develop pragmatic exposition *vis-à-vis* Western paradigms. So, he urges Muslims to adopt these ideals for the melioration of their “state”. Side by side, he also warns them (in certain matters) about the vicious features the West has cultivated, for example, cultural invasion, economic exploitation, and moral degradation. This approach indicates that he looks for such a “viable model” that would be based on Islamic principles and traditions on the one hand and would absorb some of the ideals of the Western modernity on the other. However, the reconciliation between these two dimensions remains a challenge for Ghannūshī and *al-Nahḍah* especially in the post-Bin Ali period wherein new compromises are definitely required.

The overall approach, methodology, and thought of Ghannūshī reflect, however, that the extent to which change and transformation occurs in him is conditioned by sociopolitical contexts and realities and his twin roles as a thinker and leader of an Islamic Movement (*al-Nahḍah*). At many places, his interpretation reveals a tendency where the activist side of his personality, concerned most importantly about the party's survival, gets better of him and determines the mood of his explanation and reasoning.

Ghannūshī without any doubt deserves unrestricted appreciation and credit for his earnest intellectual endeavors and efforts coupled with social activism as well. He has brought about the transformation of *al-Nahḍah*'s worldview from *old* to *new*. To add further, there were (and are) many other voices present within *al-Nahḍah*, but the party's ideology, philosophy, and action plan are dominated and framed predominantly by him. Apart from being the founder of the Movement, he has

also maintained his position and status in the party as its foremost leader and the principal ideologue. It is his given philosophy regarding various matters that *al-Nahdah* puts into practice for he has worked copiously and enthusiastically for last 45 years or so through every possible means for the Movement's survival as well as expansion. He continues to be its President which validates the point of general support to him from *al-Nahdah*. His political and intellectual activism, still ongoing, will definitely witness further development and maturity and will form in the future core strand of thought throughout the world.

NOTES

1. Azzam S. Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat Within Islamism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 215.
2. As cited in John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 116.

GLOSSARY

<i>‘ālim</i>	an Islamic scholar
<i>‘Ibādāt</i>	religious observances in Islam
<i>‘Īd al-Ḍuḥā</i>	the Festival of Sacrifice celebrated by the Muslims to remember and commemorate the trials and triumphs of the Messenger Abraham (peace be upon him)
<i>‘Īd al-Fiṭr</i>	the festival of the Muslims that marks the end of <i>Ramaḍān</i>
Arab Spring	a revolutionary wave and a series of antigovernment protests that started from Tunisia in 2010 and spread to the other Middle East and North African countries
<i>Aṣḥāb</i>	literally meaning “companions” and technically refers to the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad ((ﷺ)) peace be upon him)
<i>Bay‘ah</i>	an act by which a certain number of persons, acting individually or collectively, recognize the authority of another person
<i>Da‘wab</i>	literally means to “call upon” or “summon” and technically its means to preach Islam

Democratization

refers to a political regime with more democratic tinge. It represents the transition from an authoritarian political regime to a full democratic system

Fiqh

refers to Islamic legal system (Jurisprudence)

Ḥākmiyyah

the concept that represents the sovereignty of Allah in Islam. It means Absolute Authority and Power belongs to Allah.

Ḥijāb

refers to the ‘cover or veil’ worn by Muslim women. It is meant to protect their chastity and is a sign of modesty in Islam

Ḥilf al-Fuḍūl

etymologically *Ḥilf* means “covenant”. *Ḥilf al-Fuḍūl* refers to the alliance of elites (most carrying the name al-Faḍl, hence *Ḥilf al-Fuḍūl*) of various Makkan groups to establish and conduct fair commercial connections. Prophet Muhammad ((ﷺ)) peace be upon him) was also present in this covenant and it happened before the proclamation of his prophet-hood

Ḥizb al-Tahrīr

a political organization that aims to restore the *Khilāfah*

Ijmāʿ

an Arabic term which refers to the consensus of the scholars of Islam over a particular issue

Ijtihād

a technical term of Islamic law representing the process of making a legal decision by independent interpretation of the legal sources—the *Qurʾān* and the *Sunnah*

Ikhwān al-Muslimūn

popularly known as the Muslim Brotherhood, this refers to the religio-political or transnational Sunni organization founded in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna in 1928

Imam

a person who leads prayers in a mosque or in Shiite tradition the leader of the faithful in a particular period of time

Islamization

represents the process of transformation of society towards Islam in multidimensional aspects

Khilāfah

Islamic system of governance

<i>Kufr</i>	it refers to the State of disbelief in Islam
<i>Masājīd</i>	Plural of <i>Masjid</i> which refers to mosque
<i>Maṣlahah</i>	a concept in Islamic Law invoked to prohibit or permit something on the basis of whether or not it serves the “public interest”
Nassirism	the ideology of Arab Socialist Union—a form of Pan-Arabism endeavored informally by Jamāl ‘Abd al-Nāṣir
National Islamic Front	an Islamist political organization founded in 1976 led by Dr. Hassan al-Turabi
Personal Status Code	a set of family laws promulgated in 1956 Tunisia with an aim to reduce inequality between men and women
<i>Ramaḍān</i>	the ninth month of the Islamic year in which the Muslims fast from dawn to sunset
<i>Salaḥiyah</i>	movement meant for religious revivalism and reform in the modern period
<i>Ṣalāh</i>	the second pillar of Islam denoting the practice of formal prayer in Islam said five times a day
<i>Shari‘ah</i>	literally meaning to prescribe or ordain, Shari‘ah refers to Islamic religious law
<i>Shirk</i>	assigning partners to Allah
<i>Shūrā</i>	the process of making decisions by consultation
<i>Sunnah</i>	means “tradition or way /modus operandi” and refers to the way of Prophet Muhammad ((ﷺ) peace be upon him)
<i>Tablīgh</i>	to preach the message and teachings of Islam
<i>Tablīghī Jamā‘at</i>	an apolitical organization that emerged in Indo-Pak subcontinent—which mainly thrust on various rituals of Islam
<i>Tafsīr</i>	the exegesis, elucidation or explanation of the <i>Qur‘ān</i>
<i>Taliban</i>	the famous Sunni Islamic fundamentalist political movement of Afghanistan
<i>Tanzīm-i-Islāmī</i>	an Islamic organization that advocates the implementation of the <i>Qur‘ān</i> and Sunnah in the social, cultural, legal, political, and the economic spheres of life
<i>Ummah</i>	community of the Muslims

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